The next time Israel wants to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the United States, replenish its missiles, or secure funding to manufacture interceptors for Iron Dome and Arrow, it will discover that the rules in Washington have changed.
The approval of financial assistance, weapons sales, and defense cooperation that Israel sees today as an almost guaranteed component of its national security can no longer be taken for granted following Tuesday’s midterm elections.
To understand what is at stake, consider the numbers. Israel receives approximately $3.8 billion annually in American military assistance under an agreement negotiated during the Obama administration.
Of that amount, $3.3 billion goes toward military procurement, while another $500 million funds joint missile defense programs, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.
Many Israelis do not fully appreciate that this money does not arrive automatically. Congress must appropriate the funding every year.
The current agreement, which runs through September 2028, despite what US President Donald Trump said this week, is a commitment between two governments, not a legally binding obligation on American lawmakers to provide the money.
That means that even if the president supports continued assistance, Congress can make it difficult to secure the funds, demand certain conditions, or refuse to approve new appropriations altogether. The president cannot simply order Congress to provide money it has not approved.
And the issue goes beyond financial aid.
Major American arms sales to Israel are also subject to congressional review. These transactions do not require an affirmative vote of approval, and blocking a sale over the president’s objections is difficult.
But the administration has to notify Congress of major sales above certain financial thresholds, generally giving lawmakers 15 days to review them before they proceed.
During that period, members of Congress can introduce legislation to block a transaction. Senior lawmakers on the relevant committees can also raise objections during the informal review process, potentially delaying an agreement before it is formally submitted.
A determined president can overcome such opposition, but that does not mean lawmakers are powerless. In the new political environment, even a simple arms sale that might have once moved ahead with little controversy will become the subject of a protracted political battle.
Consider what this means. Israel could find itself in a situation where it has the money to purchase American weapons but faces political opposition to approve the sale. It could need additional missile interceptors after a war but encounter resistance to get the funding needed to replenish the stockpile.
These are not theoretical questions; they go directly to the IDF’s future capabilities and Israel’s ability to defend its citizens.
Israel is no longer the country it was
Another change is underway that proves how consequential this is.
As Trump announced on Election Day, and as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said a few months earlier, the intention is to end the traditional model of direct American military assistance and replace it with a new framework for defense cooperation.
Instead of Washington providing Israel with billions of dollars annually to purchase American weapons, the idea is for the two countries to invest together in the development and production of military technologies that both countries need.
There is merit to this approach. Israel is no longer the country it was when American military assistance became a central component of the relationship.
It has a strong economy, a sophisticated defense industry, and technological capabilities that the US increasingly needs.
But moving from one model to another is not straightforward. Congress is currently considering the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2027, which includes a provision to establish a new US-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative.
The initiative would expand cooperation in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, counter-drone systems, air and missile defense, and other advanced military technologies.
The legislation has passed the House but has not yet become law. More importantly, the initiative does not guarantee funding.
Some lawmakers, including Democrats, have already tried to remove or substantially alter the provision. Even if it passes, Congress will retain considerable influence over how the initiative is implemented and how much money is allocated to it.
In other words, Israel could find itself in a situation where the old military aid model is being dismantled while the new partnership intended to replace it remains uncertain.
At the same time, arms sales that Israel hopes to finance with its own money could face greater political scrutiny.
The kind of change that needs to happen
The Democrats’ victory does not mean that every proposed restriction on Israel will become law. Trump remains president, retains broad executive authority, and can veto legislation.
Nor does it mean that every Democrat opposes military assistance to Israel. Many remain committed supporters.
But the political calculations have changed, and Israel would be making a serious mistake to ignore them, which is why Tuesday’s results – as well as what Vice President JD Vance said after the loss – demand a reckoning in Jerusalem.
On one hand, the Israeli opposition still faces the same political dilemma it confronted last week. Without the Arab parties’ cooperation, Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Liberman, and Yair Lapid do not have the seats needed to form a government.
That arithmetic has not changed. But something else has: the sense of urgency.
The Democratic victory should influence the calculations of Israel’s opposition leaders. They need to recognize that the world around Israel is changing and that the cost of political paralysis is growing.
More importantly, the results should force the Israeli public to confront something that some of us have been warning about for years: the policies of the current government are not merely misguided; they are dangerous and damaging to Israel’s future.
But another point must be understood. A different Israeli government, a different prime minister, and a different cabinet would certainly help.
A change in leadership could create new opportunities to rebuild relationships with Democrats, restore trust with congressional leaders and improve the atmosphere between Jerusalem and Washington.
But – and this is a big but – we should not fool ourselves into believing that changing the people at the top will automatically change how large parts of the Democratic Party view Israel. It won’t.
There are deep, substantive policy differences between Israel and significant parts of the Democratic Party.
These disagreements concern settler violence in the West Bank, the expansion of settlements and outposts, the lack of meaningful progress in Gaza, the absence of serious engagement with the Palestinian Authority, the government’s judicial overhaul, and a long list of additional issues.
These disagreements will not disappear simply because Netanyahu is replaced by Eisenkot or Bennett.
Even if Eisenkot were to become prime minister tomorrow, without substantive changes in Israeli policy, the grace period he might receive from Democrats would be short.
The atmosphere might improve. Meetings in Washington might become warmer. Statements from senior congressional Democrats might become less hostile. There would likely be some goodwill toward an Israeli leader not associated with Netanyahu’s policies.
But the goodwill will not last.
If Israel continues expanding settlements and outposts, fails to confront settler violence, and offers no credible diplomatic horizon, a new government will quickly discover that the underlying disagreements remain exactly where they were.
Changing the government without changing its policies will not solve the problem. And this is something the Israeli public needs to understand and make decisions accordingly.
It is okay to know this and decide to proceed on the current path, but the knowledge of what comes next must also be understood.
The direction pursued by the current government is taking Israel toward greater isolation, mounting diplomatic pressure, and the possibility of economic sanctions that would ultimately affect ordinary Israelis.
None of this means Israel should automatically accept every demand coming from Washington. Israel must defend against vital national security threats, even when doing so creates disagreements with its closest ally.
There are legitimate reasons for Israelis to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state after October 7, and there are security realities that Americans do not always fully appreciate.
But there is an enormous difference between standing firm on essential security interests and pursuing policies that unnecessarily deepen the divide with the country whose support remains central to our national security.
The path forward requires a different government, ideally a national unity government, with different people making the decisions.
But that government will also need the courage to make difficult policy choices and recognize that Israel cannot continue doing the same things while expecting different results.
For decades, Israelis have regarded the alliance with the US as one of the foundations of their national security. Now everyone can see clearly that this foundation is not as stable as once believed.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), a co-founder of the Middle East America Dialogue (MEAD), and the author of four books on Israel’s defense and national security.
