All News (Page 29)

Last month, a billboard went up across the street from Israel’s Supreme Court. On it was a picture of a sitting justice, Noam Sohlberg, an observant, kippah-wearing Jew – beneath a demand that he take his “Reform hands” off the Chief Rabbinate. His offense: he had ruled that women may sit for the state rabbinate’s certification exams in Jewish law.

The petition had been brought by religiously observant women, steeped in Torah and Halacha. All they were asking for was to be tested in the very body of law they already live by. Nothing in that violates halacha. (Full disclosure: I was among those who brought that petition.)

The billboard was only the beginning. Days later, a group of senior rabbis from the Hardal wing of Religious Zionism – its hardline, “haredi-nationalist” edge, which fuses ultra-Orthodox stringency with religious nationalism – issued a declaration that Jews are forbidden by their religion to obey Supreme Court rulings they deem contrary to Halacha.

Hardal vs mainstream Religious Zionism

This could amount to a call for insubordination. And this week, when haredi (ultra-Orthodox) rioters – from the separate, non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox world, enraged by a different ruling on the military draft – vandalized the courtyard of Sohlberg’s home, rabbis and public figures from the Hardal camp still found it hard to condemn the attack – because Justice Sohlberg sits on the very Supreme Court they oppose.

Looking in from the outside, in Israel and in the Diaspora alike, this seems like more of the old story: religion versus the courts, Judaism versus democracy. It is a tidy narrative. It is also wrong.

Consider who Sohlberg actually is. He is a Religious Zionist: a graduate of the State-Religious school system and of Yeshivat Har Etzion, a conservative jurist from Gush Etzion, today the Deputy President of the Supreme Court and, under Israel’s seniority system, in line to become its next president.

Sohlberg is not alone. Three of the 11 justices on Israel’s highest court are Religious Zionists, roughly double their share of the population. Religious-Zionist men and women fill senior positions throughout the Justice Ministry and the courts. I teach at Bar-Ilan University’s law faculty, where many of my most outstanding students are religious – and some will become the judges of tomorrow.

What this fight reveals is that Religious Zionism is far from being of one mind. Far from it: it is in the midst of a deep-seated internal struggle. The Hardal faction works mainly within religious spaces – through the political party that usurped the very name “Religious Zionism,” the religious media, and the religious schools.

At times it can seem to be the authentic face of the movement. But the mindset of the broader Religious-Zionist community is vastly different. It works outward and is a full partner in building the country – in hi-tech and the economy, in public service, in the army, and in the courts. This is no accident. The very ethos of Religious Zionism is integration: to bridge the sacred and the worldly, and to play an integral role in building the State of Israel.

So when Hardal rabbis brand Sohlberg “Reform”, it’s not just an insult. It is an attempt to oust him from the Religious-Zionist public. But he most certainly belongs – more fully, and more admired and emulated, than they are. Those deliberately separating themselves from the building of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and attacking its institutions, are betraying the core principle of Religious Zionism: being a full partner in these efforts.

The radicals are not defending Religious Zionism against a hostile court. They are turning against its success — against the sons and daughters of Religious Zionism who long ago took their place inside the institutions of the state, including its courts.

The writer is the CEO of Kolenu, a Religious-Zionist organization working to support the values of Torah, moral leadership, and social responsibility.

US President Donald Trump’s relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is “somewhat” “calming down” the increasingly strained relationship between Jerusalem and Ankara, Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies specializing in Turkish affairs, told The Jerusalem Post earlier this week.

Lindenstrauss spoke with the Post only days after Turkey’s Interior Minister, Mustafa Ciftci, told crowds at the AK Party Corum Provincial Advisory Council meeting he had aspirations to one day govern Jerusalem, and that he hoped “those lands will be ours once again.”

“God willing, they will come under our sovereignty and dominion once more. Because we have a global leader like Recep Tayyip Erdogan at our helm. A world leader,” Ciftci said.

The Ottoman Empire controlled Israel for more than 400 years, ending when it lost to the Allied forces in World War I. In 1918, its leadership signed the Armistice of Mudros, surrendering to Britain.

Ciftci’s comments, which were widely condemned by Israeli officials, add to an “existing tensions,” Lindenstrauss explained.

“While this can one could dismiss this rhetoric as only one of one minister, it has to be seen in the context of other worrying remarks,” she asserted.

Erdogan stance on Israel since October 7 attacks

Erdogan has made numerous inflammatory comments directed at Israel since Hamas launched its October 7, 2023 attacks, dragging Gaza into the war and resulting humanitarian crisis. His condemnation of Israel is particularly notable as Turkey was once the first Muslim country to recognize the Jewish state less than a year after Israel declared independence.

Though Ciftci’s remarks alluded to an Ottoman occupation of Israeli territory, which is considered Palestinian territory for those advocating for a one-state solution, Lindenstrauss said she very much doubted that much outrage would be stirred across the Arab world. However, she cautioned that such a statement could further embroil Ankara in the battle for the country to head the Muslim world. The competition is largely taking place in the Palestinian territories and found in issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“Turkey’s involvement in east Jerusalem was more dominant in previous years and actually, because of the war, is a little bit less dramatic than it used to be. It’s definitely raised eyebrows both in Saudi Arabia and in Jordan,” she said. “Turkey has been involved both with [giving] support to the Palestinian Authority and also with, what Turkey claims to be only political support but Israel sees as more widespread, support to Hamas.”

Additionally, amid rumors of Qatari plans to expel Hamas leadership during the hostage negotiations between the Iran-backed terror group and Israel, Turkey was largely named as the terrorists’ future host nation, cementing Turkey’s growing position of influence in the region.

Through “balancing” relations with both the PA and Hamas, Ankara has cemented its position as “one of the guarantors to the Palestinian cause in the international arena.”

Holding Turkey back from further entrenching its position as a main Palestinian backer is its NATO membership, she continued, especially as the country is set to host a NATO summit in July. This, combined with Erdogan’s relationship with Trump, has meant that Turkey must delicately balance its Western relationships with its more extremist ones.

Ankara using US relationship to dissolve Kurdish groups

Ankara is also now utilizing those relationships as part of its wider aim to disarm and dissolve Kurdish groups, she continued, referencing reports that Erdogan had asked Trump to abandon his plans to utilize Kurdish militias on the Iraqi border in the war against Iran.

“One of the concerns of military confrontation between the US and Israel with Iran was that indeed the Kurds of Iran would strengthen, perhaps even gain some autonomous rule, and that would also endanger the process Turkey’s leading with the with the PKK on its dissolvement and disarmament,” she explained. “This again goes hand-in-hand with the assessment of what are the Turkish fears of this violent confrontation with Iran. How realistic the plan to involve the Kurds was in the first place, one can question, but we know that definitely Erdogan tried to block it.”

Hit significantly less than other regional countries during the March war, Ankara is also interested in avoiding becoming a target for Tehran. Earlier, it had prepared to absorb Iran’s missiles and an influx of refugees, but was largely spared except economically, she explained.

“Turkey will largely try to remain uninvolved militarily. It will support the diplomatic front. It supported the Pakistan mediation efforts, Qatar mediation efforts, Omani mediation efforts,” she concluded. “So it will remain in this mediation level. It also said it might assist in the crisis surrounding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but overall, I believe it will do its best to remain uninvolved militarily and only try to influence the diplomatic front.”

Everything has changed for Israel, with Iran, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah, and Syria.

Pre-October 7, Israel had no security zones, was afraid of getting into fights with nearly all of its enemies, especially Iran, but had a decent, if not great, diplomatic reputation.

Now, Israel has security zones everywhere, is unafraid to bludgeon its enemies if they look at it in the wrong way, including Iran, but is not using any diplomacy or any compromises to achieve its strategic goals, leading to continually dropping lows in its diplomatic strength. Given that diplomatic strength eventually impacts military strength, especially when it comes to the US, this is not a secondary issue.  

Tehran and the new Middle East

Let’s start with Iran.

Most observers forget that Israel and Iran have not fought twice in the last few years, but now rather five times.

It started in April 2024, got worse in October 2024, and then expanded much more in June 2025 and February 2026, with a smaller but not insignificant round (around 25 Iranian ballistic missiles and dozens of IDF fighter jet airstrikes) this week.

In this new Middle East, the constant rounds of big fighting is not between Israel and Hamas, but Jerusalem and Tehran.

In some ways, this new arrangement is worse for Israel, but in some ways it is much better.

It is worse because Iranian ballistic missiles are far more dangerous and scary than Hamas’s low-class rockets.

But it is much better because now when Israel fights, it can directly damage, and in that way, speak to the head of the snake.

When Israel was getting bloodied by Hamas from Gaza, round after round, year after year, Iran did not care that Hamas was losing more fighters than Israel, because the Islamic Republic was sitting pretty drinking Kool-Aid on the sidelines 1,500 kilometers away.

Now Israel has shown it is ready, willing, and able to hold Iran accountable, and that when it does, the Jewish state will come out ahead, and the Islamic regime will lose something, or many things which are valuable.

Until now, Iran has also been under the misconception that Israel might be afraid to strike its nuclear program or ballistic missile program. Now it knows that no matter what paper it signs with the Trump administration, if it crosses certain redlines, the question about Israel striking would not be if, but when.

This may be more terrifying for Israel’s citizens for short bursts of time, but Israel is militarily safer than Iran now that it has rewritten the rules.

Hamas and the Gaza strip

With Hamas, the new threat is not really rockets or being invaded, but legitimacy.

Israel’s legitimacy is the lowest it has been since the 1970s and possibly the lowest ever.

Every month that goes by without rebuilding in Gaza does not just hurt Hamas – it also hurts Israel.

Jerusalem needs to get some amount of disarmament from Hamas to move rebuilding past a certain point and to start partial reductions of its Gaza security zone (say from 50-70% to 30%, while Israel probably only needs 15%), but holding out for complete disarmament before rebuilding starts even in areas under Israeli control is harming long-term Israeli interests in the US, in Europe, and with Israel’s Arab allies. That is only among Israel’s allies. Obviously, with Israel’s enemies, it is providing them with additional public relations ammunition for aggressive disinformation campaigns.

If after October 7, 2023, Israel needed to topple Hamas’s military threat and ensure the terror group could not just rearm in the near future, it has by now done that and then some, but allowed its legitimacy to drop off a cliff – and much farther than was necessary.

While some Israeli officials may want to keep the focus only on Iran, and it was critical to set back the Islamic regime’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats, ignoring Gaza is costing Israel far more than many are admitting.

The balance of power with Hezbollah

The balance of power with Hezbollah is also radically different.

The group went from being able to threaten the whole country with apocalyptic destruction by the sheer immensity of 150,000 rockets and missiles, to basically being a Hamas in the north, which can threaten the nearby northern areas, but not much more than that.

Moreover, anytime Hezbollah might provoke Israel, the air force can now exact harsh revenge without worrying about setting off judgment day, because Hezbollah no longer wields a judgment day-level threat.

Whether Israel can get Hezbollah to at least partially disarm – say, moving its rockets much farther away from Israel and keeping long-range precision rockets down under a certain number – in exchange for a withdrawal or partial withdrawal from southern Lebanon remains an open question.

But as with Gaza, the IDF is likely to hold some kind of security zone in Lebanon for the foreseeable future, since it cannot actually fully disarm Hezbollah.

All quiet in Syria 

Israel has had quiet from Syria now for over 18 months.

Syrian ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa has an al-Qaeda background and resume and may be a ‘wolf in sheep’s’ clothing, but it is unclear what Israel would lose by a partial reduction of its huge Syrian buffer zone in exchange for Syria also demilitarizing in areas near Israel.

As long as Israel keeps a partial zone, jihadists should not be able to overrun any Israeli villages as they did from Gaza on October 7. And if al-Sharaa has decided not to fight Israel because he has too many internal problems, then a deal leading to a partial withdrawal for partial Syrian demilitarization   

Israel has beaten its enemies, at least in relative terms, on every front. But it has failed to nail down any long-term diplomatic achievements, which would allow it to switch from fighting all the time to some of the time.   

No one in Israel is talking about going back to the timid pre-October 7 positions, and Israeli military achievements have made Israel safer in the short and medium term. But if Israel does not remember how to do diplomacy before it is too late, eventually, its ignoring that critical arena will lead to the world, via Trump or others, imposing less desirable conditions on the Jewish state, including on its military abilities.

A new survey by the Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) found a sharp decline in the share of Jewish Israelis who believe US President Donald Trump views Israel’s security as a central consideration, alongside broad skepticism about a potential US-Iran agreement and continued dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of Hezbollah.

Only 41% of Jewish respondents said Israel’s security is a central consideration for Trump, down from 64% in March and the lowest figure recorded since the question was first asked in November 2024.

Among Arab respondents, however, the share expressing that view rose from 43% to 59%.

Support for the statement declined across the Jewish political spectrum. Among respondents identifying with the Left, 25.5% said Israel’s security is a central consideration for Trump, compared with 34.5% in March. In the Center, the figure fell from 62% to 32%, while among those on the Right it dropped from 70% to 48%.

The survey also examined public expectations regarding a possible agreement between the United States and Iran.

Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons

Respondents were asked whether such an agreement would include provisions preventing the continued development of Iranian nuclear weapons, eliminating the ballistic missile threat, and weakening the regime in Tehran.

A majority (56%) said they believe an agreement would prevent further development of Iranian nuclear weapons. Far fewer believed it would address other concerns. Only 32% said they expect an agreement to eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile threat, while 28% believe it would weaken the regime.

The findings reflect a notable shift from March, when public expectations regarding Israel’s military campaign against Iran were considerably more optimistic.

At the time, about two-thirds of respondents believed the operation would eliminate Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities, while more than half thought it could lead to the fall of the regime.

The survey found that 57.5% of Israelis believe ending the conflict with Iran under the currently discussed framework would not serve Israel’s security interests.

Among Jewish respondents, fewer than one-third in any political camp said ending the war would be in Israel’s interest. The figures stood at 30% on the Left, 26.5% in the Center, and 29.5% on the Right.

Respondents also expressed dissatisfaction with Israel’s handling of Hezbollah in the North.

Only 17.5% of the public rated Israel’s performance as good or excellent. Among Jewish respondents, the figure was 19.5%, compared with 8% among Arab respondents.

Only one-quarter of right-wing Jews gave gov’t positive feedback on handling of Hezbollah

Even among right-wing Jewish respondents, only about one-quarter gave the government’s handling of Hezbollah a positive rating. Support was even lower among respondents on the Left and in the Center.

The survey also examined public attitudes toward Netanyahu’s political future.

A total of 61% of respondents said the prime minister should not run in the next Knesset election.

Among Jewish respondents, 57% opposed another Netanyahu candidacy, while 39.5% supported one. Among Arab respondents, 83% said he should not run, compared with 11% who said he should.

A more detailed breakdown among Jewish respondents showed significant divisions on the Right. About two-thirds of those identifying as center-right said Netanyahu should not run again, while 69% of respondents on the hard right supported another candidacy.

As expected, large majorities on the Left, center-left, and in the Center opposed a future Netanyahu run.

Analysis of voting patterns in the 2022 election found that most coalition-party voters support Netanyahu’s continued involvement in politics. However, roughly one-quarter of voters for Likud, the Religious Zionist Party, and United Torah Judaism said he should not run in the next election.

The Israeli Voice Index for May 2026 was prepared by Prof. Tamar Hermann, Dr. Lior Yochhanni, and Yaron Kaplan. The survey was conducted by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israeli Democracy Institute between May 31 and June 5. It included 603 Hebrew-speaking respondents and 150 Arabic-speaking respondents, representing the Israeli population aged 18 and older.

During a visit to Northern Command, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir said that the IDF’s recent airstrike in Iran was a precursor to a “much more significant and heavy” operation in comments to the press on Tuesday.

He emphasized that the IDF is prepared to strike Iran again if it attacks Israel, while continuing to dismantle terror infrastructure in southern Lebanon, including a base in the Buphor area.

Speaking at a command training exercise in northern Israel, he underscored the IDF’s readiness for ongoing operations.

