Defense Minister Israel Katz’s announced proposal last week to transfer authority for handling extremist Jewish activists’ problems from the IDF to the police was not coordinated with the relevant authorities and may yet be blocked, The Jerusalem Post has learned.
Katz did not clear the issue with a number of top relevant IDF authorities before making the announcement, to the extent that until a meeting on Monday, many of them did not even understand what he was proposing.
While Katz, in statements last week and on Monday, tried to present the change as a done deal, the Post understands that several issues could block his proposal from happening, limit its impact, or delay it for months.
For years, the legal and operational situation in the West Bank has been messy.
Under international law, no matter what Katz proposes, the IDF Central Command head is the “sovereign” over the West Bank and, at most, could delegate some responsibilities, but would still have ultimate responsibility on behalf of the State of Israel.
The reason is that Israel’s position on the West Bank, unless it some day decides to annex it – something which still appears impossible due to opposition in Israel, and by both US Republicans and Democrats and globally – is that it holds a “belligerent occupation” of the area.
The legal term “belligerent occupation” has nothing to do with the politicized term “occupied” and merely refers to the fact that until the disputed territories’ status is resolved by negotiation between the parties, Israel has certain legal responsibilities and rights as the “temporary” sovereign.
Despite the IDF having primary responsibility for security and maintaining public order, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the police have also always played parallel roles in the West Bank.
The Shin Bet has handled aspects of both Palestinian terror and, on a much smaller basis since the phenomenon is much smaller, Jewish terror.
The police have handled arrests of Palestinians and Jews falling below a certain terror threshold and provided the evidentiary basis for indicting each side when relevant.
Cases against Palestinians are handled in the IDF’s West Bank Courts, while cases against Jews are handled by Israel’s civil courts, other than administrative orders.
Theoretically, the IDF’s West Bank Courts could also handle all Jewish cases, but decades ago the Attorney-General’s Office decided it made more sense for them to be handled in civil courts.
Palestinians cannot be brought to trial in civil courts because this would violate the principle that they are “foreign” residents who cannot be treated fairly in Israel’s foreign courts.
Of course, much of the world has criticized whether the IDF’s West Bank Courts treat the Palestinians fairly, but in principle, military courts are mandated for a temporary military belligerent occupation.
Katz’s idea could throw off this balance
All of this balance could be thrown off by Katz’s idea.
If the police were to take over all issues for the IDF operationally, would this lead to Palestinians being tried in civil courts?
Probably not, but there are many other issues.
One is that much of the world is seeing Katz’s move as a dangerous political move to give National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir control over the issue when almost no one globally or in Israel’s security establishments trusts him to properly handle extremist Jews.
In fact, since Ben-Gvir took office in 2023, virtually all IDF and Shin Bet officials have slammed him for blocking or hindering the arrest and prosecution of extremist Jews who have perpetrated violence and vandalism against Palestinians.
There could be diplomatic pressure against the change, including from the US, though such issues usually are viewed as more technical and internal.
All of the above issues are likely to lead the IDF legal division, the attorney-general, and human rights NGOs to oppose some or all of the changes behind the scenes, and also potentially before the High Court of Justice.
Besides these issues, there are practical problems
Besides these issues, there are practical problems.
Many of the security problems in the West Bank in recent years have not been separate Palestinian or Jewish extremist incidents, but have involved both sides.
Even in the most extreme case, Katz would want the IDF to continue to handle Palestinian issues.
How will the IDF arrive at a scene of conflict where Palestinians and Jews are mixed in conflict and only deal with the Palestinians?
How will the police arrive at the same scene and only deal with Jews?
Certainly, it could be possible to increase police resources so more police can arrive at these scenes along with the IDF, but even then, the practical issue remains.
Potentially, the IDF could handle more violent issues initially, and then the police could be on the scene to step in to handle arrests immediately after, which should already be happening.
But given Katz’s attempt to get out of handling Jewish extremism, critics are worried that the defense minister would merely prevent the IDF from stopping Jewish extremists and that the police would also not handle the issue.
More likely than not, the various parties will negotiate some smaller shift in responsibilities in very specific circumstances which will not radically change the situation.
Such negotiations could easily take months, if not longer.
Also, finding and shifting police resources to increase their West Bank presence could take months or longer.
Given the October 27 elections, if another government is elected, Katz’s hopes to change the authorities between the IDF and the police will likely never get off the ground.
However, if the government is reelected, there could be moderate changes in responsibilities after extensive negotiations, increased police resources, and High Court petitions.
In fact, in the distant past, there were legal scholars who thought it made more sense for the police to handle many of the Palestinian issues in the West Bank as well, but since various terror waves, this view is less widely held.
Instead, most view Katz’s move as a way to avoid engaging in conflict with the settler movement.
