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Three of the four major Arab parties, Hadash, Ta’al and Balad, are expected to officially revive the Joint List this week without Ra’am, while also unveiling their new Knesset slate, Hadash-Ta’al’s recently appointed chairman Yousef Jabareen told The Jerusalem Post in a Monday interview.

Jabareen will lead the party’s list, having replaced longtime party leader Ayman Odeh, after primaries for Hadash in May.

The alliance without the Ra’am Party, led by MK Mansour Abbas, marks a setback in efforts to reunite all major Arab parties under a single electoral slate.

Jabareen told the Post that the door was still open for Ra’am to join ahead of the elections, scheduled to take place on October 27.

Polls have shown that if the Arab parties run together, they will obtain more seats than in separate runs.

Until this week, Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad had been negotiating the order of the reestablished Knesset slate, navigating “certain difficulties that arose over the parties’ demands,” Jabareen explained.

To settle the differences, the parties met with the Consensus Committee that helped to establish the Joint List in 2015.

Jabareen said the parties empowered the committee to determine the final makeup of the slate, in order to avoid prolonging negotiations.

“We gave them authorization to propose the composition of the list, simply to shorten the timeline and not continue negotiations,” he said.

Committee expected to complete work by end of week

According to Jabareen, the committee is expected to complete its work by the end of the week.

“Immediately afterward, all the parties will announce that they accept the decision and officially launch the Joint List,” he explained.

Various agreements have been made regarding the first slots on the list, he also noted.

The joint list bloc, originally made up of the four parties, began to break apart ahead of the 2021 elections after Ra’am left the alliance. Then, in a dramatic last-minute split in 2022, Balad broke off from the two remaining factions and filed a separate list.

Currently, the two Arab-Israeli parties in the Knesset are Ra’am and Hadash-Ta’al. The latter is a reduced Joint List that agreed to run together in the 2022 election.

The Balad Party, not in the Knesset, continues to fail to pass the electoral threshold in polls.

Regarding the relations with Abbas, Jabareen said that there were currently no ongoing negotiations with Ra’am to join the new Joint List.

Jabareen noted that Ra’am had said it would only consider renewing negotiations closer to the deadline for submitting party lists.

“We don’t want to wait until then. Therefore, we moved forward. And we are moving forward with forming a list of the three parties,” Jabareen explained.

Asked whether Ra’am’s decision not to join the alliance would hurt the newly reestablished Joint List, Jabareen acknowledged it would make the campaign more challenging, but he said he remained confident that the alliance could succeed.

“It is not on us. In general, one Joint List in Arab society was supposed to bring very high voting rates, relatively speaking, because all the time voting rates have been lower than in Jewish society.

“If there are two lists, the three-party list on one side and Ra’am on the other, we will have to work harder to bring people to the polling stations.

“It is possible, and I hope we succeed, but this will be a more difficult task than if there were one list,” Jabareen said.

Joint List aims to remove PM Netanyahu from gov’t

He emphasized that a main objective of the party would be to replace the current government and remove Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from government.

“Our top priority is simply sending the current government home,” he said. “This government is very dangerous, and it basically threatens the basic rights of the Arab public.”

Jabareen said that the Arab public has been “under a very serious attack, from racist laws, policies of home demolitions, land confiscation, failure to transfer budgets to local authorities, policies of silencing freedom of expression, false arrests, harassment of Arab youth – of course in addition to the war in Gaza, the war, harassment in the West Bank, settler terrorism in the West Bank.”

Regarding potential cooperation with opposition figures, including Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot and former prime minister Naftali Bennett, who leads the Together party, Jabareen said any future support for an alternative government would depend on negotiations over the party’s key demands.

“Everything will depend on the willingness to negotiate with us on issues that align with our political principles,” he said.

Jabareen said that the new Joint List would be pushing for the establishment of a Palestinian State.

“We want to see renewed negotiations with the leadership of the Palestinian people, in order to advance the process of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel.”

Other priorities for the party include advancing equality for Arab citizens and combating organized crime in Arab communities amid rising violent crime, Jabareen said.

“We want a commitment to advancing a policy of equality for Arab citizens.

“We want to see a plan to fight crime organizations in Arab society, to eradicate crime.

“We of course want to see budgets for the severe hardships in Arab society, and support for local authorities,” he added.

Regarding Ra’am’s decision to run separately, Jabareen said he hoped that if the two parties competed in the election, it would be done “in a good atmosphere and without personal attacks.”

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The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem published a report in late June 2026 titled Unshielded Childhood, which cataloged and analyzed the deaths of 54 Palestinian minors killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank during 2025. The report immediately circulated widely through global media outlets, framing the fatalities as an unprovoked pattern of systemic state violence.

However, a meticulous, case-by-case counter-investigation conducted over 100 hours by Joseph Cohen and the Israel Advocacy Movement (IAM) “reveals that the report fundamentally distorts reality by rebranding active combatants and terrorists as innocent children.”

IAM’s investigation relied on four rigorous data points to verify the true identity and circumstances of each casualty: official “martyr” (Shaheed) posters published by militant groups, real-time Telegram communications between militants and locals, open-source news footage, and official statements or records from the Israeli military and police. 

While B’Tselem’s June 2026 publication categorized roughly 60 percent of the deceased as uninvolved or undetermined, the counter-analysis uncovered a vastly different statistical breakdown for 2025.

Around 20% of individuals in B’Tselem dataset tied to terrorist orgs.

According to the findings, at least 20 percent of the individuals included in B’Tselem’s dataset were militants, many of whom belonged to the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), while other terror groups Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) issued martyr posters claiming the other individuals were affiliated with their groups. 

Furthermore, according to the report, approximately 78 percent were actively participating in hostilities against Israeli security forces or civilians, including gunfights, car rammings, and hurling improvised explosive devices, firebombs, or heavy concrete blocks. The investigation demonstrated that 63 percent of the casualties were 15 years of age or older, and only two were female. 

The IAM investigation pointed to several examples to challenge B’Tselem’s findings. B’Tselem highlighted 17-year-old Rida Bani Odeh by providing a sentimental quote describing him as an “innocent boy with a tender heart who had all the beautiful qualities.” The IAM report emphasized his status as a prominent member of PIJ by providing a martyr picture of Bani Odeh distributed by PIJ holding a gun, who was killed alongside armed operatives during a firefight. 

Similarly, while B’Tselem stated it could neither verify nor refute Israeli allegations regarding six individuals killed while throwing Molotov cocktails, the IAM report highlighted explicit IDF footage allegedly showing teenagers Muhammad Atim and Muhammad Qassem actively hurling firebombs at civilian highway traffic.

In the case of 15-year-old Muhammad Abu Ayash, Hamas martyr posters explicitly identified him as “its youth martyr” killed while throwing firebombs, Cohen said in a video on the investigation that such posters serve as “a tacit admission that they recruit and use child soldiers,” while B’Tselem claimed they were unable to determine that they had thrown firebombs. 

B’Tselem report contains discrepancies between text, data charts

According to the IAM investigation, B’Tselem’s report contained internal discrepancies where its written text conflicted with its own data charts. The IAM report alleged that these figures do not match up, pointing out instances where B’Tselem’s text stated that 5 thirteen-year-olds were killed while their dataset records 3, and claimed 16 sixteen-year-olds while their charts showed 14. 

Joseph Cohen told The Jerusalem Post in a statement that “The death of any minor is tragic and should be thoroughly investigated, as is standard Israeli procedure. However, by mixing innocent casualties with active combatants from terror groups, B’Tselem has done a disservice to any genuine victims, weaponizing their deaths to shield combatants and demonize Israel on the global stage.”

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Twenty anti-Israel pro-terror organizations in the US have raised more than $250 million in cumulative funding over five years, the Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism Ministry revealed in a new report.

The report analyzed the operational patterns, funding sources, and network of connections between organizations and entities involved in incitement, terrorism, and illegal activity.

Among the listed organizations are American Muslims for Palestine, the Palestinian Youth Movement, Muslim American Society, Code Pink, Students for Justice in Palestine, Jewish Voices for Peace, and Within Our Lifetime.

Legitimate donation mechanisms being used to funnel funds towards incitement

The ministry identified what it said are seemingly legitimate donation mechanisms being used to funnel resources into delegitimization and incitement activities. The ministry also found what seems to be patterns of coordination among organizations, joint campaigns, and large-scale public and advocacy operations, which, at times, cross the boundaries of legitimate discourse and may contribute to radicalization, incitement, and even violence.

American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) is one of the main organizations examined in the report. Founded in 2006, AMP describes itself as an organization focused on Palestinian advocacy, education, and community engagement. According to the report, AMP operates through a fiscal sponsorship structure rather than as an independent nonprofit entity, with AJP Educational Foundation serving as its 501(c)(3) fiscal sponsor and AJP Action operating as a separate 501(c)(4) entity involved in political advocacy.

The report identifies AMP as a central organization within what it describes as a broader network of US-based groups involved in anti-Israel advocacy. It alleges that AMP has maintained connections with individuals and organizations linked to Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Among the key figures highlighted in the report is Osama Abu Irshaid, AMP’s chairman. The report cites his participation in a 2021 conference in Jordan alongside representatives of Hamas and the PFLP, as well as his previous association with the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP), an organization that was found civilly liable in the US for supporting Hamas.

The report also focuses on Hatem Bazian, identified as an AMP founder and a prominent figure in the organization’s ideological and public messaging. It alleges that Bazian promoted extremist Islamist positions and antisemitic rhetoric, citing comments at protests and public events, including his call during student demonstrations for an “Intifada in the US.”

Financially, the report examines AMP’s relationship with AJP Educational Foundation and AJP Action, arguing that the overlap between the entities raises questions about transparency and whether funds donated for educational purposes may support political activity. It notes that AMP’s revenue through AJP Educational increased from approximately $1 million in 2020 to $2.3 million in 2024, according to figures cited in the report.

The report also highlights a Virginia investigation into AMP’s financial records, stating that a court ordered the organization in 2024 to provide documents requested by the state attorney-general’s office regarding finances, leadership, donations, and activities.

It is important to note that AMP has denied any connections to Hamas. AMP’s lawyer told USA Today in 2024: “There have been many allegations and insinuations against American Muslims for Palestine and whether it has connections to Hamas, supports Hamas, or in any way, shape, or form aids Hamas. The answer to all of those is simple and clear: No. No, it does not.”

Mapping the broader network of US-based pro-Palestinian activism

Beyond individual organizations, the ministry’s report attempts to map what it describes as a broader network of relationships connecting US-based pro-Palestinian groups, activists, donors, and advocacy structures.

The main overlap described is between American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR), National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

According to the report, these connections are significant not only because of individual affiliations, but also because they denote a broader ecosystem in which organizations project common messages, mobilize supporters, and provide institutional support for campaigns targeting Israel.

Nevertheless, while the report alleges ideological and organizational connections, proving a legal violation requires demonstrating specific prohibited conduct, such as material support for designated terrorist organizations. The ministry’s report is, therefore, not a criminal complaint but rather a compilation of what it deems evidence.

Speaking about the report, Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism Minister Amichai Chikli said: “We continue to expose the true face of ‘innocent’ civil society organizations, which, in practice, support terrorism and incitement against the State of Israel.”

“The era of the double game – where organizations could support terrorism while hiding behind an ‘innocent’ and ‘civil’ facade – has come to an end.”

He noted that he has reached out to members of Congressional committees and the US Department of Justice to ask them to “take action” against these organizations and “halt their operations.”

Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism Ministry Director-General Avi Cohen-Scali said, “These are disguised humanitarian organizations that promote subversive antisemitic activity, delegitimization, and incitement to terrorism.”

“We will continue to work to expose the links between ‘innocent civil’ organizations and terrorist groups.”

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Palestinian Christian leaders called out American Christian Zionists for ignoring the experiences of Palestinian Christians in Israel, claiming their interpretation of “biblical prophecy” doesn’t align with reality in an interview with CNN on Sunday.

The leaders specifically encouraged evangelicals to visit Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and get a firsthand account of their experiences. 

“Our experience has been when pastors and lay people come to Palestine, see the walls, see the settlements, meet with families struggling just to survive in their land – that’s when their eyes are opened,” Father Munther Isaac, the director of the Bethlehem Institute for Peace and Justice, told CNN.

Isaac said that Christians are under attack daily in Jerusalem, and by sticking with the argument that Israel belongs to the Jewish people, Christian Zionists are rendering their experiences invisible. 

“Theology has been weaponized,” he said. “These are Christians who are funding and supporting the major threat on our existence in the land today.”

Father Bashar Fawadleh of Taybeh, the last fully Christian town in the West Bank whose population is steadily dwindling, told CNN that his congregants are afraid to harvest from their olive groves due to Israeli settler violence.

“If I have the opportunity to leave, I would leave and not stay in this town, because there is no future for me or my children,” one parishoner said.

Christian Zionism funds 80 Israeli communities in West Bank

The Christian leaders are also concerned over how much funding for Israeli settlement growth in the West Bank is coming from the Christian Zionist movement. 

The faith-based groups Christians United for Israel (CUFI) and Christian Friends of Israeli Communities (CFOIC) both urge donations to support Israeli communities in the West Bank, highlighting Bible verses on their websites.

In their eyes, the Bible tells Christians to support Jews in the Holy Land to welcome a Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the end of the world, and an eternal afterlife.

Being a Christian Zionist means following God’s word as stated in the Bible that He gave the Land of Israel to the Jewish people,” Kimberly Troup, director of the US office for CFOIC, told CNN. 

However, Isaac asserted that this idealistic vision of Christians living in Israel is not the reality. 

“Given the threat of settlers over our lives these days – an actual threat against our lives as Palestinian Christians – these are Christians who are funding and supporting the major threat on our existence in the land today,” Isaac said. “What this shows is, again, that we are not in their plan. They don’t think of us. They don’t see us.”

Isaac underscored that the goal of his community of Palestinian Christians is not to disconnect from scripture, but to read and interpret it in a more pragmatic way that takes on-the-ground experiences into account. 

In his opinion, younger generations are more open-minded and willing to question the assumptions that have harmful impacts on Palestinian Christians. He told CNN that evangelicals seem to be “warming up” to his cause as he tours the US in an effort to raise awareness of the existence of his community. 

Palestinian leaders say Christian Zionism is outdated

Palestinian Christian leaders say that Christian Zionism feels outdated, with Isaac poking fun to CNN about how Baptist minister turned US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee is “living in the 7th Century BCE.” 

Huckabee responded to the jab, denying that people overlook Palestinian Christians.

“Evangelicals believe the Bible – ALL of it,” Huckabee said. “It’s not a cafeteria where we pick and choose what fits our own prejudices and desires. There is nothing ‘racist’ about believing what the Bible clearly says about God’s promises to the Jews, and the Jewish faith is the foundation of the Christian faith. I hope Rev. Isaac joins evangelicals in calling for an adherence to the authority of Scripture.”

Christian Zionism is broadly defined as a theological and political movement within Christianity that supports the return of Jewish people to a Jewish homeland in Israel, per Encyclopedia Britannica.

The movement has many streams, and modern American evangelical Christian Zionist organizations, such as the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ), support the State of Israel through lobbying the US government and donating funds. 

This post was originally published on here. 

“Any Jew who votes for [New York City Mayor Zorhan] Mamdani is a self-hater,” Harvard law professor and attorney Alan Dershowitz said Friday during an interview on Zev Brenner’s Talkline Network radio broadcast.

He made his comments during a discussion about Mamdani and local politics, specifically focusing on a controversy surrounding Mamdani’s decision to not appoint any Jewish lawyer to a judicial commission.

Citing broader concerns surrounding the administration, Dershowitz, who is Jewish, said: “We know he’s an antisemite, we know his wife is an antisemite, we know his father has had all kinds of problems with Jews as well. So, look, he’s a bigot.”

He expressed deep frustration with Jewish residents in the Upper West Side, Upper East Side, and Park Slope neighborhoods who voted for Mamdani.

“Seven thousand Jews voted for Adolf Hitler in 1932,” Dershowitz said, and “most of them ended up in the gas chambers.”

“These idiot Jews” who voted for Mamdani “have no idea what they’re doing,” he said.

“Some of the dumbest people I’ve ever met are Jews from Park Slope and Upper East Side and Upper West Side who don’t understand where their own interests lie,” he added.

Members of the Jewish community cannot support a political figure who “marginalizes Jews, discriminates against Jews, hates Israel, [and] calls Israel a genocidal state falsely,” Dershowitz said.

“No self-respecting Jews” would do that, because it undermines the safety and collective interests of the Jewish community, he said.

Mamdani has ‘played the game’

Regarding Mamdani’s rhetoric about arresting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he visits New York for the United Nations General Assembly, Dershowitz said: “If he tries to interfere with Netanyahu in any way, that violates the federal criminal statute,” because any “direct interference with policy and with guests of the United States constitutes a crime.”

While Mamdani has “played the game” and “likes to milk it” by encouraging protests, “he knows he can’t arrest Netanyahu,” and “if he did, he’d get arrested himself,” he said, adding that Mamdani is “still calling for the United States to arrest Netanyahu,” even though, “of course, they will never do that, because Netanyahu did nothing wrong, and Israel did nothing wrong.”

During the interview, Dershowitz said the Jewish community must look beyond single election cycles and focus on long-term structural organization. While mobilization on Election Day is critical, the Jewish community needs an ongoing, sustained approach that involves schools, yeshivas, rabbis, and local organizations, he said.

Dershowitz recommended early civic participation. Young people can register to vote as early as age 16, which allows them to be properly positioned to cast ballots once they reach voting age, he said.

