Jonathan Conricus, a former international spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, warned that the current ceasefire frameworks surrounding Israel should not be mistaken for a strategic resolution.
“I think both sides, all sides, Iran, Israel, various Gulf countries, the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah, everybody is using this time, militarily speaking, in order to resupply and prepare for what probably inevitably is going to come,” Conricus told The Media Line. He said that renewed fighting could come locally, between Israel and Hezbollah, or more regionally, involving Israel, Iran, and the United States.
Speaking amid continued uncertainty over the ceasefire framework promoted by President Donald Trump, Conricus said Israel and its adversaries are using the pause to rebuild their military capacity. “Gulf states are frantically trying to improve their defensive capabilities, and Israel is replenishing all of the stockpiles, both offensive and defensive ones,” he said. “And I think that the Iranian regime is trying to do the same in order to try to brace themselves for whatever will come.”
Conricus described the diplomatic track with Iran as deeply limited. “The negotiations, they look like two parallel lines that are not going to meet,” he said, arguing that “the maximum that the Iranian regime is willing to address doesn’t meet the very basic minimum that the US is willing to consider.” He added that Iran is not “in a position to be dictating terms,” pointing to its exposure to economic pressure and damage to energy infrastructure.
On Iran’s military position, Conricus was careful not to describe the regime as defeated: “The Iranian regime is down, but it’s definitely not out.” He argued that Iran’s ability “to project force,” manufacture ballistic missiles and drones, and act as “the bully of the region” has been “significantly reduced,” but “not permanently destroyed.”
“If the regime is left in place, then I have very little doubt that what we will eventually see within a relatively short period of time would be the Iranian regime going back to what they did before,” he said, listing nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, drones, and support for terror organizations as likely priorities. “There’s no indication … that the Iranian regime is changing its trajectory,” he added.
Turning to Lebanon, Conricus said the term “ceasefire” no longer reflects the reality on the ground. “We have a ceasefire on paper, but it isn’t really a ceasefire in the way that I would interpret the phrase, whereby both sides of a conflict cease their military operations,” he said. Israel is acting “to defend Israeli civilians in northern Israel” and to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, while Hezbollah continues firing rockets and drones and fighting Israeli troops deployed inside Lebanon.
Limiting major attacks on Hezbollah’s strategic assets
Conricus said the only area in which Israel appears to be observing the American request is in limiting major attacks on Hezbollah’s strategic assets in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley. “In that … we have a certain aspect of a ceasefire,” he said. But the core issue, he argued, remains Hezbollah’s existence as an armed Iranian proxy inside Lebanon.
“What really needs to happen here is for a strategic decision to be made by the Lebanese government,” he said. “That is to make sure that there’s only one military in Lebanon, and that is the military of the state of Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces.” Until then, Conricus said, Israel and Lebanon will continue facing “various aspects of ceasefires and violations of ceasefire and fighting and attacks and moving population and many other things.”
Asked about the Litani River, Conricus said he does not see it as the central strategic marker. “I don’t think that the Litani River holds any strategic significance,” he said. Instead, he argued that Israel should focus on severing the link between Iran and Hezbollah and preventing Hezbollah from obtaining both strategic and basic weapons.
“The ability to achieve our long-term goals using military only are very limited,” he said. “Military are necessary, but they are not the ones that will actually deliver what Israel needs on a long-term security perspective.” Israel, he asserted, should combine military, diplomatic, financial, and non-kinetic tools while supporting the Lebanese government and army.
Conricus said any arrangement with Lebanon will remain weak unless Beirut acts directly against Hezbollah. “Until we see the Lebanese government order the Lebanese armed forces to take meaningful kinetic military action against Hezbollah, action that would also entail casualties on the Lebanese side, then everything said and done will be void and of very little relevance,” he said.
He argued that the moment Lebanese authorities begin such action, “then we know that they crossed the Rubicon.” At that stage, he said, Israel should provide “maximum support, intelligence, and kinetic support and diplomatic support,” while avoiding steps that would make it harder for the Lebanese government to act domestically.
In Gaza, Conricus said Hamas remains in control of territory beyond the Israeli deployment line. “If we’re honest about it, Hamas controls half of the Gaza Strip,” he said. “Is it a robust, functioning, and well-oiled bureaucracy? No, it’s jungle laws.” He described Hamas rule as “the survival of the fittest and the rule of the most cruel and violent,” adding that Hamas “still has weapons, and still controls the Palestinian civilian population.”
Conricus said Hamas’ refusal to disarm should surprise no one. “Hamas was never going to disarm,” he said. “The only way to disarm Hamas is to defeat them.” He described that process as long and politically uncomfortable. “This is not a quick fix. This doesn’t align with American or Israeli political calendars,” he said.
On Hamas’ tunnel network, Conricus said Israeli officials have become more cautious in their public assessments. “The last assessment I heard was something to the tune of 60%,” he noted, referring to the reported destruction of Hamas infrastructure. “But I take that with many grains of salt and with caution, because I think that the gap between what we know and what we don’t know is still significant.”
He said parts of Gaza remain inaccessible to Israeli troops, while areas on Israel’s side of the deployment line are being searched and cleared. “It’s a spider web of underground network,” he said. “It appears almost endless in terms of the amount, depth, and diversity of tunnels that Hamas dug over so many years.”
Conricus said the same caution should apply to assessments of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. “We’ve seen many times with the benefit of hindsight that what Intel assessments provided, they were perhaps a bit more optimistic than reality.”
For Conricus, the central lesson across the three fronts is that partial military degradation does not amount to strategic success. “Until you are able to force an enemy to surrender and give up and capitulate, it doesn’t really matter how much of his assets you’ve been able to degrade,” he said. “Whether you destroy 40%, 60% or 70 or 80%, it is important, but it is not decisive and crucial.”
