There is something almost touching about declaring a war effectively over while the enemy is reportedly contemplating how to bring it to your capital.
On November 16, CNN revealed that American intelligence had identified possible Iranian plans to target senior members of US President Donald Trump’s administration in Washington with either a radiological dirty bomb or a chemical weapon.
Seven US officials described the intelligence, some pointing to specific locations and intended targets. Others questioned whether Tehran possessed the means, personnel, or intention to execute such an operation.
The White House maintains that there is no credible threat to the American homeland. Yet that reassurance sits rather uneasily alongside intelligence sufficiently troubling to have prompted contingency meetings among senior US security officials. One is entitled to ask why Washington is preparing for a danger it simultaneously insists does not exist.
What makes this development particularly disturbing is the suggestion that Tehran’s ambitions may have moved beyond targeting American personnel overseas. According to CNN, intercepted Iranian communications included claims that materials for an unconventional attack had already been positioned inside the US.
The allegation remains unverified. Intelligence officials themselves disagree over its credibility. No public evidence establishes that radioactive material or chemical agents have actually been pre-positioned.
Nevertheless, the proposition deserves attention, especially when placed alongside what Washington already knows.
On October 23, an Office of the Director of National Intelligence memorandum to Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that Iranian efforts to target American personnel had increased substantially. Some lethal plots, according to the memorandum, had reached advanced stages in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has since been moved into military housing amid security concerns. American officials are also reportedly preparing for possible chemical attacks against US personnel in the Middle East, allegations Tehran denies.
The intelligence arrives at an inconvenient moment for those insisting that the Islamic Republic has been reduced to military irrelevance.
Israel, with substantial American assistance, has inflicted extraordinary damage upon Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan have suffered devastating strikes.
The industrial machinery required to enrich additional uranium has been severely degraded. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported no verified reconstruction of the damaged enrichment facilities.
This represents a considerable military achievement.
Yet the understandable satisfaction of destroying the machinery has obscured a rather elementary distinction. A damaged nuclear program is not necessarily an extinguished one.
Before the June 2025 strikes, Iran possessed approximately 440.9 kg. of uranium enriched to 60%. The IAEA still cannot verify its present condition or whereabouts. Important installations remain inaccessible, including an enrichment facility at Isfahan, which Iran declared shortly before the attacks but has never permitted inspectors to examine.
Some of the uranium may remain buried beneath damaged facilities. Nobody outside the Iranian system can establish the complete picture with confidence.
For a government that insists its nuclear enterprise is entirely peaceful, Tehran displays a remarkable reluctance to permit the verification necessary to establish that claim.
But the latest American intelligence raises another problem.
A dirty bomb requires no nuclear detonation. It uses conventional means to disperse radioactive material. Its destructive effects are vastly different from those of an atomic weapon, and casualties might arise principally from the conventional explosion.
Its greater attraction to a terrorist would be the fear and disruption surrounding possible contamination.
Possibility of radiological hazard
Imagine a commercial district suddenly evacuated, transportation interrupted, businesses closed, and emergency services struggling to establish whether the public faces a radiological hazard.
The economic consequences could outlast the immediate incident. So might the public’s confidence in its government’s ability to provide security.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has described dirty bombs as weapons of mass disruption.
Iran’s missing enriched uranium should not be confused with the radioactive sources ordinarily associated with such devices. These are separate technical and security questions. But destroying enrichment plants does not eliminate the need to protect radioactive materials against diversion or misuse.
And here we encounter the political doctrine that has guided the Islamic Republic since its foundation.
Tehran has never possessed the conventional military strength to defeat America. Its rulers therefore constructed a strategy intended to make confrontation prohibitively expensive. Missiles, regional armed groups, hostage-taking, maritime disruption, and attacks upon economic infrastructure have served that purpose.
The objective is to impose maximum political and economic costs upon adversaries while preserving the regime’s own survival.
A radiological attack, were Tehran to contemplate one, would fit the coercive logic of creating fear and disruption far beyond the immediate physical damage. It would also carry extraordinary risks of American retaliation. That uncertainty helps explain why US officials have not concluded that the reported planning will become an actual attack.
Meanwhile, the men governing Iran have scarcely been whispering reconciliation.
On November 11, Mohsen Rezaei, a senior Iranian security official, threatened American military bases in Europe if aircraft operating from them attacked Iran.
The following day, Iran’s Assembly of Experts called for reconsidering the country’s defense doctrine and its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its statement envisaged retaliation without geographical limits.
One is entitled to wonder how much reassurance we should draw from the late supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s supposed religious prohibition on nuclear weapons when the clerical establishment is now entertaining the possibility of revising its doctrine.
A theological restriction whose permanence depends upon political convenience is a precarious foundation for international security.
None of these statements establishes that Tehran has ordered an attack on Washington. Conditional military threats and intelligence reporting about possible clandestine operations must be assessed separately.
But taken together, they expose a regime increasingly willing to discuss escalation while its conventional capabilities deteriorate.
This is the contradiction confronting the Trump administration.
Washington can correctly insist that Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure has been gravely damaged. It cannot reasonably assume that such damage has rendered every remaining Iranian threat irrelevant.
Indeed, the destruction of familiar instruments of coercion may encourage those within the regime who favor more desperate alternatives.
The administration should not mistake preparation for panic. Intelligence agencies are supposed to examine threats before they materialize. Protecting exposed officials, securing radiological materials, maintaining effective intelligence cooperation, and demanding the return of international nuclear inspectors are elementary responsibilities.
Neither triumphalism nor complacency will discharge them.
I have spent enough time examining the Islamic Republic’s political culture to understand the importance its rulers attach to retaliation, deterrence, and the preservation of revolutionary authority.
They have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to expose other societies to considerable harm when doing so advances their strategic interests.
It would nevertheless be a mistake to imagine that every threat announces an operational decision. Intelligence requires us to distinguish intention from capability, and rhetoric from preparation.
That discipline becomes especially important when dealing with a regime adept at turning uncertainty into political leverage.
Trump has spoken of a military conflict effectively concluded. The administration now faces intelligence suggesting that elements in Tehran may be considering methods of carrying that conflict onto American soil.
The contradiction demands a sober response.
Israel’s military campaign has bought time. It has dismantled important elements of Iran’s enrichment infrastructure and forced the regime to confront the consequences of its nuclear ambitions.
But the uranium remains unaccounted for. Tehran’s nuclear doctrine is under discussion. Its senior officials threaten American installations beyond the Middle East. And Washington is examining intelligence concerning an unconventional attack against its own government.
One should be careful before announcing the disappearance of a threat whose essential political motivations remain intact.
Israel could destroy the centrifuges. It could collapse the tunnels. It could leave Fordow buried beneath its own ambitions.
What it could not do was bomb the Islamic Republic’s doctrine of coercion out of existence.
That remains the unfinished business of confronting Tehran.
And the possibility that its consequences may reach Washington itself should finally persuade the West to distinguish military victory from lasting security.
The writer is the executive director of the Forum for Foreign Relations and chief policy adviser at Stop The Hate UK.