By integrating voter registration drives directly into educational institutions and community centers, the Jewish community can better protect its interests and ensure its collective voice is effectively represented in local and national politics, Dershowitz said.

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Canadian opposition leader Pierre Poilievre has called on the federal government to immediately designate Kataib Hezbollah as a terrorist entity on Sunday, urging authorities in an open letter to Minister of Public Safety Gary Anandasangaree to “immediately recommend that the government of Canada list Kataib Hezbollah as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.”

The push follows a recent US legal filing detailing the actions of Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi, an alleged senior commander of Kataib Hezbollah and operative of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

According to the US criminal complaint, Saadi helped plan and coordinate, and claimed responsibility for, “nearly 20 terrorist attacks and attempted attacks across Europe and North America,” including two specific incidents in Canada.

The complaint cites the March 10 shooting at the United States consulate in Toronto as well as an attack against a Canadian synagogue.

During recorded conversations cited in the legal filings, Saadi allegedly confirmed that his “people were behind the attacks against the consulate and the Knesset,” which investigators understood to refer to the Toronto consulate and a synagogue.

The documents further state that Saadi “was running multiple teams and sought help carrying out further attacks against Jewish and other targets in Canada and the United States.”

Poilievre argues that Canada should not wait for further attacks before acting

Poilievre argued in his letter that “Canada should not wait for another synagogue or another foreign consulate to be attacked before shutting down the terrorist organization allegedly directing these attacks.”

Noting that Kataib Hezbollah has been listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the US since 2009, the letter emphasized that listing the group would make it illegal to “knowingly deal in its property or finances, allow authorities to restrain or seize its assets, and strengthen Canada’s ability to prevent its members from entering or remaining in the country.”

The open letter explicitly calls on the government to take five key actions: investigate whether the group’s members, operatives, facilitators, or financial networks are operating in Canada; disclose how many individuals connected to the Iranian regime and its proxies have been identified, denied entry, investigated, detained, or removed; investigate and disclose any known links between Iranian terrorist proxies and organized crime in Canada; and explain what action Canadian authorities are taking in response to the alleged Kataib Hezbollah-directed attacks in Toronto.

The letter also highlights broader domestic safety concerns, stating that “Jewish Canadians have watched their synagogues, schools and businesses targeted by shootings, vandalism, firebombings and threats.” Poilievre added that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was finally listed as a terrorist entity only “after years of pressure from Conservatives,” while asking the government to “disclose how many individuals connected to the Iranian regime and its proxies have been identified, denied entry, investigated, detained, or removed.”

Alongside the official correspondence, the Conservative Party of Canada launched a public petition stating that “Canadians deserve protection from terrorism, foreign intimidation, and violent extremist activity on Canadian soil.” The petition notes that while the US listed Kataib Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2009, “the Liberal government has still failed to do so in Canada.”

Center for Israel and Jewish Affairs welcomes Poilievre’s letter

In a statement posted on social media, The Center for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA) wrote that it welcomed Poilievre’s “call to list Kataib Hezbollah as a terrorist entity” and noted that it had urged the government in May to take the same step to ensure terrorist organizations and their proxies cannot operate in Canada.

CIJA emphasized that “the warning signs are clear,” pointing to Toronto Police Chief Myron Demkiw identifying a “similar modus operandi” as that of criminals-for-hire targeting the Jewish community and diplomatic sites, alongside warnings from Canada’s Integrated Terrorism Assessment Center of a “realistic possibility” that the Iranian regime is directing local criminal elements to target Canada’s Jewish community.

The urgent call comes amid escalating threats and violence directed at Jewish institutions across the country, marked by incidents such as the recent suspicious arson that gutted Nöam, a popular kosher restaurant in Montreal, as well as a series of targeted attacks in Toronto where gunfire struck a branch of Kiva’s Bagel Bar – while another location had its windows smashed.

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The Sarasota Police Department arrested a Florida resident following an incident of targeted vandalism at Chabad of Downtown SRQ on Friday. Brayton Laschinger, 30, was taken into custody and is facing a felony charge of criminal mischief of a religious building. This was also deemed a hate crime.

The attack occurred at approximately 6 a.m. on Wednesday at the synagogue located on Cocoanut Avenue. Surveillance footage captured Laschinger wearing a blue towel over his head and face as he hurled a brick several times to smash the building’s front window.

The Sarasota Police Department stated: “Laschinger claims that same morning, he saw propaganda on social media, and that was making him mad. He admitted to detectives that he threw the brick at the window of the synagogue because it was a Jewish place of worship.”

The investigation remains active as local law enforcement continues to review the case. Officials have urged anyone with additional information regarding the incident to contact the Sarasota Police Department Criminal Investigations Division or reach out anonymously via the Sarasota Crime Stoppers.

This incident unfolds against a backdrop of ongoing hostility toward Jewish institutions across Florida. According to data from the Anti-Defamation League’s annual audit, the state recorded 319 antisemitic incidents in 2025 alone, including nearly 100 acts of vandalism and multiple assaults, keeping Florida among the states with the highest volume of targeted hostility nationwide.

Chabad Rabbi thanks police, urges heightened security

As the community reels from this event, Rabbi Levi Steinmetz of Chabad of Downtown SRQ shared a statement with The Jerusalem Post.

“We are grateful that an arrest was made and deeply appreciate the Sarasota Police Department’s swift response and thorough investigation,” he said. “This incident has, nevertheless, left many members of our community shaken. The outpouring of support from so many members of our community, our neighbors, and local faith leaders has truly warmed our hearts.”

However, Steinmetz noted that the community’s concerns remain heightened regarding the suspect’s legal status.

“At the same time, it is deeply concerning that the suspect has been released on bail while these serious charges are pending,” he explained. “We hope that heightened security measures will be taken, and that this case will be brought to justice as swiftly as possible.”

Despite these challenges, the rabbi emphasized a steadfast commitment to resilience, community life, and mutual support.

“Despite this, we refuse to allow fear to dictate our future. We will continue to be an open and welcoming home for Jewish life. We will continue gathering for prayer, learning, and acts of kindness,” he said.

“We are profoundly grateful to the broader Sarasota community for standing with us. Your support strengthens us and reminds us that, when we stand together, hate will never have the final word.”

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The first Cooking Peace summer camp program wrapped up at the Ben Shemen Youth Village in central Israel with some forty teens, split between Jews and Arabs, concluding the week-long culinary program at a graduation ceremony on Friday.

The teens, most aged 15-17 and coming from all over Israel, participated in programming focused on building dialogue and relationships, environmentally sustainable cooking practices, and nutrition, among other things, the camp’s organizers said.

Among the camp’s activities was a two-day culinary workshop led by four professional chefs.

“The Cooking Peace camp is an initiative by the Green Network,” Myriam Charbit, the Cooking Peace camp director, told The Jerusalem Post at the graduation ceremony. “We have staff from all backgrounds in Israeli society. We have Arab facilitators, we have Jewish facilitators, even ultra-Orthodox and religious facilitators.”

Charbit added that the camp saw diversity as an element of Israeli society that “makes us better, makes us rich, makes us interesting.”

Building bridges between people

While the Green Network has operated a variety of programs, this year was the first time the Cooking Peace summer camp took place; a medium, Charbit added, ideal for building bridges between people.

“Cooking is opening the eyes,” she said. “Cooking is about happiness, about connection, about being together, about talking and laughing and sharing experiences. And when you cook together, you can teach each other things.”

Maram Younis, a Muslim woman and a mother of three from northern Israel who’s been working with the Green Network for nearly a decade, partnered with Charbit to make the Cooking Peace camp happen.

“It was important for us to rely on values that are important for both sides, the Arab and the Jewish,” she said. “For each group, we had two instructors: one Jewish, one Arab. One speaking Arabic, one speaking Hebrew.”

Younis added that it was important to them to create an environment where the teens felt comfortable discussing difficult issues, such as those relating to the environment or to Jewish-Arab relations.

Despite coming from different backgrounds, though, Younis said that she believed they succeeded in finding areas where both Jews and Arabs could find agreement and build relationships. 

The teen campers who spoke to the Post at the graduation ceremony echoed the sentiment.

Food – an incredible love language

“Food is such an incredible love language,” Noga, a Jewish teen from Tel Aviv, said. “With no actual language, it really connects everything and everybody.

She added that all the campers, both the Jewish and Arab teens, enjoyed the same things. They held similar interests, listened to the same music, and liked the same food. They also all learned a lot about each other, she said.

“It just shows us we’re all the same people,” she said. “We’re not different.”

Nouran, a 15-year-old Arab Muslim girl from Akko, said that the camp also gave the teens the ability to learn from one another and correct false impressions.

“I had a conversation with a Jewish boy. He told me a lot of things about his religion that I didn’t know, and I told him about mine as well,” she said. “For example, he had a lot of ideas about my religion, and I corrected them for him, and he also did that for me.”

One thing that surprised her, she said, was that a person could be Jewish while also not having a belief in God.

“The base of Islam is believing in God. If you don’t believe in God, basically, you’re not Muslim,” Nouran said. “But in their religion, it’s okay to not believe in God but still be Jewish.”

She added that she felt she had come away from the camp having a more nuanced perspective on other people.

“I’ve learned that I don’t judge a nation (of people) from an idea that I get from one of them,” she said.

Uri, a Jewish teen from New York visiting Israel for the summer to see his family, reflected that all of his peers at the camp had been very friendly with him.

“There’s many people that I’m gonna want to see later on, and I’m sure that we’ll be friends for many more years,” he said.

While the relationships were built, he noted, the teens didn’t shy away from the more difficult conversations, where they shared their perspectives on political and cultural issues such as women’ s rights, the regional conflicts, or the issues relating to local communities.

“Cooking really helped bind us together,” he said. “It just allows for the opportunity to talk to each other and learn about what they eat and how they live.”

Retal, a 16-year-old Muslim girl from Tayibe, said the week of cooking camp had been “the most beautiful experience,” adding that her peers had become “more than just friends,” saying they were “like a home.”

“I learned a lot of things,” she continued. “We are one nation. Like a family.”

Jolyana Khalil, one of the chefs who led the culinary workshop, said preparing food gave the teens a practical reason to cooperate, ask questions and learn from one another.

“Some things are done differently in an Arab home than in a Jewish home, so everyone brings their own background,” she told the Post. “They get exposed more to each other.”

Khalil, an Arab Christian from the northern village of Eilabun, began her professional life as a lawyer before pursuing a culinary career. She trained at Tel Aviv’s Brasserie and later received a scholarship to study culinary arts and management in France. The summer camp was the final project of the scholarship program.

The workshops she helped lead, Khalil recalled, forged bonds between the Jewish and the Arab teens.

While cooking, she said, the teens were open and asking questions, interacting in both Hebrew and Arabic, and comparing what they were working on. They also grew closer with song as they cooked.

“During the workshops, they would sing in both languages,” she said. “That was so beautiful.”

This post was originally published on here. 

Board of Peace (BoP) Director-General and High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and requested that all IDF strikes against Hamas in Gaza stop so a “14-day ceasefire” aimed at kickstarting the demilitarization of Hamas can begin, sources familiar with the matter told The Jerusalem Post on Monday.

Mladenov is also set to arrive in Israel to meet with senior Israeli officials, Israeli public broadcaster KAN reported on Monday, adding that the visit would likely be connected to the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire plan.  

This comes after Mladenov implied on Sunday that IDF strikes in the Gaza Strip are interfering with peace efforts.

“Two days of strikes across Gaza have killed civilians and destroyed medical supplies that people depend on,” Mladenov said in an X/Twitter post.

IDF’s Gaza strikes interfere with BoP efforts to disarm Hamas, give medical care, Mladenov implies

Mladenov noted that the BoP’s current efforts are concentrated on disarming “Palestinian factions” in Gaza and implementing a civilian government.

He added that both Israel and the “Palestinian factions” have obligations under the deal that they must adhere to.

“My team and I are working around the clock with the parties, the mediators and regional partners to de-escalate and create the space for the full implementation of the [US] President’s plan,” he said. “Achieving a lasting peace is hard but achievable if everyone makes their best efforts.”

IDF kills two Hamas commanders in Gaza

Mladenov’s comments come following an IDF announcement earlier on Sunday that it had killed two Hamas commanders in Gaza over the weekend.
 
Also on Sunday, the IDF said it killed three Gaza terrorists from three separate terror groups over the past week.

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Suhaib Zahda, a prominent Palestinian activist from Hebron, was arrested and interrogated by Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces after seeking permission to hold a protest over rising fuel prices, salary cuts, and corruption. 

According to the Lawyers for Justice group, the preventive security service, one of the PA security agencies, arrested Zahda after he arrived at the Hebron Governorate to request approval for a peaceful demonstration. The group said his detention highlights restrictions on freedom of expression and on the right to protest, accusing the Palestinian authorities of targeting activists for voicing dissent.

Zahda’s intention to organize a protest comes amid an unfolding fuel crisis across the West Bank. In recent weeks, long lines have been seen at gasoline stations in Palestinian cities as residents seek to secure fuel supplies due to concern over possible shortages and rising prices. Palestinian human rights advocates called for his immediate release. 

Arrest a part of PA’s intimidation campaign

His arrest is seen by many Palestinians as a continuation of the PA leadership’s campaign to silence and intimidate critics and political opponents. 

Some noted that Zahda’s case is not an isolated incident but part of a broader policy by the Palestinian leadership to suppress criticism and prevent people from taking to the streets, fearing that such actions could fuel opposition to its rule and undermine it. 

They described Zahda’s detention as a “political arrest,” and said they reject the PA’s crackdown on activists and journalists for expressing their opinions.

Over the past decade, political activists have reportedly been detained, arrested, summoned, and occasionally interrogated for social media posts in which they expressed views that do not align with the PA’s position or criticized its alleged corruption. 

Death of activist Nizar Banat

One high-profile case was that of Nizar Banat, a well-known political activist opposing the PA, who was pronounced dead shortly after a raid by PA security officers on his house in Dura, south of Hebron, in 2021. 

Zahda, a colleague of Banat, played a key role in organizing the labor protest movement in 2018 against the proposed social security law, which he and other critics said failed to guarantee Palestinian employees’ savings or protect their pensions. At the time, he announced that the movement collected 100,000 signatures to pressure the Palestinian government to cancel the law. 

Zahda was previously interrogated and detained several times by both Palestinian and Israeli authorities. 

Meanwhile, he was released, but some Palestinians say his arrest casts doubt on Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s intention to hold free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. 

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Former Mossad head David Barnea has joined US-based defense technology company Ondas Inc. as Global President and Chairman, the company announced on Monday.

According to Ondas, Barnea will support the company’s global expansion, development of strategic technology, and defense and government relationships.

The company credited Barnea with strengthening the Mossad’s intelligence, technological, and operational capabilities during his tenure with the agency, citing his leadership as the driving factor behind his appointment.

Barnea’s appointment, according to Ondas, will support the company’s strategy to build unified defense technology platforms with AI-enabled software aimed at integrating intelligence, communications, and decision-making into operational execution.

Ondas stated that Barnea will work with entities in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, where investments in autonomous defense systems are increasing.

Ondas expanding with autonomous strike, counter-drone technologies

The appointment comes as Ondas is in a period of expansion, according to the press release, having recently secured millions of dollars of orders for unmanned ground systems, autonomous precision-strike technologies, and counter-drone measures.

“The nature of warfare is changing rapidly, as demonstrated by the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine,” Barnea stated. “Operational advantage increasingly depends on the ability to combine intelligence, artificial intelligence, resilient communications, autonomous platforms and precision capabilities into one coordinated operational environment.

Barnea added that he looks forward to working with Ondas “to support the Company’s global expansion and help develop the next generation of AI-enabled, multi-domain defense systems.”

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The IDF has killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist, Mahmoud Fatair, a commander in the PIJ’s Central Gaza Brigade who infiltrated Israel on October 7 and took part in holding Rom Braslavski hostage, the military confirmed on Monday.

According to the statement, the IDF conducted strikes in the Deir al-Balah area in Gaza over the weekend, targeting and killing Fatair.

More recently, the Fatair had reportedly attempted to advance terror attacks against IDF troops and Israeli civilians.

This is a developing story.

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Ahead of Pride Amsterdam (July 25-August 8), mysterious flyers were distributed featuring names and locations of Jewish IDF soldiers visiting the city.

The flyers, which bear the logo of WorldPride and of the City of Amsterdam, say: “Protect your community, watch out for war criminals during WorldPride.”

Jewish and Israeli artists are shown on a map of the city, with their photo, name, and exact performance locations visible.

They feature a banner encouraging people to report IDF soldiers to the organization RITA, an independent reporting platform for discrimination and harassment.

RITA, WorldPride, and Amsterdam City have all denied any association with the flyer. A spokesperson for Pride Amsterdam told The Jerusalem Post, “This is not ours; they abused our logo and that of the municipality.”

RITA published a statement saying that the logo, name, and reporting form were used on the flyers without permission, and that it was “not involved in the creation or distribution.”

It added that the unauthorized use of its name and visual appearance “creates confusion” and “does not reflect what RITA stands for.”

Hind Rajab Foundation mentioned on doxxing flyer

At the bottom of the flyer, people are invited to “learn more” by checking out the website of Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF), known for its lawfare attacks against Israelis abroad.

“The hyenas of the Hind Rajab Foundation don’t know when to stop: At the Pride in Amsterdam, flyers are being distributed claiming that Israeli war criminals are roaming the city, including a proper reporting link,” Center for Information and Documentation Israel (CIDI) said, adding that this is “legalized Jew-hunting in the logo of the municipality of Amsterdam.”

HRF has been running a separate but connected campaign against an IDF reservist in Utrecht.

