The race for the drone market and Israel’s window of opportunity – opinion

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In the global race for the drone market, the question is not who manufactures the most aircraft, but who develops the technology without which they cannot operate.

Israel has been associated with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for decades. This reputation is built on operational experience, major defense industries, systems exported to numerous countries, and deep expertise in the design, operation, and integration of unmanned platforms. Yet in 2026, the ability to build a drone is no longer, in itself, enough to define technological leadership.

A modern drone is not simply an aircraft equipped with motors, a battery, and a camera. It is part of a broader ecosystem encompassing autonomy, navigation, sensing, communications, software, cybersecurity, fleet management, and airspace management. 

Alongside these capabilities, an equally significant layer of technologies is developing for detecting, disrupting, and neutralizing hostile drones. For entrepreneurs, investors, industrial companies, and security organizations, this is not merely a technological or security issue. 

It represents a business opportunity, as an increasing share of the industry’s value is shifting toward the technologies that enable drones to operate safely, autonomously, lawfully, and profitably.

 Drone flying on high altitude mountain top; illustrative. (credit: SHUTTERSTOCK/lzf)

Israel’s defense exports provide important context for this opportunity. In 2025, Israeli defense exports reached a record $19.2 billion, nearly 30% higher than in 2024. The figure demonstrates the depth of Israel’s defense industry and global demand for Israeli technology, but it does not, in itself, indicate the size of Israel’s drone market. 

The more relevant question is whether this expertise and demand are being translated into products, customers, and recurring revenues across the technology layers surrounding the drone.

Ukraine showcases why Israel cannot win race for drone production scale

Ukraine illustrates why Israel cannot, and perhaps should not, base its strategy on winning the race for scale. According to reports concerning 2025, Ukrainian production reached approximately 4 to 4.5 million drones and unmanned systems, compared with roughly 800,000 drones in 2023. 

The Ukrainian government has set a target of producing more than 7 million units in 2026. These figures do not necessarily indicate quality, profitability, or a sustainable long-term commercial advantage. 

They do, however, demonstrate how rapidly production can be scaled under the right conditions, and why an Israeli advantage based solely on manufacturing volume would be difficult to establish.

The international picture reinforces this conclusion. In the commercial market, Asian manufacturers, led by DJI, have made drones widely accessible and affordable.

In the defense market, Turkey has demonstrated through the Bayraktar family of systems that a platform, weaponry, manufacturing capacity, and export policy can be combined into a system with global impact. 

The United States, meanwhile, is investing in expanding its domestic manufacturing base and reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains.

Israel has opportunity in drone operating systems, cybersecurity, management

Against these players, Israel does not necessarily need to compete in manufacturing the drone itself. Its opportunity lies in areas where readily available, low-cost hardware is not enough: resilient navigation in the face of GNSS disruption, autonomy and artificial intelligence, integration of data from multiple sensors, communications and cybersecurity, fleet and airspace management systems, and counter-drone technologies. 

As the number of drones operating in the air increases, these layers are becoming not complementary products, but essential infrastructure.

XTEND, for example, presents XOS as an operating system for autonomous robotics. The business significance of this model lies not only in producing a better drone, but in creating a software and autonomy layer that can be deployed across a broad family of systems.

If such a layer becomes central to how these systems are operated, economic value gradually shifts from the platform itself to the software and ecosystem built around it.

D-Fend Solutions provides a particularly clear example of how value can be created around the drone rather than within it. The company developed cyber-takeover technology designed to identify the communications protocol of an unauthorized drone and take control of it, rather than relying solely on jamming or physical destruction. 

In June 2026, Motorola Solutions announced the acquisition of D-Fend for $1.5 billion. The transaction was completed in August. According to Motorola, D-Fend has thousands of deployments across more than 30 countries, its revenues had grown by more than 50% annually over the three years preceding the transaction, and its 2026 revenues were estimated at approximately $185 million.

The transaction reflects more than strong technology or growing revenues. It demonstrates how control over a layer that a large acquirer may find difficult to develop quickly in-house can turn an Israeli company into a strategic asset. 

D-Fend did not need to provide an entire counter-drone defense ecosystem. It developed a critical capability that addresses a global need while fitting into existing regulatory frameworks and distribution channels.

Percepto illustrates the civilian side of the same thesis. The company has developed a system in which an autonomous vehicle is dispatched on a mission, returns to a docking station, recharges, and uses a software layer to integrate the data it collects into a broader inspection process. 

Here, the relevant metric is not how many minutes the drone remains in the air, but how many site visits can be avoided, how much earlier a failure can be detected, and how much the inspection costs compared with the alternative. This represents the transition from the drone as a product to the drone as part of a business process that generates a measurable return on investment.

 IDF SOLDIER operates a drone in the Golan Heights, February 11. (credit: MICHAEL GILADI/FLASH90)

The three companies operate in different markets, but they share a common characteristic: their value does not derive solely from the aircraft itself. It lies in the layer of autonomy, control, protection, or software that transforms the aircraft into a useful system.

Combat-proven does not mean commercially viable

This is also where the real test for Israeli defense-tech companies lies. Operational experience can be an important technological and commercial asset, but being combat-proven does not necessarily make a product commercially viable. 

A system that performs well within a military unit may fail to meet the needs of a utility company, municipality, or logistics provider if it is too expensive, requires a highly specialized operator, is difficult to maintain, or does not meet regulatory, privacy, and insurance requirements.

The transition from defense-tech to civilian markets requires a product that is easy to deploy, a user-friendly interface, service and maintenance capabilities, integration with existing systems, and a cost structure that customers can justify. 

Israeli companies that succeed in translating operational expertise into solutions that meet these requirements will be able to sell not only to defense organizations, but also to industry, infrastructure operators, cities, and public-safety organizations worldwide.

This is the significance of Drone Nation 2.0. Israel does not need to build most of the world’s drones. Its greatest opportunity is to build the technology without which it cannot operate.

Dr. Eyal Bressler is an attorney, patent attorney, and co-head of APM PATENTS at Amit, Pollak, Matalon (APM).

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