What does the IDF’s fight with Hezbollah look like up close in southern Lebanon after the April 17 ceasefire began to collapse by the end of April?
On Tuesday, The Jerusalem Post, escorted by the IDF, visited both Naqoura and an IDF position in the Ras al-Bayada region, reaching around 10 kilometers deep into southern Lebanon.
Most of what the Post saw on this dreary, rainy trip showed heavily destroyed villages along the way – a feature of Hezbollah keeping weapons in most of the houses in these villages, said IDF senior sources.
Despite that picture, IDF officials said that Christian villages, like Alma a-Shaab, have been left intact, since Hezbollah did not set up positions or store weapons there.
That means that Christian Lebanese civilians should be able to return to their homes when the current conflict is resolved.
The area is under the control of IDF Division 146, commanded by Brig. Gen. Beni Aharon, with two of his senior commanders being Col. Aviel Balachsan, commander of the 226 Paratroopers Reservist Brigade, and Lt.-Col. Lior, commander of Battalion 9.
IDF soldiers are being wounded on a nearly daily basis
For almost a week after the April 17 ceasefire, the IDF and Hezbollah heavily limited the friction between both sides.
However, as Iran and the US started to fight over the Strait of Hormuz, the Lebanese government started to hold public meetings with Israel, and the IDF continued to hunt down Hezbollah fighters in the parts of southern Lebanon under its control. Meanwhile, Hezbollah began attacking Israeli northern towns again and escalated its attacks on IDF soldiers.
If the IDF had hoped, as a senior IDF source put it, that the ceasefire would only apply north of the Litani River and within Israel, but not in southern Lebanon in between the two, Hezbollah was not having it.
Furthermore, if the IDF believed that Hezbollah was so desperate to avoid attacks in Beirut that it would turn the other cheek – or that it would not pose a serious threat to IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon – it was proven wrong. The Lebanese terror group’s use of FPV drones has shown that, unfortunately, it charges a heavy price if engaged.
With the IDF either driving Hezbollah out of or killing its remnants in Naqoura, Ras al-Bayada, and other parts of southern Lebanon, what does “the ceasefire, which is not a ceasefire,” as one IDF official put it, look like?
First, Balachsan is proud that the IDF is cutting off any possibility of Hezbollah invading or firing anti-tank missiles upon northern Israel.
Another senior IDF officer pointed out that, even a week before the April 17 ceasefire kicked in, Hezbollah lost its capacity to fire short-range rockets and mortars on northern Israel due to IDF forces already dismantling their organized attack positions.
Senior IDF officials noted that they have temporarily halted rocket fire from the area. They added that the IDF has seized several hundred Hezbollah rockets, meaning that even if the military withdraws, the Lebanese terror group has permanently lost many rockets.
IDF officials complimented the navy on its joint work, including multiple missions where Israeli commandos rushed behind Hezbollah enemy lines coming in from the coast.
These moves were coordinated specifically with Division 146 and, at times, with Division 162, which handled the various coastal areas.
However, Divisions 162 and 98 have mostly withdrawn from southern Lebanon, as the area is already in Israeli hands; this leaves Division 146 with sole responsibility for the coastal area.
Divisions 91 and 36 are still operating in other parts of southern Lebanon.
Although there have been reports that each division was only around a brigade strong, Division 146 now commands three brigades, including brigades 300 and 401, in addition to 226.
Moreover, Division 146 has installed new radars and other sensors deep in southern Lebanon, extending all the way up to the Litani River. This gave the military distinct new advantages in tracking and anticipating Hezbollah threats, even those emanating from north of the Litani.
Senior IDF officials revealed that Division 91 is undertaking many flight-based and technological attempts to better combat Hezbollah’s enhanced drones. These include Hezbollah’s use of FPVs, which have been wounding IDF soldiers on a near-daily basis.
They expressed optimism about eventual progress, but there was no sense that the military had an immediate capability to halt Hezbollah’s “success” in that area.
Regarding the safety of IDF forces, the Post received a concrete reminder during the visit of how close it is to the front lines.
Although Hezbollah has been pushed too far back to fire anti-tank missiles on northern Israel (it can still hit northern Israel with long-range rockets), the terror group still fires anti-tank missiles on nearby IDF forces.
Notably, in one of the war’s early weeks, 25-30 advanced anti-tank Kornet missiles showered IDF forces in the area.
This caught several IDF vehicle drivers by surprise, particularly when the IDF’s trophy anti-tank defense system had to be used more than they were used to. Sometimes, even after its use, there were indirect hits on their vehicles, leaving the drivers shaken.
Shortly before the Post and other media were about to leave the Ras al-Bayada region, IDF soldiers suddenly ordered everyone either to rush into armored Tigris vehicles or into a nearby house due to what they thought was an imminent drone attack.
It later turned out that there had been an attack nearby – an anti-tank missile, and one that had failed to hit its targets.
Balachsan stated that his forces had killed over 100 Hezbollah fighters, out of around 400 killed by Division 146.
Despite that anti-tank missile attack, Balchsan noted that his forces have had tremendous success at either hunting down anti-tank missile cells or scaring the cell members into fleeing and leaving behind their weapons. The IDF has found that many of these weapons were ready to be fired, but were abandoned in open fields.
Division 146 has also uncovered five different terror tunnel networks.
Balachsan said that, compared to Fall 2024, Hezbollah’s forces are less committed to fighting back, but, in a sense, have become more organized.
He explained that in Fall 2024, Hezbollah had greater confidence in its ability to resist the IDF. However, the IDF’s overwhelming airstrikes on Hezbollah had staggered both its command and its capabilities to organize its defenses.
In contrast, during this war, Hezbollah is already more easily intimidated by the IDF. More of Hezbollah’s organized network capacities remain intact in southern Lebanon because the IDF never reached them in Fall 2024. Notably, the air force did not help IDF ground forces as much during this war as it did in Fall 2024, because it focused more on Iran.
Where does this leave Israel as it tries to go forward?
Some IDF senior officials believe that this time, the military’s technological superiority and seizure of southern Lebanon will truly make Israel safer against Hezbollah threats in the long term.
At the same time, many point out that this was what the IDF believed in 1982.
At that point, the IDF was not as advanced technologically; it had penetrated deeper into Lebanon and fought against Christian Lebanese forces. Notably, at that time, Hezbollah was much weaker.
But the question remains: have the wars in Fall 2024 and in 2026 weakened Hezbollah enough to prevent it from returning as a threat in the future?
