US President Donald Trump did not announce in Ankara on Tuesday that he was selling F-35s to Turkey; he did something more important: alongside Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the opening of the NATO summit, he explained why, in his view, opposition to the deal is no longer self-evident.
“This is a decision we are going to make,” he said, adding that the US would consider the move because its relations with Turkey are better, in his words, than with other countries that Washington thought would be more loyal. Erdogan quickly completed the message, saying Turkey had already been promised five planes and that Trump “always keeps his commitments.”
There, more than in the formal statement itself, the real argument was exposed. Trump does not see Erdogan the way Israel does. To him, Turkey is a NATO power with a strong military, a country that could have chosen “a different path” regarding Israel and Iran, and chose not to do so. He praised Ankara for not joining the fighting “on the other side,” and hinted that it may have refrained from doing so because of him.
In Israel, the reading is entirely different. Ankara hosts Hamas, is intensifying the diplomatic confrontation with Israel, considered – according to the US president – attacking Israel alongside Iran, clashes with Greece and Cyprus, and is trying to expand its influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Behind the debate over the arms deal lies a much heavier question: what is Erdogan’s Turkey today in the eyes of Washington, and in the eyes of Trump?
The F-35s have become a symbol of that dispute. Trump wants to bring Turkey back to the center of the Western system. After years in which Ankara paid a price for purchasing Russia’s S-400 system, such as US sanctions imposed in 2020 under CAATSA and removal from the F-35 program, he is signaling that this chapter, in his view, can be closed. “I don’t want to sanction friends,” he said, opening the door to easing pressure on Turkey and to a more forgiving approach toward a wayward but still vital ally.
His logic is not complicated. Turkey controls the passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, has influence in Syria, knows Iran well, fields one of NATO’s largest armies, and, in Trump’s view, may help stabilize the region, curb Russian influence and keep Ankara within the Western camp. In his eyes, pushing Turkey away did not change its behavior; bringing it back into the American framework may, perhaps, better serve US interests.
Turkey expanding influence, cannot be seen as ally
In Israel, it is hard to accept that interpretation. Erdogan’s Turkey is no longer seen in Israel as a complex Western ally whose deviations can be tolerated. Over recent years, it has gradually become a regional rival. Political support for Hamas, the harsh statements against Israel since October 7, the involvement in Syria, the disputes with Greece and Cyprus, and Turkey’s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean are not seen in Jerusalem as a random collection of crises.
They, in Israel’s view, point to a pattern of behavior in which a state expands its influence at the expense of its neighbors. The Israeli question, therefore, is not limited to Turkey’s NATO membership. It concerns whether it can still be regarded as a “normal” Western ally.
That is also the source of Israel’s opposition to the deal, which is not limited to the air force. In recent years, the security establishment has come to view the maritime arena as one of the main friction points in the coming decade. Gas discoveries, shipping lanes, energy facilities, and the project to connect Israel to the European electricity grid via an undersea cable through Cyprus and Greece have made the eastern Mediterranean a strategic asset.
At the same time, Turkey is advancing the concept of the “Blue Homeland,” which expands its claims and influence in the maritime sphere and challenges some of the existing arrangements. The concern in Israel is that Turkey’s military strengthening will affect not only the air balance, but also Ankara’s confidence as it applies pressure around those strategic assets.
Israel signaling Turkey’s threat towards region
Against this backdrop, Benjamin Netanyahu’s highly public appearance alongside the commander of the navy shortly after Trump’s and Erdogan’s statements does not appear accidental. It was a deliberate signal. Israel wanted to make clear that it does not see Turkey only as a future aerial threat, but as a broader strategic challenge, one that could affect freedom of navigation, energy infrastructure, and the growing cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. In Athens and Nicosia as well, developments are being closely watched. For them, the issue is not only the number of aircraft Turkey may receive, but the renewed legitimacy Washington may be giving Ankara’s regional policy.
For Erdogan as well, the F-35 is much more than a plane. A return to the procurement track would be a diplomatic victory for him. He would be able to argue that despite the S-400 affair, despite the sanctions and despite the clashes with Israel, the US recognizes Turkey’s status as a regional power without which the new order cannot be shaped. For him, opening the door is almost as important as the deal itself, because it restores Ankara to the status from which it was pushed years ago.
Still, the gap between Trump’s statements and a signed deal remains large. The S-400 is still a legal and political obstacle, and opposition in the US Congress is expected to be significant. Beyond the political consideration, there is also professional opposition: the fear that a Russian system deployed in Turkey could help gather information on the F-35’s stealth capabilities, thereby harming not only Israel but all countries operating the aircraft. Even a determined president would find it difficult to turn the Ankara statements into a deal without a complex fight in Washington.
Even if the deal is not completed soon, the message Trump delivered in Ankara is clear. For years, it seemed that preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge was the starting point for every American discussion of advanced weapons sales in the region. His remarks suggest a shift in emphasis: Israel remains a close ally, but it is no longer the only consideration. In Trump’s view, Turkey too is a strategic asset that must be brought back into the center of the game.
That is why the debate over the F-35 goes beyond the aircraft itself. It touches on the way the US balances between two of its most important allies in the eastern Mediterranean. If Trump does succeed in returning Turkey to the F-35 track, the significance will not be limited to another arms deal. It will be an American declaration that the new regional order will also be built around Turkey. For Israel, this is not only a security problem, it is a possible change in the starting point of American policy in the region.
