Kurdish politics has undergone a dramatic transformation since Turkey launched its so-called “terror-free Turkey” initiative in October 2024 by engaging with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Ocalan, held on Imrali Island – a Turkish prison island – since 1999, called for the unilateral dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the start of what he describes as a “new peace and democratic society process.”
The announcement marked one of the most significant turning points in the movement’s history, dividing the PKK into two camps.
One, mostly of the long-term left-wing members of Turkish origin, accepted Ocalan’s decision without hesitation and moved to implement it. The other, mostly individuals of Kurdish origin, reacted with shock, questioning both the decision and the ideological direction behind it.
This split reflects a deeper pattern that has long defined Ocalan’s leadership: repeated ideological transformations.
Over the decades, he has shifted from advocating Kurdish independence to promoting democratic autonomy and now to the far less defined concept of the “Free Kurdish Line” within a “democratic society” framework.
Each transition has required followers to abandon previous doctrines in favor of a new vision, often without meaningful internal debate. Yet while reshaping the future of his movement from prison and redefining its relationship with Turkey, we can read that some statements were made in Ocalan’s name that increasingly directed unfounded accusations against Israel.
These statements go through the filter of the Turkish control mechanisms established by the state authorities.
Rooted more in conspiracy theories than historical evidence, these claims have become more prominent in his recent writings and risk influencing generations of Kurds who continue to regard him as their principal ideological guide.
A recent letter by Ocalan’s fellow prisoner, Ergin Atabey of Imrali High Security F-Type Prison, outlines his latest ideological framework. It argues that “fully overcoming the system of annihilation will again be achieved through resistance, struggle, and construction of the Free Kurdish Line based on democratic society and democratic integration.”
Although the language is deliberately abstract, other passages make his argument clearer. According to this statement, the Kurdish “system of annihilation” originated with British imperialism and Zionism.
The statement, referring to Ocalan, traces Kurdish suffering to the Balfour Declaration and the Cairo Conference, linking them to “the rise of Zionism in the Middle East, the establishment of Proto-Israel, the capture of Mosul-Kirkuk, and Britain’s emergence as a hegemonic power in the region.”
It also speaks of a future “post-Israel” era, suggesting that Israel’s disappearance would fundamentally reshape the Middle East. In earlier writings, Ocalan even invoked the controversial term “Judenrat,” drawing misleading historical analogies that trivialize the Holocaust while distorting Jewish and Middle Eastern histories.
These anti-Israel and, at times, antisemitic claims are not only historically unfounded but also potentially harmful to the Kurdish movement, particularly for those who continue to see Ocalan as their ideological authority. Given his enduring influence, such narratives could damage the long-standing relationship between Kurds and Jews.
This raises three questions: Do the Turkish authorities manipulate Ocalan’s statements? if not, what has driven Ocalan toward increasingly hostile rhetoric against Israel? And how can the resulting damage to Kurdish-Jewish relations be mitigated?
Several explanations deserve consideration. First, more than a quarter-century of imprisonment has almost certainly shaped Ocalan’s worldview. Prolonged isolation can distort political judgment, making it harder to objectively interpret rapidly changing regional realities.
His recent writings often rely on sweeping historical narratives that oversimplify complex events. Second, Ocalan may be attempting to accommodate Tayyip Erdogan’s government as negotiations over the Kurdish question continue.
By adopting rhetoric hostile to Israel, a position that resonates strongly in contemporary Turkish political discourse, he may hope to improve the prospects for a settlement with Ankara. Such rhetoric may serve both political and personal interests.
At the same time, Ocalan may genuinely believe that Israel assisted Turkey in his capture in 1999, a perception that could have shaped his views ever since. Whether this anti-Israel rhetoric reflects genuine conviction or political calculation remains open to debate.
Likewise, it is unclear whether Ocalan’s decision to dissolve the PKK stems from a sincere belief that armed struggle has reached a dead end, from pressure exerted by the Turkish state, or from a broader capitulation that leaves the Kurds vulnerable to a regime that has long denied their rights without addressing their political grievances.
Whatever the explanation, his personal circumstances have inevitably influenced the direction of the movement.
Nevertheless, Ocalan’s historical claims do not withstand scrutiny. The Balfour Declaration had no connection to the partition of Kurdistan or the denial of Kurdish national rights after World War I. Linking these issues creates a false historical narrative that conflates the Palestinian and Kurdish questions despite their distinct historical trajectories.
Equally misleading is the claim that Zionism bears responsibility for Kurdish suffering. Historically, Jewish communities and later the State of Israel have generally expressed sympathy for Kurdish aspirations.
Israeli leaders supporting Kurdish self-determination
Israeli leaders have consistently supported Kurdish self-determination, recognizing the Kurds as a major non-Arab, non-Persian, and non-Turkish people with a long history of coexistence with Jews.
That support has endured, even as Israel’s ability to assist Kurdish groups has remained limited by geography, diplomatic realities, and security challenges.
By contrast, it was the Kurdish Muslim brothers in Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and Damascus that systematically denied Kurds their cultural, linguistic, and political rights throughout the 20th century. Kurds endured forced assimilation, displacement, and massacres, including those in Zilan, Dersim, Halabja, and many other places.
These tragedies were the result of the nation-state policies of the countries in which Kurds have lived for centuries, not Zionism. Although Kurdish conditions have evolved differently across the region, many of the underlying challenges remain unresolved.
Nor is there reason to believe that a hypothetical “post-Israel” Middle East would improve the Kurdish position. On the contrary, Israel has often served as an important strategic counterweight in a region where ethnic and religious minority populations have frequently faced discrimination and persecution.
Israel has historically viewed these communities, including the Kurds, as natural partners and has generally supported their aspirations for security, recognition, and self-determination.
Preserving constructive Kurdish-Israeli relations therefore remains in the interests of both peoples. Political disagreements and ideological shifts should not overshadow a longer history of mutual respect and shared experiences as minorities in a turbulent region.
Ocalan’s latest paradigm shift may reshape the PKK’s future, but it should not rewrite history or undermine the foundations of Kurdish-Jewish relations.
Professor Ofra Bengio, Director of the Kurdish Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Dr. Veysi Dag, researcher at the Kurdish Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. X: @dagweysi