“The IDF maintained and continues to maintain alertness and immediate readiness to return to fighting in Iran,” he said.

“All our defense and attack arrays were alert and ready. We intercepted the threats fired at us and struck Iran quickly and powerfully. We are ready to strike Iran again with another hard and deep blow. Iran’s attempt to set equations and change reality will fail.”

IDF chief Zamir says military will still strike Hezbollah after ceasefire announced, broken

Addressing the northern front, Zamir said the military will continue operations to target Hezbollah and protect communities near the border.

“IDF forces continue to fight and attack along the front defense line in southern Lebanon, destroying terror infrastructure, including significant underground facilities in the Buphor area, which Hezbollah used as a fire base and command center for combat management.”

Concluding his remarks, the chief of staff highlighted the importance of leadership in warfare.

“During a prolonged multi-theater war, command courses serve as a central anchor in strengthening the IDF’s foundations and allow us to maintain the IDF as a professional army with norms, values, and high standards.

“You have experienced unprecedented combat in IDF history and represent the IDF’s significant command echelon. The leadership and professionalism you demonstrate will determine the IDF’s ability to carry out its complex missions with excellence.”

“Ahead of you lies the most important task: to lead soldiers, defeat our enemies in battle, while adhering to operational norms and IDF values.”

The US president and Israel’s prime minister are as united now, today, this week, and last week as they have been for the last several months. They share a vision for the Middle East. The difference between them is in timing and personality.

So, no, despite the headline-grabbing media hype, there has been no breakdown in their relationship. Their friendship has not eroded; communication between them has not halted.

And while, yes, US President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu did engage in a tense, heated phone conversation, that conversation is par for the course.

Calling Netanyahu “crazy” and telling him “you’d be in prison if it weren’t for me” was Trump blowing off steam. It was his frustration over Bibi’s decision-making vis-à-vis Lebanon and his fear that it was threatening negotiations with Iran.

It was the juicy stuff, and the media and the public love to exaggerate this into a huge conflict.

What’s not so juicy is hearing that neither their friendship nor their communication was damaged because they disagreed and because things got heated. World leaders disagreeing about world-shaping events is perfectly normal.

These two leaders are powerful and opinionated, and neither one of them likes it when they do not get their way. Neither one takes it calmly when there are obstacles placed in front of them, especially not when they had already made their positions clear.

Trump told Bibi that there should be no more attacks in Lebanon because it was harming US negotiations with Iran. And Bibi told Trump that Israel needs to protect Israeli citizens, which means attacking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.

Think of their conversation, in essence, as an immovable force meeting an unstoppable object. Your choice as to who is immovable and who is unstoppable. The bottom line is that on this issue, there will be no agreement.

But know that a disagreement on an issue is not a communication breakdown.

Tactical disagreements, not a strategic rupture

In an interview with CNBC after the now-famous, expletive-filled phone call, Bibi lent context to their conversation. The prime minister said: “Sometimes we have, as in the best of families, tactical disagreements.”

“We always find a way to work them out, and we do so as great friends. We can disagree in the morning, and by the afternoon, we have common actions,” he stated.

To best understand their interaction, one must also understand that their styles of leadership are very similar. That similarity is one of the reasons why, at the same time, Trump and Netanyahu both get along so well and are so explosive with each other.

Both of them are polarizing and dominating personalities who often improvise. They are team leaders, not team players. They are what I call reactive decision-makers.

Neither Trump nor Netanyahu takes well to losing or to negatives. In this latest kerfuffle, Trump thought that Bibi had undermined him publicly by targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon. Bibi thought otherwise.

Politics inside Israel: after Hezbollah strikes at Israel from Lebanon, Bibi could not be seen as weak, and Israel had to strike back.

These leaders will be managed neither by their advisers nor by one another.

There is no difference between the goals of Trump and Netanyahu when it comes to Iran and Hezbollah. They both agree that Iran is a real threat and that Hezbollah is a serious problem. 

Netanyahu wants to protect. Trump wants a resolution. 
Their respective goals align; it’s their tactics and timing that are out of sync. Trump wants physical outcomes brought about through quick negotiation and resolution. Bibi wants continued pressure until the threat is neutralized.

Trump wants talks and agreements, and Bibi wants continued pressure involving military strikes.

It is a serious mistake for anyone, especially Iran and Hezbollah, to think that this squabble means that the Trump White House is wavering on support for Israel. While their instincts differ, they are undeniably united in their goal – an end to the conflict.

Trump is a deal-maker. For the US president, the conflict ends when he signs a terrific deal. Bibi is a protector. For Israel’s prime minister, the conflict ends when the threat is reduced, and Israel is, once again, safer. He cannot afford a resolution which is either incomplete or ends too early.

For Trump, pressure rises along with the rising price of gasoline, and midterm elections are also hanging in the balance. In Israel, too, upcoming elections are looming, and Netanyahu needs to prove that he is a protector who did not buckle under US pressure. The political survival of both the president and the prime minister is at stake.

This squabble was merely a distraction. It was nothing.

The writer is a columnist and a social and political commentator. Watch his TV show Thinking Out Loud on JBS.

The US president and Israel’s prime minister are as united now, today, this week, and last week as they have been for the last several months. They share a vision for the Middle East. The difference between them is in timing and personality.

So, no, despite the headline-grabbing media hype, there has been no breakdown in their relationship. Their friendship has not eroded; communication between them has not halted.

And while, yes, US President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu did engage in a tense, heated phone conversation, that conversation is par for the course.

Calling Netanyahu “crazy” and telling him “you’d be in prison if it weren’t for me” was Trump blowing off steam. It was his frustration over Bibi’s decision-making vis-à-vis Lebanon and his fear that it was threatening negotiations with Iran.

It was the juicy stuff, and the media and the public love to exaggerate this into a huge conflict.

What’s not so juicy is hearing that neither their friendship nor their communication was damaged because they disagreed and because things got heated. World leaders disagreeing about world-shaping events is perfectly normal.

These two leaders are powerful and opinionated, and neither one of them likes it when they do not get their way. Neither one takes it calmly when there are obstacles placed in front of them, especially not when they had already made their positions clear.

Trump told Bibi that there should be no more attacks in Lebanon because it was harming US negotiations with Iran. And Bibi told Trump that Israel needs to protect Israeli citizens, which means attacking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.

Think of their conversation, in essence, as an immovable force meeting an unstoppable object. Your choice as to who is immovable and who is unstoppable. The bottom line is that on this issue, there will be no agreement.

But know that a disagreement on an issue is not a communication breakdown.

Tactical disagreements, not a strategic rupture

In an interview with CNBC after the now-famous, expletive-filled phone call, Bibi lent context to their conversation. The prime minister said: “Sometimes we have, as in the best of families, tactical disagreements.”

“We always find a way to work them out, and we do so as great friends. We can disagree in the morning, and by the afternoon, we have common actions,” he stated.

To best understand their interaction, one must also understand that their styles of leadership are very similar. That similarity is one of the reasons why, at the same time, Trump and Netanyahu both get along so well and are so explosive with each other.

Both of them are polarizing and dominating personalities who often improvise. They are team leaders, not team players. They are what I call reactive decision-makers.

Neither Trump nor Netanyahu takes well to losing or to negatives. In this latest kerfuffle, Trump thought that Bibi had undermined him publicly by targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon. Bibi thought otherwise.

Politics inside Israel: after Hezbollah strikes at Israel from Lebanon, Bibi could not be seen as weak, and Israel had to strike back.

These leaders will be managed neither by their advisers nor by one another.

There is no difference between the goals of Trump and Netanyahu when it comes to Iran and Hezbollah. They both agree that Iran is a real threat and that Hezbollah is a serious problem. 

Netanyahu wants to protect. Trump wants a resolution. 
Their respective goals align; it’s their tactics and timing that are out of sync. Trump wants physical outcomes brought about through quick negotiation and resolution. Bibi wants continued pressure until the threat is neutralized.

Trump wants talks and agreements, and Bibi wants continued pressure involving military strikes.

It is a serious mistake for anyone, especially Iran and Hezbollah, to think that this squabble means that the Trump White House is wavering on support for Israel. While their instincts differ, they are undeniably united in their goal – an end to the conflict.

Trump is a deal-maker. For the US president, the conflict ends when he signs a terrific deal. Bibi is a protector. For Israel’s prime minister, the conflict ends when the threat is reduced, and Israel is, once again, safer. He cannot afford a resolution which is either incomplete or ends too early.

For Trump, pressure rises along with the rising price of gasoline, and midterm elections are also hanging in the balance. In Israel, too, upcoming elections are looming, and Netanyahu needs to prove that he is a protector who did not buckle under US pressure. The political survival of both the president and the prime minister is at stake.

This squabble was merely a distraction. It was nothing.

The writer is a columnist and a social and political commentator. Watch his TV show Thinking Out Loud on JBS.

Jerusalem does not do things quietly. It carries the weight of millennia, of faith, of conflict, of longing, in every stone.

So when thousands of people poured into the streets on June 4 for the 24th annual Jerusalem “March for Pride and Tolerance,” rainbow flags rippling against that ancient skyline, I felt something I wasn’t fully prepared for: pure, uncomplicated joy.

This year marks a decade since I made Jerusalem my home. Ten years in this city have given me a front-row seat to its contradictions and its miracles, and June 4 felt like both at once.

The crowd was unlike anything I could have scripted. Families with strollers painted in rainbow colors. Elderly couples walking hand in hand. Soldiers in uniform. Secular Israelis and religious ones. Diplomats. Teenagers. A grandmother holding a sign that simply read “love.” 

The parade drew people from every corner of Israeli society, and watching them march together, past the Supreme Court, toward the Knesset, through a city holy to Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike, felt like Jerusalem, against all odds, making sense.

What struck me most was how family-friendly the march was. This wasn’t a fringe event or a provocation. It was a community celebration, with performers, speakers, and kids on their parents’ shoulders waving little flags.

President Isaac Herzog was there, becoming the first sitting Israeli head of state to attend Jerusalem Pride, a moment that carries weight not just symbolically but historically. Opposition Leader Yair Lapid addressed the crowd. The message from Israel’s leadership was unambiguous: “You belong here.”

What moved me most was the texture of the unity. I stood next to a haredi (ultra-Orthodox) man who had come, he told me, simply to watch, curious. Near the Knesset stretch of the route, a group of young Arab-Israeli women marched with a hand-painted sign in Arabic and Hebrew. 

Volunteers handed out water to strangers without asking who they were or where they came from. A man in a kippah cheered from the sideline, phone raised, filming. These were not staged moments. They were the ordinary overflow of a city deciding, together, that there is room enough for everyone.

We are living through a global moment of rising hatred: antisemitism, homophobia, racism, and the cynical weaponization of one group’s fear against another. It is easy to feel despair, which is why what happened in Jerusalem on June 4 felt like an answer.

Jerusalem Pride Chooses love over fear 

Not a naive one. Not a simple one. But a real one: thousands of people, different in almost every way, choosing to walk the same road together. Choosing visibility over silence, and choosing love over fear.

I AM an ally. I work in digital media for StandWithUs, an international education organization that supports Israel and combats antisemitism.

We recognized that the Jewish and LGBTQ+ communities are often vilified or erased within and from outside their own LGBTQ communities. Pro-Israel supporters are marginalized – not just by ideological opponents, but by the broader LGBTQ+ community itself that identifies with the “Queers for Palestine” ideology. 

So we created a new division, “Pride for Israel.” It works specifically to connect LGBTQ+ communities and allies who support Israel and to push back against attempts to weaponize LGBTQ+ identity against the Jewish state.

We held our first conference in Los Angeles to reclaim unity and love for Israel, and the division is growing quickly, issuing statements about the blatant antisemitism involved in excluding Jews from Rome’s Pride parade and from a spa event in Barcelona for wearing a Star of David. Pride for Israel will be planning a second conference soon.

Israel is often flattened into a talking point. Its complexity – democratic, diverse, struggling, striving – gets lost in the noise. 

But on June 4, I saw the Israel I believe in and the Jerusalem I have called home for 10 years: a city that is simultaneously the holiest place on earth and a place where a gay teenager can march safely down the street, where an Arab-Israeli and an ultra-Orthodox bystander and a tourist from the United States can stand in the same square and witness something remarkable together.

That is not a contradiction. That is the point.

For those who reduce Israel to a single narrative, the Jerusalem Pride march is inconvenient. But for those of us who believe in the dignity of every human being, regardless of who they love, how they pray, or where they come from, it is exactly the kind of evidence we need to share loudly and proudly.

Jerusalem does not belong to any one people. Its holiness, paradoxically, demands that it hold everyone. On June 4, for a few beautiful hours, it did.

The writer is the Digital PR and Media Writer for StandWithUs, an international nonpartisan education organization that supports Israel and combats antisemitism.

Jerusalem does not do things quietly. It carries the weight of millennia, of faith, of conflict, of longing, in every stone.

So when thousands of people poured into the streets on June 4 for the 24th annual Jerusalem “March for Pride and Tolerance,” rainbow flags rippling against that ancient skyline, I felt something I wasn’t fully prepared for: pure, uncomplicated joy.

This year marks a decade since I made Jerusalem my home. Ten years in this city have given me a front-row seat to its contradictions and its miracles, and June 4 felt like both at once.

The crowd was unlike anything I could have scripted. Families with strollers painted in rainbow colors. Elderly couples walking hand in hand. Soldiers in uniform. Secular Israelis and religious ones. Diplomats. Teenagers. A grandmother holding a sign that simply read “love.” 

The parade drew people from every corner of Israeli society, and watching them march together, past the Supreme Court, toward the Knesset, through a city holy to Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike, felt like Jerusalem, against all odds, making sense.

What struck me most was how family-friendly the march was. This wasn’t a fringe event or a provocation. It was a community celebration, with performers, speakers, and kids on their parents’ shoulders waving little flags.

President Isaac Herzog was there, becoming the first sitting Israeli head of state to attend Jerusalem Pride, a moment that carries weight not just symbolically but historically. Opposition Leader Yair Lapid addressed the crowd. The message from Israel’s leadership was unambiguous: “You belong here.”

What moved me most was the texture of the unity. I stood next to a haredi (ultra-Orthodox) man who had come, he told me, simply to watch, curious. Near the Knesset stretch of the route, a group of young Arab-Israeli women marched with a hand-painted sign in Arabic and Hebrew. 

Volunteers handed out water to strangers without asking who they were or where they came from. A man in a kippah cheered from the sideline, phone raised, filming. These were not staged moments. They were the ordinary overflow of a city deciding, together, that there is room enough for everyone.

We are living through a global moment of rising hatred: antisemitism, homophobia, racism, and the cynical weaponization of one group’s fear against another. It is easy to feel despair, which is why what happened in Jerusalem on June 4 felt like an answer.

Jerusalem Pride Chooses love over fear 

Not a naive one. Not a simple one. But a real one: thousands of people, different in almost every way, choosing to walk the same road together. Choosing visibility over silence, and choosing love over fear.

I AM an ally. I work in digital media for StandWithUs, an international education organization that supports Israel and combats antisemitism.

We recognized that the Jewish and LGBTQ+ communities are often vilified or erased within and from outside their own LGBTQ communities. Pro-Israel supporters are marginalized – not just by ideological opponents, but by the broader LGBTQ+ community itself that identifies with the “Queers for Palestine” ideology. 

So we created a new division, “Pride for Israel.” It works specifically to connect LGBTQ+ communities and allies who support Israel and to push back against attempts to weaponize LGBTQ+ identity against the Jewish state.

We held our first conference in Los Angeles to reclaim unity and love for Israel, and the division is growing quickly, issuing statements about the blatant antisemitism involved in excluding Jews from Rome’s Pride parade and from a spa event in Barcelona for wearing a Star of David. Pride for Israel will be planning a second conference soon.

Israel is often flattened into a talking point. Its complexity – democratic, diverse, struggling, striving – gets lost in the noise. 

But on June 4, I saw the Israel I believe in and the Jerusalem I have called home for 10 years: a city that is simultaneously the holiest place on earth and a place where a gay teenager can march safely down the street, where an Arab-Israeli and an ultra-Orthodox bystander and a tourist from the United States can stand in the same square and witness something remarkable together.

