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Israel and Lebanon have agreed on Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia as potential contributors to a proposed mechanism that could see foreign troops deployed to Lebanon to verify Hezbollah’s disarmament, people familiar with the matter said.

The shortlist emerged from US-mediated talks in Rome last week, the latest round of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon on implementing a June agreement that ties Israel’s phased withdrawal from Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The countries could help define the mechanism’s scope, provide personnel to oversee its implementation, or contribute troops to observe or take part in inspections verifying disarmament, three sources said.

Israel and Lebanon agreed on a list of potential countries, official tells Reuters

A Lebanese official told Reuters on Friday that Israel and Lebanon had agreed on a list of potential countries that could send troops to verify disarmament, but declined to identify them, saying the US would decide which of them would take part.

Israel and Lebanon in late June agreed to a US-mediated framework as part of Washington’s efforts to end the latest round of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, triggered in March when the Iran-backed Lebanese armed group attacked Israel following US and Israeli war against Iran.

A source with direct knowledge of the matter said discussions surrounding the shortlisted countries were in the early stages but said that they were “cautiously optimistic” the effort would proceed.

The Israeli prime minister’s office, the Lebanese presidency and the British, Italian, and Indonesian foreign ministries did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Switzerland’s foreign ministry had no immediate comment.

Israel seeking searches of private homes

Israel’s military occupies what it describes as a security zone extending 10 kilometers into southern Lebanon and has said it will not withdraw unilaterally until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Two sources said that under the proposed mechanism, villages in southern Lebanon would be inspected and verified as being free of weapons. Israel wants those inspections to include private homes, they said.

Lebanon’s army has resisted pressure over the last year to search private properties, fearing such searches could spark tensions in the south and with Hezbollah more broadly. Security officials have told Reuters the army would need warrants for each house.

A foreign security official said the question of private properties would need to be addressed, including how and by whom they would be searched. The official said the extent of foreign troops’ freedom of movement would also need to be clearly established.

A mandate for the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon would have to be agreed, the sources said, with the most likely scenario being that they would be formally invited by the Lebanese government under a framework endorsed by Israel.

The US and Israel were unlikely to accept UN involvement, the sources said, while European nations may oppose oversight by US President Donald Trump‘s Board of Peace.

This post was originally published on here. 

No one has ever confused Likud primaries with genteel affairs. They are loud, messy, and extremely competitive.

But even by Likud’s rough-and-tumble standards, the run-up to Monday’s primary looks like an extraordinary mess.

There are the battles over the district slots, the party court rulings, the attempts to protect veteran ministers, the eight places Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was given to fill with candidates of his choosing, and the additional guaranteed positions he demanded – and received – for Defense Minister Israel Katz, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and Likud Central Committee chairman Haim Katz.

Taken together, Netanyahu will control 11 of the top 29 positions on the party’s next Knesset slate. That is enormous influence, especially since the Likud, which currently holds 32 seats, is polling at an average of only 23-24.

It also means that a significant number of today’s Likud MKs will not be parliamentarians tomorrow. That has left them embittered and battling for their political lives in what is essentially a zero-sum game.

And that type of bitterness tends to spill into the public arena – as it has.

Then came Netanyahu’s first personal selection: Oren Dobronsky, a hi-tech entrepreneur with years of Silicon Valley experience who was supposed to add economic and technological heft to the list.

Netanyahu apparently meant to undercut Nir Barkat, once a possible successor

He was also, if reports are to be believed, meant to undercut Economy and Industry Minister Nir Barkat, himself a former hi-tech entrepreneur.

Why would Netanyahu want to undercut Barkat, once widely viewed as a possible successor? Because according to a Channel 12 report, Barkat and Yuli Edelstein – who has since left the Likud to form a new party with Gilad Erdan – were behind an unsuccessful attempt immediately after October 7 to replace Netanyahu.

According to the report, Barkat and Edelstein tried to secure the support of the 13 Likud MKs needed to replace Netanyahu through a constructive vote of no confidence. They were unable to agree on who would take his place, and Edelstein reportedly proposed becoming interim prime minister, followed by a Likud leadership primary in which he would not run.

The report said Haim Katz learned of the effort and warned Netanyahu, who moved to thwart it. Some believe Netanyahu is now protecting Katz while reportedly using the primary to settle scores with Barkat.

The scriptwriters of a political drama could hardly have come up with a better storyline.

All of this points to a larger problem facing the Likud: How does a party that prides itself on being democratic ensure that its primary produces a list able to appeal to those beyond its base?

Unlike most Israeli parties, Likud has long taken pride in allowing its members to choose its Knesset candidates. This is a significant part of its identity. The Likud likes to contrast its broad, grassroots membership with parties led by the likes of Avigdor Liberman, Yair Lapid, and Naftali Bennett, whose lists are determined by the leader or a small committee.

There is merit to that argument. Primaries give party members a voice. They force politicians to maintain contact with the grassroots.

There is also no small irony in Netanyahu’s effort to undercut the primary system. He entered the Knesset in 1988 by prevailing in Likud’s old Central Committee-based selection process, despite opposition from parts of the party establishment. Five years later, a party-wide leadership primary enabled him to defeat David Levy, Benny Begin, and Moshe Katsav and take control of the party.

The Likud’s internal democracy did not merely help Netanyahu; it was critical to his political rise.

But that was then. In recent years, the primary system has exposed a serious downside.

To succeed, candidates need name recognition across the country. Quiet legislative work, expertise in a particular field, or a record of effective committee work doesn’t exactly provide that. Television appearances do. So do provocative statements, attacks on political opponents, and inflammatory social-media posts.

The louder the candidate, the greater the likelihood that Likud members will know their name when they reach the primary ballot box.

That system has helped propel figures such as Tally Gotliv to prominence. Gotliv is constantly in the headlines. She attacks the courts, the Attorney-General’s Office, the media, her political opponents, and occasionally members of her own party. She knows how to appeal to a significant part of the Likud base.

And she is now among the fiercest critics of Netanyahu’s reserved slots. But Netanyahu’s dilemma is understandable.

He wants a party list that can attract voters beyond the Likud faithful. Internal polling reportedly indicates that some candidates popular with Likud members are far less attractive to moderate right-wing and swing voters whom the party will need in the election.

Netanyahu therefore wants the ability to balance the list: to add people from hi-tech, economics, security, and other fields who can broaden the party’s appeal and give it greater governing credibility.

That, at least, is the argument for the reserved slots, and it is not an unreasonable one.

The problem is the scale.

Giving Netanyahu eight handpicked positions, followed by guaranteed places for three senior ministers, means that he will effectively determine a third of the party’s realistic list. At a certain point, these types of “corrections” to the primary system begin to hollow out the primary itself.

Some veteran Likud figures look back nostalgically at the days when a much smaller party forum played the decisive role in choosing the list, including through the famous shvi’iyot, in which Central Committee members selected and ranked candidates in groups of seven.

Old system wasn’t perfect, but produced some high-stature Likud representatives

That system was far less democratic. It was also vulnerable to deals, pressure groups, and political horse-trading. It should not be romanticized.

Yet it did produce Likud representatives of considerable stature: Dan Meridor, Roni Milo, Benny Begin, Michael Eitan, Uzi Landau, and others who combined strong ideological views with independence, policy expertise, and respect for the institutions of the state.

Would figures of that type survive today’s Likud primary?

Meridor’s defense of the judiciary would have made him unelectable in a Likud primary today. Eitan’s years of serious parliamentary work would mean little against a candidate producing daily viral videos. And a thoughtful candidate such as Yuval Steinitz might find it difficult to generate the excitement needed to prevail in a contest driven by social media and combative television appearances.

That doesn’t mean the old system was necessarily superior. Nor does it mean Likud members are incapable of choosing serious candidates. It does mean that a large national primary creates incentives that favor confrontation, ideological purity, and name recognition over depth, experience, and independence.

Netanyahu is now trying to correct those distortions from above. But in doing so, he risks undermining the democratic character that distinguishes Likud from nearly every other Israeli party.

This is the balancing act at the center of Monday’s primary.

Leave the process entirely in the hands of the membership, and the result may be a list filled with candidates who fire up the base but repel many of the voters Likud needs to win the election.

Intervene too heavily, however, and the party’s much-vaunted internal democracy becomes largely cosmetic – a primary in which the leader has already determined more than a third of the realistic list.

There is no selection system guaranteed to produce top-tier politicians. A small committee can choose mediocrities and cronies just as easily as a primary can reward demagogues.

But Likud’s current predicament is acute: The party wants the democratic legitimacy of a mass primary and the broad electoral appeal of a carefully put-together list. The chaos surrounding the August 17 vote shows how difficult it is to have both.

This post was originally published on here. 

The 11th annual Ushpizin Music Festival will return to Ashdod this autumn, bringing a massive lineup of Israeli rock royalty, international performers, and high-profile theater productions.

The week-long cultural celebration will run during the intermediate days of Sukkot, from September 24 until October 1, across three of the city’s premier cultural venues: the Ashdod Amphitheater, the Performing Arts Center, and Yad Labanim.

The festival’s biggest blockbuster nights will take place under the stars at the Ashdod Amphitheater. On September 29, Israeli music heavyweights Evyatar Banai, Amir Benayoun, and Berry Sakharof will share the stage for a massive triple-threat lineup. The rock marathon continues the following evening with a powerhouse roster featuring pioneering rocker Shalom Hanoch, ’90s alternative icons Eifa HaYeled, and punk-rock legend Rami Fortis.

Opera, classical music and international performers come to Ashdod

The Ashdod Performing Arts Center will host a diverse array of global and classical events, kicking off early on September 24 with the prestigious final round of the 18th Arthur Rubinstein International Piano Master Competition.

Opera lovers can look forward to a fully staged production of Verdi’s La Traviata on September 27, performed by the Ashdod Chamber Opera Orchestra, the Tel Aviv Philharmonic Choir, and a lineup of international soloists under the baton of Vag (Vahagn) Papian.

