Sweida has become one of the most sensitive issues in the new Syria, not only because of violations suffered by Druze and Bedouin civilians, but also because of questions over the province’s future and its relationship with the Syrian state.
This raises an important question for Israel: if protecting Sweida’s Druze population is a genuine objective, is supporting separation or keeping the province outside state institutions really the best way to achieve it?
Or would a more realistic option be to encourage a political settlement inspired by the path taken by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whereby the Druze receive political guarantees, rights, and meaningful participation in state institutions without turning Sweida into a separate entity?
In my view, the second option is more realistic and safer.
Sweida is not the SDF, but its experience offers a lesson
The SDF fought Damascus for years, including in Aleppo and Sheikh Maqsoud, while tensions and clashes also occurred in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and elsewhere. Yet the conflict did not lead to an independent Kurdish state.
Instead, the SDF moved toward negotiations with Damascus over a formula guaranteeing Kurdish rights and participation within a united Syrian state, followed by arrangements for integration into state institutions.
The lesson is not that Sweida should copy the SDF. It is that conflict with the state does not make separation the only option.
The students’ crisis reveals the core of the problem
The case of Sweida’s students illustrates the crisis clearly.
After the disruption of examinations, the Syrian state took exceptional measures to ensure that students could sit their exams. It prepared examination centers, staff, and materials and made special arrangements for them.
But according to media reports, the so-called “National Guard”, affiliated with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, prevented students from leaving Sweida to reach examination centers prepared by the Syrian state.
The question is simple: if the state prepared the examinations and provided the centers, who is preventing the students from reaching them?
Students should not become parties to a political conflict. When an armed force can prevent citizens from accessing state services, the issue becomes one of authority: who is responsible for providing basic services and protecting citizens’ rights?
Al-Hijri does not speak for all Druze
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has become one of the most prominent political voices in Sweida, but it would be wrong to treat him as the exclusive representative of Syrian Druze.
This matters to Israel because building long-term policy around one individual can lead to strategic miscalculations.
Reports concerning the detention, mistreatment, or killing of opponents and critics of al-Hijri also make independent investigations essential.
Al-Hijri’s past also matters
Israel should assess al-Hijri’s political record, rather than looking only at his current opposition to Damascus.
He has a history of political positions and relationships during the era of Bashar al-Assad, including positions that raised questions about his relationship or interaction with forces associated with various Iranian militias during different stages of the Syrian conflict.
If Israel is looking for a partner capable of producing stability in southern Syria, it should ask whether that person can build institutions capable of protecting the entire community, including those who disagree with him.
Violations do not make separation inevitable
The violations suffered by Druze and Bedouin civilians are unjustifiable and condemnable. Anyone who committed crimes against civilians should be held accountable, regardless of affiliation.
But justice does not require dividing Syria.
A state capable of investigating, prosecuting, and holding perpetrators accountable may provide stronger protection than local armed authorities operating outside a clear national judicial system.
Sweida therefore does not have to choose between submission to Damascus and separation from Syria. There is a third option: a genuine partnership within a united Syrian state.
Why should Israel think twice?
It is natural for Israel to view Sweida through a security lens and to care about protecting the Druze.
But this does not mean that supporting a separatist project is the best policy.
Israel can encourage a settlement between Sweida and Damascus that guarantees Druze rights rather than a permanent rupture.
If the Syrian state is responsible for security, services and the judiciary, while the people of Sweida participate in its institutions, clear arrangements can be established and monitored.
Keeping the province as a separate armed sphere of influence, by contrast, means continued uncertainty.
What if a Druze entity becomes a problem for Israel?
Even if establishing an independent Druze entity/state in southern Syria were possible, Israel should consider its long-term consequences.
Creating a political entity based on Druze identity would establish a new precedent in the region.
This raises a hypothetical question: what if the emergence of an independent Druze entity creates new identity dynamics among some of Israel’s Druze citizens?
This does not mean that Israel’s Druze citizens would seek separation or join such an entity. There is no basis for asserting that.
But an independent Druze entity across the border could, over time, open new debates about identity, belonging and relations between Druze communities across borders.
A state without recognition is not a guarantee of stability
There is also a practical question: who would recognize, finance, and protect an independent entity in Sweida?
A small entity without broad international recognition, surrounded by a complex regional environment and dependent on external support, could become a permanent zone of influence rather than a stable state.
Israel could ultimately face a new responsibility rather than more secure borders.
Damascus should put forward a political initiative
The Syrian government should build on the steps it has already taken (for example, students’ examinations) and make the people of Sweida see tangible benefits in remaining within the state.
What is needed now is a broader political initiative that includes holding accountable everyone who committed violations against civilians, ensuring a fair and transparent judiciary.
Sweida’s population needs to be included in state institutions and integrated into the state’s armed groups through clear and gradual arrangements, while ensuring the continuation of government services, particularly education and healthcare.
No settlement can succeed if an armed force remains capable of preventing state institutions from reaching citizens.
The SDF model offers Israel a third option
Israel does not have to choose between abandoning the Druze and supporting their separation from Syria.
It can encourage a third formula: Druze who are secure within Syria enjoy political representation and clear rights, while the Syrian state remains responsible for sovereignty and institutions.
Sweida can be part of the solution
The Druze do not need a new state to obtain their rights. Syria does not need to eliminate Sweida’s distinctiveness to preserve its unity. And Israel does not need an independent Druze entity to ensure the security of the south.
There is political space between these options: a united Syrian state, genuine Druze participation, justice for victims, and weapons organized under state institutions.
Protecting the Druze does not require dividing Syria, and preserving Syria’s unity must not mean ignoring Druze rights. If Israel genuinely wants to protect the Druze and contribute to the stability of its southern frontier, it should encourage this path rather than bet on continued division.
Stability in Sweida will not come from creating new borders, but from building a new relationship between Sweida and the Damascus government.
The writer is the Editor-in-Chief of Syria Focus.