That is not a contradiction. That is the point.

For those who reduce Israel to a single narrative, the Jerusalem Pride march is inconvenient. But for those of us who believe in the dignity of every human being, regardless of who they love, how they pray, or where they come from, it is exactly the kind of evidence we need to share loudly and proudly.

Jerusalem does not belong to any one people. Its holiness, paradoxically, demands that it hold everyone. On June 4, for a few beautiful hours, it did.

The writer is the Digital PR and Media Writer for StandWithUs, an international nonpartisan education organization that supports Israel and combats antisemitism.

In the wake of the Iranian ballistic-missile attacks on Israel, it’s possible that Hezbollah may be emboldened. The terrorist group had felt pressure from the US-Israel talks and also from Israel’s continued military campaign in Lebanon.

It has now received a kind of lifeline from Iran. Tehran is trying to preserve Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon. It views Hezbollah as an important card in the Iranian regional deck of cards that it uses to control the Middle East.

Hezbollah has cheered the Iranian attacks. It is now trying to shift the focus to Lebanon and persuade Beirut to repair its ties with Iran.

Lebanon has tried to expel the Iranian ambassador in recent months, while Lebanese leaders have been more outspoken about the negative roles of Iran and Hezbollah.

“Hezbollah called on the Lebanese state to correct its relations with Tehran and to take advantage of the new political developments to achieve its national demands,” Beirut-based newspaper Al Akhbar, which is pro-Iranian, reported, adding that “Iran supports Lebanon, not the other way around.”

Hezbollah wants Lebanon to change course. Rather than courting Israel, Hezbollah wants Beirut to shift back toward a pro-Iranian stance or at least allow Iran to retake control of its affairs.

The axis of ‘resistance’ against Israel

“The Iranian missile response against the Zionist entity in defense of our Lebanese people is a message of moral, political, and field commitment from the Islamic Republic to Lebanon,” Hezbollah said.

In essence, Hezbollah is once again claiming that it is “resisting” Israel, and that Iran is helping Lebanon to “resist.” Iran calls the terrorist group and its other proxies the “axis of resistance.”

The Iranian stance coincided with “the appreciated support from the Ansar Allah [Houthis] movement in Yemen,” Hezbollah said.

This means Iran is trying to rebuild its multifront threat against Israel.

Hezbollah criticized what it described as “baseless accusations” made by some Lebanese officials against Iran. It was referring to a recent interview by Lebanon’s president with CNN.

Hezbollah called on the Lebanese authorities to “correct their official relationship with the Islamic Republic in a way that serves the interests of both countries.”

The statements show that Hezbollah will try to exploit the recent Iranian attacks by using them to its advantage.

It remains to be seen whether the terrorist group can return to its former position of power in Lebanon. Beirut will need to stay the course in its talks with Israel and the US to prevent that from happening.

In the wake of the Iranian ballistic-missile attacks on Israel, it’s possible that Hezbollah may be emboldened. The terrorist group had felt pressure from the US-Israel talks and also from Israel’s continued military campaign in Lebanon.

It has now received a kind of lifeline from Iran. Tehran is trying to preserve Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon. It views Hezbollah as an important card in the Iranian regional deck of cards that it uses to control the Middle East.

Hezbollah has cheered the Iranian attacks. It is now trying to shift the focus to Lebanon and persuade Beirut to repair its ties with Iran.

Lebanon has tried to expel the Iranian ambassador in recent months, while Lebanese leaders have been more outspoken about the negative roles of Iran and Hezbollah.

“Hezbollah called on the Lebanese state to correct its relations with Tehran and to take advantage of the new political developments to achieve its national demands,” Beirut-based newspaper Al Akhbar, which is pro-Iranian, reported, adding that “Iran supports Lebanon, not the other way around.”

Hezbollah wants Lebanon to change course. Rather than courting Israel, Hezbollah wants Beirut to shift back toward a pro-Iranian stance or at least allow Iran to retake control of its affairs.

The axis of ‘resistance’ against Israel

“The Iranian missile response against the Zionist entity in defense of our Lebanese people is a message of moral, political, and field commitment from the Islamic Republic to Lebanon,” Hezbollah said.

In essence, Hezbollah is once again claiming that it is “resisting” Israel, and that Iran is helping Lebanon to “resist.” Iran calls the terrorist group and its other proxies the “axis of resistance.”

The Iranian stance coincided with “the appreciated support from the Ansar Allah [Houthis] movement in Yemen,” Hezbollah said.

This means Iran is trying to rebuild its multifront threat against Israel.

Hezbollah criticized what it described as “baseless accusations” made by some Lebanese officials against Iran. It was referring to a recent interview by Lebanon’s president with CNN.

Hezbollah called on the Lebanese authorities to “correct their official relationship with the Islamic Republic in a way that serves the interests of both countries.”

The statements show that Hezbollah will try to exploit the recent Iranian attacks by using them to its advantage.

It remains to be seen whether the terrorist group can return to its former position of power in Lebanon. Beirut will need to stay the course in its talks with Israel and the US to prevent that from happening.

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The Trump administration’s preparations for the 2026 FIFA World Cup did not influence President Donald Trump’s decisions on Iran or his push for a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, Andrew Giuliani, the senior White House official overseeing the tournament, told The Jerusalem Post in an exclusive interview.

Giuliani, executive director of the White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup 2026, rejected the idea that the administration’s desire for a quiet tournament had shaped US national security policy.

“I can tell you that it did not,” Giuliani said when asked whether the World Cup affected Trump’s decision-making on Iran. “It did not influence any decision from a national security perspective.”

Giuliani said the White House wants the world to come to the United States for the tournament, while making clear that the administration will not compromise on security.

“We want the world to come here and enjoy the World Cup,” Giuliani said. “But we do not want terrorists. We do not want hostile actors. We are making sure we are doubling and tripling the intelligence work to ensure that does not happen.”

Iran moved training camps from US to Mexico due to conflicts

The Iranian angle is among the most sensitive issues facing the tournament. Iran is scheduled to play two group-stage matches in the Los Angeles area, home to one of the largest Iranian communities outside Iran. Giuliani said the administration had already prepared for the Iranian team’s arrival.

“The president signed an order last year that allowed the players to enter,” Giuliani said. “All 31 players, 26 plus five alternates, received their visas.”

He said the players would be able to enter the US one day before the match.

Giuliani described the security arrangements around the Iranian team as a “very well-coordinated operation” involving US federal and local agencies.

“We have worked very closely with US Customs and Border Protection, with the Department of Homeland Security, with the FBI, and with local officials in Los Angeles to make sure this is being planned very carefully,” he said.

“We want everyone in Los Angeles to be safe. We want the Iranian national team to be safe. We want them to have the ability to compete.”

The administration is also preparing for Iranian-American fans expected to attend matches and related events.

“We also want all the Iranian-Americans who are excited to celebrate the World Cup and the fact that the team is here to be able to enjoy it,” Giuliani said. “I think Los Angeles has the largest Iranian population outside Tehran. These will be very special weeks for that community.”

Asked whether Iranian fans would be allowed to wave the pre-revolutionary Iranian flag, featuring the lion and sun symbol associated by many opponents of the Islamic Republic with a different Iranian identity, or hold protests outside stadiums, Giuliani said the federal government was approaching the issue primarily through a security lens.

“FIFA does what it does inside the stadiums regarding prohibited items,” he said. “We look at this from a security perspective. Outside the stadiums, people will be free to express their feelings. We want them to do that.”

“So long as they are not threatening law enforcement, not threatening Americans, or not threatening anyone else, they can express themselves,” Giuliani added. “That is one of the beautiful things we believe in here in the United States.”

Trump’s personal involvement in the tournament

Giuliani repeatedly tied the tournament to America’s 250th anniversary, which will be marked during the World Cup.

“This is an opportunity to host the largest sporting event this country has ever hosted and to do it in America’s 250th birthday year,” he said. “We expect more than two billion people to watch the final. There really is no bigger sporting event through which to showcase that.”

Trump himself, Giuliani said, has been personally involved in preparations for a long time.

“I have spoken with President Trump about this dozens of times, including this past weekend,” Giuliani said. “He is very excited that the tournament is about to begin, and he is excited that the rest of the world will be able to see American exceptionalism here.”

Giuliani noted that Trump was involved in the successful US bid to host the tournament during his first term.

“I remember working on this with the president,” he said. “I remember the evening when we were in the Oval Office after we knew the country had won the right to host the World Cup. He was very excited for the country.”

That evening, Giuliani said, had a “bittersweet” element for Trump, who at the time did not expect to be president when the tournament opened in 2026.

“And here we are again,” Giuliani said. “The 45th and 47th president of the United States gets to host the world.”

The 2026 World Cup will be the first with 48 national teams and the first to be hosted by three countries: the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Giuliani said the size of the tournament created enormous logistical and security challenges.

“The last time the United States hosted the World Cup, in 1994, there were 24 teams. Now it is double,” he said. “We have matches from Los Angeles to Boston, from Miami to Seattle, and really almost everywhere in between.”

More than 400 law enforcement bodies are involved in preparations, Giuliani said.

“We are in daily contact with those law enforcement organizations,” he said. “We are making sure the intelligence is very sharp, minute by minute, so we can help a police officer in Seattle who sees the same thing a police officer in Atlanta sees and connect the two.”

Drone threats and visa scrutiny both pose challenges

One of the issues worrying organizers is the threat posed by drones.

Giuliani said that last year, only five major security events in the US received counter-drone protection. During the World Cup, that protection will be expanded significantly.

“For 78 matches and one fan festival in each of the 11 US host cities throughout the tournament, we will be able to bring counter-drone protection to all those sites,” he said. “That is more than 150 event days in which we will be able to provide that coverage. It is an incredible effort that has taken more than a year by the federal government.”

The FBI, Justice Department, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, State Department, and National Security Council are all involved in the effort, Giuliani said.

“It is really amazing to see the work being done to protect the skies around this World Cup,” he said.

Visa issues have also become a flashpoint ahead of the tournament. Somali referee Omar Abdulkadir Artan, one of FIFA’s prominent officials, was denied entry to the US. Iraqi star Aymen Hussein was reportedly detained and questioned for hours. Other participating countries have also faced visa difficulties involving fans and officials.

Giuliani said the administration views visas and national security as inseparable.

“Every visa decision is a national security decision. That is the first and most important thing to say,” he said.

At the same time, he said the administration had cut waiting times in major soccer countries.

“In Argentina, wait times were more than 300 days just a few years ago. Now the wait times in Buenos Aires are only a few days,” he said. “In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, they were around 700 days. Think about that, 700 days for a five-time world champion. Today we have cut B1/B2 visa wait times to less than two weeks.”

Giuliani stressed that the administration would not soften security checks.

“We are not going to allow people who are hostile actors to enter,” he said. “We are carrying out the screening process. We want to process people’s applications and give them the opportunity to get appointments, but we are not changing national security procedures. We want a safe and successful World Cup, to invite everyone who comes to enjoy it, and to keep all hostile actors out.”

A message to Israeli fans

Giuliani also sent a direct message to Israeli fans.

“We want you to come to the United States for the World Cup,” he said. “Please come here. Enjoy this amazing World Cup. Celebrate America’s 250th birthday with us. We truly value this relationship. I know President Trump greatly values that special relationship. I value it as well.”

“We very much want you to be part of our 250th birthday,” he added. “So please come to the United States. Enjoy the World Cup. Enjoy all the great events.”

Trump, Giuliani said, will not attend the US national team’s opening match, though he will send a senior delegation.

“The president is very excited that the tournament is beginning,” Giuliani said. “He will not be able to attend the opening match, but several cabinet secretaries will be there to represent him. I will also be there to represent him.”

Asked what would count as success for the administration, Giuliani said the answer was simple.

“If, at the end of the World Cup, we are talking about what happened on the field, then we as a federal government did our job,” he said. “That is really a central part of it. We want to make sure the real story is the game itself.”

Still, he did not hide his hope for American success.

“You can accuse me of being a bit of a homer, but I hope and expect that the US national team will make a nice, deep run in this World Cup,” he said. “Imagine what kind of story it would be if, in America’s 250th year, the US men’s national team makes a serious run in the tournament. That could captivate the entire nation.”

Messi, Ronaldo, Haaland and the American audience

Asked which players are most exciting to the American public, Giuliani began with Lionel Messi.

“Everyone is very excited. Obviously, Messi, since coming to Miami a few years ago, has also lifted American soccer,” he said.

He also mentioned Cristiano Ronaldo and his connection to Trump.

“We have seen Ronaldo here a few times at the White House with President Trump. That was very special. Being with President Trump and Messi in the Oval Office was also a lot of fun,” he said.

The player who seemed to excite him most was Erling Haaland.

“I think it will really be amazing to see Haaland here from Norway,” he said. “Amazing.”

Giuliani said it would also be exciting to see American stars “take center stage,” including Christian Pulisic, Tyler Adams, and Weston McKennie.

“Who knows who else will come out of the shadows and become the hero of this incredible 40-day run we are about to begin,” Giuliani said.

Giuliani, 40, is the son of former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani. He played professional golf for several years before entering politics, ran in the 2022 Republican primary for governor of New York, and served in the White House during Trump’s first term as a special assistant to the president and a senior official in the Office of Public Liaison.

Today, he heads the White House task force responsible for the 2026 World Cup.

Asked at the end of the interview which player, coach, or world leader he was most excited to meet during the tournament, Giuliani chose a broader answer.

“I don’t know if there is one specific person,” he said. “What I am excited about is America’s opportunity to show its greatness. This is an opportunity to host the world.”

“People from all walks of life, all political views, and all religious backgrounds will come to the United States and see American hospitality and American exceptionalism,” he said.

“President Trump is always very clear. When he says America First, it means America First, but it does not mean America Only. We want the rest of the world to come here, enjoy the United States, and leave on July 20, saying, ‘That was an amazing 250th birthday celebration.’ We will have to do it again.”

A lighter moment came at the end of the interview, when Giuliani was asked whether he could be described as the Steve Witkoff of soccer.

Giuliani laughed, said he had played golf with Witkoff in the past, and replied: “I am going to tell him you said I am the Witkoff of soccer. I really want to see what his reaction will be.”

Iran appears to have ended its ballistic-missile attacks against Israel. The regime’s airstrikes came two days after it chose to target Israel in response to its operations in Lebanon.

Iran was signaling that in addition to using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in talks with the US, it also wants to set down new lines of deterrence against Israel.

Israeli officials have said Jerusalem will not permit this to happen, and that Iran won’t be allowed to change the “equation.”

The question now is whether Iran will continue to conduct these types of “tit-for-tat” responses and whether this becomes the new normal.

Iran already did this when it attacked Israel with large numbers of ballistic missiles and drones in April and October 2024, essentially breaking a kind of glass ceiling, or regional norm.

In each case, Iran claimed to be responding to Israeli actions. It said Israel had attacked a diplomatic building linked to Iran in Damascus, and that it was angry over the elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the summer of 2024.

Iran strives to carve out new norm

The real story was that Tehran wanted to carve out this new norm – attacking when it wants and setting new escalation rules in the region. This was supposed to shift the balance of power in Iran’s favor.

Tehran had done this before with missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facility in 2019. It was now testing to see what kind of response it would get by striking Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week said Iran would not be allowed to rewrite this equation.

“A year ago, we launched a historic preemptive strike against Iran’s intention to destroy us with atomic bombs,” he said. “We thwarted this immediate threat, and we also eliminated the tyrant [supreme leader Ali] Khamenei.”

“With that same determination, we acted against Hezbollah as well,” Netanyahu said. “Hezbollah planned to invade the Galilee with thousands of terrorists, and at the same time, it planned to devastate Israel’s cities with 150,000 missiles and rockets.”

“Iran and Hezbollah are weaker than ever, and we are stronger than ever,” he said. “But our battle against them is still not finished. In the last 24 hours, Iran and Hezbollah tried to impose a new equation upon us, and it is an equation I find intolerable and unacceptable.”