The international momentum continues on September 28 with a performance by Paraguayan ensemble Los Muchachos Paraguayos, led by Juan Luis Alberto Amarilla. The group will be joined by Paraguayan-Israeli harpist David Karlsberg.

Rounding out the venue’s schedule, the Israeli Andalusian Orchestra Ashdod will present a nostalgic “Israeli Soundtrack” concert featuring veteran pop star Avi Toledano on September 29, followed by a two-night run of the Hebrew Theater’s production of My Fair Lady on September 30 and October 1.

Yad Labanim hosts musical tributes, jazz and flamenco

The Yad Labanim auditorium will pivot toward storytelling and intimate tributes. On September 27, the venue will host A Girl Who Is Quite a Treasure, a musical celebrating the life and music of iconic Greek-Israeli singer Aris San, performed by Izakis and the Greek Legend Band.

Other highlights include a staging of the musical Loving Daisy; a celebratory gala honoring singer Shlomit Aharon for her landmark 60-year musical career; a night of American jazz standards and New York hits led by vocalist-pianist Amor Amosi Nissan and conductor Mark Tiktiner; and a fiery grand finale featuring the Remangar Flamenco Dance Company.

This post was originally published on here. 

The Israeli defense establishment hit a new low on Tuesday and Wednesday regarding its inability to restrain violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank.

Since 2023, there has been a running line of such new lows for the Israeli defense establishment versus violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank.

A mix of the rise in Palestinian terrorism that started in March 2022, as well as the rise of Itamar Ben-Gvir running the police in January 2023, led to a rise in Jewish anarchists attacking Palestinian civilians.

What had often been “just price tag” spray paint vandalism for a decade or so morphed into far more actual violence and dangerous arsons.

February 2023 saw one of the first stunning and infamous mass Jewish attacks on the Palestinian town of Huwara.

Jewish extremist attacks were no longer one or two individuals, but large groups of dozens or even up to around 100.
By 2025-2026, such mass attacks are no longer shocking because they happen too often.

The gap is large, though it has narrowed

Palestinian terrorists have still killed many more Jews in the West Bank than Jewish terrorists have killed Palestinian civilians, and the Palestinian plots that are thwarted tend to be much more lethal, but the gap between the sides used to be much larger.

There has also been an increase in Jewish extremists using violence against IDF soldiers.

An issue that might have happened once a year in the past has become much more common.
But the latest incident is new.

This time, multiple rounds of IDF forces were sent to remove multiple rounds of violent Jewish extremists from harassing a small number of Palestinians on land under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

The IDF even sent out a message late Wednesday morning that it had removed the illegal structures built by the Jewish extremists in the area.

Yet, at press time, IDF sources still were not able to tell The Jerusalem Post when the Jewish extremists in the area themselves would be fully removed.

Rather, all IDF sources could say was that there remained IDF forces in the area also.

A few dozen activists can wreak havoc on local Palestinians

In a vacuum, a few dozen activists taking a hike and sleeping in a field with sleeping bags could seem harmless.

But these activists have already harassed the Palestinians nearby, and there have been so many recent cases when Jewish extremists have been violent that such trespassers into Palestinian areas cannot be given the benefit of the doubt.
In any case, trespassing is trespassing, and it is bizarre that the Jewish extremists have not been cleared after so much time has passed.

It is also bizarre that they have not all been arrested, given that there are public videos showing their faces and showing them throwing rocks onto a path to prevent the IDF from evacuating them.

This is trespassing plus obstruction of the military enforcing the law, black and white.

Why is this latest incident happening now?

While any number of factors could explain it, Defense Minister Israel Katz’s recent attacks on IDF Central Commander Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth for placing an administrative travel restraining order on Tal Yinon Dardik due to allegations that he attacked Palestinians in March and at other times could be an obvious recent cause.

If you are a Jewish extremist in the West Bank and know that the defense minister may support you, along with the Ben-Gvir who runs the police already supporting you, why not act up?

Katz got rid of administrative detention for Jews in January 2025, even though there are over 3,000 Palestinians still in administrative detention.

Then, in recent weeks, he was even attacking using travel restraining orders.

If you will not be indicted and not even get a restraining order, why not fight the IDF and attack Palestinians if you are a violent Jewish extremist? What do you have to lose?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been silent throughout this incident, and the Dardik incident, signaling either that he supports Katz, or at the very least will not stick his neck out to support Bluth even though Bluth is himself quite right-wing politically and was once his personal military secretary.

Short of the US publicly embarrassing Netanyahu into greater action, this might not even be the final low on this issue.
How much longer before the IDF and the police not only fail to arrest and punish such violent Jewish extremists, but also fail to even be able to stop them from acting violently and trespassing, with the events of Wednesday coming pretty close to that point?

This post was originally published on here. 

The US State Department is requesting that US embassies in the Middle East develop “reduced operations” plans, as the conflict with Iran shows no immediate signs of resolution, according to a CNN report published on Wednesday.

Sources have informed CNN that, although plans have not been finalized, the State Department has encouraged US embassy staff to reduce both their assignments and staff numbers. There is a general expectation that officials do not anticipate returning to normal staffing levels in the region anytime soon. 

However, reports indicate that the State Department has yet to determine whether all affected posts will implement these changes.

Any plans for “reduced operations,” once finalized, could provide some clarity to US diplomats and their families who have been displaced, CNN reported.

A spokesperson from the State Department spoke with CNN regarding the reported changes at the embassy. They stated, “do not discuss internal deliberations or post-specific contingency planning,” but noted that the department “continually reviews the security and staffing posture at every diplomatic mission based on conditions on the ground and adjusts personnel levels as appropriate.”

“Decisions regarding the status of any post are made based on a range of security and operational factors, in close coordination between posts and Washington,” they added.

Fewer diplomats on the ground may affect the State Department’s ability to provide timely consular assistance to Americans abroad and to support the administration’s priorities, former diplomats told CNN. 

However, a State Department spokesperson refuted the notion that US diplomatic efforts are “limited” due to a reduced number of personnel on the ground.

“We have seen sustained engagement from the highest levels of the Trump Administration with our partners in the Middle East, and our relationship with our allies in the region continues to get stronger,” they said.

Embassy evacuations begin with the US-Israel war against Iran

The State Department ordered nonemergency personnel and family members to leave almost every diplomatic post in the region shortly after the US-Israel war with Iran began in late February. 

A decision that was followed by nearly six months of uncertainty about whether the posts could return to normal and whether all diplomats could return to their assignments. 

The State Department did not reduce staffing at most embassies in the region prior to the start of the US-Israeli military campaign. Before the war, only Lebanon and Israel were designated under “ordered and authorized departure status,” meaning non-emergency personnel and their family members had the option to leave but were not required to do so.

As the conflict intensified and US diplomatic facilities in the region became targets for Iran and its proxies, facing drone and missile attacks, the State Department ordered the departure of non-emergency personnel and their families from Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The abrupt reduction in staff left many diplomats and their families, who had several years left on their assignments, struggling to create temporary situations for themselves back on American soil. They found themselves unable to make long-term commitments upon returning home and had to plan around the expectation that they would need to quickly return to the Middle East if the political climate shifted.

In response to growing concern among embassy staff, the State Department spokesperson told CNN the department remains “committed to supporting our workforce and their families throughout this process and will provide updates through appropriate channels as decisions are made.”

This post was originally published on here. 

Only about 20 of Likud’s roughly 40 current ministers and MKs are expected to remain in the next Knesset under a scenario in which the party wins 30 seats, according to a new Agam Institute poll conducted ahead of the Likud primaries and released on Wednesday.

The poll points to a potential shake-up in the composition of Likud’s next Knesset slate. The researchers stressed that the scenario in which Likud wins 30 seats is significantly higher than the polling projections cited in their report.

The findings also reveal substantial differences between the preferences of registered Likud members and those of the party’s broader electorate.

According to the poll’s simulation, veteran ministers and MKs, including David Amsalem, Miki Zohar, and David Bitan, are pushed down the list, while other candidates gain ground. The researchers described the trend as a dramatic change in Likud’s slate, with veterans losing ground to new faces.

However, they stressed that the data from registered party members reflect the preferences of “free” voters and do not take organized voting blocs into account, a particularly significant factor in Likud primaries.

One of the researchers’ main conclusions concerns the latest reserved slots on the party list. According to the report, the reserved slots “saved” Haim Katz and Gideon Sa’ar and kept Israel Katz in the top 10.

Sa’ar was not ranked as a primary candidate in the poll. The researchers reached the conclusion as part of their simulation of the slate after the reserved slots were incorporated. Haim Katz, by contrast, ranked only 35th in the raw ranking among registered party members.

Party members back Ohana, voters prefer Barkat

On the question of Likud’s leadership after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel Katz ranked sixth among registered party members, with 10.3%, compared with fourth place and 11.3% among Likud voters. The researchers attributed his weaker showing among party members to frustration over the security campaign. Following the reserved slot, Katz was placed fifth in the simulated party slate.

Sharp differences between registered party members and Likud voters were also evident at the top of the rankings. Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana led among party members with 73%, followed by Tally Gotliv with 70% and Boaz Bismuth with 69.2%.

Ohana also led among loyal Likud voters, but Nir Barkat ranked first among wavering voters and those who have left the party. Gotliv and Shlomo Karhi performed better among the registered party base, while Barkat, Yariv Levin, and Miki Zohar enjoyed greater support among the broader Likud electorate.

The divide continued in the contest over who should succeed Netanyahu. Ohana was the preferred successor among registered party members, with 22.9%, while Barkat led among Likud voters with 19%. Among party members, Gotliv ranked second with 15.6%, while Barkat was only fourth with 10.8%.

Party members want a fully right-wing government, voters more open to unity

The differences were even clearer when respondents were asked about the composition of the next government. Some 66.1% of registered party members said they would prefer the next coalition to be a “fully right-wing government,” compared with 45.1% of Likud voters.

