As the election approaches its decisive stage, those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have identified several scenarios that could prove politically dangerous for him.
Beyond the question of how many seats Likud will win, the central concern is the overall result for the right-wing bloc, particularly the possibility that it will remain below the 61-seat threshold.
According to the assessment, Netanyahu understands that in the current election, even a result of 59 seats for the entire bloc could place him in genuine political danger.
In such a situation, the opposing camp could potentially secure a parliamentary majority that would allow it to establish another government, even if that government would not remain stable for four years and even if some Arab parties did not formally join it.
The scenario being discussed in the political system involves a combination of parties led by Avigdor Liberman, Gadi Eisenkot, and Naftali Bennett, together with the other parties in the change bloc and parliamentary support from Arab parties.
In that scenario, Ra’am, the Joint List, or Balad would not necessarily have to join the coalition. Nor would they necessarily need to vote actively for the government. External support, abstention, or another parliamentary arrangement could be enough for the opposing camp to assemble a majority of 61 Knesset members.
In other words, if Netanyahu’s bloc wins only 59 seats, the remaining 61 Knesset members could, at least numerically, support a move to establish another government. In that scenario, they could argue that they are not establishing “a government that relies on the Arab parties” in the traditional sense, but are instead using the existing Knesset majority to replace the prime minister and establish a temporary governing framework.
Netanyahu wants to avoid issues of military conscription
One issue Netanyahu reportedly does not want to become the central focus of the election is military conscription. The reason is straightforward: It creates difficulties for almost every component of his political camp.
The issue is challenging for the haredi parties, creates friction within Likud, and could also complicate matters for the Religious Zionist camp. From Netanyahu’s perspective, an election campaign centered on conscription could put the entire bloc on the defensive and sharpen internal disagreements precisely when the goal is to unite right-wing voters.
By contrast, issues that return the public debate to divisions between the political camps, such as Right versus Left, attitudes toward Arab parties, the character of the state, or cultural and political disputes, are more comfortable terrain for him.
In this context, public controversies such as the one that developed around the film NAZA could also, according to the assessment, serve Netanyahu’s campaign. The more the debate shifts toward questions of who is “going with the Arabs,” who is cooperating with the Democrats, and the Left’s attitude toward Israel, the further the discussion moves away from conscription and other issues that create internal difficulties for the right-wing bloc.
Until now, Netanyahu had some room to maneuver even when he did not personally command 61 seats. The reason was that the opposing camp struggled to produce a majority of its own.
As long as some of the players in the change bloc were unwilling to rely on Arab parties, the fact that Netanyahu remained below 61 seats was not necessarily enough to replace him.
In practice, he could remain transitional prime minister even without a solid parliamentary majority because his rivals also had no simple way to form an alternative government.
In the current election, however, according to the assessment, that situation could change. If the change bloc is prepared to use the support or abstention of Ra’am, the Joint List, and Balad to reach the majority required to replace Netanyahu, it would no longer need 61 “Zionist” seats on its own.
In other words, Netanyahu could previously assume that if the other side could not reach 61 seats without the Arab parties, it could not form a government. Now, if there is sufficiently broad agreement to replace him, the Arab parties could also become part of the equation.
That also gives rise to one of Netanyahu’s greatest concerns, and perhaps one reason he may leave open the possibility of a unity government after the election.
If the right-wing bloc falls short of 61 seats, and if the opposing camp has a majority capable of removing him, bringing in a centrist or opposition party could become a tool of political survival for Netanyahu.
Netanyahu needs 61 seats for PM spot to be secured
For him, therefore, 61 is not merely the number required to form a government. It is also the defensive line preventing his rivals from establishing an alternative government in his place.
The bottom line is simple: Netanyahu knows that if the entire right-wing bloc remains below 61 seats, he can no longer be certain that he will remain transitional prime minister. If his rivals unite and also secure support or abstentions from Arab parties, they could reach a majority sufficient to remove him from the Prime Minister’s Office, even without immediately forming a stable, long-term government.
This is, in effect, Netanyahu’s new vulnerability. For years, he did not necessarily need 61 seats to remain in the game. His rivals also lacked a majority capable of rallying around an agreed alternative.
The divisions within the opposing camp, particularly the veto imposed by some of its parties on relying on Arab factions, served as a kind of political safety belt for him.
This time, he fears that safety belt is coming undone. If Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman agree that the first objective is to replace Netanyahu, even without yet agreeing on every element of the next government, 59 seats for the right-wing bloc would no longer amount to an almost-victory, but would instead represent a point of danger.
Once the other side is willing to use every available parliamentary majority to bring about his replacement, the battle for the 60th and 61st seats becomes, from Netanyahu’s perspective, not merely a struggle to form a government, but a struggle over whether he remains in power.