“They thought they would fire at Israel from Lebanese territory and from Iran, and we would not act,” Netanyahu said. “That did not happen, and it will not happen… After Iran attacked Israel, I instructed the IDF to attack military and economic targets throughout Iran. We did that, too.”

Nevertheless, Israel is now “holding fire,” he said, adding that “in the event that the terrorist regime in Iran makes the mistake of resuming attacks on us, we will respond with overwhelming force.”

Iran shows willingness to attack across region

The question is whether his statement will reverberate throughout Iran and the region and make Tehran realize it can no longer lob missiles at Israel.

In recent months, Iran has shown that it is willing to carry out attacks all over the region. This has created a 4,800-kilometer front line from Lebanon to Iraq and the Gulf, as well as to Yemen, where the Iranian-backed Houthis are. The Houthis joined the Iranian attacks this week and do not appear to be deterred.

Iran’s goal is to up the ante in the region, and it feels it can do whatever it wants whenever it wants. It already has been doing this for more than 45 years, but it now feels emboldened.

Even though Israeli officials claim Iran is weakened, sometimes even a weakened country, or one that feels cornered, may lash out. Tehran is clearly trying to prevent a sense in Washington or Jerusalem that the regime will fall.

It wants to show that any action will lead to a reaction. Iran’s objective is to establish deterrence and also to carve out “redlines” across the region, indicating where it will still defend its proxies, such as Hezbollah. Iran does not want them removed or dismantled.

The coming months and years will reveal whether this week’s tit-for-tat escalation was a one-time event or whether this becomes the new normal. Since 2024, it has appeared to be a kind of new normal.

Iran appears to have ended its ballistic-missile attacks against Israel. The regime’s airstrikes came two days after it chose to target Israel in response to its operations in Lebanon.

Iran was signaling that in addition to using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in talks with the US, it also wants to set down new lines of deterrence against Israel.

Israeli officials have said Jerusalem will not permit this to happen, and that Iran won’t be allowed to change the “equation.”

The question now is whether Iran will continue to conduct these types of “tit-for-tat” responses and whether this becomes the new normal.

Iran already did this when it attacked Israel with large numbers of ballistic missiles and drones in April and October 2024, essentially breaking a kind of glass ceiling, or regional norm.

In each case, Iran claimed to be responding to Israeli actions. It said Israel had attacked a diplomatic building linked to Iran in Damascus, and that it was angry over the elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the summer of 2024.

Iran strives to carve out new norm

The real story was that Tehran wanted to carve out this new norm – attacking when it wants and setting new escalation rules in the region. This was supposed to shift the balance of power in Iran’s favor.

Tehran had done this before with missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facility in 2019. It was now testing to see what kind of response it would get by striking Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week said Iran would not be allowed to rewrite this equation.

“A year ago, we launched a historic preemptive strike against Iran’s intention to destroy us with atomic bombs,” he said. “We thwarted this immediate threat, and we also eliminated the tyrant [supreme leader Ali] Khamenei.”

“With that same determination, we acted against Hezbollah as well,” Netanyahu said. “Hezbollah planned to invade the Galilee with thousands of terrorists, and at the same time, it planned to devastate Israel’s cities with 150,000 missiles and rockets.”

“Iran and Hezbollah are weaker than ever, and we are stronger than ever,” he said. “But our battle against them is still not finished. In the last 24 hours, Iran and Hezbollah tried to impose a new equation upon us, and it is an equation I find intolerable and unacceptable.”

“They thought they would fire at Israel from Lebanese territory and from Iran, and we would not act,” Netanyahu said. “That did not happen, and it will not happen… After Iran attacked Israel, I instructed the IDF to attack military and economic targets throughout Iran. We did that, too.”

Nevertheless, Israel is now “holding fire,” he said, adding that “in the event that the terrorist regime in Iran makes the mistake of resuming attacks on us, we will respond with overwhelming force.”

Iran shows willingness to attack across region

The question is whether his statement will reverberate throughout Iran and the region and make Tehran realize it can no longer lob missiles at Israel.

In recent months, Iran has shown that it is willing to carry out attacks all over the region. This has created a 4,800-kilometer front line from Lebanon to Iraq and the Gulf, as well as to Yemen, where the Iranian-backed Houthis are. The Houthis joined the Iranian attacks this week and do not appear to be deterred.

Iran’s goal is to up the ante in the region, and it feels it can do whatever it wants whenever it wants. It already has been doing this for more than 45 years, but it now feels emboldened.

Even though Israeli officials claim Iran is weakened, sometimes even a weakened country, or one that feels cornered, may lash out. Tehran is clearly trying to prevent a sense in Washington or Jerusalem that the regime will fall.

It wants to show that any action will lead to a reaction. Iran’s objective is to establish deterrence and also to carve out “redlines” across the region, indicating where it will still defend its proxies, such as Hezbollah. Iran does not want them removed or dismantled.

The coming months and years will reveal whether this week’s tit-for-tat escalation was a one-time event or whether this becomes the new normal. Since 2024, it has appeared to be a kind of new normal.

Fatah was absent from some of the bilateral meetings during the two-day conference in Cairo amid reported frustration over Hamas’s refusal to disarm and the growing influence of the Democratic Reform Bloc, according to Arabic media reports on Monday.

The high-level meeting was said to have included mediators from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as representatives from eight Palestinian factions, most notably Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Reform Bloc.

While Fatah spokesman Abdel Fattah Dawla made comments to Independent Arabia, which made it apparent the group was growing frustrated with Hamas’s lack of motion in handing over control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, France 24’s Arabic service noted that many believe Fatah’s stretches of absence were due to the Democratic Reform Bloc’s participation.

The bloc is currently led by Mohammed Dahlan, a former senior Fatah figure reported to have recently met with Shin Bet chief David Zini in the United Arab Emirates, where he lives in exile.

Dahlan fell out with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in 2011. The Palestinian Authority convicted Dahlan of multiple serious offenses, including involvement in a poisoning plot against PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, an attempted coup against the Palestinian leadership, and embezzlement. Dahlan denied these accusations as “fantastical” at the time.

Dawla told Independent Arabia that Hamas is “obligated to implement the terms of the ceasefire agreement that it signed unilaterally, which includes disarming,” and stressed “the need not to give [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu any pretext to evade implementing the rest of the agreement and to continue killing the Palestinian people.”

Why is Hamas not disarming in Gaza?

Though Hamas has yet to disarm and follow through with its agreements, Dawla blamed the lack of movement toward the second phase of the US-brokered deal on “the behavior of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his insistence on remaining in the Gaza Strip.”

Dawla urged Hamas to “take practical steps to enable the Palestinian Authority and the PLO to exercise their duties as the legitimate political and legal authorities over the Gaza Strip” and complained that, so far, the Iran-backed terrorist organization had “not taken any steps in that direction; it is negotiating over weapons and making concessions to others.”

Hamas and its allied terrorist groups were reported to have demanded that the conditions of disarmament include weapons only being handed over to Palestinian parties, such an action be carried out in stages rather than all at once in pace with Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and that anti-Hamas militia groups allegedly receiving Israeli support be entirely disbanded, according to France 24.

Hamas attempts ‘united front’ – researcher to Post

Dr. Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center and a historian of the Middle East specializing in the social and political history of the Palestinians, explained to The Jerusalem Post that Hamas’s promises to disarm were part of a “masquerade” and the group had ambitions to remain in power in Gaza.

“They (Fatah) understand very well that Hamas’s intentions are to remain in power, and therefore, they refuse to cooperate, and their demand for Hamas disarmament is no less strong than Israel’s,” Chorev commented. “Hamas is trying to build a united front, so-called that supports its demands, but the fact is that Fatah is not supporting it… the Hamas situation is deteriorating at the moment, so there’s no reason to give them a hand at the moment, and to save them by showing a united Palestinian front.”

A senior official in the Palestine Liberation Organization also registered his displeasure at the developments in Cairo, telling Independent Arabia that there was “an attempt to create an alternative framework to the PLO” and “some factions are not allowed to decide the fate of the Gaza Strip in the absence of Palestinian legitimacy.”

The PLO official explained that any agreement reached “is not binding on us in the absence of the Fatah movement,” warning against “creating an alternative parallel framework that would perpetuate a geographical separation of the state of Palestine and even divide the Gaza Strip.” 

Fatah was absent from some of the bilateral meetings during the two-day conference in Cairo amid reported frustration over Hamas’s refusal to disarm and the growing influence of the Democratic Reform Bloc, according to Arabic media reports on Monday.

The high-level meeting was said to have included mediators from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as representatives from eight Palestinian factions, most notably Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Reform Bloc.

While Fatah spokesman Abdel Fattah Dawla made comments to Independent Arabia, which made it apparent the group was growing frustrated with Hamas’s lack of motion in handing over control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, France 24’s Arabic service noted that many believe Fatah’s stretches of absence were due to the Democratic Reform Bloc’s participation.

The bloc is currently led by Mohammed Dahlan, a former senior Fatah figure reported to have recently met with Shin Bet chief David Zini in the United Arab Emirates, where he lives in exile.

Dahlan fell out with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in 2011. The Palestinian Authority convicted Dahlan of multiple serious offenses, including involvement in a poisoning plot against PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, an attempted coup against the Palestinian leadership, and embezzlement. Dahlan denied these accusations as “fantastical” at the time.

Dawla told Independent Arabia that Hamas is “obligated to implement the terms of the ceasefire agreement that it signed unilaterally, which includes disarming,” and stressed “the need not to give [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu any pretext to evade implementing the rest of the agreement and to continue killing the Palestinian people.”

Why is Hamas not disarming in Gaza?

Though Hamas has yet to disarm and follow through with its agreements, Dawla blamed the lack of movement toward the second phase of the US-brokered deal on “the behavior of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his insistence on remaining in the Gaza Strip.”

Dawla urged Hamas to “take practical steps to enable the Palestinian Authority and the PLO to exercise their duties as the legitimate political and legal authorities over the Gaza Strip” and complained that, so far, the Iran-backed terrorist organization had “not taken any steps in that direction; it is negotiating over weapons and making concessions to others.”

Hamas and its allied terrorist groups were reported to have demanded that the conditions of disarmament include weapons only being handed over to Palestinian parties, such an action be carried out in stages rather than all at once in pace with Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and that anti-Hamas militia groups allegedly receiving Israeli support be entirely disbanded, according to France 24.

Hamas attempts ‘united front’ – researcher to Post

Dr. Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center and a historian of the Middle East specializing in the social and political history of the Palestinians, explained to The Jerusalem Post that Hamas’s promises to disarm were part of a “masquerade” and the group had ambitions to remain in power in Gaza.

“They (Fatah) understand very well that Hamas’s intentions are to remain in power, and therefore, they refuse to cooperate, and their demand for Hamas disarmament is no less strong than Israel’s,” Chorev commented. “Hamas is trying to build a united front, so-called that supports its demands, but the fact is that Fatah is not supporting it… the Hamas situation is deteriorating at the moment, so there’s no reason to give them a hand at the moment, and to save them by showing a united Palestinian front.”

A senior official in the Palestine Liberation Organization also registered his displeasure at the developments in Cairo, telling Independent Arabia that there was “an attempt to create an alternative framework to the PLO” and “some factions are not allowed to decide the fate of the Gaza Strip in the absence of Palestinian legitimacy.”

The PLO official explained that any agreement reached “is not binding on us in the absence of the Fatah movement,” warning against “creating an alternative parallel framework that would perpetuate a geographical separation of the state of Palestine and even divide the Gaza Strip.” 

Iraq’s new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is preparing a trip to Washington to secure support from the Trump administration and drum up investment for Iraq, which has suffered economic losses due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz since February. 

The war in Iran has also brought other threats from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. A part of the Iraqi paramilitary security forces, and as such, both inside and outside the government, Zaidi, with US support, appears to want to rein in the militias.

According to Asharq al Awsat, a London-based media outlet, “Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is preparing for a trip to the United States at President Donald Trump’s invitation. It will be his first since taking office as his government presses ahead with efforts to bring armed factions under state control.” 

The report notes that Zaidi is still organizing his government. Some cabinet posts remain vacant. Over the last weeks, he secured an agreement from Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shi’ite cleric, to disarm Sadr’s large Saraya al Salam militia. However, more extreme Iranian-backed militias such as Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have said they won’t disarm.

The report at Asharq notes, “Despite the absence of defense and interior ministers, al-Zaidi’s administration has moved forward with a sensitive disarmament campaign targeting several armed factions.” It adds that “Al-Zaidi has made state monopoly over weapons the centerpiece of his program. Backed by unusually strong public support from Trump shortly after winning parliamentary confidence, he has stressed that ending the influence of the factions is essential to reshaping Iraq’s economy and attracting foreign investment.”

US embraces Zaidi, who opposes pro-Iran ex-PM

Shafaq News in Baghdad added that “Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi announced on Saturday an upcoming official visit to the United States, accompanied by businessmen, to expand mutual and joint investment opportunities, noting at the same time that the development fund is for the private sector and will absorb a contribution from the Central Bank worth $10 billion.”

This report says he is drumming up support among Iraqi businesspeople and key economic groups ahead of the trip. Zaidi is a former banker, and he has experience in the private sector. The US has warmed to Zaidi after opposing former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is known to be very pro-Iran and almost became prime minister in February.

Shafaq says that “According to a statement from the Prime Minister’s Media Office received by Shafaq News Agency, Al-Zaydi affirmed that the government relies on cooperation with the private sector to ensure the success of its reform efforts in the economy and development, and that it will adopt an open-door policy regarding the proposals, requests, and problems submitted by businessmen that require intervention and resolution.” 

The report adds that “Al-Zaidi stressed the fight against corruption and extortion, and called on all businessmen or companies not to be drawn into offering any sums of money to facilitate their work and obtain their rights, and that his door is open to any case of obstruction practiced by any element within the body of the state.”

The report goes on to say that Zaidi has worked to pressure the militias not to escalate amid Israel-Iran tensions this week. “Informed sources reported on Monday that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, along with his own team, is leading an intensive effort aimed at preventing Iraqi armed factions from becoming involved in the recent military escalation between Iran and Israel, even if the United States returns to direct participation in the confrontation alongside Israel.” Maliki has also been meeting with US officials in Baghdad to discuss the issue of militias and their control of weapons.

Australia, Canada, France, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have imposed joint sanctions on West Bank individuals they accuse of “horrific abuses against Palestinian civilians.”

The foreign ministers of all six countries jointly announced the move on Tuesday, Australia and New Zealand sanctioned many of those now sanctioned by the other states last week.

All six countries have recognized the State of Palestine and claimed that the new sanctions will help to “preserve the viability of the two-State solution.”

The ministers’ statements – although with different wording – all condemn extremist settler violence in the West Bank. They accuse this phenomenon of driving forced displacement of Palestinian communities and undermining the viability of a two-state solution, as well as broader regional peace and security.

“For too long, violent settlers have acted with almost impunity while the expansion of settlements and the creation of outposts continue with the support and assistance of the Israeli government,” said France’s Jean-Noël Barrot.

He claimed that some settlers commit violence under the protection of Israeli security forces, and urged the Israeli government to “take steps to ensure that perpetrators of violence in the West Bank are truly held accountable.”

The UK is specifically imposing sanctions on six entities and one individual involved in “financing, enabling and carrying out settler violence in the occupied West Bank” and Canada is listing two individuals and five entities.

Those designated individuals and entities will face asset freezes and possibly travel bans and Director Disqualifications.

UK – no economic involvement in illegal settlements

For the first time, the UK Foreign Secretary has also announced that the UK’s official guidance explicitly advises businesses against economic and financial activity in illegal settlements.

The UK continues to support trade with Israel within 1967 lines, but states that there should be no economic involvement in illegal settlements.  

“Today we are acting with our international partners to sanction those who support and sponsor violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank,” said UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper.

“Settler expansion and violence are illegal and a fundamental threat to the viability of a two-state solution, and to long-term peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis.”

Israel’s foreign ministry said, “Israel firmly rejects the disgraceful measures adopted by foreign governments against Israeli citizens, entities, and a government minister.”