Conversely, 54.9% of Likud voters preferred a unity government with the center-right, compared with only 33.9% of registered party members.

The researchers said these findings, together with the differences in preferences for individual politicians, help explain the strategic importance of reserved slots as a tool for broadening Likud’s electoral appeal beyond its registered membership base.

On the issue of military conscription, however, the picture was different. Clear majorities in both groups supported increasing the proportion of people enlisting in the IDF, even at the expense of Torah study and at the risk of a coalition crisis. The proposal was supported by 66.8% of registered Likud members and 80.4% of Likud voters.

The poll was conducted by Dr. Nimrod Nir of the Agam Institute between August 6 and 10 among 1,062 Likud members eligible to vote in the party primary, alongside more than 1,000 Likud voters.

This post was originally published on here. 

Recent political developments in the United States, including several closely watched primary elections, have prompted questions among Israeli business leaders about the future of the US-Israel relationship. 

In the days following the Senate primary in our home state of Michigan, we’ve been asked outright, “Is Michigan turning away from Israel?”

The concern is understandable, but it mistakes a political headline for the reality of a decades-long economic partnership.

As the leaders of the organization that has spent more than two decades building the bridge between Michigan and Israel, this reading gets the story backward. The economic, technological, and personal relationships that bind our two economies do not rise or fall with any one election cycle.

For decades, Michigan has been one of Israel’s most committed partners, and that relationship has never been defined by who wins a given race. We’ve built ties deliberately, one partnership at a time, with businesses, universities, entrepreneurs, investors, and civic leaders who recognized early that our two economies have complementary strengths.

Michigan is the global capital of mobility innovation, with world-leading depth in automotive and autonomous technology, electrification, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, defense, healthcare, and industrial automation. Those sectors connect directly with Israel’s innovation strengths.

Michigan’s research universities, engineering talent, manufacturing capacity, venture capital base, and concentration of Fortune 500 headquarters give Israeli companies an exceptional gateway to the North American market, just as Michigan-based companies increasingly look to Israel for the next wave of technology and talent.

We see the human side of this relationship every day.

For more than two decades, the Michigan Israel Business Accelerator has served as the trusted bridge between our two innovation ecosystems.

More than 100 Israeli companies have landed in Michigan through initiatives like The Elevator, one of the only landing zones in the United States dedicated to Israeli company growth, while Israeli innovation and activity in Michigan have generated some $45 million in economic activity.

We have facilitated trade missions from Michigan to Israel involving over 200 corporate and community leaders, and connecting thousands of entrepreneurs, investors, academics, and public officials along the way.

Introductions become partnerships, and partnerships become investments. And often, investments turn into friendships that outlast whichever administration happens to be in office when they began.

The results are visible on the ground: Israeli technology now runs inside Michigan auto plants and on Michigan farms, powers new EV-charging infrastructure on Detroit streets, and is entering clinical trials with local hospitals.

American federalism guarantees politics stay out of business ties

Those calls were made by leaders in various segments, including manufacturers, utilities, agriculture, finance, and health systems.

There is a basic fact about American federalism that is easy to miss from abroad: individual states function as powerful engines of continuity, sustaining international relationships that outlast the swings of national politics.

Business leaders make decisions based on opportunity, talent, legal certainty, and trusted partners, not on primary results, and Michigan continues to deliver on every one of those measures.

Its rule of law is strong, its universities remain open to Israeli collaboration, its economic development institutions remain committed to international investment, and its private sector remains eager to build.

Israeli executives weighing expansion into North America should meet this moment with perspective rather than hesitation. Political headlines change quickly; business fundamentals change far more slowly.

For companies seeking customers, manufacturing capacity, research partners, or capital, Michigan remains one of the most welcoming and productive environments in the United States, and that has not changed because of one primary result.

The Michigan-Israel relationship has weathered economic cycles, technological revolutions, geopolitical shocks, and changing governments on both sides of the ocean because it rests on mutual benefit, personal trust, and a shared conviction that innovation creates prosperity.

Political rhetoric and media coverage shape public perception, and we don’t dismiss that. But the commercial relationship we work in every day runs on different terms: jobs, capital, research partnerships, and supply chains built over years, not headlines from any single week. Those fundamentals haven’t shifted.

Michigan is not turning away from Israel. If anything, we are more engaged than ever. More companies. More partnerships. More investment. That’s how this relationship has always grown, and that’s how it will continue to grow.

Mark Davidoff is the CEO of the Michigan Israel Business Accelerator and president and CEO of The Fisher Group, the family office of Max M. and Marjorie S. Fisher. He is also the past chair of the board of the Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce.

Howard Handler is chair of the Michigan Israel Business Accelerator and an enterprise leader, board director, and strategic adviser. He most recently served as president of 313 Presents, Detroit’s premier live entertainment company.

This post was originally published on here. 

The Boulder Valley School District Board of Education held a regular meeting on Tuesday night to address antisemitic harassment and a federal civil rights complaint detailing severe abuse and physical violence against a Jewish student.

The meeting drew dozens of community members, parents, students, and advocates who packed the boardroom to demand systemic accountability and reform from district leadership.

The federal civil rights complaint, which was filed in June by the Anti-Defamation League on behalf of a Southern Hills Middle School student against the Boulder Valley School District, outlines a pattern of severe misconduct.

According to the complaint, a Jewish student was subjected to repeated antisemitic harassment, slurs, threats, and physical abuse over two years.

The allegations state that students referred to the student as “dirty” and “contaminated,” played a game called “Jew touch tag,” made Nazi and Holocaust-related comments, and on one occasion, allegedly placed a charging cord around the student’s neck and dragged him backward while using an antisemitic slur.

Superintendent Rob Anderson opened the meeting by delivering a public apology to the student and their family, acknowledging that past district responses were insufficient. “Clearly there was a lack of district-level systems and structures needed to better respond and support all students,” Anderson said, pledging to implement a coordinated district response team and a new oversight council.

During the public comment session, Jewish Alliance of Colorado president Aaron Brooks told the board that the student’s ordeal must be addressed directly, rather than being redirected into broader political debates.

“A Jewish child was allegedly targeted for two years because he is Jewish,” Brooks said. “It is troubling to see this student’s experience pulled into broader unrelated political arguments. A child’s experience of harassment should not be repurposed for political messaging.”

Students, parents testify at meeting, speak of insecurity within district

The meeting included testimony from students and parents who described a pervasive sense of insecurity within the district.

One parent, Ena Plum, criticized the district’s previous handling of such incidents, stating, “Somewhere in this district the line between criticizing a foreign government and tormenting a Jewish child got blurry enough that adults hesitated.”

Other speakers, including students from Southern Hills, shared their own experiences, with incoming seventh-grader Claire Seagal noting that despite her past efforts to promote “No Place for Hate” programming, antisemitism has continued to rise.

While many speakers supported the implementation of robust antisemitic prevention policies and urged the district to continue partnering with the ADL, others expressed strong opposition.

Some speakers say district should avoid IHRA antisemitism definition over free speech concerns

Several speakers argued that the district should avoid utilizing the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism, claiming it could chill free speech regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In response to the board’s proposed policy revisions, Superintendent Anderson emphasized that while the language of school policies remains under consideration, the district is already moving forward with concrete operational changes.

“I will be working to strengthen our policies and procedures,” Anderson stated, confirming that the district intends to establish a dedicated web page for addressing antisemitism and will implement a multi-part professional learning series for staff.

As the board prepares for further study and potential revisions to district policies on non-discrimination and bullying, community members made it clear that they expect ongoing transparency. As Brooks concluded, “Jewish students deserve more than discussions. They deserve action, transparency, accountability, and above all, safety.”

This post was originally published on here. 

Last week, I attended a vivid, moving photography exhibition, celebrating kibbutz and day-to-day Israeli life. I shouldn’t write about it because I’m not an objective observer, given that the photographer was my talented cousin, Adele Raemer. 

But what made it exceptional, newsworthy, and inspiring yet heartbreaking was that her photographs capture life in Nirim, a Gaza border kibbutz, since 2020, meaning before it was invaded on October 7, and since.

Baseball fans love split-screen television. You watch the pitcher prepare to pitch, as the first-base runner prepares to bolt.

What a metaphor for life in Israel.

It’s the “great Israel disconnect.” 

What’s true?

I wonder “what’s real in my amazing, enjoyable, reassuring, soul-expanding, day-to-day life?” 
Is it that life is full of wonderful, grounded, all-too-often heroic, self-sacrificing children, many weddings and births, fun coffee dates, scenic jogs around Jerusalem, and special relatives and friends?

Or, as many others fear, is “the real Israel” its toxic politics, the terrifying headlines, the threats from so many evil enemies? 

The challenges are mind-boggling. And they’re exacerbated, I regret to say, by some American Jewish friends minimizing the threats, joining the pile-on demonizing of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while trying to bond with supposed allies who increasingly threaten them – and us.

Still, I live in the moment, and what a moment it was last Thursday. My cousin, Adele, a Bronx native who moved to the Negev decades ago, has long had a remarkable artistic flair. 

In 2016, she joined the online network 52Frames to grow as a photographer. Since then, by 7 a.m. every Monday (midnight East Coast US time), she posts a photograph in response to the weekly challenge. It could be a self-portrait, a landscape, a group shot, or a photograph taken with a certain technique. She’s become Nirim’s unofficial photographer-in-chief, recording the community’s life, moment by moment.

So yes. After all these years, she deserved to be honored by her community for her eye, her composition, her technique. One woman thanked her for capturing so many of her family’s special moments as her kids grew.

The photographs were displayed in the old etching studio of the late Dov Heller, a Romanian-born artist who arrived at the nine-year-old Kibbutz Nirim in 1955. 

His daughter, Galia Heller Kremer, offered Adele a converted dairy barn, which is now the community’s art gallery, and greeted the guests warmly. “We could have called it From New York to Nirim, but ultimately, Adele is from here. She’s one of us,” Kremer said.