The soldier, who will not be named here, served as a judge at the European Universities Debating Championships (EUDC), hosted by Utrecht University, 27-31 July.

During his stay in the Netherlands, HRF accused the soldier of displaying “blatant disregard for international law, mocking anti-genocide protesters, and referring to them as “pathetic,” at a time when Dutch authorities were already examining allegations against him.”

It therefore filed an urgent criminal complaint with the Dutch National Public Prosecutor’s Office against him.

Utrecht 4 Palestine calls for civilians to call police if spotting IDF veteran

On the back of HRF’s campaign, Utrecht 4 Palestine circulated flyers with the soldier’s photo, encouraging people to call the police if they see him.

Various pro-Palestine groups also posted on Instagram, calling for the debate event to be protested and circling the soldier’s face in red.

The post also read, “93 participants from the Zionist entity are still in Utrecht” and called for them to be investigated.

According to witnesses, during the protest against the debate, members shouted “Go Hamas” and “Long Live the 7th of October.” They also shouted, “Arrest [soldier’s name] yourself.”

A Jewish Israeli participant in the debate told De Telegraaf that the atmosphere was “extremely unsafe.”

“I was urgently advised to leave Utrecht because activists now thought we were involved in Gaza,” he said. “We heard that people on campus were looking for that reservist to beat him up.”

“It was a very, very terrifying thought that an Israeli was wanted without a warrant or anything like that. Not only by activists from outside but also by students who wanted to play their own judge. The fear came from all sides.”

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The High Court of Justice on Monday questioned whether a petition challenging legislation restricting UNRWA’s operations had established the factual basis needed for constitutional review, with all three judges repeatedly asking for evidence that the laws had caused concrete harm to an identifiable person.

“Our position at this stage is that the petition does not meet the initial threshold of showing harm to any particular individual,” Justice Ofer Grosskopf said at the end of the hearing. “I suggest that counsel withdraw the petition. We are not requesting a response.”

Attorney Suhad Bishara, representing the petitioners, asked for 10 days to give the court an answer. The petition has therefore not been withdrawn or dismissed, and the court did not rule on the constitutionality of the legislation.

Filed by 10 Palestinian residents together with Adalah and Gisha, the petition challenges two laws passed in October 2024 and an amendment approved in December 2025. UNRWA itself is not a petitioner.

One law prohibits UNRWA from operating within territory considered sovereign Israeli territory under Israeli law, while the other bars Israeli authorities from maintaining contact with the agency.

The amendment expanded enforcement powers, including the disconnection of utilities from properties used by UNRWA and measures concerning specific sites.

Petitioners claim UNRWA ban violates rights

The petitioners asked the court to strike down the legislation, arguing that it violated the rights of Palestinians who depend on UNRWA for education, health care and other assistance. Alternatively, they asked that the laws not be applied in the West Bank or Gaza.

Monday’s hearing centered almost entirely on whether the petitioners had submitted evidence of the practical harm they said the legislation had caused.

Grosskopf repeatedly asked Bishara to identify an updated affidavit from a particular person explaining what assistance they had received before the laws took effect, what had changed afterward and how that change had infringed a protected right.

Bishara argued that the laws had damaged a social, medical and humanitarian safety net relied upon by vulnerable Palestinians in east Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. She said the end of official cooperation with UNRWA had affected the agency’s ability to distribute medicines and maintain assistance, including free medication and food support.

She referred to one petitioner from Shuafat refugee camp who has chronic medical conditions and said he was no longer receiving medication previously provided through UNRWA.

Grosskopf responded that the court could not establish that fact from statements made orally by an attorney. The amended petition, he said, did not include an updated affidavit documenting the alleged change after the legislation took effect.

“How do you expect us, as a court that lives from the facts brought before it, to rule without bringing us one person who comes to court and says that his situation is worse as a result?” Grosskopf asked.

Grosskopf also distinguished between harm to UNRWA as an organization and an infringement of the constitutional rights of the residents represented in the case.

UNRWA’s ability to operate had clearly been reduced, he said, but the agency was not before the court claiming rights of its own. The petitioners therefore had to show that the restrictions had caused an actual deterioration in services received by particular people and that the deterioration infringed a protected right.

The state argued that alternative arrangements and aid mechanisms remained available, and that individual enforcement complaints belonged in separate administrative proceedings rather than a challenge to the laws.

Grosskopf referred to the state’s position that basic services remained available through state authorities, the Palestinian Authority or other mechanisms. Without contrary evidence, he said, the court could not find a constitutionally significant deterioration.

Justice Yechiel Kasher described proof of a post-legislation injury as the petitioners’ necessary “entry ticket” to the broader constitutional case.

Court has not yet been shown evidence of infringement of rights

The court had not been shown even initial evidence from a person explaining that they previously received a service through UNRWA, lost it or received less after the legislation, and consequently suffered an infringement of a basic right, he said.

Kasher added that even if the petitioners crossed that threshold, they would still face further legal questions before the court could consider striking down the laws.

The bench was also skeptical that reducing assistance from the level previously supplied through UNRWA to the ordinary level of public services would automatically violate human dignity.

Kasher asked whether providing a Shuafat resident with the same services available to a Petah Tikva resident could itself amount to a human-rights violation merely because UNRWA had previously supplied more.

Bishara responded that the population served by the agency was particularly vulnerable and had received additional support because it needed it. The court could not separate the alleged reduction in assistance from the circumstances of people who depended on free medication or limited food support, she argued.

Justice Gila Canfy-Steinitz focused on whether the state had a legal obligation to cooperate with UNRWA specifically, rather than an obligation to ensure that essential services were available through the state or another body.

“Is there an obligation to receive these rights specifically from UNRWA?” she asked. “What is the legal basis for the state’s obligation to cooperate with a particular organization?”

Bishara said the provider could be UNRWA or another United Nations agency, but maintained that the laws had damaged an existing humanitarian system without ensuring sufficient alternatives.

Canfy-Steinitz said that if the claim was ultimately that the state must provide adequate health, education and welfare services, rather than that it must cooperate with UNRWA in particular, the dispute appeared closer to an administrative challenge concerning specific services.

Adalah accuses court of neglecting petitioners’ arguments

In a statement following the hearing, Adalah accused the court of focusing on whether the state could replace UNRWA rather than addressing the petitioners’ arguments concerning Palestinian refugees’ rights under domestic and international law.

“Instead of subjecting the state’s violations to judicial scrutiny, the court’s line of questioning focused entirely on state authority and the feasibility of replacing UNRWA, culminating in a push for us to withdraw the petition,” Bishara said.

She argued that the approach signaled the court’s unwillingness to intervene in what Adalah described as an effort to dismantle UNRWA and remove protections afforded to Palestinian refugees under international law.

The hearing instead ended on the preliminary question of whether the alleged effects of the legislation had been supported by enough evidence to allow the constitutional challenge to proceed.

The petitioners now have 10 days to respond. Until then, the petition remains pending, and no final judgment has been issued.

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The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) announced the release of senior Fatah official Jibril Zubeidi on Monday after his administrative detention order expired.

Zubeidi, a resident of Jenin in the West Bank, had been held in administrative detention since 2023.

He is the brother of Zakaria Zubeidi, the former commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, who was recently elected to represent released prisoners on Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

This is a developing story.

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Three workers at a private Tel Aviv daycare were indicted on Monday over the alleged repeated assault and abuse of infants and toddlers, including an incident in which one child’s arm was fractured, the State Attorney’s Office announced.

Ortal Levi, 39, an assistant at Gan Hiyuchim, and the daycare’s owner and manager, Natalie Shahar, 42, were indicted in the Tel Aviv District Court. A separate indictment was filed in the Tel Aviv Magistrate’s Court against another assistant, Ronit Shira Ariel, 63, of Bat Yam.

The children at the daycare were between six months and one-and-a-half years old.

According to the indictment, Levi repeatedly assaulted children under her care from November 2024, creating what prosecutors described as an atmosphere of fear and treating the children as though they were objects.

She allegedly threw children onto the floor or mattresses, pulled them forcefully by their arms, lifted them by their clothing, pushed their heads into mattresses, pinched their cheeks, struck them, and forcibly covered their heads and faces with blankets.

Some of the children suffered injuries, sleeping and eating disturbances, weight loss, and behavioral changes during or shortly after the alleged abuse, according to the indictment.

Some toddlers suffered serious injuries leading to hospital visits 

The most serious individual incident described by prosecutors occurred on December 19, 2024, after Levi took a toddler into the changing room to replace his diaper.

Levi allegedly used force and twisted the child’s right arm in a manner that prosecutors said could not be determined precisely. The child immediately stopped using the arm, began crying, and threw his head backward.

Throughout the remainder of the day, he allegedly avoided moving the arm, lay motionless for extended periods, did not participate in daycare activities, and cried for long periods. He also struggled to support himself and avoided using the arm while eating.

Despite his condition, prosecutors said Levi did not tell the child’s parents or ensure that he received medical attention.

The toddler was later taken to Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv, where he was diagnosed with a spiral fracture of the humerus, the bone in the upper arm. He was sedated while the fracture was repositioned, his arm was placed in a cast, and he was hospitalized for two days for observation.

Daycare workers charged with assaulting, injuring children

Levi is charged with assaulting a minor and causing serious injury while responsible for the child, multiple counts of assaulting a minor and causing bodily harm – while responsible for them – aggravated assault, and eight counts of abusing a minor.

Prosecutors alleged that the nature, frequency, and number of the incidents amounted to physical abuse of eight children, as well as psychological abuse.

Shahar, who owned and managed the daycare and also worked there as a caregiver, is accused of assaulting two children herself and failing to prevent the alleged violence carried out by the two assistants.

Several parents had reported injuries sustained by their children while at the daycare, according to the indictment. A trainee assistant had also allegedly warned Shahar in January 2024 about Levi’s unusual and aggressive treatment of the children.

Shahar was also allegedly present during several of the assaults.

Despite the complaints and what she had witnessed, prosecutors said Shahar did not properly investigate the parents’ reports or take steps to ensure that violence was not used against the children.

In two incidents, she allegedly held one girl upside down by her legs, leaving her body suspended in the air, and pushed another girl’s head toward a mattress before striking her, pulling her by the arm, and lifting her into the air.

Shahar is charged with two counts of aggravated assault and breaching the duty of a parent or person responsible for a child.

The separate indictment against Ariel charges her with 15 counts of aggravated assault.

Prosecutors said Ariel pulled children by one hand, lifted them into the air by an arm or wrist, completely covered their heads while putting them to sleep, pushed their heads into mattresses, and force-fed one child.

The indictments state that 21 infants and toddlers were under the supervision of the three women during the relevant period, from September until December 29, 2024.

They also allege that the private daycare operated without the business license required by law.

Alongside the indictments, prosecutors asked the courts to extend orders barring all three defendants from working in any position involving the care of minors until the conclusion of the proceedings against them.

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Israel must facilitate the “voluntary emigration” of Gaza residents who wish to leave, completely demilitarize the Gaza Strip, and retain full security freedom of action before allowing an international force to enter, the Tikva Leumit movement demanded on Monday.

The movement, which represents bereaved families and families of the hostages, presented what it described as “critical and nonnegotiable” conditions for any future arrangement in Gaza. Its statement came amid reports of progress toward another stage of the framework for the Gaza Strip and the possible deployment of an international force.

The families argued that facilitating the departure of Gaza residents who wish to leave could improve Israel’s security situation and weaken Hamas’s control over the local population.

The movement also said Israel must secure international guarantees allowing it to operate inside the Gaza Strip against terrorists, locate terrorist infrastructure and weapons, and protect Israeli communities.

Tikva Leumit further demanded that the Gaza Strip be completely demilitarized before any international force enters. It called for all weapons in the Strip to be collected and for Israel to retain full freedom of action on security matters.

No weapons can be left in Gaza

The movement stressed that officials must ensure no light or heavy weapons remain in the Gaza Strip before any progress is made under the phased plan proposed by US President Donald Trump. Any remaining weapons, it said, could endanger IDF troops and Israeli civilians.

The movement’s families said: “We must remember that we are the ones who were directly harmed by the previous failure, and many families are still recovering after two years of suffering until our loved ones returned. The State of Israel, as a country that values life, must care for its citizens and safeguard its security.”

No trust in Hamas, int’l force

They added: “We have no trust whatsoever in Hamas, and unfortunately, we also do not trust any international force that may arrive. We are responsible for our own security, and we hope that the decision-makers understand this. We must prevent the next October 7 and not allow Hamas to grow stronger.”

The families urged the prime minister and other decision-makers not to depend on an international force that, in their view, would be “without authority and without the ability to eliminate Hamas.”

“Continue the targeted killings and defeat Hamas,” they added. “No stages and no international forces.”

The Israel-Hamas War began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas-led terrorists invaded southern Israel, killing more than 1,200 people and taking more than 250 hostages. A Gaza ceasefire under Trump’s plan went into effect on October 10, 2025.

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Morocco has named its 1,055-km. Tiznit-Dakhla expressway the “Donald J. Trump Highway” in recognition of the US president’s support for Rabat’s sovereignty claim over Western Sahara, the Moroccan state news agency MAP reported on Saturday.

King Mohammed VI informed US President Donald Trump of the decision in a letter dated July 2, saying relations between Morocco and the United States had become particularly strong and productive during Trump’s two presidential terms.

“Your historic recognition, in 2020, of Morocco’s sovereignty over its Sahara will forever be etched in the memory of Moroccans,” the king wrote.

Mohammed VI said the route was one of Morocco’s most important road projects and described it as the longest road infrastructure in Africa. The expressway connects northern and southern Morocco and forms part of an Atlantic transport corridor linking Europe with West Africa.

The roughly $1 billion route begins in Tiznit and passes through Guelmim, Tan-Tan and Laayoune before reaching Dakhla. Much of the southern section runs through Western Sahara, which Morocco considers part of its southern provinces.

Moroccan authorities say the road will shorten travel times, reduce disruptions caused by flooding and shifting sand, and improve the movement of people and goods between the country’s economic centers and its southern regions.

Trump publicly thanked the Moroccan monarch in a July 26 post on Truth Social.

“Such a Great Honor! I look forward to traveling the entire length of this Great Highway someday, hopefully soon!” Trump wrote.

The naming reflects the diplomatic relationship that developed during Trump’s first administration. In December 2020, Washington recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara alongside a US-brokered agreement under which Morocco agreed to normalize relations with Israel.

Morocco joined Abraham Accords during first Trump administration

Morocco subsequently became a member of the Abraham Accords framework, expanding diplomatic, economic and security ties with Israel.

Western Sahara has been disputed since Spain withdrew from the territory in 1975. Morocco controls most of the region, while the Algeria-backed Polisario Front seeks the establishment of an independent Sahrawi state.

Israel formally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2023 and reaffirmed that position the following year.

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution in October 2025 that supported negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, under which Western Sahara would receive limited self-government while remaining under Moroccan sovereignty.

In his letter to Trump, Mohammed VI presented the expressway as both an infrastructure project and a symbol of the two countries’ strategic partnership, saying it would strengthen Morocco’s position as a commercial link between Europe and Africa.

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A reservist and a civilian were indicted on Monday over the theft and alleged trafficking of an M16 rifle taken from an IDF base in northern Israel, Israel Police and the military said in a joint statement.

The investigation also uncovered a suspected network that allegedly sold cocaine and other drugs, including to soldiers inside military bases in northern Israel. An IDF major implicated in the drug investigation is expected to be indicted separately at a later date, according to the statement.

The investigation began on June 20, after Military Police received a report that an M16 rifle had been stolen from a base in northern Israel.

Investigators arrested a 30-year-old reservist noncommissioned officer from Tiberias later that evening on suspicion that he had stolen the rifle from a soldier serving in his unit.

After investigators came to suspect that the weapon had been transferred to criminal elements, the Northern District Police’s central investigative unit opened a joint investigation with the northern unit of the Military Police.

Police discover drug network supplying soldiers

A 30-year-old Kiryat Tivon resident was subsequently arrested on suspicion of receiving the rifle on the night it was stolen.

During the investigation, police said they uncovered evidence that the Kiryat Tivon resident and a 34-year-old Tiberias resident had operated a network trafficking cocaine and other drugs over the preceding months. A significant portion of the drugs was allegedly supplied to soldiers inside military bases in northern Israel.

Several days later, investigators questioned the reservist’s brother, an IDF major serving at a base in northern Israel, on suspicion of obstruction of justice and conspiracy to commit a crime.

The investigation allegedly found that the officer had supplied the other suspects on several occasions with medical cannabis that he had legally obtained with a prescription.

The Northern District Attorney’s Office filed an indictment against the Kiryat Tivon resident on Monday on charges relating to trafficking in the stolen weapon. The Military Prosecution separately indicted the reservist over his alleged involvement in the rifle’s theft and trafficking.

Police prosecutors in Kiryat Shmona are also set to indict the 34-year-old Tiberias resident on drug-trafficking charges.

An indictment against the IDF major is expected to be filed at a later date, the statement said.

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Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Missions Minister Orit Strock on Monday called on the government to hold a new vote on the recommendations of the government’s Board of Peace (BoP), arguing that ministers approved the original decision based on incomplete and misleading information.

The demand comes despite Smotrich voting in favor of the cabinet resolution when it was originally approved, while Strock led opposition to the measure.

The cabinet last week approved the launch of the BoP’s pilot phase and granted principal approval for the deployment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) into the Gaza Strip as part of the framework for postwar reconstruction.

In a joint letter addressed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and cabinet ministers, Smotrich and Strock argued that the summary presented to ministers before the vote omitted key consequences of the recommendations, preventing the cabinet from making an informed decision.

