Israel and the United States – or more precisely, Trump and Netanyahu – entered the war against Iran together, but emerged from it further apart than before.
Contrary to expectations, Israel was not involved in shaping the agreement with Iran, whose terms have generated considerable concern.
Equally important, Israel now finds itself isolated on both the regional and international stages, facing a real danger of becoming a “pariah state.”
Israel’s growing isolation intensified as the war with Iran became increasingly complicated, failing to achieve the hoped-for outcome of toppling the regime. Trump discovered that Netanyahu’s embrace was a “bear hug.”
Thus, during the negotiations with Iran, Trump held a conference call with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. What these countries have in common is that they are all US allies, play central roles in Middle Eastern politics, and were affected by the war.
Yet Israel, which fits all these categories as well, was absent. Instead, Trump maintained a direct channel with Netanyahu to ensure Israel’s acceptance of the agreement. Some Arab leaders were even invited to the G7 summit in Paris, but Israel was not.
These developments underscore the decline in Israel’s position in the Middle East following October 7 and the subsequent rounds of conflict with Iran. This decline has two dimensions.
First, Israel is no longer a partner in all American initiatives, some of which are imposed upon it unexpectedly.
Second, Israel is excluded from regional consultations and collective decision-making. In this respect, Israel has largely returned to the period preceding the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, when most of its contacts with regional states were conducted behind the scenes.
The Abraham Accords were signed only six years ago, yet they dramatically transformed Israel’s relations with several countries in the region. Relations with the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Bahrain became public and open, including areas that had previously been secret, such as military cooperation, arms procurement, and more.
Moreover, cooperation extended beyond governments, militaries, and intelligence agencies to include elements of civil society. For the first time, signs of genuine normalization emerged – what Israelis like to call a “warm peace.”
Furthermore, the Abraham Accords led, in early 2021, to Israel’s transfer from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM). This move facilitated cooperation – partly overt and partly covert – between Israel and several Arab states within CENTCOM, including Saudi Arabia, which remained outside the Abraham Accords framework. It is difficult to imagine the various rounds of confrontation with Iran without this cooperation.
The Abraham Accords also laid the groundwork for three political and economic initiatives that publicly connected Israel to the region. The first was the Negev Forum, established in March 2022, which brought together in Sde Boker the foreign ministers of the United States, Israel, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain.
Working groups created within the framework of the forum were intended to promote a plethora of civilian projects. A second meeting was scheduled to take place in Morocco, but the war led to the suspension of its activities.
The second initiative was announced in July 2022 and included the United States, Israel, India, and the UAE (known as I2U2, based on the initials of the four participating countries). Its purpose was to promote cooperation in food security, clean energy, water, transportation, health, space, and technology.
The third initiative was launched in September 2023, one month before the Hamas attack. It focused on creating a corridor linking India and Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. The plan included physical infrastructure projects such as railways, roads, energy facilities, ports, and communications cables.
The unraveling of the Abraham Accords era
In many respects, therefore, the Abraham Accords ushered in a new era.
Yet Hamas’s attack and the subsequent rounds of conflict with Iran have largely reversed these developments. This may seem surprising because Israel and many states in the region continue to share common adversaries, including Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others.
However, many perceive Israel’s response as excessively aggressive, resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians in Gaza (some even characterize it as “genocide”).
The occupation of territory in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria is viewed as part of a scheme to expand Israel’s borders, while the strike in Qatar is seen as the behavior of a regional bully rather than that of a state seeking to maintain regional stability.
Furthermore, Israel’s actions in the West Bank are not viewed as the excesses of a handful of radical settlers, but rather as an expression of the government’s true policy – one aimed at annexing these territories and, in any case, opposing any political settlement with the Palestinians.
The clearest example of this retreat has occurred in relation to the UAE, arguably Israel’s strongest – and almost only – supporter during the war. The Emirati insistence on keeping Netanyahu’s visit secret demonstrates the extent of concern about being publicly associated with this government and especially with its prime minister.
ISRAEL HAS also lost the special status it once enjoyed as a country capable – either directly or through the Jewish lobby – of helping other states get access and favour in Washington. Most of these countries have now developed direct channels to Trump, making Israel’s intermediary role unnecessary.
As a result of its military achievements, regional states continue to recognize Israel’s military and technological capabilities. Yet they increasingly prefer to conduct business with Israel discreetly rather than publicly.
In this sense, Israel has returned to the status of a “mistress” – a relationship acknowledged privately but concealed in public – that characterized its regional position before the Abraham Accords.
One important exception is the process currently unfolding in Lebanon, which has opened the door to a possible settlement. This development must, of course, be understood in the context of Hezbollah’s weakening following the recent rounds of conflict. The US–Iran agreement further strengthens Israel’s immediate need to seize the opportunity in Lebanon.
The damage to Israel’s regional and international standing is not necessarily irreversible. However, changing this reality requires Israel to change its policies as well. With regard to Iran, Israel has little influence to change the situation, yet Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza present diplomatic opportunities that could improve Israel’s regional standing.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a member of the executive board of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and member of the Coalition for Regional Security. He is the author of the book in Hebrew From Mistress to Common-Law Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948–2020.