It was more appropriate to call the exhibit Seeing Home, especially, she sighed, “after all we’ve been through.” Enough said.

To those who will never come home

The exhibit was dedicated “to all our friends who never got the opportunity to see home again, after October 7,” and especially commemorated Adele’s dear friend Judih Weinstein Haggai.
Weinstein Haggai was murdered by Hamas while walking in Kibbutz Nir Oz’s fields with her husband, Gadi Haggai, early on October 7. 

The snacks at the exhibit were vegan, honoring her passion. Recalling Weinstein Haggai’s warmth, patience, love, and goodness, Kremer observed, “She died so far from everything she lived.”

The split-screen nature of Nirim’s post-October 7 life hung over the delightful photos of kids in mid-jump at the pool, dads dressed in silly ways at a community Shavuot ceremony, and stunning landscapes of the surrounding fields. 

Adele, who survived for 11 hours in her safe room, said that in the unnerving weeks following the massacre, “from week to week I didn’t know where I was going to sleep, but I knew that every Monday I would send in my photography assignment.” The power of ritual, of regularity, in defying catastrophe was quintessentially Israeli.

Beyond feeling how, for these survivors, the pall of October 7 infects everything, the juxtaposition of Nirim’s renaissance, with Weinstein Haggai’s beloved Nir Oz just 2.5 kilometers away, suspended in October 7, was sobering. 

On the day of the massacre, Nirim lost five civilians and had five members kidnapped. Those devastating losses pale compared to the 47 souls Hamas murdered in Nir Oz, while kidnapping 76 people – 67 of whom were alive. Fifty-four eventually were freed.

What it costs to survive

Rehabilitating Nirim cost approximately 43 million shekels. Since last summer, it’s fully restored and functional – physically at least. 

Most residents returned. It will cost over 10 times more to rebuild Nir Oz – and will take years. “Hamas didn’t just set out to murder us, kidnap us, abuse us,” Adele explained, “they wanted to destroy our communities, the societies we’ve built.” 

Of more than 30 individual civilian communities assaulted that day, Hamas hit 22 kibbutzim. Intelligence documents and the terrorists’ boasts revealed that these terrorists delighted in ravaging the kibbutzim – all of which are within Israel’s original borders, the so-called Green Line. 

But to Hamas and their enablers worldwide, every inch of Israel is “occupied territory.” Every Israeli is a “settler.” Even the most secular, left-wing, Peace Now kibbutz is an illegitimate “settlement,” reflecting the kind of Zionist success Hamas cannot tolerate and seeks to annihilate.

Apparently, it is quite easy for the world to forget that Hamas and other Gazans planned, intentional, unspeakable horrors. Yet the people of the Gaza border communities can’t forget – even the “lucky ones” back living their seemingly-normal lives. 

Few Israelis forget either. That’s why we need our friends worldwide to understand how deep the trauma runs and how much we have learned about our many enemies’ non-negotiable evil.

Our friends should also take pride in Israel’s Zionist resilience. It’s remarkable that so many of those who were overrun on October 7 have returned, as Nirim’s members have, or are still vowing to return home.

Professor Gil Troy is a Distinguished Scholar of North American History at McGill University and a Senior Research Fellow at the JPPI, the Jewish People Policy Institute. He is the author of nine books on presidential history and nine on Zionism, including Theodor Herzl: Zionist Writings from the Library of the Jewish People, as well as his latest e-book, The Essential Guide to the US-Israel Partnership: the 250th Anniversary Edition.

This post was originally published on here. 

Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) demonstrators blocked Highway 4 near Bnei Brak on Wednesday in protest against the detention of a draft dodger, according to N12 News, with the Israel Police declaring the demonstration illegal later on Wednesday.

Footage released by N12 later showed the demonstrators leaving the highway and heading into Bnei Brak.

Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman commented on the protests in an X/Twitter post later on Wednesday, saying that the demonstrators will make “great soldiers” if they can “block roads in this heat.”

אם בחום הזה המשתמטים יכולים לחסום כבישים – הם יכולים להיות יופי של חיילים.
אחרי ה-27.10 לא יהיה להם זמן לחסימות – הם יהיו עסוקים בלעלות על מדים!

— אביגדור ליברמן (@AvigdorLiberman) August 12, 2026

“After October 27, they won’t have time for blockades – they’ll be busy putting on uniforms!” he added.

According to Ynet, the suspect was initially summoned by Lahav 433 for questioning, whereupon he was transferred to the military police once it became apparent that he was a draft dodger.

Shas MK Moshe Abutbul claimed that the man had approached police to “assist” in an ongoing fraud investigation, having contacted Police Commissioner Insp.-Gen. Danny Levi regarding the incident.

“This is a crossing of a red line and a serious violation of the commissioner’s commitment to the Haredi public,” said Abutbul. “This is not how you build trust. This is how you destroy it.”

Police dispute Abutbul’s description of events leading to draft dodger’s detention

Abutbul described the man as a “yeshiva guy,” with police disputing the MK’s version of events, noting that the suspect would not have been transferred to the military police if he was simply someone coming to give testimony, Ynet reported.

“The suspect was summoned for questioning with a warning at Lahav 433 for serious criminal offenses,” police said in a statement.  “Upon learning that the suspect was wanted by the military police, a report was submitted as is customary and required.”

“Any other publication is incorrect and intended to reinforce a biased and false narrative,” police added.

Abutbul to Ben-Gvir: Police must refine complaint process for haredim

In a letter to National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Abutbul demanded that the procedures for haredim to file complaints with the police be refined to avoid such situations. 

“Their (police) procedures need to be refined immediately and clearly to allow haredim to file complaints at police stations without being arrested,” wrote Abutbul. “Continuing such conduct could seriously damage public trust in the police, and cause citizens to avoid contacting them when necessary, which could cost lives.”

The protest comes as the latest demonstration against attempts to draft haredim into the IDF and the arrests of those who refuse their draft orders, with the issue central to the coming elections in October.

This post was originally published on here. 

The United States and the Board of Peace face a fundamental question in Gaza: Will they implement President Donald Trump’s plan, or continue allowing Israel to prevent it from changing reality on the ground?

Right now, the answer is deeply troubling.

The war officially ended months ago, but for the more than two million Gazans, the reality of war has not truly ended. Israeli military occupation continues over more than 60% of the territory. Palestinians continue to be killed. Recovery is painfully slow, reconstruction has barely begun, and the new governing and security arrangements meant to replace both Hamas rule and Israeli military control have not been allowed to take hold.

This threatens the strategy behind Trump’s plan, and Hamas benefits from the paralysis.

It is right to continue to demand the full disarmament of Hamas. There cannot be two armed authorities in Gaza. No sustainable Palestinian political system can exist while Hamas or another faction maintains an independent military force outside a legitimate Palestinian government. But disarming Hamas and diminishing Hamas are not the same thing.

Hamas will not lose political relevance simply because it surrenders its weapons. Hamas will be marginalized when Gazans see a credible alternative capable of delivering what Hamas has catastrophically failed to deliver: security, freedom, effective government, reconstruction, and a political future. That alternative was supposed to be at the heart of the Gaza strategy.

The plan envisioned Hamas relinquishing its weapons and governing authority; the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) assuming responsibility for civilian life; a new Palestinian police force providing internal security; an International Stabilization Force (ISF) guaranteeing the transition; Israeli forces withdrawing in stages; humanitarian assistance flowing at scale; and reconstruction beginning.

That architecture cannot work if Israel blocks the very changes intended to replace Hamas. Israel should be required to withdraw from designated areas adjacent to the current separation lines. As Israeli forces withdraw, the NCAG should assume civilian responsibility, accompanied by the new Palestinian police.

Recovery and reconstruction should begin there immediately. The ISF should deploy along the line separating the remaining Israeli forces from Hamas-controlled territory. Its mission should be to secure the transition, prevent armed infiltration, and enable the gradual expansion of territory under legitimate Palestinian administration.

The transferred areas must not become another vacuum for Hamas. They should demonstrate what a post-Hamas Gaza can look like. Homes should be rebuilt. Schools and clinics should reopen. Water, electricity, and sanitation should be restored. Businesses should reopen and jobs should be created.

As security arrangements take hold and Hamas’s weapons are removed, this zone of Palestinian governance should progressively expand. This is how the map of Gaza should change: not through permanent Israeli occupation or the return of Hamas but through the steady expansion of territory governed by Palestinians who are neither Hamas nor the Israeli military.

If Gazans see that areas from which Israel withdraws become safer, begin rebuilding, and are governed by Palestinians rather than Hamas, the political consequences could be profound. That is how Hamas is diminished.

If, however, Gazans continue to see Israeli soldiers controlling their territory, Palestinians being killed by Israeli forces, destroyed neighborhoods, and no meaningful reconstruction, Hamas will have an easy argument: Nothing changed. Israel still controls Gaza. Diplomacy achieved nothing. The Americans made promises they did not enforce. Armed resistance therefore remains necessary.

That is precisely the argument we should be trying to destroy.

The two objectives for peace in Gaza that Trump must pursue

The United States and the Board of Peace must therefore pursue two objectives simultaneously: Hamas must disarm, and the reality that gives Hamas political strength must be dismantled. A credible political horizon showing Palestinians that freedom, dignity, and self-government can be achieved through politics rather than armed struggle weakens Hamas. Continued Israeli military control does the opposite.

Trump understood this when he pushed for an architecture that went beyond another temporary ceasefire. Gaza did not need another pause between wars. It needed a fundamentally different political and security reality.

But that vision cannot survive if Israel decides which parts of the plan will be implemented.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political interests increasingly diverge from this strategy. His coalition includes powerful forces opposing Palestinian sovereignty and meaningful Israeli withdrawal.

A renewed war in Gaza, or a major escalation in the West Bank, could allow Netanyahu to once again campaign primarily as Israel’s wartime leader. That may serve his electoral interests. It does not serve Israel’s national-security interests.

