A year after Operation Rising Lion, we must ask: was the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran as historic as it once seemed? At the time, Israelis were awoken in the early hours of the morning with emergency alerts on their phones. No one knew what was happening, nor why. However, having endured war since October 7, 2023, many were steeled for the conflict ahead. Soon, the news broke that Israel had carried out strikes against Iran.
Israel’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear program is one of those “waiting for Godot” moments. It had been discussed for decades. In fact, it was such common knowledge that there had been mock discussions at Israeli universities about what would happen the “day after” Iran got a bomb. Israel’s prime minister had spent decades preparing for this eventuality, and even went to the UN with a cartoon drawing of a nuclear bomb with a red line.
The big question was not if, but when. US administrations had lurched back and forth on this topic. Some had sought ways to delay an Iranian bomb, via either technological means or a deal.
However, it was far easier to discuss scenarios than it was to actually do something. The nuclear program in Iran was well-known; the sites associated with it had become common knowledge, and we all heard about them via the media. Iran was often presented as being only a few weeks or months from breaking out a bomb.
Post-October 7 talk about the Iranian nuclear program
After the Israel-Hamas War began, there were continued discussions about the Iranian nuclear program. As it turned out, while Israel was focused on Iran, Hamas was the larger and more impending threat. Hamas was not viewed as a serious threat in most security circles.
The Iranians, meanwhile, had chosen to enrich uranium in response to US President Donald Trump leaving the nuclear deal during his first term. By 2024, the discussions were not about enrichment, but weaponization. Now, talks center on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone threats. Iran has used hundreds of ballistic missiles and long-range drones in its attacks on Israel in 2024.
Because of that, there were suddenly questions about whether the nuclear program was the main threat. After all, hundreds of ballistic missiles also posed a credible threat to Israel’s security. This was another example of how the laser focus on Iran’s nuclear program had led to Israel letting its guard down on other security threats.
When Operation Rising Lion was launched, Israel had the support of the Trump administration. The Iranian attacks in 2024 had proven that Israel’s new ties with US Central Command and other countries would help detect and intercept Iranian threats.
June 2025 inspired even more confidence. Iran’s ally, Hezbollah, was weakened in 2024. The Assad regime had fallen, and Hamas was similarly weakened.
Operation Rising Lion led to important achievements against Iran and its nuclear program. However, several goals didn’t pan out. Claims of myriads of missile launchers and launching sites being destroyed proved either to be too optimistic or outright false.
In fact, the problem Israel has faced since October 7 is a tendency toward optimism and a lot of premature claims of victory. For instance, just months after October 7, the IDF already claimed that Hamas was largely defeated in Gaza.
Israel also exaggerated its gains against Hezbollah and the Houthis, and it showed a similar tendency towards Iran. For instance, there were several claims in 2024 that Iran had suffered setbacks to its ballistic missile program because its “planetary mixers” had been destroyed.
The same hubris would return during Operation Roaring Lion in 2026, when there were claims that Iran could no longer enrich uranium or produce ballistic missiles. Iran, however, has always shown that it can find ways to rebuild its programs.
Operation Rising Lion was important because it has apparently clipped the wings of Iran’s nuclear program. The problem is that after the apparent victory in June 2025, the war in February 2026 occurred in response to purported ballistic missile threats.
The war in February and March was waged for a second reason: to push for regime change. Unfortunately, this didn’t pan out.
Now, the conflicts with Iran present a new problem, because they have entered a familiar pattern Israel has seen on other fronts. This includes a series of extended conflicts and managing said conflicts amidst diminishing returns.
Air warfare has, historically, not won wars. Enemies can’t be bombed into submission. Israel knows this. It fought a decade-long conflict in Syria called the Campaign Between the Wars against Iranian entrenchment. Yet, the entrenchment remained, and Iran moved weapons to Hezbollah until the Assad regime was overthrown in December 2024.
Israel has since shifted to carving out a buffer zone in Syria. In the early days of the new government, Israel resorted to bombing Syria. Iran was subsequently removed from Syria, but the bombings continued despite the new government that appeared more amenable to Israel. This shows that, even when a regime falls, it doesn’t necessarily result in peace or even a change in Israeli policy.
A grueling war that didn’t appear to have a clear strategy
The US has entered the picture to address the conflicts on Israel’s borders. The Trump administration got the Gaza deal that brought home the hostages. This helped end a grueling war that didn’t appear to have a clear exit strategy. The US also helped with ceasefires in Lebanon.
Currently, the Trump administration has become increasingly agitated with Israel’s strikes on Beirut. Iran, as a result, is trying to tie the conflict in Lebanon to itself. This means that a year after Operation Rising Lion, the region has shifted from a narrowly tailored conflict in June 2025 to a broad conflict stretching over thousands of miles.
The US and Israel’s strikes on Iran in February 2026 likely hope to replicate June 2025’s success. However, without a narrower scope and a clear, obtainable objective, these strikes have led to regional uncertainty.
There was also controversy over talks of a Kurdish offensive in Iran. Iran is a large country, and the bombing campaign sought a large number of Iranian targets. Eventually, this led the US to threaten to attack bridges and other infrastructure. This kind of mission creep is the opposite of what has tended to win conflicts, such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the Six-Day War.
This means that Operation Rising Lion may be seen as a chapter in a long war, rather than a decisive conflict. There were rounds of strikes against Iran in 2024, and 2025 could be considered a second round. The latter is still important, as it weakened Iran’s nuclear program.
Now, the challenge is to see if the US will agree to a new deal and seek to remove the enriched uranium from areas that were bombed in 2025. As such, Operation Rising Lion was an usher for what comes next. History will judge whether it was particularly important or a step on the road to a broader strategy.
