The United States must not allow the nuclear issue to be sidelined in any agreement that would ease financial pressure on the Islamic regime, experts told The Jerusalem Post on Sunday, warning that control over the Strait of Hormuz would amount to a much-needed “lifeline” for Tehran.
In Tehran’s counter-proposal sent to Pakistan on Saturday, according to Axios, the Islamic regime reportedly demanded the unrestricted sale of its oil, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, an end to Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the release of some of the regime’s frozen assets.
In return, Washington and Tehran would sign a memorandum of understanding under which, for 60 days, no tolls would be imposed on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran would also reportedly sweep some of the mines it laid. According to some reports, the sides would also discuss a nuclear agreement at some point.
While the reported version of the agreement would rely largely on the US relinquishing much of its leverage in the initial phase, with the understanding that it could lead to Tehran dismantling its nuclear facilities at a later stage, Dr. Raz Zimmt, director of the Iran and Shi’ite Axis research program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told the Post that any terms favorable to Tehran should only be accepted if they include firm, concrete commitments on ending uranium enrichment and transferring its existing stockpile.
He said that even if there were sanctions relief or the unfreezing of Iranian assets, it would not be enough to “solve Iran’s deep economic crisis.” At the same time, he acknowledged that the reported terms of the deal would provide “some kind of lifeline to the Iranian regime.”
The Islamic Republic’s financial woes have already led to significant internal unrest, igniting the violently suppressed January protests. The situation is understood to have only worsened since the regime installed an internet blackout, restricting access to global markets and online platforms needed by many.
Maj. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, an Iran expert from the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security, agreed with this assessment, telling the Post that ending the US blockade cannot solve the regime’s budgetary crisis, though its ability to collect “mafia-style” protection money from ships in Hormuz would be a concerning development.
Companies would be unwilling to enter Iran thanks to the regime’s internet blackout, hyperinflation, and general instability, providing little relief to Tehran, he continued.
More concerning to Zimmt than the potential financial “lifeline” is the absence of any clear guarantee regarding Iran’s nuclear disarmament or a genuine halt to its nuclear ambitions.
“If there was an ability to reach a good deal with Iran, which would be sure to block Iran’s path toward nuclear weapons, then one could argue that even if that means some kind of sanctions relief, it would be okay,” he commented.
“But right now we see a preliminary agreement or possible agreement between Iran and the United States in which Iran has made no commitment whatsoever to give up its nuclear capabilities, at least not in this first stage.
“Nobody can really guarantee that it’s going to be possible to reach a detailed agreement with Iran,” he added.
Iran unlikely to make or keep commitment to give up nuclear capabilities
Grinberg was doubtful Iran would ever make or keep to such a commitment, describing the trade-off as “theoretically but not practically possible.” Agreeing to a US term would signal a type of “surrender” to the US, which would be interpreted by both its allies and enemies as a sign that it is in a weakened state.
The Iranian regime “cannot afford to behave more reformist than the reformists,” Grinberg said, claiming such an action would likely lead to internal attempts at a takeover from both the regime’s opponents and its more hardline supporters, who would be religiously against such a settlement.
Another potential issue with the terms demanded by Iran is its insistence that Jerusalem end its war against Hezbollah, even though the conflict does not involve US forces.
While Israeli officials like MK Benny Gantz have warned against such terms, aware that Israeli civilians living next to the Lebanese border would pay the price of continued attacks from the Iran-backed terror group, Zimmt suggested that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may already have accepted that Washington would need to accept and impose such a condition.
He warned that if Hezbollah launched a full-on offensive against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, the agreement could leave Israel “constrained” in how it can respond.
Despite “the many advantages” of joining forces with the US against Iran, Zimmt said there would always be differences between Washington’s and Jerusalem’s agendas, differences that could force Israel to compromise on its own national security needs.
“The number one priority from the US point of view right now in the war against Iran is the Strait of Hormuz, while from the Israeli point of view, it’s always been the issue of the nuclear issue,” he commented.
US ‘blinked first’ in negotiations with Iran
Dr. Menahem Merhavi, a fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told the Post that the US “blinked first” by signaling to Tehran that it was unwilling to put “boots on the ground” to reopen the strait.
This, he said, has pushed Washington into negotiations with “fewer cards to play with.”
Though he described Washington’s restraint as “frustrating,” he said Tehran’s portrayal of itself as a winner in the conflict was little more than smoke and mirrors.
“Iran is even more diminished and weaker than before the war. It has lost its immunity from outside attacks,” Merhavi said.
Merhavi suggested that Washington’s reluctance to use direct military force stemmed not from fear of Iran’s military capabilities, but from “concern of the repercussions for Iran’s immediate neighbors,” who “probably pressed” the US not to take such a step after months of aerial attacks.
From the perspective of the Gulf states, which have endured months of Iranian attacks with less time to respond and without Israel’s defense advantages, Zimmt suggested that they have likely concluded that an agreement to end the war under the current terms is worth pursuing.
The regime’s intactness has meant that, in their view, the gains of months of conflict have amounted to limited success, even if Tehran itself has been significantly weakened, he said.
Needing to adjust to the reality of Iran remaining their neighbor, Zimmt assessed that Gulf states would likely continue to adopt the increasingly common view that Israel is the “destabilizing force in the region.”
This, he said, could create new obstacles for expanding the Abraham Accords and other regional security arrangements, which are seen as important tools for addressing the regime’s growing threat.
Such an assessment, he added, was not extended to the United Arab Emirates, an Abraham Accords state, which increased its collaboration with Israel and used the war period to advance its defensive capabilities and security cooperation.
Zimmt’s assessment was aligned with that of Dr. Arash Azizi, a Gulf analyst and Iranian-American historian, who told the Post that the “warpath” promoted by Trump and Netanyahu over the past few years had made the situation “worse, not better.”
Azizi said that member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have come to see the war as largely unproductive. In his view, this has strengthened a preference for de-escalation, renewed regional relationships, and a broader effort to find “a way to live with Iran in the neighborhood.”