Israel cannot achieve sustainable security by permanently controlling millions of Palestinians. It cannot defeat Hamas politically while maintaining the conditions that allow Hamas to justify its existence. Nor can it expect Arab and Muslim countries to contribute troops, political capital, and billions of dollars to rebuilding Gaza if Israel can prevent the new Palestinian order from functioning.

These policies also work against American interests. The US invested enormous presidential authority in Trump’s Gaza initiative and assembled Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others around the possibility of moving beyond the war toward a new regional architecture.

If Israel can prevent implementation of an American-led plan while continuing to enjoy American political and military support, every American partner in the region will draw an obvious conclusion: Washington may be powerful enough to negotiate agreements but is unwilling to enforce them when Israel objects.

That would damage American credibility far beyond Gaza and undermine the larger opportunity for regional transformation, including a future Israeli-Saudi agreement and broader Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace.

The Board of Peace cannot become a waiting room in which everyone discusses implementation while Israel decides what happens on the ground. It must become an implementation mechanism with clear obligations, benchmarks, and timelines.

Disarmament cannot be demanded in an environment where nothing else changes. Israeli withdrawal cannot create a vacuum for Hamas. Withdrawal, disarmament, Palestinian governance, international stabilization, and reconstruction must become mutually reinforcing parts of one process. The key principle is reciprocity: Movement on one side must produce movement on the other.

There cannot be an Israeli veto over an American plan. Trump has extraordinary leverage over Netanyahu. He should use it. Israel should receive strong American support for its legitimate security requirements. Gaza must never again become a launching pad for attacks against Israel.

But American support for Israel’s security cannot mean support for permanent Israeli military control of Gaza, endless war, or obstruction of the political and security arrangements Trump himself created.

If Palestinians can compare two realities with their own eyes – one of Hamas, weapons, destruction, and endless war, and another of Palestinian governance, security, reconstruction, and hope – that comparison may ultimately do more to defeat Hamas than another Israeli military campaign ever could.

Trump’s Gaza plan can still succeed. But the US and the Board of Peace cannot continue allowing Israel to veto the very plan they committed themselves to implementing.

The writer is the Middle East director of the International Communities Organization and the co-head of the Alliance for Two States.

This post was originally published on here. 

Flames could be seen from the upper floors of a building in downtown Jerusalem on Wednesday afternoon.

The blaze occured at a building on the corner of HaMatmid Alley and Meir Shaham Street, across from Independence Park.

Police, firefighters, and emergency response services Magen David Adom and United Hatzalah personnel were all on the scene.

As of the time of publication, the official cause of the blaze has not yet been announced, although Baruch Levy, a senior officer with Israel Fire and Rescue Services’ Jerusalem District, said that the cause was known.

“We are currently investigating if there is a fire on the 24th floor,” he told The Jerusalem Post at the scene. “We know the cause, but we are not allowed to say.”

No known injuries as a result of the fire

The Jerusalem Post has reached out to United Hatzalah regarding any individuals who may have been hurt but has yet to receive a response.

This post was originally published on here. 

An Irish man in France told an Australian Jewish couple inside a supermarket on Tuesday that he was sorry “Hitler didn’t finish the job” before threatening to put a bullet in their heads.  

Footage of the incident circulated widely across social media platforms including X/Twitter and Instagram. The Australian Jewish Association (AJA) shared the footage and said the couple were “friends of AJA,” and they had reported “to us that they had a friendly conversation with an Irishman who introduced himself as Paddy.

Australian Jewish couple threatened with murder by Irish man in France

An Australian Jewish couple, friends of AJA report to us that they had a friendly conversation with an Irishman who introduced himself as Paddy.

The conversation took a turn when Paddy found out that they… pic.twitter.com/pFg3a1d3u8

— Australian Jewish Association (@AustralianJA) August 11, 2026

“The conversation took a turn when Paddy found out that they were Jewish,” the AJA said. “He told them he was sorry that Hitler didn’t finish the job.”  

AJA told The Jerusalem Post that the targeted couple were Australian Jews vacationing in France. They had contacted AJA shortly after the incident occurred on Tuesday in a supermarket in Avignon. 

The couple provided AJA with an account of the incident, saying that an Irishman “approached us because my husband was wearing a French football top, and he obviously heard us chatting in English, and bantered, ‘Why is an Englishman wearing a French shirt?’ My husband answered in a friendly style that he’s an Australian, but liked the shirt, and as we are traveling around France, he was happy to wear it.

“Then he introduced himself as ‘Paddy from Ireland,’ and we gave our names and shook hands. Then my husband said he wouldn’t wear an Irish shirt, and Paddy agreed that their team was crap and started running down the Irish soccer team, which we had no real knowledge of.

“I told him, ‘No, it’s not that; it’s the Irish politics where they hold such anti-Israel policies and support Hamas and Hezbollah, terrorists! His demeanor changed, and he became aggressive, informing me, ‘We all agree with that. And I’m sorry Hitler didn’t finish the job! At that point, I retrieved my phone and started videoing.”

Footage shows Irish man threatening to ‘put a f***ing bullet’ in head of tourists

The video footage began with filming the man inside the store aisles. In the clip, the man smiled and laughed while walking away from the camera, while the person filming repeatedly asked him to repeat his remarks, saying, “Go on, tell us again. You’re sorry Hitler didn’t finish the job. Please tell us again, Paddy.”

As the man turned back to face the camera, his expression hardened. He stopped walking and threatened the tourists, stating, “You get the f*** away from me before I put a f***ing bullet in your head, okay?”

AJA President to ‘Post’: Jewish tourists must be cautious in Europe

AJA President Robert Gregory told the Post that the couple had since been in contact with a French Jewish security group.

“Australia is facing an unprecedented wave of antisemitism, but this incident is a reminder that Jews can be targeted anywhere,” he said. “Jewish travelers in Europe should exercise caution and remain vigilant. This is a wonderful couple and proud Jews who did nothing to deserve this. Our thoughts are with them.

“Every threat of antisemitic violence must be taken seriously,” he added. “We expect the authorities to investigate this matter urgently and take decisive action against those responsible.”

This post was originally published on here. 

Concern is growing for the safety of Israelis Mali and Liel Yahalomi, who have been missing in Vienna since Friday and failed to board their scheduled return flight from Prague on Tuesday night, as Austrian police continue investigating their disappearance on Wednesday.

The two did not arrive for their return flight, which was scheduled to depart Prague at 9:45 p.m.

According to the information available, the vacation apartment where they had been staying in Vienna was found empty of their belongings. Austrian police, the Israeli Embassy, and the city’s Chabad community have reported that there are still no leads in the case.

The family was informed that the investigation into the mystery had been transferred to the Vienna Police’s central unit, an indication that concern is also growing in Austria. However, as of Wednesday, family members had not yet been questioned by Austrian police, and contact with authorities was being conducted solely through the Israeli consulate, which is involved in the search.

As of Wednesday afternoon, Austrian authorities had issued no official announcement regarding the disappearance of Mali and Liel Yahalomi, and the case had received little attention in Austrian media. Brief reports appeared on several news sites, but they relied primarily on statements from the Israeli Embassy and Israeli media.

The investigation was ongoing in Vienna and neighboring countries on Wednesday afternoon, but a source familiar with coordination with the Jewish community noted that, unlike in previous missing-person cases, the community had not yet been mobilized to physically assist in the search.

“Maybe there’s a reason, since they aren’t sharing details,” the source said.

Israeli, Austrian authorities ask public for information on missing women

Meanwhile, the Israeli Embassy, the Foreign Ministry, and Austrian police have been asking since Tuesday for anyone who encountered the two women or has information about them to urgently come forward. Despite widespread publicity, no information had been received that assisted in locating them.

Ronen Yahalomi, Mali’s son and Liel’s brother, landed in Vienna on Wednesday afternoon to personally join the search.

According to Levin, the trip was a birthday present. Mali celebrated her 50th birthday last week, and her daughter surprised her with a trip to Prague. On Friday, they were in Vienna, from where they sent videos and messages to their family.

“They were happy and joyful,” Levin said.

“The two observe Shabbat, so at first the loss of contact did not cause concern. But after Shabbat ended, no message came from them. On Sunday morning, Elinor, Mali’s sister, sent a message in the family group asking, ‘Where are you, what’s going on?’ but the message remained with only one check mark. Phone calls also went unanswered, and there has been no sign of them since,” she said.

“Nothing about this disappearance fits their character. They travel abroad together often and have never disappeared, not even close to anything like this. They’re always in constant contact, always messaging,” Levin added.

The two had also left their dog with Tzipi, Mali’s mother, and during the trip “they called every two hours to ask what was going on, and suddenly it stopped,” she said.

A surprise birthday trip for ‘experienced travelers’

“Mali and Liel are experienced travelers,” she said. “The trip was planned as a surprise for Mali’s 50th birthday.”

The family described the two as living quiet, ordinary lives. Their greatest fear is that something happened to them while they were traveling back from Vienna to Prague, where they were supposed to catch their flight on Tuesday night.

“We have no leads whatsoever. I’m afraid they got into a vehicle and were kidnapped,” Einav said.

The two had set out on a prearranged trip through Europe. They arrived in Vienna by train from Prague, checked into a local vacation apartment, remained in regular contact with their family, and sent their final message to the family group on Friday afternoon, shortly before Shabbat began.

“We arrived at the apartment. Look what a cool apartment! Shabbat shalom, everyone,” they wrote.

Since then, there has been complete silence. Their phones are switched off, there is no location data, their credit cards have not been used, and there is no security-camera footage of them.

“By Sunday, we had already started to worry,” relatives said.

A makeshift command center was established at the family’s home in Modi’in. Elinor, Mali’s sister, described how messages sent to them remained marked with only one check mark on WhatsApp.

“They were in constant contact. This kind of loss of contact is completely out of character for them.”

Vienna police entered the apartment and discovered that the women’s belongings were no longer there, raising the possibility that they left intending to continue their journey.

However, Europe’s open borders have made the search considerably more difficult. A person can quickly cross into Slovakia, Hungary, or other countries without undergoing passport control.

