Ankara has increasingly embraced religiously conservative rhetoric and “family values” as part of a broader political strategy aimed at consolidating support among nationalist and conservative constituencies, two experts told The Jerusalem Post on Sunday.
The comments came days after police detained more than 50 people at a Pride event in Istanbul that had been banned by local authorities, and after Turkish officials denied docking permission to a long-planned LGBT cruise.
Turkish geopolitical analyst Burak Can Çelik said the recent measures do not necessarily reflect a society becoming more religiously conservative, but rather a state that is increasingly embedding religion and conservative values into its political framework.
The Governorship of Aydın, for example, said on X that the cruise ship had been denied permission to dock because those aboard were “known for their behavior incompatible with our society’s structure and moral values.”
Rich Campbell, CEO of trip organizer Atlantis Events, told The Washington Post that the American company had brought LGBT travelers to Turkey about a dozen times over more than 20 years, and this was the first time Turkish authorities had refused docking permission because of passengers’ sexual orientation, and the canceled visit alone would cost the Turkish economy about $1 million.
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While legal in Turkey, LGBT people have increasingly faced prosecutions under laws critics say effectively criminalize their identities
Although same-sex relations have been legal in Turkey since 1858 and gender transition since 1988, LGBT people have increasingly faced prosecutions under laws critics say effectively criminalize their identities.
In April, 11 members of the Genç LGBTI+ association were put on trial on charges of “obscenity” and “violating the protection of the family” after authorities accused them of publishing photographs online showing same-sex couples kissing. Concerns also mounted in October last year after a leaked draft of the government’s 11th Judicial Package proposed criminalizing behavior deemed “contrary to biological sex and general morality” while raising the minimum age for gender transition from 18 to 25.
“My reading is that Turkey is not necessarily becoming more religiously observant as a society, but the state’s political language has become more visibly conservative, family-centered, and civilizational in recent years,” Çelik said. “This distinction is important. Turkish society remains highly diverse, and some survey data actually suggest that younger and urban segments are not moving in a uniformly more religious direction. In that sense, I would be careful not to describe the country as a whole as simply ‘Islamizing.'”
Instead, Çelik argued, what has changed most noticeably is the government’s political use of conservative identity.
“The recent denial of docking to the LGBT cruise, the repeated bans on Pride events, and the police detentions should be read within a broader domestic framework: the government increasingly presents ‘family values,’ social morality, and national-cultural authenticity as areas of political defense,” he said.
“This helps consolidate conservative and nationalist constituencies, especially at moments of economic pressure, political polarization, and demographic anxiety.”
Turkey’s economy had shown signs of stabilizing earlier this year following a 2023 policy shift toward higher interest rates aimed at curbing inflation and stabilizing the lira. However, Operation Epic Fury disrupted much of that progress, sending Brent crude prices soaring from an anticipated $65 per barrel to as high as $119 and complicating Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek’s economic reform agenda.
Ankara balancing global relationships with the West and Islamist powers
Ankara has also increasingly taken to the geopolitical world stage, balancing both Western allies through its NATO membership and Islamist powers in the region.
Turkey, alongside Qatar, is considered one of the most hospitable countries for the Muslim Brotherhood, and was even seen as a potential new home for Hamas leadership when reports of Doha’s frustrations emerged during the Israel-Hamas hostage negotiations.
Despite this, Çelik said he doubted that Ankara’s domestic actions were at all to do with its regional alignments.
“There is certainly an ideological layer in Turkey’s approach, especially in its sympathy for Palestinian Islamist actors, its rhetoric on Gaza, and its historical proximity to Muslim Brotherhood-linked networks. But Turkish foreign policy today is also deeply pragmatic,” Çelik argued. “Ankara has normalized or improved relations with Egypt, the Gulf states, and other actors with whom it previously had ideological tensions. It remains a NATO member, seeks influence in European security, maintains transactional ties with Russia, and tries to position itself as an autonomous regional power rather than merely part of an Islamist camp.”
“Ankara uses conservative identity as a domestic mobilizing tool and as part of its regional soft-power vocabulary, while still making pragmatic decisions when strategic, economic, or security interests require it,” he reasoned.
“In my view, the more accurate description is not ‘Turkey is aligning with Islamist powers because it is becoming more religious,’ but rather: Ankara is using a conservative-Islamic and nationalist vocabulary to strengthen domestic legitimacy and regional influence, while pursuing a flexible, interest-based foreign policy.”
Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on Turkey at Tel Aviv’s Moshe Dayan Center, told The Post that much of the ideological shift in Turkey was based on Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s aspirations and origins.
Erdogan is ‘considered as the champion of conservatism and Islamism in Turkey’
Coming from an Islamist background, Yanarocak explained that Erdogan is “considered as the champion of conservatism and Islamism in Turkey,” and his focus, as shown by his plans to change the constitution so he can run for a fourth term, is on building his own legacy. This legacy depends on his triumph over his political rivals.
Erdogan has already imprisoned the popular Ekrem İmamoğlu and is increasingly targeting other opposition groups, including the left-wing Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, which has broad support among minority communities.
Given that these constituencies are unlikely to back his continued rule, particularly in light of his Islamist vision, Yanarocak said he has little political incentive to refrain from further crackdowns.
More broadly, Yanarocak said Erdogan subscribes to a neo-Ottoman vision that seeks to restore Turkey’s regional influence politically, economically, culturally, and, at times, militarily across territories once ruled by the Ottoman Empire.
He argued that this outlook is closely tied to a more conservative domestic agenda and a more assertive, increasingly authoritarian approach both at home and abroad, and that means not providing “breathing room for a pluralist society.”