“The real essence of these steps is the attempt to impose a political stance regarding the right of Jews to settle in the Land of Israel and concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – camouflaged as measures against violence.”

“What these governments have in common is their resounding failure to combat the antisemitism that is rampant in their own countries. Anti-Israeli policies of the kind adopted today only serve to fuel that antisemitism.”

It also noted that these same governments have failed to impose sanctions or take action against the Palestinian Authority’s salaries for terrorists (“pay-for-slay”) policy and incitement.

UK sanctions Israeli organizations under Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations

The UK sanctioned six Israeli organizations and one Israeli citizen under the 2020 Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations, primarily for the resources and funds that they supposedly provided to West Bank outposts and farms, which were allegedly engaged in violence and the displacement of Palestinians. The organizations and individuals did not immediately respond to queries for comment.

The Farms Association, which, according to its website, was founded in 2024 to fundraise, coordinate security, and represent farm owners before state authorities, was subject to an asset freeze by the UK. The association was allegedly providing financial services, resources, and technologies to violent settler groups. Neria Ben Pazi, who was previously sanctioned by the UK in 2024 for constructing three West Bank outposts and participating in acts of violence, sits on the association board. Eliav Libi is also on the board. Libi is the director of Libi Construction and Infrastructure, which was sanctioned along with his own Harel Libi last May.

For allegedly serving as a financial conduit for the Farms Association, Ahavat Gilad was subject to an asset freeze and its director disqualified for directing or any promotion or management of a company in the UK. The destination for donations on the Farm Association’s website is listed as Ahavat Gilad.

The Ari Yishag organization, which on its Facebook page professes to work to “strengthen the hills and outposts of the front, and raise awareness of the settlement of the Land of Israel,” was punished with the same sanctions. It was accused of fundraising for outposts associated with acts of violence, according to the UK government.

Artzenu was subject to an asset freeze by the UK, as was its alleged fundraising body Shivat Zion Lerigvey Admata, which also had a director disqualification sanction leveled against it. Artzenu describes itself as a group of farmers and settlement activists founded in 2020 to entrench settlement activity across the country and improve economic and security conditions for farms. The UK alleged that it had financially backed farms and outposts associated with violence against Palestinians, including supplying tactical equipment for “armed settler squads.”

Eyal Hari Yehuda construction company owner Itamar Yehuda Levi was slapped with a travel ban, and both he and his organization were sanctioned with asset freezes and director disqualification. Yehuda and the company were sanctioned for construction and demolition work in the West Bank, allegedly including the destruction of Palestinian property. The company’s owners and staff were alleged by the UK to have shot and killed Palestinians.

Following suit with previous UK sanctions against Harel and Eliav Libi and their company, Canada sanctioned them on Tuesday along with Regavim, Coco’s Farm, Micha’s Farm, and Nachala.

The Regavim Movement focuses on preventing “illegal seizure of state land,” and to protect the rule of law and clean government in matters pertaining to land-use policy in the State of Israel. Nachala organizes groups of young couples whose goal is to establish new communities in Judea and Samaria. The other two are farms in the West Bank which have been accused of engaging in violent actions against Palestinians.

“This round of sanctions lists two individuals and five entities for their role in directly or indirectly facilitating, supporting, providing funding for or contributing to the use or attempted use of violence by extremist settlers against Palestinian civilians or their property,” said Global Affairs Canada. “Extremist settler violence is further destabilizing the West Bank, driving the forced displacement of Palestinian communities and undermining the viability of a two-state solution, as well as broader regional peace and security.”

Canada’s fifth round of actions against settler violence

The sanctions were the fifth round of Canadian actions against Israelis allegedly involved in West Bank violence, with farmers Moshe Sharvit and Zvi Bar Yosef, and activists Yinon Levi and David Chai Chasdai sanctioned in 2024. Later that year, Canada sanctioned the farms associated with Sharvit and Bar Yosef, alongside anti-Arab assimilation group Lehava, radical outpost group Hilltop Youth, and settlement movement Amana. Nachala founder Daniella Weiss, Lehava director Ben-Zion Gopstein, Hilltop Youth leader Meir Mordechai Ettinger, and activists Einan Ben-Nir, Amram Tanjil, Elisha Yered, Ely Federman, and Shalom Zicherman were sanctioned in the same round.

Ben Pazi was sanctioned by Canada in the third round of sanctions, along with former Kach Party leader Noam Federman, activist Eden Levy, activist Shlomo Sarid, and the organizations Mount Hebron Fund and Shlom Asiraich.

Last Tuesday, Australia sanctioned Gopstein, Levy, Sharvit, and farms and outposts associated with them. They also sanctioned the farms of Bar Yosef, Ben Pazi, and Levi, who were sanctioned in July 2024.

Itamar Yehuda Levi, Harel Libi, and Eliav Libi were banned from New Zealand last Monday, according to the New Zealand Herald.

Last June, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich were sanctioned by Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Norway. France imposed a travel ban on the ministers in May. 

During Israel’s counter-invasion of Hamas in Gaza, over 10,000 Palestinians, a spike of 92%, were imprisoned from October 2023 until January 2025, the State Comptroller’s report revealed on Tuesday.

According to Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, whose term concludes next month, neither the Israel Prisons Service (IPS) nor the IDF was adequately prepared for the implications of needing to arrest and imprison such large volumes of Gazans long-term.

The absence of the IDF and the IPS having prepared even any theoretical plans or estimates for how many Gazans they might need to arrest and imprison in the event of a longer war and how they would they would do so, led to improper “freebie” releases of senior Hamas officials mid-war at times when Israeli hostages were still being held in Gaza, said the report.

On November 23, 2023, the IDF detained the director of Shifa Hospital, Muhammad Abu Salmiya, for significant coordination with the Hamas terrorists who used his facility as a command center.

The case of the release of Abu Samiya

The report specifically flags the release of Abu Samiya on July 1, 2024, and of 18 other senior Hamas officials at various points, as especially problematic

Englman said, “The fact that prisoners who presented danger to the security of Israel were released without notifying the prime minister in real time should be viewed with severity.”

The Jerusalem Post understands that the case of the release of Abu Samiya was far more complex than this summary sentence by the comptroller.

Shin Bet sources told the Post in real-time in 2024 that the political echelon and the cabinet had ignored the major issue of drastically overcrowded prisons and makeshift field-prison facilities for several months.

Given the absence of cabinet guidance, sufficient resources, and cell space, the IPS, IDF, and the Shin Bet all were forced to make a large number of ad-hoc decisions to address imminent problems, with many of those decisions being sub-optimal.

Sde Teiman field detention facility

For example, the establishment of the huge makeshift IDF base, Sde Teiman field detention facility, was accused by the High Court of Justice of leading to a wide range of violations of the detainees’ rights.

At least one IDF prison guard was convicted of abusing a prisoner, five more IDF prison guards were indicted in the large Sde Teiman case, with their indictment only being withdrawn due to how the IDF prosecution violated the prison guards’ fair trial rights, but not necessarily because of an absence of evidence, and other possible cases are pending.

These harms to Palestinian detainee rights massively harmed Israeli legitimacy globally, with the New York Times and other media outlets publishing long pieces about the abuse months before the IDF prosecution got involved.

The report said it does not address any of these issues as it focused only on IPS facilities, though it is not clear why this distinction was made.

Absent the High Court’s intervention in mid-2024, the Sde Teiman problems might have continued indefinitely.

Sources close to the IDF Military Advocate General Yifat Tomer Yerushalmi told the Post at the time that she had tried to close the facility earlier, but had not succeeded.

The report focuses on the errors made by the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet, which harmed security on the Israeli side in terms of releasing prisoners who it says should have been held for longer.

While the Shin Bet has said it lacked sufficient guidance from the political echelon, a claim which comptroller sources sympathize with, the comptroller sources also say that the agency should have recognized that in the unique situation of the war at the time, a special appeal should have been made to Netanyahu regarding the handling of the Abu Samiya file.

Put differently, in a vacuum, the Shin Bet possibly made the right call to release Abu Samiya as he was not a violent terrorist and did not present a physical danger in that sense.

Having held him for seven months with no clear path to indict him, releasing him to make room for more violent prisoners was not illogical.

However, given that Hamas was holding Israeli hostages and the public relations boon which the terror group received from Abu Samiya’s return, without having to give anything in return themselves, comptroller sources said that the Shin Bet should have thought out of the box and held a special meeting with Netanyahu.

The influx of arrests slowed down the whole process

Next, the report said that the IDF and IPS’s lack of preparation for arresting and imprisoning such a large sudden influx of Gazan prisoners significantly harmed the Shin Bet’s ability to carry out future arrests and interrogations.

In other words, if the Shin Bet had nowhere to hold new detainees, how could it arrest and then interrogate them?

The comptroller also said that the overbooking of Gazan prisoners in IPS facilities endangered IPS personnel.

The comptroller does not note that the overcrowding could have also increased the frequency of IPS prisoner abuse.

Regarding numbers, the comptroller said that the pre-war totals of 16,200 total prisoners and 5,200 security prisoners had jumped to 23,400 total prisoners and over 10,000 security prisoners by early 2025.

The true number of Palestinians whom the IDF arrested may be as high as 30,000, but the comptroller did not produce numbers on the thousands of Palestinian security prisoners who were released in the first half of the year of the war due to lack of space or shaky evidence.

In addition, the cabinet released around 3,000 security prisoners as part of three hostage deals which it signed between 2023 and October 2025.

In terms of the numbers and the shortage of space, in October 2023, the maximum number of prisoners who should have been held in the cell space available was around 14,500.

By early 2023, there was insufficient space for 3,502 security prisoners as well as thousands more non-security prisoners.

2,366 Palestinian security prisoners were still being held in IDF cells as of February 2025, an extended improper situation according to the comptroller and various Israeli legal officials.

The comptroller does not give updated numbers of Palestinian security prisoners for mid-206, but the Post understands that the numbers are still extremely high, including for administrative detention, though the rate of new arrests dropped substantially already in 2025 when the number of actual battles between Hamas and IDF forces dropped substantially.

In addition, fewer Hamas fighters generally surrendered in 2025, and multiple IDF sources indicated that it was more difficult to take prisoners when Hamas fighters would emerge by surprise from underground tunnels near IDF positions, a significant trend in 2025.

No trials yet for October 7 terrorists

Englman also criticized that not a single Hamas terrorist has been brought to trial to date for crimes related to the war.

However, the government only approved a budget for handling indictments and trials of the October 7 Hamas terrorists last week, on June 4.

Until October 2025, the government decided to delay any indictments or trials out of fear that it would need to trade many of the Palestinian security prisoners for the return of Israeli hostages (which it did ultimately need to do.)

This prevented the state prosecutor from moving forward on any indictments or trials.

When the government approved over one billion shekels on June 4 to prosecute terrorists who participated in the October 7 Hamas massacre, this was the first time that there was funding for moving the cases over from the state prosecution to the military prosecution.

The legislation to prosecute terrorists involved in the October 7 massacre was passed in May, granting authority to impose the death penalty and conduct public trials for the perpetrators of the attacks at a new Jerusalem military court, which will need to be built.

The law’s proposal consists of a broad framework for implementing the trials.

The Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry stated that the framework of over a billion shekels was approved for the years 2026-2029, and that the funds will be allocated to the Defense Ministry and the IDF.

The approved budget is intended for establishing numerous buildings to implement the law, the Defense and Finance Ministries stated.

The infrastructure to be built for the trials includes a court complex, prosecution offices, and an IDF headquarters facility.

Until the buildings are built, new military prosecutors are hired, and new military judges are hired – something which could easily take several months if not years – the cases are likely to be put on hold.

Not addressing these specific issues in detail, the comptroller concluded that against the broader historical backdrop, “Bringing to trial Hamas terrorists who perpetrated terror attacks on October 7 and during the Iron Swords War is a decisively important issue, from a legal, ethical, and public relations perspective. Bringing the terrorists to trial will do justice for the victims of the slaughter.”

The Post was still awaiting responses from the IDF, IPS, and Shin Bet at press time.

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory on Tuesday released a report accusing Israeli authorities of being involved in West Bank settler attacks that have injured or killed Palestinians.

The UN report claimed that Israeli authorities had enabled settler attacks through financial and military support, in an alleged climate of impunity fostered by judicial and law-enforcement bodies. It also found that the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas had committed war crimes against both Palestinians and Israelis.

The Prime Minister’s Office and the IDF did not immediately respond to requests for comment, nor did Hamas.

The report said Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian villages and agricultural land had surged since 2023, rising by 130%, including incidents involving groups of masked assailants. The UN also claimed that Israeli security forces often accompanied settlers, which the report said provided a “shield” for the violence. 

Israel has repeatedly rejected allegations that IDF troops shield settlers during attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank, saying such actions are rogue incidents that violate military protocol and are investigated.

At least seven Palestinians were killed, and 832 were injured last year, with violence continuing into 2026 in the form of frequent attacks, according to the UN.

UN claims settler violence used to advance state policy

The report accused Israeli security forces of perpetrating a “collapse of the distinction between settlers and soldiers.”

It claimed such violence has been used to advance state policy and displace Palestinians in the West Bank.

The Commission also alleged that settlers committed or threatened sexual violence to instill fear and harassed Palestinian women.

“The relentless, daily assaults by Israeli settlers against Palestinians are intolerable – and must end,” said the commission’s head, S. Muralidhar, an Indian former senior judge. He urged the international community to press Israel to curb the violence.

Despite condemnations and the dismantling of unauthorized outposts in the West Bank, the report said that Israeli authorities have not done enough to stop the attacks.

Wassel Abu Yousef, a member of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the body the UN recognizes as representing Palestinians, told Reuters the report “reflects the extent of the violence perpetrated by settlers against our people.” He called for measures such as sanctions in response.

Hamas’s human rights violations

The UN report said it was also gravely alarmed by serious abuses it documented in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.

The commission found that Hamas-affiliated terrorists were involved in at least 60 of 249 documented cases of executions and severe physical violence in 2024 to 2025, including beatings with metal pipes and bone-breaking as punishment for alleged collaboration with Israel or accessing humanitarian aid without Hamas permission.

In two instances, 11 men were publicly executed. The commission said these acts amount to war crimes and violations of international law.

The commission found that the October 7, 2023, massacre in Israel by Hamas and other terrorist groups, which killed 1,200 people and involved hostage-taking and destruction of property, amounted to war crimes. 

State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman warned that Israel’s cyber-preparedness gaps before and during the Israel-Hamas war amounted to a “comprehensive and significant warning,” according to a report published Tuesday on the state’s readiness for cyber incidents and its wartime performance. The audit examined the Prime Minister’s Office, the National Cyber Directorate, the Shin Bet, the National Security Council, government ministries, sectoral cyber units, and 21 key bodies in the economy from February 2023 through June 2025.

The report found that cyberattacks against Israeli bodies increased in scope, intensity, daring, and creativity after the outbreak of the war on October 7, 2023. Early attacks focused on influence operations and denial-of-access incidents, while later attacks shifted toward destructive operations, including deleting information, and in 2024 toward collecting information on civilians, personal targets, and processes in Israel.

Cyber threat intensified during the war

According to the National Cyber Directorate’s assessment, the threat from cyberattacks will continue to intensify. The report said that from the outbreak of the war until the completion of the audit in June 2025, Israel did not suffer a cyber incident that significantly harmed the economy, but it identified hundreds of incidents with significant potential for damage between October 7, 2023, and April 30, 2024.

The report cited the National Cyber Directorate’s estimate that cyberattacks cost the Israeli economy NIS 12 billion annually. It also noted that global cybercrime damage was estimated at about $8 trillion in 2023, about 15% higher than in 2022.

Cabinet was not given a full cyber picture

The report found that from 2020 until June 2025, the National Cyber Directorate did not submit required semiannual reports on the protection status of computerized systems in Israel, including critical state infrastructure bodies, to the prime minister, cabinet secretary, head of the National Security Council, head of the Shin Bet, and chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

It also found that the steering committee responsible for essential computerized systems in critical state infrastructure bodies did not convene in 2021 and did not convene for one year and two months after the outbreak of the war. The committee met in December 2020, January and December 2022, June 2023, and December 2024.