Reuven Timsit, a Chabad representative in Vienna, told Walla, “There are no leads whatsoever, and it’s very strange and highly unusual. We’re in Vienna, not some Third World country. These days, you can locate a person even if they bought a Coke Zero from a machine. But here, nothing. Four hundred people gathered for the Shabbat meal at the Chabad House near the apartment building where the two were staying. They did not register for the meal, did not attend it, and were not seen on the site’s cameras.”

The Israeli Embassy in Austria issued an urgent appeal to the public, asking anyone with information to immediately call the emergency number +43-676-3672304 or contact local police.

The family is working with authorities in Israel and Austria while expanding its search efforts with professional teams on the ground. A fundraising campaign has been launched to finance the search, whose cost is estimated at approximately $100,000.

“Every hour matters, and every bit of assistance helps expand the search efforts,” family representatives said.

Israel Police hold situational assessment 

Israel Police Commissioner Daniel Levy held a situational assessment regarding efforts to locate the missing Israeli women.

Levy instructed that all necessary resources and capabilities be allocated, both in Israel and abroad, to support the investigation and efforts to locate the women.

This post was originally published on here. 

Jonathan Frisher, a 17-year-old student from Cheshire in England’s northwest, is leading a growing national campaign to make education about contemporary antisemitism mandatory in UK schools.

Frisher launched a Change.org petition three years ago after seeing the positive impact a dedicated lesson had in his own school, pushing for legislative and policy changes to ensure students across the country are equipped to recognize and challenge antisemitism in all its modern forms.

In an interview with The Jerusalem Post, Frisher shared that the campaign was born from his own experiences as a Jewish student in a school with a very small Jewish population.

As a descendant of Holocaust survivors, facing direct antisemitic harassment from peers carried a particularly heavy personal toll. “As soon as I started high school, peers targeted me for being Jewish; they would tell me that I should be in a gas chamber, and I was constantly subjected to seeing swastikas drawn in classrooms and Nazi salutes being displayed,” Frisher said. “Someone told me they hated me for being Jewish.”

Frisher noted that much of this hostility stemmed from ignorance and a lack of a clear framework for recognizing hate. He explained that while schools do teach about the Holocaust, it is often taught as a distant historical event that ended 80 years ago, leaving students with the impression that antisemitism is a phenomenon of the past rather than something continuing today.

Furthermore, Frisher pointed out that because antisemitism is so heavily associated with Nazi Germany and concentration camps, people often set an impossibly high bar for what counts as antisemitism. In his own experience, overt actions, such as a Nazi salute in a classroom or remarks about gas chambers, were frequently dismissed by peers as a joke or banter rather than recognized as the targeting of a Jewish student.

To fix this gap, Frisher worked with his school to implement a single lesson focused specifically on contemporary antisemitism, which was introduced in year nine [eighth grade in Israel] alongside Holocaust education. The class addressed how symbols like swastikas and Nazi salutes continue to cause harm today and provided students with the tools to recognize antisemitism for themselves, rather than relying on a Jewish classmate to point it out.

Lesson explored how antisemitism differs from other forms of hatred

Crucially, the lesson looked at how antisemitism differs from other forms of racism by examining pervasive conspiracy theories concerning Jewish power and control. While many forms of racism portray a targeted group as inferior, Frisher highlighted that antisemitism uniquely portrays Jewish people as powerfully dangerous, focusing on centuries-old tropes that they secretly control banks, governments, and the media.

The impact of the lesson within his school was immediate.

“People apologized to me and attitudes changed,” Frisher said.

Realizing that the curriculum could successfully shift the culture and give young people the language to identify hate in coded language, memes, and conspiracy theories, Frisher launched his petition three years ago because he wanted to see the approach implemented in every school across the country.

His campaign has since gained significant momentum, spiking following the Golders Green attacks earlier this year. At present, the petition has garnered over 40,000 signatures, with a Jewish News poll finding that three-in-five voters support the policy.

Initiative supported across UK party lines, Jewish organizations

The initiative has earned support from major cross-party figures and Jewish organizations, including the Movement for Progressive Judaism, the Jewish Leadership Council, and the Jewish Labour Movement. Additionally, his local Member of Parliament, Connor Naismith, has started an Early Day Motion in Parliament supporting the initiative.

Frisher emphasized that education must bridge the gap as the living memories of decidedly personal connections to the Holocaust fade and society grows more polarized.

“As we lose Holocaust survivors, we lose the most powerful testimony there is – people who lived it, who can look a young person in the eye and say, ‘This is what antisemitism did to me,’” Frisher noted.

“As that generation passes, antisemitism risks becoming an abstract historical concept rather than a lived reality. That’s exactly why education must fill that gap – because we can no longer rely on personal testimony alone, and schools are where that responsibility now falls.”

This post was originally published on here. 

State Attorney Amit Aisman, Israel’s chief prosecutor, may handle the investigation into leaked footage from the Sde Teiman detention facility and the alleged cover-up, the High Court of Justice ruled on Wednesday.

The ruling allows Aisman and his prosecution team to continue reviewing the full police file, determine whether further investigation is needed, and decide whether charges should be filed.

The court ruled 2-1 that there was no basis to overturn an updated opinion by Justice Ministry legal adviser Yael Kotik, finding that Aisman was no longer barred from the criminal case.

The petition was filed by bereaved-families organization Bacharnu B’Haim and two bereaved fathers. They sought to bar Aisman and the prosecution from the case, give Justice Minister Yariv Levin more time to appoint an external supervisor, and require police to pursue specific lines of investigation.

The restriction on Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara remains in place. The dispute concerned legal oversight after she, Aisman, and other senior officials were initially excluded because they might have to testify about an earlier examination.

The investigation centers on footage broadcast in August 2024 that appeared to show IDF reservists abusing a Palestinian detainee at Sde Teiman, as well as allegations that the leak’s source was concealed. Former military advocate-general Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi admitted in October 2025 that she authorized its release.

The reservists’ indictment was withdrawn in March, partly because the detainee had been released to Gaza under the hostage agreement and because of evidentiary difficulties, the ruling noted.

In an earlier ruling, the court found that Levin could appoint a senior civil servant to perform the attorney-general’s supervisory role, subject to restrictions intended to prevent political influence.

Levin first appointed Judicial Complaints Commissioner Asher Kula, but the court struck down the appointment because Kula was legally barred from taking another role. Levin subsequently appointed retired judge Yosef Ben-Hamo, whose appointment was canceled because he did not meet the eligibility requirements.

After Ben-Hamo’s appointment was struck down, Levin neither appointed another eligible supervisor nor asked the court to make an appointment.

The investigation continued under senior police supervision. Police told Kotik on February 3 that their work had produced evidence against several people within the Military Advocate-General’s Office, but nobody outside it.

Investigators took dozens of statements, conducted confrontations and searches, arrested two suspects, and questioned five others under caution. Kotik sought further information, met the head of the police Investigations and Intelligence Division, and received additional details before issuing her updated opinion on March 8.

The opinion found that Aisman had not participated in the events under investigation and would not need to testify. Although he had attended a January 2025 meeting concerning the earlier examination, police concluded that his presence did not justify calling him as a witness.

The materials were subsequently transferred to Aisman, who established a prosecution team overseen by two of his deputies to summarize the file and recommend whether additional investigative work was required.

Kotik: Aisman appropriate choice since he was not involved

Supreme Court Chief Justice Isaac Amit, joined by Justice Khaled Kabub, ruled that Kotik’s opinion rested on a sufficiently current and comprehensive factual basis. The information available to her was substantially broader than that underlying her original opinion, which was written near the beginning of the investigation.

The majority also relied on a standing decision issued by Levin in 2023, under which the A-G’s prosecutorial powers pass to Aisman whenever she is barred from handling a case. Once Aisman’s own restriction was removed, the court held that the arrangement resumed automatically and no new appointment was required.

The majority refused to give Levin additional time to appoint an external supervisor, noting that he had declined for months to exercise the authority granted to him. Amit said the petitioners and Levin raised the issue only after the investigation had produced conclusions with which they disagreed.

Making the validity or completion of the investigation dependent on an appointment by the justice minister would give him influence over its pace, direction, and even its continued existence, Amit wrote, contrary to the need to protect criminal investigations from political influence.

Court: Judges cannot replace law enforcement

The court unanimously rejected the request to order police to undertake particular investigative steps, saying judges do not act as investigators or replace the professional judgment of law enforcement authorities.

It also stressed that neither Baharav-Miara nor Aisman was a suspect, and criticized unsupported accusations of a cover-up against them.

Justice David Mintz dissented from the remainder of the ruling. He argued that the earlier judgment had treated external supervision as a necessary safeguard, not an option, and that an investigation conducted without such oversight could not itself provide the basis for lifting Aisman’s restriction.

Mintz said Levin should be ordered to explain why he had not appointed an eligible external supervisor. He acknowledged that doing so could further delay the case, but said speed did not justify disregarding the requirement for an independent and credible investigation.

Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Approximately 300 young Jews from 34 countries are expected to immigrate to Israel this summer and enlist in the IDF as lone soldiers through the Garin Tzabar program of the World Scouting Movement, according to polling data released by the program on Monday.

Participants come from various countries, with the US leading with 175 recruits this year, followed by Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, India, and others.

The program’s data also reveals that many participants choose to remain in Israel after completing their military service. Some 85% remain in the country and establish their homes there, while around 30% of their families later immigrate to Israel as well.

Moreover, the data report also showed noticeable changes in the profile of those joining the program. 

Since 2022, the proportion of religious young people participating in Garin Tzabar has increased by 85%, and the overall number of participants has grown by 2.5 times. 

Notably, there has been a 20-fold increase in the number of participants from France, while the population of older participants – many of whom have academic qualifications – has grown by 65% since October 7.

As part of the program, Garin Tzabar participants also engage in volunteer activities across the country before enlisting in the IDF. Since the outbreak of war, they have worked in agriculture in communities along the confrontation lines in northern and southern Israel, packed food and equipment for soldiers, and assisted the local communities where they have settled.