They urged ministers to rescind the previous approval and revisit the proposal only after reviewing what they described as its full legal and operational implications.

According to the letter, the recommendations would significantly alter Israel’s ability to prevent financial activity by organizations that authorities view as acting against the state’s interests.

Several provisions were not presented before vote, Smotrich, Strock argue

The ministers argued that several substantive provisions were not adequately presented before the vote, despite their potential impact on national security and financial enforcement.

Among the issues highlighted in the letter are proposed changes to the authority of financial institutions to restrict banking services, new procedural requirements before financial sanctions could be imposed, limitations on the operational role of the Israel Security Agency in providing information used in financial enforcement, revisions to Israel’s sanctions policy, and the establishment of a new oversight mechanism.

The ministers argued that, taken together, these measures would weaken existing tools used to combat financial activity linked to hostile organizations.

“The cabinet’s decision was based on a misleading presentation,” the ministers wrote, arguing that had the full details been disclosed, ministers would have understood the broader implications of the recommendations.

They contended that the government had effectively voted on the basis of false or incomplete information and therefore should conduct a new vote after ministers receive the complete picture.

The letter also argues that the recommendations would reduce the effectiveness of existing mechanisms used by the banking system, the Tax Authority and other government bodies to prevent financial activity by entities considered hostile to Israel.

Ministers issue criticism of International Stabilization Force

It further criticizes provisions governing the ISF and Israel’s sanctions policy, claiming they would create additional bureaucracy while limiting Israel’s operational flexibility.

The cabinet decision that Smotrich now seeks to revisit approved the launch of the BoP’s pilot phase and granted legal immunity to the ISF, which is expected to coordinate with the IDF in areas of Gaza outside Hamas control.

Under the approved framework, any deployment of ISF personnel would still require specific authorization from the prime minister, defense minister and foreign minister. During the original vote, Smotrich supported the proposal while National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir opposed it and Strock publicly criticized the plan.

The letter concludes by urging ministers to withdraw their previous approval and hold a new vote only after receiving what Smotrich and Strock describe as a complete and transparent presentation of the recommendations’ legal, security and practical consequences.

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The US Defense Department has signed a framework deal with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to expand the production capacity of components for the Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD missile interceptor systems, it said on Monday.

Pentagon negotiators have pressed contractors to move much faster with tentative production agreements struck earlier this year to increase missile output as conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine strain US weapons stockpiles.

Ukraine has run chronically low on supplies of Patriots, which remain the only weapon in its arsenal capable of downing ballistic missiles.

Production of Patriot missiles to triple, THAAD production to quadruple

In its statement on Monday, the department said the framework deal would allow production of Patriots to triple and THAAD systems to quadruple.

It did not give a value for the deal, which it said would establish a second source for PAC-3 solid rocket motors and ramp up output of ignition safety devices.

It follows a deal last week when the US Army awarded Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to $58.6 billion to produce Patriot interceptor missiles.

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Israel is facing a “tsunami” of emigration from the country, warned Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs Committee Chair MK Gilad Kariv (Democrats) on Monday, following the publication of a new study from Tel Aviv University showing that over 90,000 Israelis left the country in 2025 for three or more consecutive months. 

The study, based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, found that the number of Israelis who have left the country since 2023 for three or more months is significantly higher than it was a decade ago.

According to the study, a total of 268,930 Israelis left Israel in 2023 (86,509), 2024 (91,499), and 2025 (90,922). For comparison, the study showed that during the same period in 2013, 2014, and 2015, only 83,219 citizens left Israel.

“Since I took office, I have warned: Israel is facing a tsunami of emigration from the country, and the government is doing nothing about it,” Kariv said. “We have demanded time and again during the discussions we convened that a person be appointed to comprehensively deal with the phenomenon.”

“We have implored government representatives to present a multi-year plan to reverse the trend. But apparently, from the perspective of this fanatical coalition, this is a blessing.”

“The study published today confirms the dangerous trend: 90,000 Israelis left the country in the past year. Many of them are doctors, engineers and academics,” Kariv continued, adding that “this is a strategic threat to the future of Israel, and is closely linked to the government’s conduct and the coup d’état.”

“[Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu‘s dismissive attitude towards the phenomenon from the Knesset stage is well remembered. This disdain characterizes the promiscuous, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli conduct of the current government,” he stated.

He called on any Israelis who have left the country to return to vote in the upcoming elections. 

“To all the Israelis who left the country,” he said. “The fix is ​​on the way. And we need you with us to bring it.”

Topic of migration renewed post-Oct. 7

However, since an index of departure for a period of 12 months or more for 2025 is not yet available and will only be available in 2027, researchers used an index for three or more months, as the correlation between the two indices is very high (0.96).

According to this, researchers have estimated that between 45,000 and 50,000 citizens will have left Israel in 2025 for a year or more.

The study explained that public discourse surrounding the topic of the migration of Israelis was renewed during elections in November 2022, the judicial reform protests, and then once again after the October 7 massacre.

It stressed the importance of having up-to-date data on the characteristics of migration so the public and the government can understand the scope of the situation and its implications for the Israeli economy and society.

Mass migration from Israel could lead to serious consequences

Unlike most countries, mass emigration from Israel could lead to “difficult and serious consequences” as its economy is based largely on those in the high-tech industry, advanced medical services, and academia.

The emigration of people who work in these fields would serve a “severe blow” to the industries and pose a danger to Israel’s economy.

“Even in 2025, we see very disturbing numbers of Israelis who left the country for a significant period of time, and these are added to the wave of immigration in 2023 and 2024,” explained study co-author Prof. Itai Ater of the Kohler Faculty of Management and head of the Economists for Democracy Forum.

“These figures in themselves do not yet pose a risk to Israel’s resilience,” Ater said.

“However, looking ahead, and if there is no change, there is a growing concern that immigration from Israel will increase in a way that will endanger security and the Israeli economy,” he added.

The study was conducted by Prof. Itai Ater of the Kohler Faculty of Management and head of the Economists for Democracy Forum, Prof. Netai Bergman, head of the School of Economics, and Doron Zamir, a doctoral student in the Kohler Faculty of Management, all at Tel Aviv University.

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The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior officially confirmed the existence of an online campaign falsely encouraging people to attempt to reach Ceuta.

This came after more than 50,000 people crossed into Ceuta by land and sea on Thursday last week in an unprecedented surge. More than 48,000 returned to Morocco within 48 hours and more did so over the weekend, Spanish authorities said.

Speaking Sunday evening, Ministry Spokesperson Rachid Khalfi said the border crossings “were not the result of temporary or spontaneous factors” but resulted from “the interaction of several overlapping factors.”

Specifically, he cited “the excessive exploitation of digital platforms, the dissemination of misleading information, the role of human trafficking networks, and incorrect interpretations of legal and administrative information.”

Khalfi said these factors were used to create the “false impression” that it was possible and easy to reach European territory without legal consequences, and that the border was open.

He confirmed that the Public Prosecutor’s Office has opened judicial investigations into the various circumstances behind the events, with the aim of “identifying those responsible, and determining the appropriate legal consequences in accordance with the law.”

Chronology of the coordinated media campaign

José María Gil Garre, Co-Director of the International Security Observatory, released on Sunday a 70-page report into the disinformation campaign that stimulated the invasion of Ceuta.

Gil said the campaign began at the beginning of July across social networks from profiles in Algeria, Tunisia, France and observations from the US.

He presents a full chronological reconstruction of the precipitating events behind the incursion.

Gil said the first phase began on July 8, 2026, the date on which the Spanish Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning the return of migrants intercepted at sea with destinations in Ceuta and Melilla. In the days immediately afterward, “simplified and decontextualized interpretations” began, presenting the ruling as a supposed guarantee of permanent residence in Spanish territory.

Between July 8 and July 15, this narrative gradually expanded across social networks and messaging services. The evidence collected by Gil showed an increase in posts reproducing similar messages, sometimes accompanied by short audiovisual content, images, and comments designed to reinforce the perception that there was an immediate opportunity to gain access to Spanish territory.

By mid-July, Gil noted the first indicators of a transition from a primarily narrative phase toward an operational phase. His investigation identified the gradual arrival of people to the Fnideq (Castillejos) area from different Moroccan cities, while activity increased in existing Facebook groups and messaging channels used to exchange practical information about routes, schedules, and travel conditions.

Around July 25, “a qualitative shift” occurred in the nature of the content being distributed. Maps began circulating that showed routes for swimming from the Moroccan coast toward Ceuta and Melilla, accompanied by references to distances, departure points, and basic recommendations for completing the journey.

On July 27, digital activity experienced another acceleration. The evidence documents a significant increase in certain Facebook groups dedicated to exchanging information about access to Ceuta, alongside intensified circulation of videos, photographs, and messages related to preparing for the journey. During the same phase, content on TikTok and other audiovisual platforms also increased, strengthening the campaign’s visibility and expanding its reach among potential participants.

On July 28, one of the most relevant elements of the investigation emerged: the identification of a public messaging group called “Hijma Kiraib Setba” (هجرة قريبة سبتة, “Migration close to Ceuta”), administered from a telephone number with an Algerian international prefix (+213). The group distributed messages related to mobilization toward Ceuta.

During July 29 and 30, the campaign reached its highest intensity. The frequency of publications increased significantly, and specific instructions began circulating regarding schedules, meeting points, recommended equipment, and travel conditions.

During the night of July 30-31, the event with the greatest operational impact occurred, with a mass attempt to enter Spanish territory through the Ceuta area.

Although Gil said the nature of the platforms makes it impossible to determine an exact count of messages distributed without access to their internal systems, the information collected showed that the digital campaign may have generated between one and five million impressions, relying on communities that collectively exceeded 250,000 members and on profiles capable of reaching audiences of several million views.

The two accounts with the highest reach and interest were two Moroccan TikTok accounts, @haragaa_ceuta1 and @haragama00. These collectively had over 400,000 followers.

This was followed by two Algerian WhatsApp code groups designed to coordinate activity and provide logistical information. This was then followed by three Moroccan Instagram accounts and a Moroccan Facebook account with tens of thousands of followers each.

Overall, the research documented more than 11 million potential impressions, resulting from the aggregation of views of audiovisual content, members of digital communities, posts, comments, and interactions recorded during the analyzed period.

The investigation concluded that the digital dimension played a significant role in the dissemination of narratives, the circulation of information, and the coordination of physical movements, showing the power of social media in mobilizing real activity.

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Turkey on Sunday accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s government of having no intention of achieving peace with the Palestinians, following Israel’s latest military strikes in the Gaza Strip.

In a statement published by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara said the latest attacks demonstrated that the Israeli government was continuing policies that undermine efforts to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

“Netanyahu’s sole objective is to displace Palestinians from their homeland and prevent the establishment of peace and stability in the region,” the ministry said.

The ministry further alleged that Netanyahu continues to take steps that weaken the region’s fragile balance and obstruct mediation initiatives led by several countries, particularly the US.

“It has become imperative for the international community to adopt a more determined, consistent and robust stance against Netanyahu’s expansionist and militarist approach, which seeks to turn the entire Middle East into a zone of conflict,” the statement said.

Calling on countries that support “peace and stability in Palestine and across the wider Middle East,” the ministry urged the international community to act with a shared sense of responsibility and uphold international law and humanitarian values.

Israel says operations are aimed at dismantling Hamas

Israel has repeatedly said its military operations in Gaza are aimed at dismantling Hamas and its governing capabilities. Israeli officials have maintained that Hamas bears responsibility for the continuation of the war by rejecting proposed ceasefire and hostage-release proposals.

The Turkish statement came amid continued diplomatic efforts involving the US and regional mediators to advance negotiations over a ceasefire and the release of hostages held in Gaza. The status of those efforts was not addressed further in the ministry’s statement.

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A rare collision that will leave behind a new crater is expected on Wednesday, when a massive piece of a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket crashes into the Moon at seven times the speed of sound. The impact will occur on the side of the Moon facing Earth, near Einstein crater, and could raise a cloud of dust and rock fragments that may remain visible through sensitive telescopes for several minutes.

In Israel, the impact is expected at around 9:35 a.m., making local observation extremely difficult because of the daylight.

The object heading toward the lunar surface is the spent upper stage of a Falcon 9 rocket launched from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida on January 15, 2025. The rocket carried two privately operated spacecraft intended to land on the Moon: Blue Ghost, built by the US company Firefly, and Resilience, operated by Japan’s ispace. After the spacecraft separated from the rocket, the upper stage remained in a high, unstable orbit that crossed the Moon’s path.

For more than a year, the rocket component drifted through space under the gravitational influence of Earth, the Moon, and the Sun. In May, experts tracking objects in space noticed that its trajectory was set to end in a direct collision with the Moon.

According to the latest calculations, the impact will occur on August 5 at around 6:35 a.m. UTC, at a speed of approximately 2.43 kilometers per second, or about 8,700 kph.

Massive explosion via kinetic energy creating new crater

The rocket stage is approximately 12 meters long and four meters in diameter, with an estimated mass of four tons. The energy released at the moment of impact is expected to be comparable to the explosion of approximately three tons of TNT. This will not be an explosive charge or a planned detonation. Instead, the object’s enormous kinetic energy will be converted into heat and shock waves, shattering the rocket and throwing large quantities of lunar soil into the air.

The initial flash is expected to last less than one second. Scientists estimate that it will be relatively faint, partly because the rocket will strike an illuminated area of the Moon, where reflected light from the surface could conceal it. An ordinary amateur telescope may not be able to capture the moment of impact, and it will certainly not be visible to the naked eye.

The researchers’ main interest, however, is not the flash but the cloud that will form immediately afterward. The collision is expected to send dust, rock fragments, and pieces of metal high above the lunar surface. Because the Moon’s gravity is six times weaker than Earth’s and it has no atmosphere or wind, the particles could remain suspended for several minutes before falling back to the surface.

Computer simulations published ahead of the event suggest that the main curtain of dust could rise to an altitude of 15 to 20 kilometers. In an optimistic scenario, a narrower jet of fast-moving particles could reach a height of 75 to 100 kilometers. Since the impact site is near the edge of the Moon’s visible disk, part of the dust cloud may extend beyond the illuminated edge and appear against the darkness of space.

The best viewing conditions are expected in the eastern United States and Canada, as well as across large parts of South America, where the event will take place during nighttime hours while the Moon is above the horizon. Researchers have emphasized that even there, there is no certainty that the cloud will be visible.

Its precise brightness will depend on the angle of impact, the composition of the ground, the rocket’s direction of travel during its final moments, and the size of the dust particles thrown into the air.

Professional astronomers plan to use high-speed cameras connected to telescopes, allowing them to capture multiple images every second. Amateur astronomers with suitable equipment have also been encouraged to try to document the event. Observations are expected to continue after the moment of impact, since the development of the dust cloud during the following minutes may be the clearest and most scientifically significant part of the event.

The impact is expected to excavate a crater approximately 20 to 30 meters in diameter and around five meters deep. A crater of that size would be too small to see from Earth, but spacecraft orbiting the Moon will be able to photograph it.

NASA’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and South Korea’s Danuri spacecraft are expected to compare images taken before the event with those captured afterward. Danuri is expected to pass within several kilometers of the rocket stage about two minutes before impact.

This will be only the second known case in which a piece of rocket debris has accidentally crashed into the Moon. In March 2022, a rocket body attributed to a Chinese mission struck the Moon’s far side and created a double crater. Since the collision occurred on the side that cannot be seen from Earth, it was not documented in real time and was discovered later in satellite images.

Rockets smashed into the moon deliberately

Spacecraft and rocket components have previously been deliberately crashed into the Moon as part of scientific experiments.

During the Apollo program, NASA crashed rocket stages and parts of lunar modules into the surface to create seismic waves, which were measured by instruments left behind by astronauts. In 2009, the LCROSS spacecraft crashed near the lunar south pole as part of a search for water ice, sending up a plume of material that was analyzed using scientific instruments.

This collision was not planned. Space experts said it could have been prevented by changing the rocket stage’s trajectory after launch and moving it into a stable orbit around the Sun. The event poses no danger to people or equipment, but it illustrates the growing difficulty of managing debris in the region of space between Earth and the Moon.

The concern is expected to become more significant in the coming years as the number of spacecraft, landers, and satellites operating around the Moon increases. The United States, China, and commercial companies are planning crewed missions and long-term infrastructure on the lunar surface.

Particles ejected in a similar collision could travel hundreds of kilometers, damage equipment, contaminate research areas, or endanger astronauts outside protected structures.

Measurements collected on Wednesday will help researchers study how the debris spreads and prepare for future impacts.

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The Trump administration is preparing to launch a nationwide campaign against antisemitism, sending senior Justice Department officials to 15 cities that it says have failed to adequately protect their Jewish communities.

Leo Terrell, chairman of the Justice Department’s Task Force to Combat Antisemitism and a senior counsel at the department, told The Jerusalem Post that the initiative had been approved by US President Donald Trump and Justice Department leadership. The campaign is expected to begin in early September.

“The 15-city tour is designed to go to victims who need help, and they’re not getting help from their local government,” Terrell said.

“We’re working 24/7 to kick this tour off probably early September, and it’s going to run for the next 60 to 90 days,” he added.

The effort marks an expansion of the administration’s campaign against antisemitism beyond college campuses and into local communities, where Jewish Americans have reported rising threats and hate crimes since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, according to Terrell.

Rather than simply meeting with local officials, the federal government intends to bring an interagency team directly into affected communities, he said.

“I’m coming with a full arsenal of people,” Terrell said. “I’m bringing the Department of Labor. I’m bringing the FBI. I’m bringing resources and law enforcement.”