Prime ministers did not initiate dedicated security cabinet discussions on cyber during the decade before the war and through June 2025, except for one dedicated meeting held in 2018, the report said. Although cyber was mentioned in broader discussions, including annual intelligence assessments and multi-arena situation reviews, the cabinet was not exposed to the full range of cyber risks, preparedness gaps, and potential damage.

Protection levels were insufficient in parts of the economy

The National Cyber Directorate had warned before the war that cyber protection levels in parts of the economy, excluding critical state infrastructure bodies, were insufficient. These warnings were presented in several forums, including to an interministerial team, to then-intelligence minister Gila Gamliel, and once to a ministerial forum headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

In October 2024, about a year after the war began, then-National Cyber Directorate head Gaby Portnoy reported that the maturity level of cyber protection in the economy remained insufficient and might not meet future challenges. Portnoy said the dramatic improvement in the pace and capabilities of attacks required action to strengthen Israel’s line of defense and ensure functional continuity at the economic and security levels.

The report said some critical state infrastructure bodies had certification levels before the war that reflected a limited ability to deal with attackers. By June 2025, certification scores had improved, but a gap still remained.

Cyber law delayed for more than a decade

The report criticized the failure to complete dedicated cyber legislation for more than a decade, despite professional agreement inside the government that Israel needed a legal framework for cyber defense. Such a law, the report said, was needed to guide and supervise essential bodies, require them to meet an appropriate protection level, report serious cyberattacks, and follow state instructions during such attacks.

The report said several government decisions on the issue were adopted between 2011 and 2021, while an international comparison by the National Cyber Directorate found that Israel was significantly behind in cyber regulation. Several previous State Comptroller reports had also identified gaps in advancing Israel’s cyber law.

In January 2024, after the outbreak of the war and amid increased cyberattacks in the civilian space, Netanyahu instructed officials to submit a cyber bill memorandum for approval by the Ministerial Committee for Legislation within three months, by April 2024. As of June 2025, the bill had not been completed, disagreements between ministries had not been fully resolved, and no timetable had been set for submitting the bill, the report found.

National drills were not held for six years

Additionally, the report found major gaps in national and sectoral cyber exercises before the war. At the national level, the National Emergency Authority and the National Cyber Directorate did not hold a national cyber drill for six years before the Israel-Hamas war.

Only in November 2024, about a year after the war began, was a national cyber drill held in tabletop format. In March 2025, the National Emergency Authority held a broader national drill that included both a war scenario and a cyber scenario, which the National Cyber Directorate helped plan and attended.

The report also found that representatives of the political echelon, including the prime minister, security cabinet members, and ministers, did not participate in the national cyber drills held in 2018, 2024, and 2025. At the sectoral level, gaps were found in cyber drills in 2022 and 2023, even though the National Cyber Directorate had defined an annual sectoral drill as a required anchor for sectoral cyber units.

Sectoral cyber units showed functional weakness

Sectoral cyber units were described as the professional and practical infrastructure for guiding, supervising, and overseeing cyber defense in hundreds of public and private bodies that provide essential services. However, it found that part of the sectoral cyber unit system suffered from significant functional weakness.

Before the war, the National Cyber Directorate did not hold intelligence reviews for the sectoral cyber units, did not establish a regular information-sharing forum among them, and did not sufficiently involve them in developing tools intended for their use. The professional guidelines sent to the units were recommendations only and were not binding, while the directorate could not oversee the extent of their implementation.

The report noted positively that during the audit, the National Cyber Directorate began addressing some gaps, including by convening a professional forum with the sectoral units and presenting an intelligence review. It said strengthening the sectoral units was essential because the level of protection in some sectors remained insufficient.

National cyber crisis concept was outdated

Although a 2011 government decision required the National Cyber Directorate to formulate a national concept for handling emergency situations in the cyber dimension, the report found that the document “The National Concept for Managing a Cyber Crisis” had not been updated for many years.

The document did not include references to cyber-defense guides and organizational preparedness materials published by the directorate from 2018 to 2023. It also did not detail all state regulatory bodies in the cyber field, their powers, areas of responsibility, or the interfaces between them.

The National Cyber Directorate did not instruct the sectoral units to operate according to the concept, even during the war, the report found. It also identified gaps in cooperation among relevant bodies dealing with cybercrime and financially motivated cyberattacks.

21 key bodies showed preparedness gaps

The report distributed questionnaires to 21 important bodies in the economy to assess their readiness before the war and their ability to respond to cyber incidents. The bodies included sensitive entities guided by the National Cyber Directorate, government ministries, essential bodies, higher education institutions, local authorities, and special bodies operating under self-guidance in the cyber field.

Seven of the 21 bodies, or 33%, received a score of 60 or lower in an index measuring organizational frameworks and tools needed to handle a significant cyber incident. These included appointing a cyber officer, establishing a management team for a cyber crisis, convening a cyber steering committee at least once every six months, and employing an internal or external incident-response team.

The report found that four bodies, or 19%, had no internal or external incident-response team. It also found that 48% of the bodies had not convened a cyber steering committee as required in the year and a half before the war, 38% had not established a cyber crisis management team, and 90.5% did not have cyber insurance.

Director-generals lacked cyber-risk information

Before the outbreak of the war, eight of the 21 director-generals, or 38%, lacked the situational picture and information infrastructure needed to understand their organization’s cyber preparedness, protection level, and gaps. The missing information included cyber risks, cyber policy, principles for handling incidents, business recovery plans, lessons from exercises, and findings from investigations of significant incidents.

The report found cross-cutting gaps in presenting recovery plans for cyber incidents to director-generals (52%) and in presenting lessons learned from exercises (55%). It also found that 40% of director-generals were not presented with critical and high-severity penetration-test findings, while 52% did not receive annual reports from their organizational security operations center.

These gaps could impair management’s ability to allocate resources, make decisions, and ensure continuity of operations during a significant cyber crisis, the report said.

Risk analysis and incident planning were incomplete

The reports of 18 of the 21 bodies, or 86%, indicated gaps in threat and risk analysis between January 2022 and July 2023, before the October 7 attack. The report also found gaps in some bodies in planning and implementing technological measures to detect cyber incidents, although some were corrected during the audit.

On the eve of the war, two of the 21 bodies, or 10%, reported that they had not implemented any SIEM or SOC system for monitoring and handling cyber incidents. These bodies later reported that the issue had been corrected following the audit.

The reports on 20 of the 21 bodies, or 95%, indicated that, before the war, there was at least one gap in planning for handling cyber incidents and integrating those plans into work processes. The report warned that inadequate preparedness could undermine bodies’ ability to manage cyber incidents effectively and increase the damage they cause.

Lessons from past cyber incidents were not fully implemented

Among 13 important bodies that said they had experienced cyber incidents, five, or 38%, reported that they only partially implemented lessons from those incidents. The report warned that partial implementation could lead to similar future incidents.

The report also found that the National Cyber Directorate’s information on hundreds of wartime incidents with significant potential for damage lacked essential details needed to build a full situational picture, investigate incidents, and produce systemic lessons. The missing information weakened the state’s ability to prevent recurrence and to improve cyber defense processes.

The report noted positively that the National Cyber Directorate acted at the beginning of the war and during it to identify and reduce critical gaps, strengthen cyber resilience, divert resources, and change priorities. However, it said those actions did not fully address the gaps identified in the audit.

Temporary orders filled part of the legal vacuum

In the absence of a permanent cyber law, the National Cyber Directorate worked with the Shin Bet and the Defense Ministry’s security department to enact emergency regulations and temporary orders for serious cyberattacks in the digital services and hosting-services sector. The original validity was seven months, but it was updated several times and extended until November 2025.

By the end of August 2024, the National Cyber Directorate had reported to the attorney-general and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee several cases in which it identified serious cyberattacks and issued binding instructions to bodies under the temporary framework.

The report also noted positively that the Knesset approved Amendment 13 to the Protection of Privacy Law in August 2024. The amendment expanded enforcement and oversight tools, updated criminal offenses, required the appointment of privacy protection officers in certain public and private bodies, and created a special oversight mechanism for security bodies.

National plan recommended

Englman called on all relevant parties to treat the deficiencies as an urgent warning and act promptly to correct them. He recommended that the National Cyber Directorate, government ministries, and sectoral cyber units formulate a national-governmental action plan to reduce cyber-protection gaps in both the short and long term and bring it for government approval.

The report also recommended that the prime minister hold orderly discussions, at least once every six months, to present the state’s cyber-preparedness picture and the gaps in it to the security cabinet or to a dedicated ministerial committee. It further recommended that the Prime Minister’s Office act to complete the cyber law.

The report said responsibility now rests with the prime minister, the National Cyber Directorate, the Shin Bet, the National Emergency Authority, the government cyber defense unit, the sectoral cyber units, and the management of the audited bodies. Each must act within its area of responsibility to ensure that the gaps identified in the report are corrected.

The report comes amid a broader rise in cyber activity against Israel. The National Cyber Directorate handled more than 26,000 serious cyber incidents in 2025, a 55% increase compared with 2024, Yossi Karadi said at the Cybertech Global conference in Tel Aviv.

A permanent cyber law was advanced in January 2026, with the National Cyber Directorate seeking stronger powers after years of operating largely through executive decisions and temporary emergency regulations. Karadi later said the Iran war had delayed the bill and that it would likely not be completed before 2027.

Karadi warned in March 2026 that AI was increasing the scale and sophistication of cyber threats, including hacking, deepfakes, and mass attacks. In December 2025, he said Iran had tried to target Israelis during the June war through large-scale cyber and social-engineering campaigns.

Former National Cyber Directorate head Gaby Portnoy called in May 2025 for a cyberdefense coalition with regional partners that helped defend Israel against Iranian attacks in 2024.

In response to the report, The Israel National Cyber Directorate said the National Cyber Defense Law, which was approved Monday night in its first reading, would improve cyber protection for essential organizations and digital suppliers, and strengthen government regulatory ministries’ ability to lead cyber defense efforts in the various sectors under the directorate’s professional guidance.

Sensitive computerized information at the President’s Residence was not protected in a manner suited to the risks facing a body of national importance, according to findings published Tuesday by the State Comptroller. The audit found deficiencies in cyber management, database governance, supplier oversight, email handling, monitoring, and outdated systems at the residence.

The President’s Residence holds large amounts of information, including especially sensitive data on nearly 100,000 pardon applicants. Damage to those systems could harm privacy, the reputation of the institution, and the public image of the President’s Residence and the person who stands at the head of the state.

Sensitive national institution faced wartime cyber risks

The proper functioning of the President’s Residence depends on the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and survivability of the information in its possession, including the computer systems and communications components that process and store it.

The audit said the President’s Residence’s information and computer systems are central and essential assets that must be protected like any other organizational resource of value. Harm to those systems could cause operational, technological, and financial damage, as well as harm to privacy and to a central symbol of the state.

The risk is especially significant during wartime, when the number of cyberattacks increases. The report said the substantive deficiency in senior management’s handling of information protection led to the conclusion that cyber-protection issues were not addressed in a manner suited to the risks facing the President’s Residence.

Pardon database did not meet key legal requirements

The President’s Residence holds sensitive information on nearly 100,000 pardon applicants in its pardon database. The audit found that the database was managed in a manner that did not comply with certain legal requirements that apply to bodies that hold databases.

Among other things, the President’s Residence had not appointed an information-security officer for the databases. It had also not prepared the required database-definition documents, mapped its databases, or prepared an inventory of database systems.

The audit also found that the President’s Residence had not established required procedures regarding access permissions. It did not operate an automated documentation mechanism to monitor access to the database systems.

Supplier oversight left sensitive systems exposed

Since 2019, the President’s Residence has received services from an external supplier for the characterization, development, support, and maintenance of the pardon database. The audit found that the President’s Residence did not act as required under the Information Security Regulations in its engagement with the supplier.

The President’s Residence did not conduct a preliminary examination of the information-security risks involved in the engagement from 2019 onward. The agreement with the supplier also did not clearly specify what information the supplier was permitted to process or the purposes for which the supplier could use it.

The agreement did not specify the systems the supplier was permitted to access or the actions it was authorized to carry out. It also failed to establish a mechanism to return the information to the President’s Residence at the end of the engagement period.

The supplier was not obligated to report to the President’s Residence on its compliance with the Information Security Regulations. It was also not obligated to report a database information-security incident if one occurred.

Sensitive pardon requests were sent by unencrypted email

The President’s Residence transferred pardon requests containing sensitive information to the Justice Ministry and to the Military Advocate General’s Corps by email over the internet, without encryption. The audit found that this method was used even for especially sensitive information.

The information transferred included personal details, personal and family circumstances, and medical, social, economic, and rehabilitative reasoning. By doing so, the President’s Residence acted contrary to the requirements of the Information Security Regulations and the Cyber Defense Doctrine, the report said.

The audit also found that pardon requests sent to the Justice Ministry and to the Military Advocate General’s Corps were stored in the email inbox of the legal bureau at the President’s Residence for an unlimited period. The inbox was not emptied regularly, leaving old pardon requests containing especially sensitive information stored there.

That meant anyone with access to the inbox, such as a system administrator, could be exposed to personal details of pardon applicants over many years, even when there was no need to retain them.

Cyber management framework was not strong enough

In September 2024, the President’s Residence adopted the guidelines of the government cyber defense unit for the unclassified environment. However, as of June 2025, no steering committee for cyber-defense issues had been established at the President’s Residence.

During the audit, in June 2025, a ministerial steering committee for cyber-defense issues was established for the first time at the President’s Residence. It was chaired by the director-general of the President’s Residence and convened for the first time in early July 2025.

The audit found that central tasks had not been advanced. The management of the President’s Residence had not assessed damage, examined or approved the office risk map, formulated measurable targets for examining implementation of cyber-defense infrastructure, carried out management reviews, or checked the feasibility and execution of activities defined for the cyber-defense management system.

Penetration testing remained partial

In July 2025, during the audit and about 10 months after the President’s Residence adopted the government cyber defense unit’s guidelines, the residence updated that it had begun carrying out an infrastructure risk survey for the first time. As part of that process, a penetration test was being performed.

The audit found that the President’s Residence had carried out only a partial infrastructure penetration test. It also found that no penetration test had been carried out for applications installed on its computer systems.

The lack of full testing limited the residence’s ability to identify vulnerabilities in its infrastructure and applications. This was especially significant because some computerized systems had reached the end of their life cycle, and some endpoint stations were running expired versions that exposed them to vulnerabilities.

Monitoring gaps and outdated systems increased risk

The President’s Residence operates several communications networks and has a disaster recovery plan. However, the audit found deficiencies in its compliance with requirements concerning monitoring of information systems.

Monitoring is a central component of cyber defense because it helps detect unauthorized access, abnormal activity, and possible incidents. Partial monitoring can weaken the ability to respond quickly to a breach or misuse of sensitive information.

The audit also found that some computerized systems at the President’s Residence had reached the end of their life cycle. Some endpoint stations were running expired versions, leaving them exposed to known vulnerabilities.

Cyber work plans and budget tracking were insufficient

The management of the President’s Residence did not manage its cyber-defense activity over the years according to dedicated cyber-defense work plans. Its general work plans included some cyber-related tasks, and the 2025 work plan included two tasks related to cyber defense.

The President’s Residence allocated about 15% of its total information-technology budget to cyber defense in 2023. That share dropped to about 5.8% in 2024 and rose to about 11% in 2025.

The report viewed the allocation of cyber-defense budgets in 2023 and 2025 positively. However, it found that the President’s Residence did not maintain a separate record of budgets directed specifically to cyber defense, making it difficult to examine whether it complied with the guidelines of the government cyber defense unit.

National symbol must close the gaps

State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman said the President’s Residence must continue correcting the deficiencies found in the audit. He said this was necessary to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and survivability of the information in its possession.

The report warned that harm to systems containing sensitive information on nearly 100,000 pardon applicants could damage privacy, reputation, and the image of the President’s Residence. It said the residence must act to protect the privacy of residents and prevent damage to the institution’s standing.