Integrating Torah study with military service

New this year, Garin Tzabar, in collaboration with Midreshet Lindenbaum, will launch the second class of Garin Tzabar Torani, which aims to integrate religious education with military service. 

The new program plans to bring 12 religious young women from the United States to immigrate to Israel, which is double the number who participated in the previous year. 

The program is set to combine Torah study with values-based and spiritual preparation for military service, along with personal and community support before enlistment and throughout their service. 

Over its 35 years of operation, Tzofim Garin Tzabar has supported more than 8,000 immigrant lone soldiers. Today, more than 1,500 soldiers serve through the program across Israel.

According to program data, the number of participants has increased by 33% since October 7. By the end of 2026, approximately 550 new immigrants are expected to join the program.

‘Responsibility, Zionism, and a desire to contribute’

A program participant from Chicago shared: “The year I spent in Israel further strengthened my Jewish identity and my sense of mission, and made it clear to me that this is the place where I want to build my future.”

“The decision to immigrate to Israel and enlist in the IDF through Garin Tzabar comes from a sense of responsibility, Zionism, and a desire to contribute, and I am setting out on this path knowing that the challenges and difficulties are also part of the growth and meaning of the service,” he added.

Raz Perl, chairman of the Scouts Movement, said that the new immigrants’ choice to enlist was brave and selfless. 

“At a time when Israeli society is dealing with complex questions of shared responsibility and contribution to the country, the choice of these young men and women to immigrate, enlist, and serve is a profound expression of commitment and mutual responsibility. Our role is to make sure that none of them makes this journey alone.”

This post was originally published on here. 

The United States’ rare decision to join Japan in supporting the yen marked more than an attempt to arrest the decline of one of the world’s most heavily traded currencies.

It also highlighted the depth of the financial relationship between Washington and Tokyo at a moment when the Iran war has increased Japan’s energy costs, strengthened demand for the dollar, and renewed scrutiny of more than $1 trillion in US government debt attributed to Japanese investors.

Japan and the United States conducted coordinated action to support the yen on July 31. Japanese and US officials publicly confirmed the operation on August 3 after the yen had approached its weakest level against the dollar in approximately four decades. The intervention helped the currency gain around 5%, lifting it from nearly 164 yen per dollar to about 155.

By August 11, however, the yen had fallen back to about 159.36 per dollar, surrendering roughly half of that advance. Bank of Japan (BOJ) account data suggested that Tokyo may have spent as much as $58.97 billion on its July 30 intervention. According to media reports cited by Shirai, the US Treasury acted through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, purchasing yen with euros rather than selling dollars directly.

Buying yen with euros allowed Washington to support the Japanese currency without creating the impression that the United States had embarked on a wider policy of deliberately weakening the dollar.

Why US involvement in the yen intervention matters

Sayuri Shirai, an economics professor at Keio University’s Faculty of Policy Management and a former member of the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board, said Washington’s participation sent a stronger message than action by Tokyo alone.

“Coordinated intervention is likely to exert more persistent upward pressure on the yen than unilateral Japanese intervention, because US participation sends a stronger signal that the yen is substantially undervalued,” she told The Media Line.

“Media reports suggest that the US Treasury intervened through the New York Fed [Federal Reserve Bank of New York] by selling euros and buying yen, rather than selling dollars directly. This may have been intended to support the yen without creating the impression that the United States had begun a broader policy of weakening the dollar,” she explained.

The New York Fed conducts foreign-exchange transactions at the direction of the US Treasury or the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). US participation in currency interventions has been uncommon since the mid-1990s, making the decision to support the yen particularly important as a signal to traders betting on further depreciation.

Iran war accelerates an existing yen crisis

The Iran war did not create the yen’s structural weakness. That weakness has been driven primarily by the interest-rate gap between Japan and the United States, Japan’s comparatively loose monetary conditions, and the continued use of the yen to finance investments in higher-yielding foreign assets.

The conflict nevertheless intensified those pressures.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York said the dollar’s appreciation during the first quarter of 2026 was partly driven by the negative terms-of-trade shock suffered by major energy-importing economies during the US-Iran conflict. The United States, as a net energy exporter, was in a stronger position to absorb the shock than countries heavily dependent on imported fuel.

Japan is particularly exposed. Approximately 95% of its crude-oil imports have come from the Middle East in recent years, and much of that supply normally passes through or is affected by conditions around the Strait of Hormuz.

Japanese authorities responded to the conflict by releasing national oil reserves and seeking alternative supply routes that avoided the strait. The waterway remained largely closed on August 11, when Iran said it would not reopen it unless the United States ended the war and met other conditions, including the release of frozen Iranian assets.

For Japan, higher oil prices and disrupted shipping create several connected problems. Energy imports become more expensive, demand for dollars to pay for those imports increases, and imported inflation places pressure on households and businesses. A weaker yen magnifies the problem because every dollar-denominated barrel costs more in Japanese currency.

Helen Popper, professor of economics and associate dean at Santa Clara University’s Leavey School of Business, said the underlying interest-rate differential remained essential to understanding why the yen had been under sustained pressure.

“When there are high interest rates in the US, people do not want to sit on assets denominated in yen that are earning low interest rates. They want to dump those yen and buy assets that have higher interest rates,” she told The Media Line.

“The carry trade that everyone is talking about is: you borrow yen, change the yen into dollars, take those dollars and buy US assets, wait until they mature, and then trade them back. Hopefully, if you are carrying out the trade, you trade them back without losing too much in the foreign-exchange market. If the interest-rate differentials are not changing, you cannot really expect the yen to strengthen,” she said.

The inflation-adjusted difference between Japanese and US interest rates also continues to favor the dollar.

“The inflation-adjusted interest rate is still higher in the US, by most measures, than the inflation-adjusted interest rate in Japan,” Popper said. “As long as that interest rate is higher in the US, there is going to be upward pressure on the dollar and downward pressure on the yen.”

The war therefore acted as an accelerant rather than the sole cause of the currency crisis. It increased the economic costs of yen depreciation and contributed to the conditions under which Washington decided that intervention was no longer solely a Japanese concern.

Japan’s trillion-dollar connection to US debt

The intervention has also drawn attention to Japan’s role in the US Treasury market.

The latest available US Treasury data show that securities attributed to Japanese holders totaled approximately $1.143 trillion at the end of May 2026, down from about $1.210 trillion in April. Japan remained the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities.

That figure, however, should not be confused with the amount of US debt directly controlled by the Japanese government or immediately available for currency intervention.

The Treasury International Capital data include securities held by both Japanese official institutions and private investors. They are compiled largely through custodial records and cannot always establish the ultimate owner of securities held through accounts in third countries.

Japan’s official reserves are reported separately. At the end of July, the country held $1.287099 trillion in official reserve assets, including $927.332 billion in foreign-currency securities, according to data released by Japan’s Ministry of Finance on August 7. The monthly data do not identify all those securities individually as US Treasuries.

When Japan intervenes to support the yen, the decision is made by the Ministry of Finance and executed by the Bank of Japan as the ministry’s agent. Dollar funds held in the government’s Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account are used to purchase yen.

The correct distinction is therefore between Japan’s aggregate Treasury holdings, which include a wide range of Japanese investors, and the government-controlled foreign reserves that can be mobilized for intervention.

The concern for Washington is not that Tokyo could casually threaten to sell the entire $1.143 trillion portfolio. Rather, sustained intervention could require the Japanese authorities to liquidate some foreign securities, while higher Japanese yields could encourage private investors to reduce their exposure to US debt over time.

Large sales of Treasury securities could place downward pressure on their prices and upward pressure on US government borrowing costs. But a sudden fire sale would also damage Japan by reducing the value of the securities still held by Japanese investors.

Popper said that mutual exposure made a wholesale liquidation highly improbable.

“They are not going to dump all this in one day, because it would cause them pain. They are still holding Treasuries. If you sell a big chunk, their value falls, and you are still holding a big chunk. For their own purposes, they cannot just dump all their Treasuries and make a fire sale,” she said. “People are saying that the US is worried about a precipitous decline, but a precipitous decline would hurt Japan as well. So I think it is pretty unlikely.”

Foreign monetary authorities that meet the relevant requirements can also use the Federal Reserve’s Foreign and International Monetary Authorities Repo Facility to obtain temporary dollar liquidity against Treasury securities, rather than selling those securities outright into the market.

The facility is intended to reduce the risk that foreign demand for dollars could destabilize Treasury trading.

Why intervention alone may not strengthen the yen

The coordinated operation can deter traders from aggressively betting against the yen and signal that both governments regard its depreciation as excessive. Its longer-term effect will nevertheless depend on whether monetary conditions change.

Popper said intervention can be useful when war or another shock disrupts market liquidity, but evidence of a lasting impact remains limited.

“Intervention is sometimes done in a situation like when there is a Middle East war outbreak, and everything is uncertain. Central banks will come in, reduce the bid-ask spread and do trades to address liquidity issues,” she explained. “But there is not very much evidence that intervention has any sustained effect, even when it is concerted, meaning it involves more than one central bank, and they do it in concert.”

She compared attempts to permanently alter an exchange rate without changing monetary policy to trying to change the water level in one section of an ocean: “You are trying to change the level in one bay, but you still have the whole ocean out there. The intervention they are doing is like getting a bunch of buckets and soaking up this bay, but you still have this whole ocean of yen, dollars and euros out there.”

The only way countries really change their exchange rate, she said, is by changing their domestic monetary conditions.

For Japan, this places attention back on the Bank of Japan and whether it will increase interest rates. A rate rise could narrow the gap with US yields, make yen-denominated assets more attractive and raise the cost of maintaining carry-trade positions.

Shirai said the coordinated operation was likely to increase expectations of monetary tightening.

“The intervention therefore strengthens expectations that the BOJ could raise rates, possibly as early as September, because intervention alone is unlikely to produce a durable appreciation of the yen.”