The goal is twofold, he said: to educate Jewish communities about their legal rights and publicly highlight what he described as failures by local governments to enforce hate crime laws.

Terrell points to New York and Los Angeles as possible destinations

Although Terrell declined to identify the 15 cities included in the tour, he pointed to New York and Los Angeles as examples of jurisdictions where he believes local officials have not done enough to prosecute antisemitic crimes.

“What’s happening here is that the local district attorneys and local mayors are not prosecuting hate crimes,” he said. “The hate crime conviction rate or charges do not exist in these blue cities.”

He also accused teachers’ unions in Los Angeles, Boston and Philadelphia of contributing to what he described as anti-Jewish indoctrination in K-12 schools.

“This has to stop because the local officials are not taking any corrective action,” Terrell said.

Asked how the federal government could intervene despite the broad authority held by governors and mayors, Terrell acknowledged that local officials have significant discretion. However, he argued that Washington still has tools at its disposal.

“First of all, we want to shine a spotlight on their failures,” he said. “They need some sunlight.”

The public campaign is intended to document what the administration views as systemic failures before it considers further legal action, he said.

“If they fail to take action on behalf of Jewish Americans, the federal government could come in and do what they call a pattern-and-practice lawsuit,” Terrell said. “We have to document their failures first before we can take corrective action.”

Not just NY and LA: Trump admin. receives reports of antisemitism nationwide

While New York and Los Angeles often dominate discussions about antisemitism, Terrell said the administration had received reports from Jewish communities across the country.

“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know there are problems in New York,” he said. “It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know there are problems in Los Angeles.”

“But in Seattle, Tacoma and some smaller cities in the Midwest, we’ve been inundated. I’ve gotten calls from St. Louis because of hate crimes going on,” he added.

Terrell stressed that the campaign was not solely about protecting Jewish Americans but also about defending broader American values.

“My plea was not only to the Jewish population but to everyone,” he said. “Fighting antisemitism is an American issue.”

The initiative follows a series of Trump administration actions targeting antisemitism at American universities, including investigations into campuses accused of failing to protect Jewish students.

Terrell said the new effort would apply the same philosophy to municipalities.

“We’re going to the cities,” he said. “I want these Americans to be empowered with information. They’re not getting it on the local level, so we’re going to tell them what their rights are.”

The campaign will also include an extensive media strategy designed to counter antisemitic content online.

“We’re going to be on radio, podcasts and every aspect of social media,” Terrell said. “We’re going to start that at the beginning of the tour, during the tour and after the tour.”

“We’re going to neuter the lies and the hate that’s out there on social media,” he added.

During a speech at an Israel on Campus Coalition event in the United States on Sunday, Terrell raised the issue of what he called the “Jewish tax,” the financial burden many Jewish institutions face in securing their own protection.

“A Jewish tax is where the Jewish community, to go to their synagogue, may have to pay $60,000, $70,000 or $80,000 for police security,” he said. “If they’re going to have a three-day convention like this, it might cost them $200,000 in security.”

“No other group has to pay that,” he argued.

In a later conversation with the Post, Terrell maintained that protecting synagogues, Jewish schools and communal events was fundamentally the responsibility of local governments rather than the communities themselves.

“The mayor and local law enforcement have the obligation to protect the city,” he said. “They should instruct law enforcement to protect that school or synagogue. But they’re not doing it. They’re failing to take action when they know there’s a problem.”

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An anonymous Belgian collector has lent a rare work by René Magritte to the Israel Museum while the artist’s iconic painting The Castle of the Pyrenees undergoes restoration following accidental damage.

The smaller work, painted in gouache on paper in 1962, presents another version of Magritte’s famous image of a castle perched atop an enormous rock floating in the sky. It will be displayed at the museum over the coming months, until conservation work on the original 1959 oil painting is completed.

The Castle of the Pyrenees was damaged approximately two months ago when a five-year-old boy visiting the museum with his family pushed a pinecone toward the painting, causing a small tear in the canvas.

The museum immediately activated its emergency procedures for damaged artworks. The painting was carefully removed from the gallery and transferred to the conservation laboratory, where specialists are stabilizing the canvas, painstakingly reconnecting its fibers under a microscope, and restoring the paint layers using conservation materials and techniques.

The 1959 painting is considered one of Magritte’s masterpieces and one of the best-known and most beloved works in the Israel Museum’s collection.

A highlight of modern art galleries

It was donated to the museum in 1985 by Jewish lawyer and art collector Harry Torczyner, a close friend of Magritte and a long-time supporter of the museum. Torczyner commissioned the painting directly from the artist and purchased it from him.

From its completion in 1959 until it arrived in Israel, the work hung in Torczyner’s New York office. Since joining the museum’s collection, it has been displayed regularly and has become a highlight of its modern art galleries.

After hearing about the damage and the ongoing restoration, the anonymous collector offered to lend the museum the 1962 gouache, which Magritte created three years after completing the oil painting.

“The generous gesture allows our visitors to encounter one of the most important artists of the 20th century while his iconic original work receives comprehensive treatment and will soon return to display,” Israel Museum director Prof. Yasha Jacob Grobman said.

The gouache was previously displayed at the Israel Museum in the 2022 exhibition Floating with Magritte: In the Footsteps of The Castle of the Pyrenees.

Meanwhile, the original oil painting is being treated in the museum’s open conservation laboratory, where visitors can observe the restoration process and gain a close-up view of the complex work usually carried out behind the scenes.

Once the conservation process is completed, the painting is expected to return to its permanent place in the museum’s galleries.

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In the second half of 2027, regulations will come into effect in Israel to allow driving in vehicles with advanced autonomous assistance systems, sources in the Ministry of Transport believe. Local regulations on the subject have been in the process of being formulated in government ministries for over five years, but their implementation has been delayed due to the lack of organized international standards and legal problems.

However, at the end of June, the UN’s central standardization body (UNECE) approved an international regulation that regulates the standardization of autonomous vehicles allowed to travel on public roads. According to the sources, it constitutes a “breakthrough that will accelerate the process.”

This is the first comprehensive international regulation of its kind that regulates fully autonomous systems for autonomy level 4 and above — vehicles that can drive in a controlled environment with minimal driver intervention.

At least like a human driver

The new framework defines, among other things, safety requirements and uniform model approval processes, which include safety management and providing manufacturers with responsibility that the autonomous driving system functions at a level of safety that is at least equal to that of a skilled human driver. It also includes the obligation to install a data recording system, along with continuous monitoring of malfunctions and reporting of safety incidents and regulating the licensing of vehicles that do not have conventional steering wheels and pedals. These allow, in theory, a full driverless vehicle.

The new standard, which is expected to be adopted in Israel automatically as part of the European standard, will eliminate the existing regulatory awkwardness and provide the Ministry of Transport with a ready-made basis in theory for import permits for vehicles with autonomy level 4 and above. However, it is still unclear how insurance companies will respond to the issue.

The automotive industry estimates that in the first phase, adoption will focus on commercial fleets that travel on limited and demarcated routes, such as “robot taxis” (robotaxis), autonomous unloading cranes at ports, and designated buses. The Cross Israel company is currently promoting a tender for the trial operation of autonomous “shuttles” in communities in the Golan Heights, which will initially be transported with a control driver in the vehicle, and then without a driver at all.

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Late Saturday, Mohammad Dahlan, the former Fatah security chief who now heads the Democratic Reform Current from exile in the United Arab Emirates, said in a post on his official Facebook page that US special envoy Jared Kushner had told him he had reached an agreement with Israel to halt its attacks on Gaza the following morning. 

“Mr. Jared Kushner confirmed to us that he had agreed with the Israeli side to halt the attacks on Gaza beginning tomorrow morning,” Dahlan wrote. 

Less than two hours later, Dahlan edited the post, removing both the claim that Kushner had reached an agreement with Israel and the deadline. “Mr. Jared Kushner has informed us that he is working with the Israeli side to stop the attacks on Gaza,” the revised version read. “We continue our intensive contacts with the US side to ensure the agreement is implemented fully and faithfully.” 

The revised post said the agreement’s success now depended on Israel fully committing to ending its daily attacks. A Board of Peace official separately walked back a claim that the disarmament had already begun. 

“There is a clear Israeli rejection of the matter of storing the weapons,” Mohamed Ibrahim, an Egyptian security analyst involved in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, told The Media Line. “This is the most important problem facing the agreement, and we will make a great effort to solve this problem, which could obstruct implementation.”

Israel will continue striking Hamas, says MK Eli Cohen

Israel will keep attacking Gaza despite Hamas’ agreement to hand over its weapons, Energy Minister Eli Cohen said Sunday. In an interview with Army Radio, Cohen, a member of the security cabinet, denied that Israel had agreed to end its assault and backed a full military takeover of the Strip, which Israel already holds about 70% of. Cohen, who as foreign minister opened talks with Rwanda and Congo on accepting displaced Palestinians from Gaza, has said Israel is moving toward full control “until we reach 100%.” 

Two people were killed in Deir al-Balah before the hour the halt was meant to take effect. Medics counted nine dead in Gaza on Sunday morning. By afternoon the figure was 13. By evening, Palestinian medical sources put it at least at 15. 

An Israeli helicopter struck an apartment in the Al-Masha’ala area of Deir al-Balah, killing Kamal Abu Muailaq, head of Hamas’ administrative body in the city, and his wife; the Israeli military said its strikes there targeted two commanders of Hamas’ Nukhba force. 

In Gaza City, a strike on an apartment in the al-Sousi tower killed Abdullah Adnan Abu al-Tayef, his wife Abeer and their son Azzam. Three members of the al-Hams family, one of them a child, were killed in al-Qarara, northwest of Khan Yunis. 

It was the second straight day of airstrikes since President Donald Trump announced what he called a historic agreement for the “complete disarmament” of Hamas. 

Dahlan said contacts with Washington were continuing and that the ball is now in the Israeli court. 

Hamas and the other Palestinian factions accepted the roadmap on Thursday at El-Alamein, on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. It names one body that may hold Hamas’ weapons, and it is not Israel. 

Only the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza may “hold, store or control weapons in Gaza,” the document says. No weapons may be transferred or surrendered to Israel or to any non-Palestinian party. Palestinian factions would take part in identifying and storing them. An International Verification Committee would monitor the process, backed by an International Stabilization Force. Point two requires Israel to cease its military operations “fully and without delay.” 

President Trump says “complete disarmament.” Hamas officials do not use the word, and neither does Cairo. 

Hamas would lose independent control of its arsenal. But nothing in the document sends those weapons to Israel or out of Gaza – the two things Israeli officials have called essential. Hamas has since submitted amendments to the weapons article and to the clause covering Gaza’s government employees. It has asked for changes to the definition of the military infrastructure to be dismantled, seeking language it says cannot later be reinterpreted. It is waiting for an Israeli response. 

Ghazi Hamad, a member of the Hamas negotiating team, said the movement was making concessions “for the sake of our people in the Gaza Strip, to save them from killing and displacement.” The weapons go into storage only after Israel completes what it owes under the Sharm El Sheikh protocol: halting attacks, pulling back, letting in aid and commercial goods. 

Hamad, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, told Lebanon’s LBC TV in October 2023 that the group would repeat the Oct. 7 attack “again and again” until Israel was annihilated, and that Israel “is a country that has no place on our land.” 

Hamas “is demonstrating considerable flexibility and making substantial concessions in an effort to save the Palestinian people in Gaza,” Mohammad Seyam, a Palestinian researcher from Gaza based in Doha and a professor of security and conflicts, told The Media Line, and “at the same time, deprive Israel of its pretexts.” 

A 15-point roadmap for disarmament

The 15-point roadmap sorts Gaza’s arsenal into categories and sends each one down a different route. 

Police weapons go first. When the committee enters Gaza and takes up its duties, every police weapon passes to its authority. Serving officers and new recruits face vetting. Hamas’ police force numbers about 10,000 officers, mostly unarmed and dressed in navy uniforms, and whether any of them join the new force is one of the plan’s unresolved questions: Hamas wants them included, and Israel rejects any officer with a Hamas affiliation. 

The same commission is mandated to rebuild Gaza’s civil registration and identity systems and to coordinate with the Palestinian Authority, Israel and international partners on a unified population registry. Israel has controlled that registry since Oslo; births, marriages, deaths and address changes all require Israeli approval. 

Heavy weapons follow – a gradual, sequential process covering heavy arms, production facilities, depots and tunnels. The text says decommission and store. It does not say where, who guards the sites, how inspectors get in, or whether anything is destroyed. 

Personal weapons are the rifles and pistols held by individuals, families and clans rather than by the factions. Under the roadmap, they come under Palestinian law, with the committee alone registering and licensing them, revoking licenses and enforcing the rules. Civilians would be allowed to sell privately owned weapons, and the roadmap asks factions, clans and other parts of Palestinian society to cooperate. 

No published estimate exists of how many such weapons are in Gaza. The large clans have been heavily armed for decades. Hamas tried and failed to disarm the Doghmush family of Sabra in Gaza City repeatedly after the movement’s founding in the 1980s, in clashes that continued through last October. Armed groups outside Hamas now field roughly 3,000 fighters across the Strip, according to Sky News’ Data and Forensics Unit. 

Militias outside Hamas are covered too. Their weapons are placed in committee storage, and their members are barred from the new police and security services. Israel has armed and supported anti-Hamas groups inside Gaza. 

Dahlan called on all Palestinian factions to abide by the agreement, “end all armed activity and refrain from any actions that could give Israel a pretext to undermine it.” 

The stabilization force would not police Palestinians. It deploys between Israeli troops and committee-run areas, watches the ceasefire, trains Palestinian police, guards aid convoys. Internal security stays with the committee. The verification committee decides when the process moves from one stage to the next. The roadmap does not name its members, does not say what happens if they disagree, and does not say what follows if anyone blocks an inspection. 

Establishing a stabilization force “without clear command structures, UN oversight, and the privileges and immunities established through the United Nations” is “particularly worrisome,” said Susan Akram, a clinical professor at Boston University School of Law, who added that it remains unclear whether the mission is peacekeeping or peace enforcement. 

The roadmap makes each stage conditional on the last, and Israel controls the first one. 

On Thursday, Netanyahu’s office said the proposal did not meet Israel’s demand for the complete demilitarization of Gaza. On Sunday, Doron Spielman, spokesperson for the Prime Minister’s Office, said Israel had raised serious security concerns with Washington.  

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir called the roadmap unacceptable and said Israel should keep killing Hamas leaders. Ben-Gvir, convicted in 2007 of incitement to racism and support for a terrorist organization, has said the only path to victory is “the full conquest of the Gaza Strip, a complete halt to the so-called ‘humanitarian aid,’ and the encouragement of emigration.” Netanyahu himself has not commented publicly. 

Israel’s position is that the weapons leave Gaza, said Nimrod Goren, president and founder of Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and that Israel signs off on the decommissioning before it moves. 

“It’s essentially an Israeli stamp of approval – that it was done according to the expectations,” Goren told The Media Line. “Only then Israel will move to withdrawal.” 

When Israeli and Egyptian officers met in Cairo in early July, Egypt said it was willing to take Hamas’ weapons if they are handed over. 

“If Israel does not accept the agreement formally, the ground will be prepared for further tension, and we could return to a state of war,” Ibrahim said. Egypt will step up coordination with the mediators and the United States “in order to pressure Israel into accepting the agreement in full.” 

“The Egyptian state trusts the American administration completely,” he said. Without bilateral coordination between Cairo and Washington, he added, Trump’s original 20-point plan “could not have been reached.” 

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty spoke with Nickolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace’s high representative for Gaza, and with US envoy Steve Witkoff the same day. 

“There should be simultaneous steps – a gradual Israeli withdrawal against a gradual resolution of the weapons problem, the inventory and storage of the weapons,” Ibrahim told The Media Line. “If the two parties commit to the principle of simultaneity, the agreement will succeed. The opposite is also true.” 

Mladenov, the architect of the phased approach, wrote on X that implementation and verification mechanisms must be “real and effective,” and that the Israeli withdrawal must proceed in parallel with the dismantling of weapons. 

Israel narrowly approves the ISF with minor flexibility

What Israel has given Washington is narrow approval for the stabilization force to enter, some flexibility for a partial entry, and a decision not to attack the agreement publicly, Goren said. 

“All of these smaller operational things, or symbolic or statement-related things, are not really impacting the way the Israeli presence in Gaza looks like,” he said. “And then he will avoid anything that can bring political backlash during a campaign season.” 

Israelis vote on October 27. The disarmament sequence runs six to eight months. 

The 14-day clock may not have started. The roadmap does not give Hamas two weeks to empty its depots. It gives the parties 14 days to write the implementation timetable, and only after all sides approve the document. The verification committee can extend even that. 

“There’s no real debate on the practicalities,” Goren said. “This whole discussion about this process is so detached from the debate in Israel.” 

The body that would take custody of the weapons was formed in January and has been working from Cairo. Israel has not permitted most of its members into the territory they are meant to govern. The committee said this weekend it was fully ready to take on governance and reconstruction once the transition begins.

Abdelatty raised it with Mladenov by phone on Sunday, stressing the importance of the committee beginning its work from inside Gaza to manage the transitional phase and preserve the unity of the Palestinian territories, according to a statement from the Egyptian foreign ministry. 

Hamas announced in July that it was dissolving its emergency government. 

Neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority has faced voters since 2006. The committee’s members were approved by the Palestinian factions, not elected, and hold little decision-making power inside the Board of Peace structure. 