“The President’s Residence must continue acting to correct the deficiencies in order to ensure the confidentiality and survivability of the information,” Englman said.

The findings come as Israel has faced an increasingly severe cyber threat environment during wartime, including Iranian-linked activity and attacks on public and private entities.

Earlier cyber-related audits and reporting have raised concerns about vulnerabilities in public systems, critical infrastructure, government databases, hospitals, and remote-work environments.

Police in Northern Ireland said they had arrested a Sudanese man on Tuesday over a knife attack that left one person in a serious condition and prompted calls online for a protest after footage circulated on social media.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer described the incident as “sickening” after video of the attack, which took place in north Belfast late on Monday evening, was shared widely online.

Police said the suspect was a 30-year-old Sudanese national, correcting an earlier statement that he was believed to be Somali, and cautioned that inaccurate information was circulating online about the victim’s condition.

The injured man, in his 40s, remained in a serious condition in hospital, the police said.

It comes at a time of heightened tensions in Britain after the murder of a student who was handcuffed by police as he lay dying from stab wounds after his killer, a Sikh man, falsely alleged a racist attack.

Lawmakers call for transparency on suspect’s background

In a debate in the British Parliament in London, some lawmakers called for more transparency about the Belfast suspect’s background, saying a lack of confirmed information risked fueling speculation online and stoking tensions over immigration.

Northern Ireland’s main political party leaders jointly condemned the attack in a statement, calling it “horrific” and urging calm while backing the police investigation.

The deputy first minister, Emma Little-Pengelly, had described it as a “savage and barbaric attack.”

A widely shared post on Facebook and WhatsApp called for protests on Tuesday evening.

“This is a deeply concerning assault and I have declared this a critical incident,” Assistant Chief Constable Ryan Henderson said. “We have commenced an investigation to establish a motive.”

“We are also aware of footage circulating online and we would strongly urge members of the public not to share or repost these images. Doing so risks causing further trauma to the injured man’s loved ones and may impact the ongoing investigation.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared deflated in his pre-recorded press statement in northern Israel on Monday, a stark contrast to the confident “absolute victory” speeches he has delivered in recent years.

He stated that he would not allow Israel’s enemies to dictate the state’s security paradigm, saying, “Israel has the full right to defend itself, and it will use that right as much as needed.” Even as he spoke, an alert sounded in Metula after a drone entered the town’s airspace.

Netanyahu can once again claim a policy shift as a personal triumph. What began as military strikes against Hamas has escalated to strikes targeting Iran. Israel, once able to act freely in southern Lebanon and strike Dahiyeh as needed, now faces the reality of Iranian threats promising ballistic retaliation for any future action in the area.

This escalation unfolds while Hezbollah continues launching drones, UAVs, and rockets, Hamas is consolidating strength in the Gaza Strip, and US President Donald Trump nears finalizing an agreement widely seen as a defeat for Israel in its dealings with Iran. Indeed, Netanyahu’s “absolute victory” narrative seems undercut by strategic pressures on multiple fronts.

Israel is not equipped to sustain rounds against Iran. The economy cannot absorb the strain, the public cannot endure it, and the defense establishment faces serious operational challenges. This situation unfolds during the Trump era, which will end in roughly two and a half years. What Israel fails to address now cannot be postponed.

Presently, the country struggles to assert dominance on any front. After years of dramatic military successes, the scoreboard increasingly shows setbacks.

Iran has grown more dangerous. While its military and economy have weakened, the regime feels emboldened, believing it has survived past conflicts against the odds. It seeks revenge and is prepared to obtain a nuclear weapon by any means necessary, even clandestinely from North Korea or through an improvised nuclear test. Yesterday’s strikes were largely symbolic, leaving the underlying threat intact, perhaps even intensified.

Trump: PM does not decide Iran deal, I do 

During his appearance, Netanyahu made several striking claims, but mentioned Trump only briefly. On Sunday, Trump told a Financial Times reporter, “Bibi will sign any agreement I bring. He does not decide. He does not decide. Only I decide.” Yet, Netanyahu’s remarks emphasized the need to maintain the personal and political alliance.

“A year ago, in Operation Rising Lion, we stopped Iran’s nuclear program,” said Netanyahu. “If we had not acted in time and with force, we would not be here today,” suggesting that without Israel’s action last June, Iran would already have acquired nuclear capabilities, a scenario that many analysts consider improbable within a single year.

“As I have done for decades, I firmly stand on our right to act against our enemies,” he added. “This is how we acted even now.” Yet critics point to a long history of restraint and concessions, from negotiating monthly payments from Qatar to Hamas, to avoiding direct confrontation with Hamas leadership despite multiple Shin Bet recommendations, releasing prisoners, and tolerating Hezbollah’s military buildup.

Limited Beirut, Iran strikes

Recent military actions provide a mixed record. Netanyahu authorized strikes on Dahiyeh in Beirut against Trump’s wishes and targeted Iran without US approval. However, the strike on Dahiyeh was limited, hitting empty offices, and the Iranian strike avoided sensitive infrastructure to prevent destabilizing oil markets, according to Israel’s ambassador in Washington. As the IAF prepares for potential follow-up strikes, control and messaging largely remain influenced by the US.

Netanyahu’s critics argue that he has tied himself politically to Trump to protect his own position, particularly amid his legal challenges. This alignment, they claim, has constrained Israel’s strategic freedom, leaving the country vulnerable to threats it cannot adequately counter.

Ultimately, Netanyahu’s leadership reflects a paradox: while he presents victories, the state faces mounting strategic risks. His tenure demonstrates a blend of personal political survival and complex regional pressures, leaving Israel with few clear paths to long-term security.

“Azerbaijan increasingly sees itself as a connectivity state linking multiple regions.” has been pulled into one of the most sensitive questions surrounding the Israel-Iran war: whether its territory played any role in Israeli operations against Iran.

Baku has rejected recent reporting that Israel deployed elite military and intelligence units in Azerbaijan as part of a network of covert sites used to facilitate operations against Iran, calling the claim “entirely baseless” and saying it has never allowed its territory to be used for military operations, intelligence activities, or hostile purposes against another state.

The dispute is explosive because Azerbaijan shares a border with Iran, maintains deep security and energy ties with Israel, sells gas to Europe, works closely with Turkey, communicates with Russia, and has spent years trying to avoid a direct rupture with Tehran. In a region where geography can be a leverage or a liability, Baku is trying to turn proximity to conflict into diplomatic influence without being pulled into the wars around it.

That is the central difficulty of Azerbaijan’s position: Its cooperation with Israel is open and long-standing, but the claim that its territory was used for military or intelligence operations against Iran remains disputed and officially denied. The debate has placed fresh scrutiny on a country whose strategic value has grown because of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz, and the US-Israel confrontation with Iran.

Fuad Shahbazov, an independent researcher and political analyst based in Baku, strongly disputed the CNN report about alleged Israeli activity in Azerbaijan, saying it relied on anonymous sources and lacked physical evidence.

“CNN failed to refer to any serious or credible source, just reframing it to anonymous sources familiar with the situation,” he said. “The satellite imagery failed to provide any physical evidence of Israelis in Azerbaijan’s side,” he added.

The broader Israel-Azerbaijan relationship goes well beyond energy and rejects the idea that it implies hostility toward Iran.

John Roberts, a UK-based energy, security, and geopolitical analyst specializing in Caspian, Middle Eastern, and Russian energy issues, took a more cautious position. He said Azerbaijan would be deeply unhappy if such information had emerged publicly, but he did not dismiss the reports.

“There were reports concerning just what use Israel may have made of observation points. In order to see how things were developing in Iran,” Roberts said. “I think the Azerbaijanis would be very upset that the information came out, but I have no reason to doubt the information,” he added.

The broader Israel-Azerbaijan relationship goes well beyond crude oil. Shahbazov described Israel as one of Azerbaijan’s most important strategic partners, while stressing that Baku rejects the idea that cooperation with Israel means hostility toward Iran.

“Azerbaijan pursues quite a pragmatic multivector diplomacy, because the country has long sought to maintain productive relations with competing powers simultaneously, rather than joining geopolitical blocs,” Shahbazov said. “Baku consistently argues that cooperation with Israel does not mean hostility towards Iran or Turkey or another Muslim country, because it’s mostly energy and security cooperation,” he added.

Israel views Azerbaijan as a rare Muslim-majority partner with close political, economic, and security ties to the Jewish state, Shahbazov said. Azerbaijan’s border with Iran and its location between the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Basin make it strategically valuable to Israel.

Roberts said Israel and Turkey were two key external actors that contributed to Azerbaijan’s military success in Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Turkey, which taught them how to use, operate, and manufacture drones for them. Nagorno-Karabakh was an early use of drones in warfare. And Israel, because it taught some of the elite Azerbaijani troops,” Roberts said.

Shahbazov was even more direct about the defense relationship. “We do not refute those allegations that we have a very, very deep security partnership with Israel,” he said. “This includes intelligence sharing, this includes military technical, defense industry, procurement, weapons supply, even experience exchange with military officers,” he added.

For Israel, Azerbaijan is not a direct gas supplier, but it is a significant oil partner and an increasingly important energy and security counterpart. Shahbazov said Azerbaijan remains Israel’s second main oil supplier and has continued deliveries despite the war.

“Azerbaijan contributes to Israel’s energy security through oil exports,” he said. “Azerbaijan is the second main oil supplier of Israel, even despite the war since 2003. Azerbaijan still systematically and consistently supplies Israel with oil with no interference or with any interruptions,” he added.

Baku walks a fine line between its relationship with Israel and its ties to Iran

Roberts framed the oil relationship in commercial rather than strategic terms. Once Azerbaijani crude reaches Ceyhan in Turkey, he said, it enters the open market, and Israel is one of the nearest customers.

The Israeli connection is also what makes the Iranian dimension so sensitive. Azerbaijan shares a border with Iran and has significant ethnic, historical, and cultural overlap with the Azerbaijani population in Iran. Roberts said Baku has been careful not to make territorial claims or provoke Tehran.

“Azerbaijan is very careful not to make claims over Iranian territory,” he said. “It tried to have good trade relations. It tried to work with the Iranian government over issues like the Caspian. It tried to improve road and rail links with Iran. In no way does Azerbaijan want to upset Iran.”

Both experts said Iran-linked security threats have made Azerbaijan’s position more difficult. In March 2026, Azerbaijan said it had foiled Iran-linked plots against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli Embassy, an Ashkenazi synagogue, and a Mountain Jewish community leader. A day earlier, Azerbaijan accused Iran of launching four drones at Nakhchivan, injuring four civilians and damaging airport infrastructure; Tehran denied responsibility.

Shahbazov said Azerbaijan also faces the challenge of Iranian sympathizers and possible sleeper cells inside the country.

“It’s quite a complicated question, because there is no specific guideline on how the government will be handling this sleeper cells or Iranian sympathizers issue,” he said. “Since Azerbaijan is a Shia-majority Muslim country, and we have quite a number of Iranian sympathizers, who are not exactly members of Iranian cells, but personally they do sympathize for the regime,” he added.

He also warned that the war had not destroyed the Iranian regime but had strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“IRGC became more powerful and more authoritarian than it was before the war,” Shahbazov said. “So I expect that the IRGC will take control over the country in all spheres, including civilian, diplomatic, and military spheres. So IRGC will be quite a serious problem, even a greater problem than it was one or two years ago,” he added.

Roberts also saw Iran as a revolutionary actor willing to use calibrated escalation across the region.

“It would appear that Iran has a governmental structure that really is quite genuinely revolutionary,” he said. “That fervor is still there.”

Azerbaijan maintains a strong border security capacity, receiving support from both the US and Israel

Iranian attacks beyond its borders can serve a deterrent function, Roberts said, but sustained escalation against Azerbaijan would carry risks for Tehran because Azerbaijan has recently won a war and has capable armed forces of its own.

Shahbazov pointed to Azerbaijan’s border security capacity, noting that it has received support from the United States and Israel. “Azerbaijan is one of those regional states that has a quite effective border security service.”

He said infiltration attempts from the Iranian side continue, but mostly involve smuggling. “There are still some attempts of infiltration from the Iranian side, but mostly those are smugglers, drug smugglers, or the people who are carrying some guns,” he said. “None of them successfully managed to infiltrate into Azerbaijan.”

The dispute over alleged Israeli activity is only one piece of a larger Azerbaijani strategy: staying useful to competing powers without becoming captive to any of them. Baku’s value has grown because it can talk to Israel, Turkey, the European Union, the US, Russia, and Iran, even as many of those actors are increasingly at odds with one another.

That diplomatic flexibility is also visible in Azerbaijan’s approach to Moscow. Roberts said Baku’s policy toward Russia is based on caution, distance, and realism.

“The point about their relationship with Russia is keeping Russia at a distance, being polite, not being unnecessarily inimical, but no full trust in Russia,” Roberts told The Media Line. “Azerbaijan will not go to try to deliberately upset Russia, but it will do things in its own interest that Russia may not be happy with,” he added.

Energy has made that caution more valuable. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe accelerated its search for alternatives to Russian gas. Azerbaijan had already been supplying Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor, a 3,500-kilometer route carrying gas from the Shah Deniz field through the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline across Turkey, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline through Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea to Italy.

The European Commission says Azerbaijani gas supplies to the EU through the corridor increased by more than 40% between 2021 and 2024. It also says the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan supplied gas to 14 countries in 2025, while Reuters reported that Azerbaijan began gas deliveries to Germany and Austria in January 2026.

Shahbazov described the war in Ukraine as the turning point that heightened Azerbaijan’s value in European calculations.

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine elevated Azerbaijan’s importance in European energy security calculations,” Shahbazov told The Media Line. “Because before 2022, Azerbaijan was already supplying gas to Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor. But after the war, the EU began actively seeking reliable non-Russian suppliers as a part of isolating Russia from and trying to diminish its role in the global energy market,” he added.

While Azerbaijan is playing a larger role in supplying energy to Europe, it cannot fully replace Russian volume

Still, both experts warned against overstating Azerbaijan’s capacity. Shahbazov said Azerbaijani gas can help Europe diversify but cannot fully replace Russian volumes.

“But still, Azerbaijani gas cannot fully replace Russian gas, because it’s technically impossible, given also the size of gas reserves that Russia has,” he said. “Russia simultaneously supplies Asia and the European markets, which Azerbaijan cannot do, of course. But Azerbaijan can be quite an important contributor in terms of global uncertainty,” he added.

Roberts said Azerbaijan has already done much of what it can without major new upstream investment. Additional European exports would require pipeline upgrades, added compression capacity, and long-term commercial certainty for companies such as BP.

The same geography that makes Azerbaijan useful as an energy supplier also strengthens its role as a corridor state. Turkey is central to that position. The partnership is strategic, military, cultural, and infrastructural, and it gives Azerbaijan energy access to Europe through the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline. In June 2026, Turkey’s energy minister said Ankara and Baku were looking beyond oil and gas toward electricity transmission and green energy corridors with Georgia, Bulgaria, and southeastern European states.

Azerbaijan’s links to Turkey, Israel, Europe, Russia, and Iran have made ambiguity a strategic tool. Shahbazov described this as a deliberate “multivector” foreign policy, while Roberts argued that Azerbaijan is unlikely to abandon that approach.

“I would be absolutely astonished if Azerbaijan at any point showed all its cards and took a definite side,” Roberts said. “It enjoys very good commercial relations with the West, with Europe, and with the United States. Look at the development of its oil and its gas and the markets it serves. It is well aware of how important those commercial ties are,” he added.

Beyond energy, Azerbaijan is also positioning itself at the center of the Middle Corridor, which links China and Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian and the South Caucasus while bypassing Russia and Iran. Roberts said Azerbaijan is central to this geography.

“Azerbaijan is absolutely essential because it is the country between Iran and Russia that constitutes the gateway at the Caspian through to Europe,” he said.

A final peace treaty with Armenia, Roberts added, could open additional routes into Turkey and Europe while reducing dependence on the Black Sea during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Azerbaijan increasingly sees itself as a connectivity state linking multiple regions.

