Israelis have voted. Some are celebrating, others are deeply disappointed, and many are wondering what comes next.
Europe must respect the result. But respecting the voters’ choice does not mean endorsing whatever the next government does. Israelis, in turn, should recognize that their decision will also shape their country’s relations with Europe.
Europe has confronted this distinction before. Giorgia Meloni’s 2022 victory in Italy unsettled many European leaders because of her party’s political roots. Brussels nevertheless is working with her government.
A year later, Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom won the most seats in the Dutch parliament. The result was accepted, despite deep misgivings about his views on immigration, Islam, and European integration.
The distinction was especially clear in January 2006, when Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections. European observers found the vote competitive and professionally administered, and the European Parliament acknowledged the result. Yet the EU refused normal relations with a Hamas-led government unless it met the Quartet’s conditions, including renouncing violence and recognizing Israel.
The comparison concerns Europe’s response, not the parties involved. Recognizing an election result is not the same as accepting what its winners believe or intend to do.
Europe has not always drawn this line consistently. In 2000, 14 European Union (EU) member states imposed diplomatic measures against Austria when Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party entered government. Their objection was to the coalition itself, before its ministers had acted.
In 2025, Britain and Norway sanctioned Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich for inciting violence against Palestinians. The Netherlands subsequently barred them from entering the country. Those measures concerned the ministers’ conduct, not the fact that Israelis had voted for their parties.
The next Israeli government deserves a consistent approach. European leaders should meet its representatives, listen to them, and judge them by their actions. If Israeli policies change, Europe’s response should change accordingly.
But respect for an election result cannot erase what has happened in recent years.
Since October 7, 2023, relations between Israel and Europe have deteriorated sharply. The war in Gaza deepened disagreements that had existed for years. Settler violence, settlement expansion, and proposals to extend Israeli sovereignty over occupied territory threaten to widen the rift. Formal annexation could inflict damage that neither side would easily undo. The consequences would extend far beyond foreign ministries.
In 2025, an EU review found indications that Israel was breaching Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which makes respect for human rights and democratic principles an essential part of the relationship.
The European Commission subsequently proposed barring Israeli companies from new grants and investment support under the European Innovation Council Accelerator, a limited part of the Horizon Europe research program, and suspending trade concessions under the Association Agreement.
Both proposals remain pending. The EU is Israel’s largest trade partner. Behind that fact are Israeli exporters who have spent years winning the trust of European customers, researchers working with colleagues abroad, and entrepreneurs who see European markets as part of their future. These relationships took years to build and could be lost far more quickly.
Yet Europe is divided about how far to go.
In April 2026, Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia pressed for suspension of the Association Agreement. Germany and Italy opposed the move. Full suspension requires unanimity, which was not forthcoming. In June, Slovenia’s new government reversed several earlier measures concerning Israel – a reminder that the balance within Europe can shift.
The European Commission’s narrower proposals require only a qualified majority. Under ordinary EU voting rules, a blocking minority must include at least four member states. Germany and Italy cannot prevent these measures alone.
Sufficient support for the proposals has not emerged. Several EU member states share Berlin’s and Rome’s reservations, but a shift in a few capitals could determine whether the measures remain on paper or begin affecting Israelis’ livelihoods. Some EU member states have already restricted arms exports, limited trade in settlement goods, or recognized Palestinian statehood without waiting for agreement among all 27.
Keeping up the relationship
Europe has reasons to hesitate. Israel remains an important partner in technology, intelligence, security, and regional diplomacy, including efforts to contain Iran. Germany’s relationship with Israel also carries a historical responsibility that cannot simply be set aside. A serious breakdown would cost Europe too.
I keep thinking about the Venice Declaration of June 1980, when the nine European Community leaders recognized Palestinian self-determination and called for the PLO to take part in peace negotiations. Israel reacted furiously. For years, Venice symbolized how differently the two sides understood the Middle East.
Yet the relationship survived. Trade expanded, universities developed partnerships, and Israeli scientists joined European research networks. Agreements between governments grew into friendships, careers, and shared projects. These ties are now so familiar that we sometimes forget how much patience and trust went into building them.
That history makes the present moment especially troubling. In 1980, Israel and Europe argued bitterly about the future of the Middle East. Today, the argument threatens the relationship itself. Israelis and Europeans are already losing connections that took decades to create, some of which might never be fully restored.
In important respects, relations are already worse than they were after Venice. If the next government continues on the same path, the damage could become deeper and harder to repair.
There is another way forward. A government prepared to restrain settlement expansion, confront violence in the West Bank, defend democratic institutions, and pursue a credible political future with the Palestinians would give Europe reason to reconsider.
Brussels should respond by reconvening the EU-Israel Association Council, preserving research partnerships, and withdrawing proposed restrictions and sanctions when their justification no longer applies.
The EU has responsibilities too. Israelis are not interchangeable with their government.
A student hoping to study abroad, a scientist working with colleagues in Germany, or an artist collaborating with a European museum should not lose those opportunities because of political decisions they may not support. Nor should disagreement with an Israeli government weaken Europe’s commitment to Israel’s security or the fight against antisemitism.
Israeli voters have every right to choose leaders Europeans dislike. They cannot, however, choose Europe’s response to those leaders.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a professor of European studies and international relations in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
