This is the second of a three-part series.
In Part I, I suggested implementing broad parameters to create a truly representative government by doubling the size of the Knesset to 240 members, with MKs elected by district and not political party, while imposing a two-term (8-10 years) limit on all Knesset members.
While that is a start, the structures of government (Part II) also need to be altered to reflect the requirements of a population that is now 15 times larger than when Israel was established, with a citizenry that has roots in over 100 different cultures.
Part III will be devoted to addressing the social challenges of Israeli society.
Formal constitution
Difficult as it is to believe, Israel still has no formal constitution. When the state was established, the intent was to develop a constitution within a year. Sadly, various attempts since 1948 to draft a constitution have fallen short of the mark.
Instead, Israel has evolved under a system of basic laws and rights, which enjoy semi-constitutional status.
However, what has been obvious over the past few years – given the constant accusation of Supreme Court overreach – is that without a governing constitution, the court has no solid legal basis on which to make its decisions, therefore setting itself up for conflict and criticism.
Historically, in May 2003, the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of the Knesset, chaired by then MK Michael Eitan, initiated the Constitution by the Broad Consensus Project. It aimed to write a constitution for the State of Israel.
The Committee, now chaired by MK Simcha Rothman, has been meeting weekly since then with the goal of creating a draft constitution that will enjoy wide support among the citizenry, but it has yet to be successful.
Of course, MK Rothman himself is not a neutral party in this effort, as he is a vocal critic of the Supreme Court and has strongly campaigned for legislation to allow the government to override it while also supporting immunity from prosecution for serving prime ministers.
Therefore, it is probably not a reasonable expectation that a widely accepted constitution will ever actually emanate from a committee he chairs.
Nevertheless, the main challenge represented by the Basic Laws is that in the absence of a constitution, the powers of the various branches of government – as well as the checks and balances between them – can be easily altered by a simple Knesset majority.
While they were intended to serve as “chapters” of an eventual Israeli constitution, as they can be amended or even overridden by a simple parliamentary majority, they clearly have not passed the test of time, given the frequent changes that have occurred.
Statistically, according to a study by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), in the past decade alone, the number of amendments to Israel’s Basic Laws has exceeded the total number of amendments made to the US Constitution in the 238 years since its ratification in 1778.
In addition to the Knesset committee working on this, several prominent think tanks and presumably non-partisan organizations in Israel are also drafting constitutional proposals.
These include: (a) Jewish People Policy Institute, (b) Israel Democracy Institute, and (c) Movement for Quality Government in Israel, among others.
Basic elements of a proposal
Structure of government
A constitution establishes the basic principles and laws of the state, its credo, values, and the basic structure of government. In a democratic state, the constitution places limits on government to prevent it from abusing its powers. The constitution also defines the structure of government and limits its powers.
Israel’s constitution must clearly define the separation of powers between the branches of government. The Knesset is truly the people’s echo chamber and should have the responsibility to deal with all government operations.
The judicial system is obligated to maintain balance and adjudicate challenges to the law. It should not overstep its authority, though its authority should be clearly defined.
Supreme Court judges should not be appointed for life, but rather for fixed 18-year (“chai”) terms, be vetted by the Israel Bar Association, and nominated by the president of Israel, but approved by a majority vote of the Knesset.
The appointments should be rotational so that every two years, two justices would leave and be replaced by others.
Lastly, the president of the court should be elected by the judges themselves, and a new person should be chosen every 18 years or upon the retirement of the current occupant of the office.
The number of ministries should be fixed by the constitution, while opening new ministries to satisfy coalition agreements should be “off limits.”
On that point, it is important to remember that according to analyses by the Times of Israel, it costs about NIS 6.5 million to open a ministry.
However, the real cost to the budget can be substantially higher. New ministries typically demand tens or hundreds of millions of shekels in operational and discretionary funds to implement their mandates.
The overall objective is to streamline governmental operations, reduce costs, and limit the wanton creation of additional ministries at will, while providing full clarification of the roles of each branch of government and their limitations under the limits set by the constitution itself.
Taken together, the total of these recommendations will go a long way towards achieving operational parity in government for the good and welfare of the entire electorate.
The writer, a 42-year resident of Jerusalem, is a former national president of the Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel, a past chairperson of the board of the Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies, and a board member of the Israel-America Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM).
