Former Biden administration official Phil Gordon on Saturday rejected attempts by supporters of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to portray Brett McGurk’s new book and interviews as vindication of Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza.
“Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of Brett McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza,” Gordon wrote in a post on X. “But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared — including among former members of the Biden administration.”
Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of @Brett_McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza. But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared—including among former members of the Biden administration. I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner, and few think that the biggest mistake Biden made was to show daylight with Israel. And even Brett’s account makes clear that hostages were not the top priority for Netanyahu and that when U.S. pressure actually was applied—as after the World Central Kitchen strike—it worked. Brett tells the story of the Biden phone call after that tragedy, but not the story of how Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024 to press him to conclude the hostage deal after Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released. Netanyahu instead added so many of his own conditions—against the advice of his own security chiefs—that the deal became impossible for another six months, during which nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six that Hamas executed in August. The Israeli changes included a demand that Israel retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt, which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal, and a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north which would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Both of those new conditions were dropped in the deal ultimately concluded in January 2025. Nothing in the book or elsewhere changes the reality that October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch; that he prioritized “total victory” and the maintenance of his coalition over a hostage deal or an end of the war; that his conduct of the war and management of its humanitarian consequences catastrophic; that it has left Israel more isolated and insecure; and that it has deeply damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s relationship with the United States—which should have done more to change Israel’s conduct rather than enable it. There was never an easy way forward in Gaza, but no version of the story vindicates Netanyahu.
— Phil Gordon (@PhilGordonDC) October 10, 2026
“I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner,” Gordon wrote, adding that “few think that the biggest mistake Biden made was to show daylight with Israel.”
Gordon argued that even McGurk’s own account showed that securing the release of the hostages was not Netanyahu’s top priority, and that US pressure on Israel could produce results when it was actually applied.
As an example, he pointed to Biden’s phone call with Netanyahu following the World Central Kitchen strike, saying that US pressure after that incident “worked.”
Biden aide says Netanyahu went against Israeli security chiefs, delayed Gaza deal
Gordon said, however, that McGurk’s account omitted another significant episode: a July 4, 2024 phone call in which Biden pressed Netanyahu to conclude a hostage deal after Hamas had, according to Gordon, accepted the basic framework.
“Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released,” Gordon wrote.
Rather than agreeing, Gordon alleged, Netanyahu introduced a series of additional conditions “against the advice of his own security chiefs,” making a deal impossible for another six months.
Gordon said that during that period, nearly 9,000 additional Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six hostages executed by Hamas in August.
Among the Israeli changes cited by Gordon was a demand that Israel retain forces “along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt,” which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal had already been made.
He also cited “a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north,” which he said would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza.
Gordon emphasized that both of those conditions were ultimately dropped from the agreement reached in January 2025.
Ex-Biden aide: No version of Gaza war ‘vindicates’ Netanyahu
Gordon went on to sharply criticize Netanyahu’s broader handling of the war, arguing that nothing in McGurk’s book or elsewhere altered what he described as the fundamental record of the conflict.
“Nothing in the book or elsewhere changes the reality that October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch,” Gordon wrote.
He accused Netanyahu of prioritizing “total victory” and “the maintenance of his coalition” over either a hostage deal or an end to the war.
Gordon also wrote that Netanyahu’s conduct of the war and his management of its humanitarian consequences were “catastrophic,” arguing that they had left Israel “more isolated and insecure” and had “deeply damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s relationship with the United States.”
The former Biden official said Washington should have done more “to change Israel’s conduct rather than enable it.”
“There was never an easy way forward in Gaza,” Gordon concluded, “but no version of the story vindicates Netanyahu.”