The committee “may not enjoy widespread popularity among the people of Gaza because it was established through arrangements involving those parties who,” they claim, “committed genocide against them,” Seyam said. “Nevertheless, the people of Gaza continue to hold on to it because it represents the only remaining thread of hope for saving them from Israeli brutality and returning them to a path toward normal life.” 

Israel’s security cabinet gave initial approval on July 26 for a stabilization force of roughly 200 troops, with a headquarters near Rafah, and reserved the right to decide which countries may take part. Ben-Gvir voted against, telling ministers Hamas had not disarmed, and Israel was therefore not obligated to proceed. No deployment date has been set. 

Since the ceasefire took effect in October 2025, Israeli forces have killed 1,222 Palestinians and wounded 4,053, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry. 

“Without a different Israeli leadership, you could not really make any progress – either with or without the Board of Peace,” Goren said. 

“Even if Hamas were to raise the white flag and all its leaders, together with the population of Gaza, were to surrender, this would still not satisfy Israel,” Seyam said. “It would continue to demand more.” 

This post was originally published on here. 

France has reportedly opened judicial and internal investigations into the French Prime Minister’s Service (SPM) after two of its employees committed suicide, and several others have attempted suicide, over the past few months. 

SPM hosts some 50 secretariats, directorates, and missions, as well as other independent bodies, at the Hôtel Matignon, the official residence of the French prime minister.

On Monday, French public radio channel France Inter reported that labor unions had requested to meet with SPM leadership in early June regarding the situation. Following these meetings, an internal investigation into an employee’s suicide attempt, which had previously been stalled, was approved.

The unions were also able to get SPM to commit to broader investigations into risks in all of its offices, France Inter claimed, which is expected to be conducted over the next few months by an external firm. 

“All we want is to restart a healthy dynamic for everyone,” a staff representative told France Inter.

France Inter reported that a complained had been filed in June under Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which dictates that any official with knowledge of a crime must inform the justice system of it.

The report, filed by a staff representative after the attempted suicide of SPM employee Laura (a pseudonym) in April, alleges “exceptionally serious issues” concerning SPM’s working conditions.

Mocked, made invisible

Starting in late 2023, “my client was made invisible,” Laura’s lawyer Christelle Mazza explained Laura’s lawyer Christelle Mazza to France Inter. “She was no longer invited to meetings, she was removed from the organizational chart, she was nothing anymore. She was mocked, jeered at as if in schoolyard bullying, ostracized.”

Mazza added that eventually, Laura was fully isolated from her team and assigned a basement office. 

After receiving no “effective response” from her superiors regarding the situation, Laura consulted several other professionals and an internal audit confirmed that while there was “severe workplace suffering,” the only option offered was for her to leave the department.

“Ultimately, the problem becomes her,” Mazza told France Inter. “She ended up in a situation typical of what we usually see in public administrations: nothing happened even though all of this was well known. All these warning signs are never heeded, never prioritized, and then they explode into public view with harm to people’s physical integrity.”

Laura’s situation is not an isolated case, according to France Inter.

France Inter reported that in October 2025, an an employee of the Directorate of Legal and Administrative Information (DILA) attempted to take her own life in her office by cutting her throat with a box cutter.

Several of her colleagues reportedly went on strike in response, but the incident was not recognized as a workplace accident.

Less then six months later, in March 2026, a project manager in the General Secretariat for Investment took his own life at home while working from home, according to France Inter.

A few days later, an employee of the General Secretariat of the Government (SGG) threw himself under a train in Val-d’Oise, “in a context of identified workplace suffering,” according to the Article 40 report, seen by France Inter.

Each time, France Inter noted, SPM said it set up “a support and assistance program for colleagues.”

‘Finally realized a pattern’

“We’ve crossed a line. This accumulation forms a pattern, and we finally realized it,” an SPM source shared with France Inter. 

According to France Inter, the “pattern” follows the instability of French politics, as since the dissolution of France’s’ National Assembly in 2024, there have been four different governments.

“It’s like a new army arrives every four to six months,” an SPM staff representative described to France Inter. “The chief of staff shows up wanting to implement their new organization. Teams change, offices get redone, phones get reassigned, etc. You have to bend to the new boss’s new demands.”

“The first effects were felt about ten years ago, with departments being destabilized,” one employee recalled to France Inter. “With entities merging, headcounts shrinking, and a growing share of contract workers, the sense of belonging to a collective weakens.”

“At the same time, there’s a generational shift,” added another source, “with managers coming from the private sector who just want the Matignon credential on their résumé. They’re often very technically competent people, but their management style is extreme. They arrive with no understanding of public service culture, lecture us, and break a lot of things before moving on.”

“We need to strengthen the political side, strengthen our departments, that requires reforms, no doubt about it, but the Prime Minister’s services still can’t be allowed to become a lawless zone the way they sometimes are.”

This post was originally published on here. 

What first appeared to be a small wound near the nose concealed a rare and dangerous injury after an 11-and-a-half-year-old boy was struck by an arrow during an archery activity at a summer camp on Sunday.

The boy was admitted to the pediatric emergency department at Kaplan Medical Center after the accident and was diagnosed with pneumocephalus, the presence of air inside the cranial cavity, a rare complication that could have had far more serious consequences had physicians not carried out an extensive diagnostic evaluation. 

Following consultations between specialists at Kaplan and Schneider Children’s Medical Center, the boy was transferred to Schneider for continued treatment and observation. His condition has since improved.

Arrow strikes boy’s nose during camp activity

The incident occurred during an archery activity held as part of the camp’s summer vacation program. One of the children fired an arrow that struck the upper part of the boy’s nose. 

Despite the wound’s superficial appearance, the medical team decided not to rely solely on an external examination.

The boy was examined by the pediatric emergency team as well as ear, nose, and throat specialists and ophthalmologists. At the same time, he underwent a series of imaging tests to rule out vascular injury, bleeding, or deeper trauma.

Upon examination, doctors discovered pneumocephalus

The scans revealed an unusual finding. The arrow had penetrated through the bridge of the nose and the eye socket, passed through the sinuses, and reached the cranial cavity, where it caused air to enter the skull, a rare medical condition known as pneumocephalus.

One of the unusual signs of the injury emerged when physicians asked the boy to blow his nose. As he did so, air bubbles emerged from the wound, raising suspicion of a connection between the nasal cavities and the cranial cavity.

“This case illustrates how an injury that appears small and superficial on the outside can conceal a significant underlying injury. Because of the location of the wound and the mechanism of injury, we decided not to rely solely on the external examination and instead carried out a thorough evaluation,” Dr. Tzafnat Yair Prokoczimer, director of the pediatric emergency department at Kaplan Medical Center, said.

“The imaging studies revealed that the arrow had penetrated through the sinus region and caused air to enter the cranial cavity. This is a rare complication that requires evaluation and monitoring by specialist teams. The vigilance of our staff and the rapid completion of the diagnostic work-up enabled us to identify the injury and transfer the boy for the appropriate treatment.”

Following the findings, Kaplan’s medical teams held a multidisciplinary consultation with ear, nose, and throat specialists and neuroradiologists, together with pediatric trauma and pediatric neurosurgery experts from Schneider Children’s Medical Center. At the conclusion of the discussion, it was decided to transfer the boy to Schneider’s pediatric intensive care unit.

“In injuries of this kind, even when the external wound appears small, there may be a complex injury involving multiple body systems. The joint work of the teams at Kaplan and Schneider enabled us to quickly reach the correct treatment decision and provide the boy with the best possible care,” Dr. Nir Samuel, a senior physician in the emergency department and head of the trauma service at Schneider Children’s Medical Center, noted.

“Equipment such as bows and arrows, even when intended for recreational use, can cause severe and even life-threatening injuries. It is essential to use appropriate safety equipment, ensure close supervision, and match activities to the children’s ages in order to prevent incidents that could end with much more serious consequences.”

Upon arrival at Schneider, the boy underwent an additional evaluation by a multidisciplinary team that included specialists in pediatric trauma, pediatric neurosurgery, otolaryngology, ophthalmology, and pediatric intensive care. 

After the assessment was completed, doctors determined that surgery was not required. He was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit for observation and was later transferred to the surgical ward after his condition improved. His condition continues to improve.

This post was originally published on here. 

Volunteers from the Arava’s Search and Rescue unit have located the family of seven that was reported missing in the area of Nahal Gov on Monday afternoon.

“We reached the family, who are all with us, very exhausted, but in good condition,” volunteers from the Arava’s Search and Rescue unit said. “In a moment they will be brought into an air-conditioned vehicle, drink water and be treated.”

“A Magen David Ambulance ambulance is on its way here to join us. The family members will be examined and a decision will be made whether they need to be evacuated [to hospital] for further treatment.”

Volunteers had begun the search earlier in the day, after a woman had contacted emergency services after losing contact with her husband and their six kids who had gone hiking despite the intense heat and extreme weather conditions. N12 reported that the kids were aged nine to 19.

The husband had informed the wife upon setting off from Kibbutz Ir Ovot in the Arava at 8:00 a.m., saying that they were equipped with a large amount of water. At 11:30 a.m., he had told her that they were exhausted due to the hot weather but hoped to finish the hike within half an hour. 

Police comb Kinneret for missing vacationer 

In a separate incident, Israel Police announced that it is searching for a man in his 40s who left his belongings on Trapez Beach, entered the Kinneret, and has not been seen or heard from since.

Officers from the Kinneret’s Maritime police unit, the nothern district, as well as a police helicopter and fire and rescue teams from the nearby cities are combing the area for the man.

Israeli public broadcaster KAN News reported that the Kinneret Cities Association is aiding in the search with a supervising boat and a drone.

According to the association, the man is a vacationer who has been missing since morning.

This post was originally published on here. 

US Central Command asked military analysts to develop “creative and unconventional” ways to pressure Iran as US President Donald Trump’s administration reassessed its strategy in the ongoing conflict with Tehran, CNN reported on Monday.

“We are looking for new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran,” an officer in CENTCOM’s intelligence branch wrote in an email sent Wednesday to a broad group of military analysts, according to a source familiar with the message.

A second source said that a senior US military officer had circulated the request last week. Military officials described the crowdsourcing-style email as unusual, while the second source said CENTCOM was reviewing its approach and considering a wide range of alternatives.

“US Central Command has a long history of thinking and working in innovative ways,” Captain Timothy Hawkins, a spokesperson for CENTCOM, said in a statement. “Admiral [Brad] Cooper, in particular, reaches out to members of our great team, regardless of rank, to achieve the highest levels of operational performance possible.”

The request illustrated the challenge facing Trump as he considers three difficult paths: expanding the air campaign, committing US troops to riskier operations on the ground, or reaching an agreement that falls short of some of his original war objectives.

Trump weighs military escalation, renewed diplomacy

Trump threatened renewed strikes against Iran after the email was sent but called off a planned attack over the weekend. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was among the regional leaders who contacted the president and urged him to de-escalate, according to CNN.

Trump said on Sunday that the US and Iran were expected to resume talks concerning the Strait of Hormuz and Tehran’s nuclear program on Monday.

The diplomatic track follows weeks of US airstrikes intended to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and compel Tehran to return to negotiations. US intelligence assessments have nevertheless concluded that the bombing campaign is unlikely, by itself, to change Iran’s negotiating position, CNN previously reported.

One option under consideration would significantly increase the scale of the air campaign. US officials said CENTCOM had developed a plan for one or two weeks of heavy bombardment intended to destroy Iran’s remaining missile capabilities.

Trump has not approved the plan. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine has reportedly raised concerns about dwindling US supplies of air-defense interceptors, while other officials have warned that strikes on bridges, desalination facilities and other infrastructure could cause high civilian casualties.

Caine has publicly acknowledged that an air campaign cannot necessarily meet all of the administration’s stated goals.

“Air power has its limits,” he told lawmakers in July.

Deeply buried nuclear sites raise prospect of ground operation

The same limitation applies to Iran’s remaining nuclear infrastructure. Two sources familiar with military planning said preparations had been made for possible strikes against Pickaxe Mountain and other facilities believed to contain nuclear material or equipment.

The underground sites may be too deeply buried to be destroyed with conventional US bombs and missiles, according to the sources. Fully eliminating them could therefore require American troops to enter Iran, an option carrying far greater military and political risks.

Trump has repeatedly threatened ground operations, including the possible seizure of the strategic Kharg Island or efforts to remove Iran’s highly enriched uranium. Such action would conflict with his 2024 campaign promise not to send Americans to fight in prolonged foreign wars.

It would also expose US personnel to additional danger. Eighteen American service members have been killed in the conflict, while hundreds more have been wounded.

A more limited possibility discussed by Trump would involve strikes resembling a “fireworks” display, according to a source familiar with the planning. The operation could target sites previously attacked, or similar locations, and offer the president a symbolic military victory without destroying Iran’s nuclear program.

Such an attack would not necessarily address Iranian claims over the Strait of Hormuz, which has become a central point of contention between Washington and Tehran.

“At the end of the day, POTUS will want a deal, so he’ll continually look for ways to get tough and get out of this,” one source familiar with the discussions said.

“You need creative minds at times, especially if you’re running out of conventional options.”

Continued strikes risk prolonging conflict

The third choice would be to continue the current pattern of limited strikes and Iranian retaliation while pursuing negotiations. That approach would avoid the immediate risks of a ground invasion but could prolong threats to US personnel and commercial shipping.

“I think we just want to win,” Trump said during a Cabinet meeting on Friday when asked how the war would end. “We’ll be hitting them very hard, and you know, at some point, they’re going to say, ‘We just can’t take it anymore.’”

This post was originally published on here. 

Police detained a contractor and several other businesspeople for questioning on Monday on suspicion of concealing interests in real estate and transferring assets during bankruptcy proceedings, Israel Police said.

One of the figures questioned is considered close to senior Likud circles.

According to police, the contractor, who has been in bankruptcy proceedings since 2012, allegedly concealed his rights to properties worth tens of millions of shekels and transferred assets under his control, in violation of his obligation to disclose them.

Police said the suspects allegedly acted systematically to conceal their interests from authorities. Property was seized during the operation for possible forfeiture later in the legal proceedings.

The investigation was conducted jointly by the Lahav 433 National Economic Crime Unit and the Justice Ministry’s insolvency enforcement unit.

This a developing story.

This post was originally published on here. 

For years, the defense community has focused on a single question: Will artificial intelligence replace the human commander? 

It is an interesting question, but the war in Ukraine, together with Israel’s recent operational experience, demonstrates that it is the wrong one. AI is not replacing people, nor is it replacing commanders. Instead, AI is fundamentally changing how commanders think, decide, and fight. 

More importantly, it is redefining the division of labor between humans and machines, transforming both military decision-making and the execution of operations across every echelon of the battlefield. 

The revolution is not about a specific algorithm or a breakthrough software application. It is about the fact that modern warfare has become a dynamic system that generates unprecedented volumes of information at a speed and complexity far beyond the processing capacity of the human mind. 

For decades, the principal challenge for military organizations was collecting information. Today, the challenge is understanding it before it loses its operational value. 

In modern warfare, information has become more valuable than mass alone. The force that sees first, understands first, decides first, and acts first will increasingly hold the decisive advantage. 

A careful examination of recent conflicts reveals that we are witnessing not one AI revolution, but two complementary revolutions unfolding simultaneously. 

The first is taking place inside command headquarters; the second is occurring at the tactical edge. Both are powered by AI, yet their purposes are fundamentally different. 

The first revolution: AI in military headquarters 

Modern headquarters face an entirely new operational challenge. The problem is no longer a lack of information; quite the opposite. At every moment, headquarters receive an uninterrupted flow of information from hundreds of sources – unmanned aerial systems, satellites, manned aircraft, radar networks, SIGINT platforms, electronic warfare systems, ground sensors, manoeuvering forces, air and missile defense assets, logistics networks, cyber systems, and command-and-control architectures. 

Each source provides only a partial view of reality. The challenge is no longer to collect more information. The challenge is to understand it faster than the battlefield changes. 

This is precisely where AI delivers its greatest value: it is not replacing the commander; rather, it is becoming an integral component of the commander’s decision environment. 

Its primary contribution is not decision-making, but cognitive augmentation. By reducing cognitive overload and compressing decision time, AI enables commanders to focus on the uniquely human aspects of command. 

Rather than manually processing thousands of data points, AI continuously filters information, fuses multiple intelligence sources, detects operational patterns, prioritises threats, classifies targets, builds a dynamic Common Operational Picture (COP), and generates courses of action for human consideration. 

The commander remains the sole decision-maker. However, that decision is now based upon a richer, more accurate, more current, and more comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. 

Command responsibility therefore does not diminish. It becomes even more demanding. 

As AI accelerates the flow of information, commanders are required to exercise judgement under increasingly compressed decision cycles while integrating operational, legal, political, and strategic considerations that no algorithm can fully evaluate. In military terms, AI fundamentally compresses the early stages of the OODA Loop – to observe, orient, decide, act. 

It dramatically accelerates the processes of observation, information processing, orientation, and situational understanding, allowing commanders to dedicate their attention to the functions that remain inherently human: understanding operational context, balancing competing priorities, assessing risk, managing uncertainty, exercising mission command, and applying professional military judgement. 

This is where AI creates decision superiority. 

Sensor fusion – from data collection to battlefield understanding 

Perhaps the most transformative capability enabled by AI is sensor fusion. No single sensor can provide a complete picture of the battlespace. 

A UAV observes one portion of the fight. A satellite captures another. Electronic Warfare systems detect electromagnetic emissions. SIGINT identifies communications activity. Ground forces contribute human observations and operational context. Radar tracks movement. Cyber sensors reveal activity within the digital domain. Individually, each source offers only fragments of reality. 

