Twenty-nine Democratic senators have demanded that Israel halt proposed construction in the E1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, an Israeli city of 40,000 people.
E1 has long been a lightning rod for advocates of Palestinian statehood, who argue that Israeli construction would sever the Ramallah-Bethlehem corridor and destroy the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. But any viable Palestinian state would likely require tunnels, bridges, or dedicated roads to connect separated areas. Moreover, E1 lies in Area C, where Israel retains planning and zoning authority under the Oslo framework, despite international opposition.
Still, I believe building in E1 now is ill-timed. Israel’s most important ally, the United States, is already grappling with growing anti-Israel sentiment and antisemitic intimidation from the Democratic Left and the conspiratorial Tucker Carlson Right. Israel gains little by creating another unnecessary political confrontation with Washington at this time.
But Washington is asking the wrong question about E1.
The Democratic senators wrote, “The United States must remain committed to a two-state solution that delivers lasting peace and security for both the Jewish, democratic State of Israel and for a future Palestinian state.… development in E1 would seriously jeopardize the prospects for a Palestinian state.”
Their call for Israel’s security and a Palestinian state deserves more scrutiny.
Obstacles toward Palestinian state
The obstacles to Palestinian statehood did not begin with E1. They began with the Arab rejection of two states in 1948 and their subsequent refusals for a state in 1967, 2000, 2001, and 2007-08, the last offered Palestinian sovereignty in Gaza and nearly all of the West Bank, with a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem.
Underlying those failures is a question those American policymakers too often avoid: whether Palestinian society is prepared to accept a permanent Jewish state anywhere between “the river and the sea.”
After October 7, that question can no longer be treated as theoretical.
The real E1 debate should not be whether Israelis can build homes there. It should be whether Israel could ever safely relinquish security control of this strategically critical corridor.
Highway 1 runs east from Jerusalem, past Ma’aleh Adumim and E-1, toward the Jordan Valley. It is an essential artery connecting Israel’s major population centers on the coast with its eastern frontier, and provides a vital route for rapidly moving troops, weapons, and supplies toward Israel’s longest border with Jordan.
That matters because Jordan’s long-term stability cannot be taken for granted.
The Hashemite monarchy remains an important American and Israeli security partner, but Jordan is economically fragile and faces significant demographic and Islamist ideological pressures. American and Israeli strategists must contemplate the possibility that over the coming decade Jordan could face increased Sunni Islamist influence, Iranian destabilization efforts, or serious internal disorder.
If that happens, Israel’s eastern frontier could rapidly transform from one of its quietest borders into one of its most dangerous.
During visits with Israeli military personnel and intelligence officials, I saw firsthand the concern about weapons and narcotics smuggling across Israel’s eastern frontier. Weapons entering Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, can strengthen an already formidable Hamas and other armed groups’ presence, operating only miles from Israel’s major population centers.
Today, Israel is confronting increasing tensions inside the West Bank. Israeli security officials have warned repeatedly about the potential for significant escalation.
The Netanyahu government deserves criticism for failing to adequately restrain extremist Jewish violence. Those who attack Palestinians violate Israeli law and should be prosecuted. A future Israeli government should enforce the law aggressively.
But Jewish extremism is only one part of a much larger security problem. For decades, Palestinian Authority schools, official media, and religious institutions have promoted incitement and narratives that reject any Jewish sovereignty, while the PA’s notorious “pay for slay” system has financially rewarded terrorists and their families, incentivizing violence that makes territorial compromise increasingly dangerous.
This brings us back to E1.
There are actually two separate questions that Washington has mistakenly conflated.
The first is whether Israel should build in E1 today. I believe it should not. With an election approaching, beginning construction looks more like a political gesture to the Israeli Right than an urgent security requirement.
The second question is far more consequential: Should E1 ever come under Palestinian security control?
From an Israeli security perspective, the answer is no, certainly not in the foreseeable future.
E1 sits alongside a vital corridor connecting Jerusalem and Israel’s coastal population centers with the Jordan Valley. The valley constitutes Israel’s eastern strategic barrier and could become dramatically more important if Jordan is destabilized.
October 7 fundamentally changed Israeli security doctrine. Israelis learned at catastrophic cost what happens when hostile armed organizations are allowed to build military infrastructure adjacent to Israeli communities. Israel cannot repeat that mistake on a vastly larger front.
American policymakers should stop treating E1 as an Israeli-Palestinian real-estate dispute. It is who controls the roads, high ground, and military corridors Israel will need in the next war to the east.
That makes E1 fundamentally a question of strategic depth, military mobility and Israel’s ability to defend its eastern frontier, not simply another argument about settlements.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and is the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy staffers, and the State Department.