Shahbazov framed Azerbaijan’s future in even broader terms, saying its importance is no longer tied only to hydrocarbons. “Azerbaijan increasingly sees itself as a connectivity state linking multiple regions.”

He described the country as becoming “the hub of both energy and transportation at the same time,” combining geography with political flexibility.

“What makes Azerbaijan particularly significant is that it combines geography with political flexibility, so it’s not simply an energy exporter,” Shahbazov said. “It’s becoming a regional platform for diplomacy, for strategic cooperation.”

That stability is becoming a strategic asset. Azerbaijan sits near the Iran-Israel front, north of the Persian Gulf crisis, west of Central Asia, south of Russia, and east of Turkey. It has emerged from its own war with Armenia stronger, while neighboring Georgia and Armenia face political uncertainty, and the Black Sea remains affected by the Russia-Ukraine war.

Roberts warned against assuming there is a single coherent regional plan behind these shifts. “I would be very careful about using words like a ‘bigger plan or picture.’ I think an enormous amount of what happens in the Middle East is unplanned. It’s accidental, it’s coincidental, it’s mistaken, and it’s not planned.”

That uncertainty may be precisely why Azerbaijan’s position matters. It is not large enough to replace Russia in Europe’s energy market or powerful enough to dictate the outcome of the Iran-Israel confrontation. But it is geographically placed at the intersection of several crises and politically agile enough to talk to actors that are increasingly unable or unwilling to talk to one another.

For Europe, Azerbaijan is a tool for diversification. For Israel, it is a rare Muslim-majority security and energy partner. For Turkey, it is a strategic brother-state and corridor partner. For the US, it is a useful Caspian actor at Iran’s northern edge. For Russia, it is a neighbor that must be managed but no longer fully constrained. For Iran, it is both a sensitive border state and a potential source of suspicion.

Baku’s challenge is that the same geography that gives it influence also exposes it. Its future role will depend on whether it can continue to convert proximity to conflict into diplomatic and economic leverage without being pulled into the wars surrounding it.

A member of the Taliban murdered a 15-year-old girl and her Iranian-Kurdish mother after he failed in his attempt to abduct the teenager for a forced marriage, an informed source told The Jerusalem Post after information was published by the Kurdistan Human Rights Network on Monday.

Sara Yousefi and her mother, Chiman Hosseinzadeh, were said to have been killed by Mofti Mohammadollah, head of the Taliban’s Hajj and Endowments Department in Kohistanat district, when he attempted to take the young girl on May 8.

When Hosseinzadeh began resisting the attempted abduction, it was said that Mohammadollah opened fire on the pair.

“The gunshot wound to Sara’s chest also indicates that the perpetrator fired deliberately and with the intent to kill,” the source said.

Mohammadollah allegedly assaulted both Yousefi and Hosseinzadeh prior to the killings, the source continued, stating that the teenager’s face showed visible signs of injury and the house was left in a state that indicated there was a physical altercation.

The source added that Mohammadollah had already been married three times before seeking the hand of Yousefi, though the status of his three prior marriages remains unclear.

Murderer arrested, but family lives in fear of his influence

The teenager’s father had allegedly accepted Mohammadollah’s proposal “due to financial motivations,” though her mother did not approve.

Allegedly restricted from traveling to Iran, the source claimed relatives had been contacted prior to the two women’s deaths with requests to help them return to Hosseinzadeh’s homeland.

The mother and daughter were buried last week in Kahriz-e Sardar in Bukan.

Though the alleged perpetrator has been arrested and judicial proceedings are reportedly underway, the source told the Post that the victim’s family feels unsafe traveling to Afghanistan to oversee the legal process out of fear of Mohammadollah’s influence and power.

“They have little confidence that justice will be delivered through the Taliban’s courts and judicial system,” the source claimed, adding that the family had engaged with diplomatic channels in hopes of pressuring the Taliban to follow through on the proceedings.

“However, it does not appear likely that justice will ultimately be achieved in this matter,” the source said.

The murder of Yousefi and Hosseinzadeh comes amid a wider crackdown on the rights of women in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Since the terror group seized control in 2021, women have been stripped of many of the freedoms they enjoyed under the legitimate government.

We remind the de facto authorities that all people have the right to freedom of movement and that all persons, both women and men, are entitled to equality before the law.

— UNAMA News (@UNAMAnews) June 7, 2026

Girls around the age of 13 are banned from continuing to secondary school, women have been banned from attending universities, and the United Nations has warned that child marriages are expected to surge by 25% through 2026.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan also raised concern earlier this week about reports of women being detained for failing to comply with “dress requirements” set out by the Taliban. Local media reported that 21 women and girls were detained in Herat province.

Under the Taliban’s morality law, a woman’s face is considered awrah (intimate parts of the human body), so women are forced to wear clothing that fully covers their faces.

“UNAMA is concerned over ⁠multiple arrests and detentions of women in Herat…for alleged non-compliance with dress requirements, which raises serious human rights concerns,” UNAMA wrote in a post on X late on Sunday.

“We remind the de facto authorities that all people have the right to freedom of movement and that all persons, both women and men, are entitled to equality before the law.”

More than a hundred current or former UNRWA staff were referred to the US State Department for suspension or disbarment from their role in the UN agency for participating in the October 7, 2023, massacre and or their affiliation with Hamas’s military wing, the USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG) confirmed last week.

UNRWA school principals, teachers, security personnel, attendants, psychosocial counselors, and medical professionals were among those referred.

Some of the 101 individuals had already been referred by the USAID OIG, but additional information was uncovered since the initial application.

Two deputy school principals at an UNRWA institution were referred by USAID OIG for serving in senior positions in Hamas’s Izzadin al-Qassem Brigade.

In one case, the UNRWA professional served as a deputy company commander in the Ain Jalut 5th Infantry Battalion, while the other was said to be a squad leader for the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Khan Yunis Brigade.

Another deputy school principal was said to have served as a platoon commander in Hamas’s Nuseriat battalion and had communications responsibilities during the 2023 massacre, while a teacher who also worked as a soldier for the terror group was said to have delivered two anti-tank missiles to a prescribed location for use in the October 7 terror attacks.

UNRWA-affiliated commanders of Hamas fighting forces, soldiers

If the State Department chooses to disbar or suspend the 101 individuals identified by USAID OIG, they will be excluded from working across future US-funded aid organizations.

The referrals have already led to the disbarment of Hafez Mousa Mohammed Mousa, an operative of the Hamas East Jabaliya Battalion, who was found to have coordinated communications with other suspected Hamas members during the October 7 attacks while also serving as an UNRWA school principal.

A representative from UNRWA told The Jerusalem Post, “We take these allegations very, very seriously and any allegation of neutrality breach made against staff will be taken very seriously, and that includes alleged membership in sanctioned Palestinian groups.”

Asserting that the allegation would be treated seriously, whether it was made by Israel or another party, the representative added, “We have a zero tolerance policy for neutrality breaches, and that means there is no place in UNRWA for terrorists or criminals or those who don’t share the values of the United Nations.”

UNRWA provided information to USAID OIG for their referrals and offered to provide more information if needed, he added, concluding that the organization would be happy to respond to allegations where corroborated evidence is provided.

Former CBS News correspondent Scott Pelley on Sunday accused CBS News chief Bari Weiss of editorial interference and called for her removal from the network’s leadership in his first interview since being fired, telling The New York Times that “CBS News is on fire.”

Pelley, who spent 37 years at CBS News as a White House correspondent, anchor of the CBS Evening News, and correspondent for 60 Minutes, said his firing came during a period of upheaval that included a controversial settlement with US President Donald Trump, the sale of Paramount to David Ellison, the appointment of Weiss to lead CBS News, and a series of dismissals at 60 Minutes.

Pelley recounts events leading to firing

Pelley described the recent changes at 60 Minutes as a shock, noting that they came after what he characterized as a highly successful season for the program.

He said staff members were stunned by the removal of senior leadership, including executive producer Tanya Simon, and the appointment of Nick Bilton as the show’s new executive producer.

According to Pelley, Bilton’s arrival raised concerns among staff because he lacked prior experience managing a television news operation.

Pelley also described a tense staff meeting during which he challenged Bilton’s appointment and questioned why longtime employees had not received a fuller explanation for the leadership changes.

Shortly afterward, Pelley said he was called into a meeting with CBS News president Tom Cibrowski and was informed that his conduct during the staff meeting constituted grounds for termination. Pelley denied allegations that he physically intimidated Bilton and said he was subsequently dismissed from the network.

Claims of editorial interference

A significant portion of the interview focused on Pelley’s allegations that Weiss attempted to influence coverage of politically sensitive stories.

Pelley told The New York Times that Weiss sought changes to a report on protests in Minneapolis related to immigration enforcement operations, arguing the edits would have portrayed protesters as more aggressive and aligned with the administration’s version of events.

He said he rejected the proposed changes after reviewing the underlying footage and concluded that the available evidence did not support the characterization Weiss wanted included in the report.

Pelley described the incident as an example of what he viewed as political influence being exerted on newsroom decisions.

CBS News disputed those allegations, telling The New York Times that Weiss’s comments were part of a standard editorial process intended to make the report “as strong, fair, and accurate as possible.” The network also rejected claims that Weiss had acted on behalf of a political agenda.

Calls for leadership changes

Pelley argued that the larger problem at CBS News was a lack of experience among members of the network’s new leadership team.

While acknowledging Weiss’s success as founder of The Free Press, he questioned whether she was qualified to run a major television news organization.

Asked directly whether Weiss should remain in her position, Pelley responded that she should not.

He also claimed trust inside CBS News had been severely damaged following the recent firings and leadership changes.

In the interview’s closing moments, Pelley expressed hope that Paramount leadership would reconsider the direction of the news division and restore what he described as stability and editorial independence.

“We can save this. It’s possible to land this plane,” he said. “But right now, CBS News is on fire.”

Kenyan police fired tear gas on Tuesday to scatter protesters in the central town of Nanyuki opposing a quarantine center for Americans exposed to Ebola that the US government has raced to build despite Kenyan court orders barring further work.

The proposed 50-bed unit on an air force base has angered many Kenyans, who accuse the United States of offloading the health risk of caring for those exposed to the Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.

Two people were killed in protests last week in Nanyuki, where frustration has grown among residents as Kenyan and US authorities publicly reaffirm their commitment to the plan in spite of the court orders.

Police fired tear gas to disperse small groups of protesters who had gathered early on Tuesday. One protester carried a white cross emblazoned with the phrase “Respect Ebola,” in red.

US President Donald Trump’s administration has ⁠said it “cannot and will not allow” any cases to enter the US, unlike during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa when several infected US nationals were treated on US soil.

US military planes have continued to ferry in staff and equipment even after court orders blocking the plan

The Nanyuki facility is designated for Americans who ​have been exposed to the virus but are still asymptomatic. Patients who develop symptoms would be sent for care to other countries, US officials have said.

US military planes have continued to ferry in staff and equipment even after court orders blocking the plan, according to US and diplomatic sources and flight tracking data, with several aircraft expected to land this week.

Satellite imagery seen by Reuters shows an increasing buildup of white tents in the middle of a plot of land totaling around 0.046 sq km (11 acres) that was cleared within the Laikipia Air Base since May 27.

The United States has said it is aware of the court challenge and was “working with the Kenyan government to resolve any objections.”

Kenyan officials have said the facility would also serve Kenyans and foreign nationals in addition to American citizens, but US officials have not confirmed this.

Residents of Tehran referred to themselves as “hostages of a cruel regime” in an interview with Israel’s N12 News on Tuesday, calling any potential deal with Iran a “betrayal.”

One Iranian spoke of the increased police and security presence in Tehran following a short period of strikes between Israel and Iran.

“The atmosphere is becoming more security-oriented again,” said Tehran resident Roshanek, noting the harsh security methods used by the forces during Operation Roaring Lion, in which authorities would arrest those found to have anti-regime content on their phones.

Iranian anti-regime activist Alireza Mashhad called on US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to continue the fight against Iran, specifically asking Netanyahu to end the regime for good, calling such action “the right thing” to do.

Any deal with the ayatollahs is a betrayal of freedom,” said Mashhad. “They do not attach any value to the people, and are not bound by any value or agreement.”

Another resident of Tehran, identified as “Omid,” told N12 of the hardships he and his fellow Iranians endure due to the actions of the regime, emphasizing that only Mojtaba Khamenei’s “cruel” government is to blame.

“If power plants are attacked in the coming days, if the water supply is cut off, if the refineries are damaged, if we have no electricity, and the lives of millions of citizens become even more difficult than they are today – remember who brought us to this point,” said “Omid.”

‘Omid’: Regime ‘robbed us of our future’

“This regime has sacrificed its own people for decades for its ideology and for its survival,” he added. “We are hostages of a cruel regime that destroyed our economy and robbed us of our future.”

Another Tehran resident, identified as “Yasmin,” said that she hopes for peace with Israel, telling N12 that she wishes Iran would join the Abraham Accords.

“Our problem is not with the people in Israel,” she said. “I hope that a day will come when Iranians and Israelis get to know each other not through war, military threats, or headlines.”

A federal judge on Monday struck down a $100,000 fee that US President Donald Trump imposed on new H-1B visas for highly skilled foreign workers, concluding that it constituted an unlawful tax Congress never authorized.

US District Judge Leo Sorokin in Boston issued the ruling in a lawsuit filed by 20 Democratic state attorneys general challenging a fee Trump announced in September that dramatically raised the cost of obtaining H-1B visas, which tech companies in particular rely heavily on to bring in foreign workers.

The administration argued the fee constituted a lawful monetary penalty that the president was authorized to impose under federal immigration law, which gives him the power to restrict the entry of certain foreign nationals when he deems it “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”

But Sorokin concluded that the fee was not a penalty but a tax that the Republican president lacked any authorization from Congress to issue and that the US State Department and US Citizenship and Immigration Services could not implement.

“Here, the substance and application of the $100,000 payment reveal that it is a tax, regardless of what the payment is called,” wrote Sorokin, who was appointed by Democratic President Barack Obama.

The judge cited the US Supreme Court’s February ruling striking down Trump’s sweeping tariffs, which he pursued under a law meant for use in national emergencies. Under the logic of the justices’ decision in that case, Trump similarly had no authority under immigration law to levy a tax, Sorokin said.

President has ‘clear legal authority to restrict entry of aliens’

White House spokeswoman Taylor Rogers, in a statement, said the Trump administration is confident Sorokin’s order will be reversed on appeal.

“President Trump has clear legal authority to restrict entry of any class of aliens he determines is not in America’s best interests, and that is exactly what he did,” she said.

The H-1B program offers 65,000 visas annually, with another 20,000 visas for workers with advanced degrees, approved for three to six years. Employers seeking a visa for a foreign worker before Trump’s proclamation typically paid about $2,000 to $5,000 in fees, depending on various factors.

Trump, in imposing the hefty new fee, in a proclamation said the H-1B program “has been deliberately exploited to replace, rather than supplement, American workers with lower-paid, lower-skilled labor.”

The fee does not apply to visas granted to foreign citizens already in the United States on student visas, who generally make up a large share of new H-1B recipients.

Few employers have paid Trump’s fee since it was instituted. As of February 15, USCIS had received just 85 payments of the $100,000 fee, an agency official said in a March filing.

Enhanced vetting of H-1B applicatns, new visa selection process

The Trump administration has also ordered enhanced vetting of H-1B applicants and proposed a new visa selection process that would favor higher-skilled and better-paid workers.

The $100,000 fee prompted at least three different lawsuits challenging its implementation, including a case by the US Chamber of Commerce, which is appealing a December decision by a judge in Washington, who rejected its claims that Trump had no authority to set the fee.

California Attorney General Rob Bonta, a Democrat who led the multi-state coalition that filed the case before Sorokin, hailed his ruling for striking down Trump’s “unlawful and costly $100,000 tax.”

“This tax was an attack on America’s ability to attract and retain the high-skilled talent that strengthens our economy and helps us meet critical workforce needs,” he said.