AI transforms these fragments into a coherent operational picture. Rather than simply aggregating data, AI continuously correlates information across multiple domains, identifies relationships between otherwise disconnected observations, highlights anomalies, removes duplication, and produces an integrated understanding of the battlespace. 

The result is a fundamental transformation in the role of the headquarters. 

It is no longer merely an organization that collects information. It becomes an organization capable of understanding the battlefield in near real time. This shift represents far more than a technological improvement. It is a transformation in the architecture of military command itself. Information superiority no longer depends upon collecting more data. 

It depends upon converting data into actionable understanding faster than the enemy can adapt. In future conflicts, the headquarters that can continuously transform information into operational understanding will possess a decisive advantage over one that simply accumulates more sensors. 

AI therefore becomes not another command-and-control application, but the cognitive engine that enables modern headquarters to function effectively in an increasingly complex battlespace. 

The second revolution: AI at the tactical edge 

The tactical edge represents the first operational environment in which AI is no longer supporting human cognition alone. It is increasingly supporting autonomous execution under human command. 

If the primary role of AI within military headquarters is to enhance human cognition, its role at the tactical edge is fundamentally different. Here, time is far more limited, and in many cases the decision window is measured in seconds. 

A drone that detects a target cannot always wait for approval from higher headquarters. An unmanned ground vehicle operating in a GPS-denied environment cannot stop every time communications are disrupted. An unmanned interceptor engaging a swarm of UAVs cannot transmit every decision back to the command center. 

This is where a new division of labor between humans and machines begins. At the tactical edge, AI is already making decisions. 

These are not strategic decisions, nor political decisions. They are tactical decisions, local in nature, highly time-sensitive, and driven by operational tempo. AI can navigate without GPS, operate under degraded communications, track targets, identify objects, select routes, perform terminal guidance, intercept threats, and cooperate with other unmanned systems. 

Capabilities of this kind are already emerging in Ukraine, Israel, and several advanced Western militaries. 

As the pace of combat continues to accelerate, the number of decisions that can no longer wait for human intervention continues to increase. Sensor fusion also plays a central role at the tactical edge, although its purpose is fundamentally different. 

Within headquarters, sensor fusion is designed to improve understanding. At the tactical edge, it is designed to improve action. A drone integrating Electro-Optical (EO) sensors, Infrared (IR) imaging, Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), Electronic Warfare (EW) data, radar, and additional sensors is capable of making significantly higher-quality tactical decisions than a platform relying on a single sensor. 

This is also where the value of autonomy becomes apparent. Autonomy does not mean replacing humans. The human commander continues to define the mission, operational boundaries, Rules of Engagement (ROE), abort criteria, and the required confidence thresholds. 

The machine operates within those predefined parameters. It does not replace human judgement. It executes human intent at a speed that human operators alone can no longer achieve. 

From separate layers to a cognitive operational network

There is a natural tendency to view AI in headquarters and AI at the tactical edge as two separate capabilities. In reality, they are not separate at all. They are components of the same operational system. 

Headquarters continuously learns from the information generated by manoeuvering forces and unmanned systems. At the same time, tactical systems receive situational awareness, priorities, and objectives from headquarters. Sensors continuously update both echelons in real time; information flows in every direction without interruption. 

The result is the emergence of a single cognitive operational network across the battlespace. No longer a traditional hierarchy consisting of “headquarters” and “combat forces,” but a single integrated cognitive network. 

Within this network, every sensor functions as a neural node. Every platform becomes an operational actuator. Every AI algorithm serves as a processing engine. Every commander becomes part of a larger operational ecosystem in which humans and intelligent machines operate together continuously. This represents a transformation far greater than simply introducing AI into individual platforms. It represents a fundamental transformation in force architecture. 

The war in Ukraine, together with Israel’s recent operational experience, does not demonstrate that AI is replacing humans. Rather, it demonstrates that AI is transforming the human role. Within headquarters, AI enhances human cognition by compressing information, fusing data from multiple sensors, shortening decision cycles, and creating a richer and more reliable operational picture. 

At the tactical edge, AI enables machines to make clearly defined tactical decisions, operate under degraded conditions, share information, navigate, identify targets, and employ combat power at a speed beyond human capability. 

These two revolutions, however, represent only an intermediate stage. The ultimate objective is neither an intelligent headquarters nor an intelligent drone. The objective is a Cognitive Operational Network in which headquarters, sensors, unmanned systems, manoeuvering forces, fires, air defense assets, and AI-enabled capabilities operate as a single integrated system that continuously learns, adapts, and evolves in real time. 

The future advantage will not belong to the military that possesses the largest number of tanks, nor to the one that fields the greatest number of algorithms. It belongs to the military that succeeds in integrating people, AI, data, sensors, command and control, and doctrine into a single, coherent, resilient, and adaptive operational architecture. 

In the future, the central question will no longer be whether humans or machines make decisions. The real question will be how effectively they think, learn, and fight together. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Israeli OnlyFans model Adva Lavie, 29, who also uses the name Mia Ventura, will remain in custody in Los Angeles after a judge ruled on Friday that she posed a flight risk due to repeated violations of the conditions of her release.

The hearing followed Lavie’s third arrest in just a few months. On Tuesday evening, she was arrested by Beverly Hills police as she left the upscale Azul restaurant near Rodeo Drive after police in Indio, Riverside County, east of Los Angeles, issued a warrant for her arrest.

According to the latest allegations, in April 2025, during the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival, one of the world’s largest music festivals held over two weekends each April in Indio, Lavie, who identified herself as Mia Ventura, stole luxury items worth more than $11,000 from at least two victims, including a Rolex watch valued at approximately $8,600, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, and a card holder from the French luxury brand.

According to reports, some of the alleged thefts were captured on the apartment’s security cameras and on the Tesla cameras of one of the victims, evidence that later led Riverside County authorities to obtain an arrest warrant against her.

Her legal troubles only deepened when police officers noticed that Lavie was no longer wearing the electronic ankle monitor she had been required to wear as a condition of her release in her previous case. 

A legal saga of burglary, theft

As a result, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed an additional charge alleging that she violated a court order.

Lavie’s highly publicized legal saga began in October 2025, when the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department asked the public for help locating her in connection with a series of alleged burglaries and thefts targeting older, wealthy men she had met through dating applications. Investigators allege that between 2023 and 2025 she developed relationships with the victims, entered their homes, and stole cash, gold, and luxury items.

In March 2026, prosecutors filed serious charges against her, including theft, residential burglary, and unlawful use of personal information. Lavie pleaded not guilty and was released on bail under the conditions that she wear an electronic monitoring device and remain within Los Angeles County.

Since then, she has repeatedly run into further legal trouble. In June, she was arrested twice for allegedly violating the conditions of her release, including leaving Los Angeles County.

 She claimed she had crossed the county line while visiting a restaurant in Malibu, only to discover that it was located in the neighboring county. Despite prosecutors’ requests that she be returned to custody, judges at the time opted to issue warnings instead.

The case has also drawn attention because of Lavie’s relationship with 64-year-old Jewish billionaire Steven Cloobeck, a former California gubernatorial candidate. Cloobeck was himself arrested in May on suspicion of attempting to influence witnesses in her case. 

The two had informed acquaintances in February that they planned to marry in Jerusalem in June, but following her latest arrest, it was reported that the planned wedding had been called off and that Cloobeck had also stopped funding her legal defense.

At Friday’s hearing, the judge said that “nothing will ensure that she appears for trial anymore,” adding, “She wants everything to happen on her own terms.”

Local Los Angeles media reported that Lavie, who was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs and wearing a blue prison uniform, requested a Hebrew interpreter despite speaking fluent English.

Lavie, also known as Ventura, is currently being held in Los Angeles County Jail while awaiting further proceedings in both cases, the main case in Los Angeles County and the new case in Riverside County. She faces serious felony charges and, if convicted on all counts, prosecutors could seek a sentence of 10 years in prison or more.

This post was originally published on here. 

Volunteers from the Arava’s Search and Rescue unit have begun searching for a family of seven that was reported missing in the area of Nahal Gov on Monday afternoon.

According to N12, a woman had contacted emergency services after losing contact with her husband and their six kids, aged nine to 19, who had gone hiking despite the intense heat and extreme weather conditions.

The husband had informed the wife upon setting off from Kibbutz Ir Ovot in the Arava at 8:00 a.m., saying that they were equipped with a large amount of water.

At 11:30 a.m., he had told her that they were exhausted due to the hot weather but hoped to finish the hike within half an hour. The seven have not been heard from since.

This is a developing story.

This post was originally published on here. 

Reports that Saudi Arabia may be preparing a military operation against Yemen’s Houthis have revived fears that Riyadh could be drawn back into a direct ground war. But the evidence currently points to contingency planning and force repositioning – not a confirmed Saudi ground invasion. 

Public reporting has described Saudi troop movements in eastern Yemen, discussions over a possible operation in or towards the central governorate of Al-Bayda, and efforts to assemble a multinational maritime coalition.

Saudi Arabia, however, has not publicly announced a ground offensive, and the reported movements do not by themselves establish that a final political or operational order has been issued. 

The speculation follows the collapse of the relative calm that had prevailed along the Saudi-Yemeni border. On July 13, the Houthis fired missiles towards southern Saudi Arabia after accusing Riyadh of striking Sanaa airport, ending approximately four years without comparable cross-border exchanges.

On July 20, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, and days later claimed attacks against Saudi oil tankers and energy infrastructure. 

Red Sea critical for Saudi energy exports as Hormuz traffic disrupted

The pressure is particularly sensitive because the Red Sea has become increasingly important for Saudi energy exports as the war between the United States and Iran continues to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping around Bab el-Mandeb therefore exposes Saudi Arabia to pressure at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi officials have responded with airstrikes against Houthi targets and the establishment of a 14-nation maritime defense coalition involving countries including Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen and Turkey. 

Yet a new Saudi campaign would not necessarily resemble the intervention launched in 2015. 

Cyril Widdershoven, a senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, told The Media Line that as of Aug. 2, 2026, there was no conclusive evidence that Saudi regular forces had already entered Houthi-controlled Yemen in significant numbers or begun a major ground invasion. 

He said that the increasingly credible indicators of Riyadh’s preparation of military options could include possibly a limited land campaign, which most probably would be led by Yemeni anti-Houthi forces with Saudi air, intelligence, logistics, and command support. 

The central distinction is between a Saudi invasion and an offensive conducted by Yemeni forces with Saudi support. Analysts say Riyadh appears to have little appetite for sending large, armored formations deep into northern Yemen, where the geography, extended supply lines and the Houthis’ experience in irregular warfare would expose Saudi forces to significant losses. 

Saudi Arabia could contribute air power, logistics, special forces

Instead, any operation might rely on units aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, particularly forces positioned around Marib, Hadramaut and the Saudi border. Saudi Arabia could contribute air power, intelligence, artillery, engineering capabilities, air defense, logistics and command assistance. 

“It will not be a Saudi invasion resembling the 2015 intervention,” Widdershoven said. “Most plausibly it would be a Saudi-enabled Yemeni offensive, possibly supported by small numbers of Saudi personnel in command, intelligence, artillery, air-defense, engineering, and special-forces roles.” 

Several possible axes have emerged. An operation through Al-Bayda could place pressure on Houthi-controlled territory from central Yemen and potentially connect government-held areas in the east and south with routes leading towards Sanaa. 

“Based on assessments, a central-axis campaign could attempt to pressure the Houthis through Al-Bayda, thereby connecting anti-Houthi areas in southern and eastern Yemen to the approaches to Sanaa,” Widdershoven said.

“In reality, Al-Bayda is strategically valuable because it lies at the center of several major Yemeni regions and could threaten Houthi internal lines of communication,” he explained, adding that for the military, it would be a difficult operation due to its mountainous terrain, tribal complexity, and narrow roads, all favoring defenders. 

A second scenario would involve renewed pressure from Marib, where government-aligned forces already confront established Houthi defensive positions. A third could focus on the Red Sea coast, potentially extending from Mokha and Al-Khawkhah towards Hodeidah.

In theory, such a campaign could seek to restrict Houthi access to ports, missile positions, surveillance sites and infrastructure used to threaten maritime traffic. 

Involvement would likely remain outside the realm of significant ground incursion

Saudi involvement could therefore remain largely outside the principal ground formations. According to Widdershoven’s assessment, Saudi personnel would be more likely to protect border areas, provide precision-strike and artillery support, conduct limited special-forces operations and help secure ports, airfields or logistics installations captured by Yemeni forces. 

“Saudi combat aircraft and drones will be used to strike launch sites, storage facilities, command nodes, and coastal missile positions before and during any ground advance. Saudi naval forces could simultaneously tighten inspections or establish protected shipping corridors. Keep in mind, all of this will not remove or defeat the Houthis,” he noted. 

The purpose of such an operation would consequently be coercive rather than territorial: to change the military balance, reduce the threat to Saudi infrastructure and shipping, and force the Houthis back towards negotiations. 

“Riyadh’s objective is overall expected to be not a complete conquest of Houthi territory, but to change the military balance sufficiently to force the Houthis to halt attacks on Saudi territory and shipping,” Widdershoven said. 

Abdulghani Al-Iryani, senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, where his work focuses on conflict, political transition and regional dynamics, offered a more skeptical assessment of both the likelihood of an imminent ground campaign and the capacity of Yemen’s government forces to conduct one.  

“There is a lot of talk, but it is not convincing to me. I think the government forces are not prepared to carry out an offensive,” he told The Media Line. 

“They can defend themselves and their positions now that they have better weapons, are better armed and are better commanded, but I do not think they have the capacity to carry out offensive action. So, despite all the rumors, I do not think there is going to be a ground war in the near future. This might change in the coming weeks, but right now, it is not likely.” 

The capacity of anti-Houthi forces remains a central constraint. The forces include formations with different chains of command, regional constituencies, political objectives and foreign sponsors. Even with Saudi air support, bringing them together under a coherent operational structure would be difficult.

An offensive that succeeds initially but then stalls could leave Riyadh facing an extended conflict without achieving sufficient leverage to impose a settlement. 

Al-Iryani also rejected the prospect of Saudi forces leading a major ground campaign. 

“Saudi Arabia will not send its forces. I think the Saudi plan is to get the Yemeni government forces to carry out the ground operations while Saudi Arabia provides air support,” he said. 

“I think a combination of the stick – a ground invasion by government forces supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt – and the carrot – a political deal – will eventually prevail,” Al-Iryani noted. 

The references to possible Pakistani and Egyptian support describe Al-Iryani’s assessment of how a broader campaign could develop. Public commitments by Cairo and Islamabad have so far focused on the Saudi-led maritime security initiative rather than a confirmed deployment of ground forces inside Yemen. 

Saudi-Houthi conflict no longer confined to Yemen

The renewed confrontation is also no longer confined to Yemen. Saudi and regional assessments cited by Reuters alleged that some recent attacks against Saudi energy facilities were launched from Iraq through coordination between Houthi personnel and Iran-aligned Iraqi factions.

The Houthis claimed responsibility themselves, while Iraq said it was investigating. Saudi Arabia and the United States subsequently struck militia positions in Iraq, widening the geographical scope of the confrontation. 

That development complicates any Saudi military calculation. Even a successful campaign against missile and drone infrastructure in Yemen would not necessarily eliminate attacks conducted through Iraqi territory or other Iran-aligned networks. It also increases the danger that a Saudi-Houthi confrontation becomes inseparable from the broader exchange between Washington and Tehran. 

President Donald Trump has publicly threatened to hold Iran responsible for further Houthi attacks, while the United States has continued striking Iranian targets. Tehran, in turn, has attacked or threatened American positions in neighboring Arab countries. Saudi Arabia therefore faces pressure to respond to attacks on its territory and shipping without allowing Yemen to become another uncontrolled front in the US-Iran war. 

For Washington, a Yemeni ground campaign would present its own limitations. Airstrikes can degrade launch sites, storage facilities and command networks, but they cannot by themselves establish control over territory or resolve Yemen’s fragmented political order. 

“The United States has no palatable military options, and elections are getting close, so I expect Trump will return to the memorandum of understanding,” Al-Iryani said. 

The humanitarian consequences would be significant. Yemen is already facing severe food insecurity. In government-controlled areas alone, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projected that approximately 5.4 million people would experience crisis-level hunger or worse during the June-to-September lean season. Renewed disruption to ports, roads and commercial shipping could further increase food and fuel prices across both government- and Houthi-controlled territory. 

“The Houthis cannot hold on for long because the Yemeni population under their control is starving,” Al-Iryani said. “Interfering with maritime traffic will lead to higher food prices and the onset of famine in Yemen.” 

For the Houthis, maritime pressure offers leverage over Saudi Arabia, regional energy markets and Washington. But sustained disruption could also deepen economic hardship among the population they govern. For Riyadh, military action may reduce immediate pressure on shipping or the border, yet it risks reviving a war that proved costly, difficult to control and resistant to a purely military solution. 

The evidence supports a cautious conclusion. Saudi Arabia appears to be preparing options, reinforcing maritime defenses, and assessing how to activate Yemeni forces against the Houthis. A limited Saudi-enabled offensive around Al-Bayda, Marib, or the Red Sea coast is increasingly conceivable. A large Saudi ground invasion, however, remains less likely. 

The decisive questions are whether Yemeni government forces could sustain an offensive; whether Saudi air and logistical support could compensate for their fragmentation; and whether battlefield pressure could produce a political settlement before a limited campaign became another prolonged regional war. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Reports that Saudi Arabia may be preparing a military operation against Yemen’s Houthis have revived fears that Riyadh could be drawn back into a direct ground war. But the evidence currently points to contingency planning and force repositioning – not a confirmed Saudi ground invasion. 

