On August 9, the Syrian foreign ministry announced that, following approximately 18 months of negotiations, Syria and Russia had concluded a memorandum of understanding: the Russian presence at the Tartous naval facility and at the Hmeimim air base adjacent to Latakia International Airport would be “reorganized.”
The bases would pass into Syrian civilian administration, and their military facilities would be redefined as joint Syrian-Russian training and qualification centers.
As a result, the Russian naval base at Tartous on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, operational for 55 years, is now virtually defunct. A NATO official is reported to have said: “There has been nothing there since June. That’s the first time in more than 10 years. This is pretty significant.”
Russian vessels previously stationed in the Mediterranean have been diverted to protect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s armada of sanctioned oil tankers that operate principally on Baltic-to-ocean routes, passing through the Danish straits, the North Sea, and, in some cases, the English Channel.
Immediately after the announcement, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani traveled to the coast with an official delegation. He inspected both Tartous Port and the Hmeimim air base, established in 2015 by agreement between Putin and Syria’s then-president, Bashar al-Assad.
SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) described the visit as “a tour of the facilities covered by the newly concluded memorandum.”
The official Syrian accounts of the tour make no mention of any Russian representative being present.
But two days later, on August 11, Reuters reported the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spin on the agreement: “We regard the signing on August 9 of the memorandum between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on the operation of our bases in Hmeimim and Tartous as an important step aimed at further improving bilateral cooperation in the military sphere.”
So the focus of the Russian narrative is not abandonment of its Mediterranean presence, but continued military cooperation – and a Syrian source subsequently told Reuters that some Russian forces would indeed remain at the newly designated joint training centers.
But by August 12, Russian personnel were observed vacating buildings around the previously Russian-controlled commercial berth at Tartous, while Syria had already begun using it for civilian shipping.
So the former Russian naval base at Tartous is being dismantled as a military facility and is being converted into a joint Russian-Syrian training facility, and the same is true of Russia’s former air base at Hmeimim.
Arguably, Hmeimim is the more consequential loss for Russia. It was the hub for Russia’s air operations in Syria, supported its wider military activities, and enhanced its regional standing.
The effective end of Russia’s military presence at Tartous and Hmeimim is a strategic gain for Israel. When Russia established its air base at Hmeimim in 2015 to support the Assad regime, there was a risk that Israeli and Russian air operations over Syria could come into conflict.
Jerusalem and Moscow consequently developed a deconfliction mechanism under which each side was given advance notice of planned air operations. With Russia no longer maintaining a significant aerial presence in Syria, Israeli air operations will face fewer constraints.
Turkey is replacing Russia
Israel’s current concerns in Syria are disrupting attacks against its troops in the south, preventing hostile forces from consolidating near the Golan Heights, and frustrating any attempt by Turkey to gain a military foothold that could threaten Israel.
Turkey is increasingly filling the vacuum caused by Russia’s withdrawal. The post-Assad Syrian government has developed a close military relationship with Turkey, which has been helping rebuild Syrian military capabilities. Israel has warned Turkey officially against embarking on what Defense Minister Israel Katz called “dangerous adventures in Syria.”
Israeli media reports have described Israel’s negotiating “red lines” as: no Turkish military activity in Syria; demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan; security for Syria’s Druze community; and limits on certain Syrian strategic weapons systems.
These would include ground-based air-defense systems, missiles, armed drones, and military aviation infrastructure such as radar networks.
On August 18, shortly after a Turkish delegation visited Syria’s Abu al-Duhur air base, Israel carried out airstrikes on the facility. Israel said the action was intended to prevent an impending Turkish military deployment there.
Damascus condemned the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, arguing that Syria was entitled to rebuild its armed forces and ally with whatever foreign partner it chooses. Meanwhile, the US, in the person of Tom Barrack, has been trying to establish a deconfliction process among Israel, Syria, and Turkey.
Barrack, whose official title is lengthy and perhaps a trifle excessive (he is currently US ambassador to Turkey and special presidential envoy for Syria and Iraq), described the Abu al-Duhur strike as an “unnecessary escalation” that did not advance regional stability.
His increasingly critical stance towards Israeli policy in Syria has itself attracted criticism, particularly following recent remarks on Israel’s military stance in Syria and equivocal statements, later clarified, about the Golan Heights.
Russia’s loss of exclusive military control at Tartous and Hmeimim changes the geopolitical landscape. For roughly 55 years, a Soviet/Russian military presence on the Syrian coast has been part of Israel’s strategic environment.
The Soviet Union was one of Israel’s principal military adversaries during the Cold War; Putin’s Russia subsequently became a partner of sorts in managing the Syrian battlefield. That presence is now being reduced to a joint training role under Syrian sovereignty.
For Israel, therefore, this is much more than the closure of two Russian bases. It is evidence of the collapse of the geopolitical system that existed along Israel’s northern frontier for half a century.
While Russia’s effective withdrawal from Syria, and therefore from the Middle East as a whole, appears a net positive for Israel diplomatically and militarily, strategically it seems to be fostering the emergence of a Turkish-influenced Syria.
Turkish military penetration of Syria is a substantially more serious problem than the Russian presence that it is replacing.
For Turkey, close alignment with Damascus offers the prospect of curbing Kurdish autonomy on its border, facilitating refugee returns, winning a large share of Syria’s reconstruction and trade, reopening overland routes to Arab markets, and consolidating Ankara’s regional influence at the expense of rival powers.
Israel will need to be vigilant.
The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com