Public reporting has described Saudi troop movements in eastern Yemen, discussions over a possible operation in or towards the central governorate of Al-Bayda, and efforts to assemble a multinational maritime coalition.

Saudi Arabia, however, has not publicly announced a ground offensive, and the reported movements do not by themselves establish that a final political or operational order has been issued. 

The speculation follows the collapse of the relative calm that had prevailed along the Saudi-Yemeni border. On July 13, the Houthis fired missiles towards southern Saudi Arabia after accusing Riyadh of striking Sanaa airport, ending approximately four years without comparable cross-border exchanges.

On July 20, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, and days later claimed attacks against Saudi oil tankers and energy infrastructure. 

Red Sea critical for Saudi energy exports as Hormuz traffic disrupted

The pressure is particularly sensitive because the Red Sea has become increasingly important for Saudi energy exports as the war between the United States and Iran continues to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping around Bab el-Mandeb therefore exposes Saudi Arabia to pressure at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi officials have responded with airstrikes against Houthi targets and the establishment of a 14-nation maritime defense coalition involving countries including Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen and Turkey. 

Yet a new Saudi campaign would not necessarily resemble the intervention launched in 2015. 

Cyril Widdershoven, a senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, told The Media Line that as of Aug. 2, 2026, there was no conclusive evidence that Saudi regular forces had already entered Houthi-controlled Yemen in significant numbers or begun a major ground invasion. 

He said that the increasingly credible indicators of Riyadh’s preparation of military options could include possibly a limited land campaign, which most probably would be led by Yemeni anti-Houthi forces with Saudi air, intelligence, logistics, and command support. 

The central distinction is between a Saudi invasion and an offensive conducted by Yemeni forces with Saudi support. Analysts say Riyadh appears to have little appetite for sending large, armored formations deep into northern Yemen, where the geography, extended supply lines and the Houthis’ experience in irregular warfare would expose Saudi forces to significant losses. 

Saudi Arabia could contribute air power, logistics, special forces

Instead, any operation might rely on units aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, particularly forces positioned around Marib, Hadramaut and the Saudi border. Saudi Arabia could contribute air power, intelligence, artillery, engineering capabilities, air defense, logistics and command assistance. 

“It will not be a Saudi invasion resembling the 2015 intervention,” Widdershoven said. “Most plausibly it would be a Saudi-enabled Yemeni offensive, possibly supported by small numbers of Saudi personnel in command, intelligence, artillery, air-defense, engineering, and special-forces roles.” 

Several possible axes have emerged. An operation through Al-Bayda could place pressure on Houthi-controlled territory from central Yemen and potentially connect government-held areas in the east and south with routes leading towards Sanaa. 

“Based on assessments, a central-axis campaign could attempt to pressure the Houthis through Al-Bayda, thereby connecting anti-Houthi areas in southern and eastern Yemen to the approaches to Sanaa,” Widdershoven said.

“In reality, Al-Bayda is strategically valuable because it lies at the center of several major Yemeni regions and could threaten Houthi internal lines of communication,” he explained, adding that for the military, it would be a difficult operation due to its mountainous terrain, tribal complexity, and narrow roads, all favoring defenders. 

A second scenario would involve renewed pressure from Marib, where government-aligned forces already confront established Houthi defensive positions. A third could focus on the Red Sea coast, potentially extending from Mokha and Al-Khawkhah towards Hodeidah.

In theory, such a campaign could seek to restrict Houthi access to ports, missile positions, surveillance sites and infrastructure used to threaten maritime traffic. 

Involvement would likely remain outside the realm of significant ground incursion

Saudi involvement could therefore remain largely outside the principal ground formations. According to Widdershoven’s assessment, Saudi personnel would be more likely to protect border areas, provide precision-strike and artillery support, conduct limited special-forces operations and help secure ports, airfields or logistics installations captured by Yemeni forces. 

“Saudi combat aircraft and drones will be used to strike launch sites, storage facilities, command nodes, and coastal missile positions before and during any ground advance. Saudi naval forces could simultaneously tighten inspections or establish protected shipping corridors. Keep in mind, all of this will not remove or defeat the Houthis,” he noted. 

The purpose of such an operation would consequently be coercive rather than territorial: to change the military balance, reduce the threat to Saudi infrastructure and shipping, and force the Houthis back towards negotiations. 

“Riyadh’s objective is overall expected to be not a complete conquest of Houthi territory, but to change the military balance sufficiently to force the Houthis to halt attacks on Saudi territory and shipping,” Widdershoven said. 

Abdulghani Al-Iryani, senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, where his work focuses on conflict, political transition and regional dynamics, offered a more skeptical assessment of both the likelihood of an imminent ground campaign and the capacity of Yemen’s government forces to conduct one.  

“There is a lot of talk, but it is not convincing to me. I think the government forces are not prepared to carry out an offensive,” he told The Media Line. 

“They can defend themselves and their positions now that they have better weapons, are better armed and are better commanded, but I do not think they have the capacity to carry out offensive action. So, despite all the rumors, I do not think there is going to be a ground war in the near future. This might change in the coming weeks, but right now, it is not likely.” 

The capacity of anti-Houthi forces remains a central constraint. The forces include formations with different chains of command, regional constituencies, political objectives and foreign sponsors. Even with Saudi air support, bringing them together under a coherent operational structure would be difficult.

An offensive that succeeds initially but then stalls could leave Riyadh facing an extended conflict without achieving sufficient leverage to impose a settlement. 

Al-Iryani also rejected the prospect of Saudi forces leading a major ground campaign. 

“Saudi Arabia will not send its forces. I think the Saudi plan is to get the Yemeni government forces to carry out the ground operations while Saudi Arabia provides air support,” he said. 

“I think a combination of the stick – a ground invasion by government forces supported by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt – and the carrot – a political deal – will eventually prevail,” Al-Iryani noted. 

The references to possible Pakistani and Egyptian support describe Al-Iryani’s assessment of how a broader campaign could develop. Public commitments by Cairo and Islamabad have so far focused on the Saudi-led maritime security initiative rather than a confirmed deployment of ground forces inside Yemen. 

Saudi-Houthi conflict no longer confined to Yemen

The renewed confrontation is also no longer confined to Yemen. Saudi and regional assessments cited by Reuters alleged that some recent attacks against Saudi energy facilities were launched from Iraq through coordination between Houthi personnel and Iran-aligned Iraqi factions.

The Houthis claimed responsibility themselves, while Iraq said it was investigating. Saudi Arabia and the United States subsequently struck militia positions in Iraq, widening the geographical scope of the confrontation. 

That development complicates any Saudi military calculation. Even a successful campaign against missile and drone infrastructure in Yemen would not necessarily eliminate attacks conducted through Iraqi territory or other Iran-aligned networks. It also increases the danger that a Saudi-Houthi confrontation becomes inseparable from the broader exchange between Washington and Tehran. 

President Donald Trump has publicly threatened to hold Iran responsible for further Houthi attacks, while the United States has continued striking Iranian targets. Tehran, in turn, has attacked or threatened American positions in neighboring Arab countries. Saudi Arabia therefore faces pressure to respond to attacks on its territory and shipping without allowing Yemen to become another uncontrolled front in the US-Iran war. 

For Washington, a Yemeni ground campaign would present its own limitations. Airstrikes can degrade launch sites, storage facilities and command networks, but they cannot by themselves establish control over territory or resolve Yemen’s fragmented political order. 

“The United States has no palatable military options, and elections are getting close, so I expect Trump will return to the memorandum of understanding,” Al-Iryani said. 

The humanitarian consequences would be significant. Yemen is already facing severe food insecurity. In government-controlled areas alone, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projected that approximately 5.4 million people would experience crisis-level hunger or worse during the June-to-September lean season. Renewed disruption to ports, roads and commercial shipping could further increase food and fuel prices across both government- and Houthi-controlled territory. 

“The Houthis cannot hold on for long because the Yemeni population under their control is starving,” Al-Iryani said. “Interfering with maritime traffic will lead to higher food prices and the onset of famine in Yemen.” 

For the Houthis, maritime pressure offers leverage over Saudi Arabia, regional energy markets and Washington. But sustained disruption could also deepen economic hardship among the population they govern. For Riyadh, military action may reduce immediate pressure on shipping or the border, yet it risks reviving a war that proved costly, difficult to control and resistant to a purely military solution. 

The evidence supports a cautious conclusion. Saudi Arabia appears to be preparing options, reinforcing maritime defenses, and assessing how to activate Yemeni forces against the Houthis. A limited Saudi-enabled offensive around Al-Bayda, Marib, or the Red Sea coast is increasingly conceivable. A large Saudi ground invasion, however, remains less likely. 

The decisive questions are whether Yemeni government forces could sustain an offensive; whether Saudi air and logistical support could compensate for their fragmentation; and whether battlefield pressure could produce a political settlement before a limited campaign became another prolonged regional war. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Police detained a contractor and several other businesspeople for questioning on Monday on suspicion of concealing interests in real estate and transferring assets during bankruptcy proceedings, Israel Police said.

One of the figures questioned is considered close to senior Likud circles.

According to police, the contractor, who has been in bankruptcy proceedings since 2012, allegedly concealed his rights to properties worth tens of millions of shekels and transferred assets under his control, in violation of his obligation to disclose them.

Police said the suspects allegedly acted systematically to conceal their interests from authorities. Property was seized during the operation for possible forfeiture later in the legal proceedings.

The investigation was conducted jointly by the Lahav 433 National Economic Crime Unit and the Justice Ministry’s insolvency enforcement unit.

This a developing story.

This post was originally published on here. 

Israel’s Highway 1 eastbound was, briefly, entirely blocked off to traffic near the Shoresh Interchange outside Jerusalem on Monday after a vehicle went up in flames. 

Emergency responders, including the Israel Fire and Rescue Authority, arrived on the scene shortly after it began. No injuries were reported. 

Firefighters received a call at 10:46 a.m. on Monday morning about a fire on the highway, and dispatched four teams from the Beit Shemesh area to the scene. They immediately began working to extinguish the fire to prevent it from spreading to the woods nearby. 

During the initial stages of putting out the fire, all traffic was blocked. Soon afterward, however, police were able to open up one lane to traffic. At 12 p.m., Israel National Roads Company announced that the highway was fully opened to traffic, although the area is very congested. 

This comes as the Israel Meteorological Service forecasts a record-high heatwave and strong, dry winds for this weekend, peaking at 47°C in the Galilee region and posing a high risk for wildfires.

Agencies collaborate on real-time fire identification, location

The recent increase in extreme weather and global warming has led to a significant rise in the scale and intensity of forest fires. Rapidly spreading fires endanger human life, communities, infrastructure, and open areas, presenting a growing challenge for emergency response agencies who strive to detect fire outbreaks early on.

In response to the crisis, the National Security Ministry, the Israel Innovation Authority, IAI, Technion, and the Fire and Rescue Authority collaborated on devising a solution for identifying and locating fires in real time, within minutes of its ignition. 

According to the IAI, the core challenge lies in sustaining an up-to-date operational picture in real time and reacting swiftly as a fire spreads, especially across vast, remote, or hard-to-access terrain.

The system leverages spectral algorithms for image analysis, AI for real-time data analysis, anomaly detection, locating of fire source, and extraction of the fire’s precise location, even from high altitudes. Alongside advanced scanning, the drone transmits immediate alerts to the Fire and Rescue Authority’s command center.  

Ariel Moskowitz contributed to this report.

This post was originally published on here. 

Defense Minister Israel Katz on Monday rejected the claim that he called for IDF Central Command chief Maj.-Gen. Avi Bluth’s dismissal, calling the argument an outright lie that is part of a political campaign directed against the government.

During a live Sunday night interview with Channel 14’s The Patriots, Katz said that, “when one of the participants called to ‘dismiss the general [Bluth],’ I responded immediately and clearly: ‘No.’ The exchange was recorded on camera and is fully documented,” he said.

Katz said the appointment process for IDF Manpower Directorate Chief Maj.-Gen. Dado  Bar Khalifa to Central Command commander had already been underway for months; “therefore, the attempt to suggest that any decision was made as a result of that interview does not stand up to the facts.”

“This is not a genuine controversy but rather a media attempt to divert attention from the real question: What would happen if Yair Golan, who has already threatened to dismiss [Shin Bet chief] David Zini, were to become defense minister in a government led by Gadi Eisenkot?”

“In such a scenario, there is concern that figures associated with the old “conceptzia” would once again be appointed, something that could harm the settlement enterprise and Israel’s security,” Katz said. “That did not happen under my watch, and it will not happen.”

Katz accuses Bluth of being overly harsh to settler violence, neglecting terrorism 

During the interview with Channel 14, Katz explained that his decision was made due to Bluth’s allegedly unsatisfactory handling of extremist settler violence in the West Bank. He accused Bluth of being overly harsh in efforts to combat Israeli settler violence while neglecting the fight against Palestinian terrorism from the West Bank.

According to the IDF, Katz’s statement was not coordinated with IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. The military stated that Zamir does not intend to remove Bluth from his position at this time and that when any such decision is made, it will require Zamir’s approval in accordance with the required protocols.

Katz’s office released a statement claiming that as early as the end of April, Zamir recommended Katz appoint Bar Khalifa as the Commander of the IDF’s Central Command.

According to the statement, Katz interviewed Bar Khalifa in June and deemed him a suitable candidate to take over the position when the time comes to appoint a new Central Command head.

Goldie Katz contributed to this report.

This post was originally published on here. 

A record heatwave is gripping the Korean peninsula, sending temperatures soaring across South Korea and North Korea as authorities expand emergency measures and residents seek relief in cooling shelters, beaches and water parks.

Forecasters said on Monday that extreme heat, previously concentrated in South Korea’s southeast, was spreading into the Seoul metropolitan area and other western regions. North Korean state media also reported temperatures approaching 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) in parts of the country and a fifth straight tropical night in Pyongyang.

South Korea’s weather agency warned temperatures could rise further in western regions this week.

Data from the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency from Sunday showed 14 had died and 1,889 people had suffered heat-related illnesses since mid-May.

The Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) said Yangsan recorded 42.5°C on Sunday, the highest temperature measured in 122 years of weather observations. The southeastern city had already broken the national record on the two preceding days.

Government ordered to mobilize all available resources

Prime Minister Han Seong-sook ordered ministries and local governments to mobilize all available resources to respond to heatwave and drought risks, after the government raised its heatwave response alert to the second-highest level, unlocking funding for relief efforts and more frequent inspections in affected areas.

Power authorities have activated emergency measures and are closely monitoring supply and demand as electricity consumption is expected to reach a record high in late August amid surging air-conditioning use.

Severe heatwave warnings have been issued across parts of southern South Korea, including Busan, Ulsan, South Gyeongsang and parts of Gwangju and South Jeolla Province.

Local governments have scrambled to protect vulnerable residents. Seoul districts have expanded cooling shelters and distributed free water and sun umbrellas, while Yangsan has expanded water-spraying operations and water distribution.

Searing temperatures have disrupted daily life. Over the weekend, the Korea Baseball Organization canceled games in Busan and Changwon and said further schedule adjustments could be considered if dangerous conditions persist.

Local media reported packed beaches, water parks and riverside recreation areas.

North Korea is experiencing similar conditions. State media said heat advisories covering much of the country would remain in place through the week and reported that tens of thousands of people had visited the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone during July.

Water parks in Pyongyang were also packed, according to state television.

This post was originally published on here. 

Members of Israel’s opposition should remain focused on toppling Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, rather than argue over who among them should be the next leader, MK Avigdor Liberman, chairman of Yisrael Beytenu, said in an interview with 103FM on Sunday.

His comment came after Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot stated that leaders of smaller parties in the opposition bloc should not insist on seeking the premiership.

“I think [Eisenkot] is missing the main point, and all of us need to focus on one objective: bringing down the draft-dodgers’ alliance and the October 7 massacre government,” Liberman said. 

“All this talk about who should be prime minister? Come on, you’re talking about it too, and you’re saying that you also want to be, and deserve to be, prime minister.”

Liberman claimed Eisenkot was falling into Netanyahu’s “trap,” claiming the prime minister wants opposition leaders to “spend all our time talking about who’s first, who’s second, and what coalition there will be, instead of talking about the substance.”

Ra’am cannot be a coalition partner, Likud is ultra-Orthodox-lite

Liberman argued that focusing on such issues effectively turns opposition parties into campaigners for Likud, and noted that he has not been able to align himself with the party since it became “a light ultra-Orthodox party.”

“That’s not somewhere I intend to work,” he said.

Asked whether the United Arab List (Ra’am) could eventually become part of the opposition bloc, Liberman said the answer was no, and that after October 7, “Ra’am cannot be a partner in the coalition, not from within and not from outside, period.” 

He added that, in any case, his party would not need Abbas’s support.

“The real news is that we’re going to win by a landslide, and there will be a Hungarian scenario. The Zionist parties will secure an overwhelming majority, enough on our own, and we won’t need anyone else,” he said. 

“We’ll establish a truly statesmanlike and Zionist government, as opposed to a sectoral government, the draft-dodgers’ alliance of Goldknopf, Deri, and Netanyahu.”

On Iran: ‘We’ve become a banana republic’

Liberman also addressed the ongoing crisis with Iran and US President Donald Trump’s decision to cancel a planned strike on targets in the Islamic Republic.

“The Iranians are not willing to give up for even a second, not on their nuclear program, not on control of the Strait of Hormuz, and not on support for all their proxies across the region,” he said. “They’re simply buying time. We’ve become a banana republic. It can’t be that Trump announces that we won’t attack Iran, that everyone is speaking on our behalf.”

This post was originally published on here.