She said that US participation places greater pressure on the BOJ than unilateral intervention by Japan would have done, although the BOJ will continue to justify any rate increase primarily in terms of domestic inflation and economic conditions.

But the central bank must balance support for the currency against the risks of tightening monetary policy in a highly indebted economy. Higher interest rates would increase government financing costs and could weaken domestic demand, even as imported inflation creates an argument for tighter policy.

The limits of official intervention may therefore become apparent quickly.

“However, if markets conclude that further coordinated intervention will be limited, attention will shift quickly back to the Bank of Japan and the outlook for interest rates,” Shirai said.

A powerful signal, but not a permanent solution

Further intervention remains possible if the yen again experiences disorderly depreciation, particularly if renewed disruption around Hormuz causes another rise in energy prices or strengthens demand for the dollar.

Repeated action would nevertheless carry wider risks.

“Further intervention cannot be ruled out, but it is likely to remain limited,” Shirai said. “Repeated official attempts to correct the perceived misalignment of major currencies could destabilize international currency markets and weaken confidence in the international monetary system.”

Washington’s decision to participate bought Japan time and raised the potential cost for investors continuing to bet against the yen. It also demonstrated that Japan’s currency stability, energy dependence and position in the Treasury market are no longer separate issues.

The Iran war intensified the pressure by raising the cost of Japan’s imported energy and strengthening the dollar against major energy-importing currencies. Japan’s interest-rate policy and the US-Japan yield gap, however, remain the fundamental forces determining whether the yen can sustain its recovery.

Coordinated intervention can alter market expectations and slow a rapid sell-off, but it is unlikely to produce a durable reversal unless the underlying monetary and economic conditions also change.

This post was originally published on here. 

For 17 years, Venezuela and Israel were separated by a rupture that went far beyond diplomatic protocol. Hugo Chávez’s decision to sever relations in January 2009 left thousands of citizens without direct representation and deepened the uncertainty facing a Jewish community that declined from approximately 25,000 people to around 5,000, amid emigration and years of political hostility toward Israel.

The statement issued this week does not yet restore full diplomatic relations, but it formalizes a decisive first step: the exchange of diplomatic notes, the resumption of consular relations, the opening of consulates general in both capitals, and the continuation of the technical cooperation launched after the devastating double earthquake of June 24. Above all, it marks the beginning of rebuilding trust.

The historical paradox is striking: For years, Venezuela was Iran’s principal ally in Latin America. The landscape began to shift following the US capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3 and assumed a human dimension after the disaster. The arrival of Israeli delegations, the official mission, and organizations including ZAKA, NATAN, and IsraAID enabled two countries without formal relations to recognize one another again through the universal language of saving lives and rebuilding.

Humanitarian aid opens a path toward renewed trust

I coordinated the ZAKA delegation led by Rabbi Yosef Garmon. I returned to Venezuela after 20 years, having left the country marked by my identity as both a journalist and a Jew. I crossed the border from Colombia as a Venezuelan, an Israeli, and a Jew, carrying aid and representing Israel’s values.

In La Guaira, we encountered not rejection, but gratitude: Venezuelans recognized the Jewish people and the biblical land that resonates so deeply with their spiritual sensibilities.

Israel could have responded with resentment; it chose responsibility. Every life touched transformed solidarity into diplomacy: the recovery of Néstor’s body, the aid delivered to Rosa and her family, and hundreds of other stories. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 9, the delegations were rebuilding both ruins and relations, showing Venezuela the true face of Israel.

Years of quiet diplomacy begin to bear fruit

This breakthrough also recognizes years of quiet and persistent work. Rabbi Isaac Cohen, chief rabbi of the Israelite Association of Venezuela and a native of Tangier, maintained channels of communication with the governments of Chávez, Maduro, and Delcy Rodríguez, with the stated purpose of protecting the Jewish community and addressing its needs.

On August 9, he delivered a letter to Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia, addressed to President Rodríguez, requesting the restoration of diplomatic and consular ties. One day later, years of patient engagement began to translate into a decision of state.

As soon as I learned of the official statement, I spoke with two privileged witnesses to this history. Milos Alcalay, Venezuela’s former ambassador to Israel during Yitzhak Rabin’s government, welcomed the decision and congratulated Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Rodríguez, despite not sharing her government’s ideological orientation. I also spoke with Eldad Golan, the last counselor at the Israeli Embassy in Caracas, who was forced to close its doors in 2009.

Today, from the other side of that painful chapter, Golan congratulates the Venezuelan and Israeli foreign ministers, Plasencia and Saar, for their meticulous diplomatic work. Their reactions show that foreign policy can recognize an achievement of national importance above partisan affinities.

The restoration of consular relations will return institutional support to citizens who lacked direct channels for almost two decades. Diplomacy acquires meaning when it once again serves people.

Diplomacy allows nations to build new bridges

This shift is not easy for everyone to absorb. In 2024, I interviewed María Corina Machado (current Nobel Peace Prize laureate) for i24NEWS while she was in hiding and facing persecution in Venezuela. She spoke of her admiration for Israel and of the need to restore relations. The process did not come about under her leadership. History rarely follows the expected script: Diplomacy does not erase the past, but it allows nations to evolve, rectify mistakes, and build new bridges.

In 1947, Venezuela voted in favor of United Nations Resolution 181, which paved the way for the creation of the State of Israel. That historical memory survived 17 years of rupture. The earthquake shook structures and certainties, but revealed something essential: Even when governments close doors, solidarity between peoples remains intact.

What politics destroyed, humanitarian action began to rebuild

What politics destroyed over 17 years, humanitarian action began to rebuild in a matter of weeks. Today, a consular channel is being restored; tomorrow, full diplomatic relations may follow. Yet the most profound achievement has already occurred: Two sister nations have begun to look upon one another with trust again. Tragedy opened a door that politics had kept closed. We are only beginning to write the first chapter.

This post was originally published on here. 

Standing two months away from the three-year anniversary of the start of the Israel-Hamas War, The Jerusalem Post has recently interviewed and spoken to top current and former defense officials, some of whom rarely speak to the media, to provide a broader view of where Israel stands on all of the military fronts.

Some major points remain under serious debate, while some points have hardened into a new consensus.

Regarding the broader consensus points, from Right to Left, top Israeli defense officials believe the country must maintain some kind of security zone in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria for years to come.

Defense officials back long-term Gaza security zone

The Post understands that this remains true despite recent deals with Hamas in Gaza and the Lebanese government, as well as rising pressure from the US on those fronts and with Syria for Israeli withdrawals.

In contrast, there is disagreement between top defense officials about how to handle US pressure and how much to bend on some related withdrawal issues in order to maintain broader American support.

For example, the Post has learned that a majority of top Israeli defense officials are in favor of allowing the Palestinian Authority to take over Gaza from Hamas, and criticize Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for being an obstacle to this process.

They would prefer moving forward with the PA more rapidly than Netanyahu has, though there is a minority that supports the prime minister’s insistence on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) as a sort of pressure point on the PA-connected officials to have to answer to the US Board of Peace.

Moving forward with the PA or NCAG is preferred despite heavy doubts that they will fully succeed at displacing Hamas as the main military power in Gaza.

Rather, they support giving the PA or NCAG a larger role in Gaza regardless of how much disarming Hamas succeeds and regardless of how long the process is drawn out.

There are also disagreements about how much Israel should be willing to withdraw from Gaza in exchange for Hamas carrying out partial disarming and partial delegating of political powers.

While a minority wish to hold on to maximum territory in Gaza, a majority are willing to withdraw to a smaller security zone, stating that the exact percentage is less important than keeping the high ground at each portion of the Strip, the Post has learned.

For example, the Post understands that the area around Shejaia requires the IDF to be deep into Gaza to maintain a useful buffer zone, whereas in Rafah, the military could control much less territory than it does now and still have an excellent vantage point to foresee and prevent any Hamas attempt to push into Israel.

In northern Gaza, there are ridges and hills from Netiv Haasara on the Israeli side which straddle parts of Beit Hanoun and other areas, which need to remain under Israeli control, but whether the total percentage of Israeli-controlled territory is 70%, 53%, around 30% or closer to 15% is less important than these on-the-ground realities.

If Hamas makes partial concessions, many Israeli defense officials are willing to make partial withdrawals, provided the high ground is maintained in a Gaza buffer zone.

These officials would insist on keeping such a zone for many years into the future because they do not believe that Gazan society is likely to change its hostile attitude toward Israel even if Hamas does some partial disarming and the PA or NCAG gain new political powers.

Israeli officials are skeptical of Lebanese army’s ability to counter Hezbollah

Likewise, a majority of Israeli defense officials do not believe that the IDF needs to control the 10 kilometers or more of Lebanese territory it currently holds, but this is not because they have any faith in the Lebanese military versus Hezbollah.

Rather, even those Israeli defense officials who are quicker to endorse partial withdrawals from Lebanon to a smaller security zone have little faith that the Lebanese army taking control of “pilot” areas is anything more than a public relations effort, the Post has learned.

There is a spirited disagreement, the Post understands, about whether the daring new diplomatic engagement by the Lebanese government with Israel can have any real strategic impact on the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israel.

Some believe that with the Lebanese government’s public backing, Israel can reduce the Hezbollah threat, while some believe that the government is mostly irrelevant, noting that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun had been ready to meet with Netanyahu, then canceled out of fear of assassination.

‘War between wars’ remains part of Israel’s defense strategy

Another broad area of consensus is for Israel to maintain a “war between wars” on all fronts, regularly performing attacks when necessary, which will prevent all enemies bordering Israel from increasing their strategic capacity to threaten Israel, the Post understands.

There is a debate within the defense establishment about how far to go with such attacks, and whether to dial back such attacks during periods when the US believes it is making diplomatic progress.

Some defense officials worry more that pausing the war between wars could make it harder to restart it when necessary, while some are more worried about losing American support when support for Israel globally has hit historic lows.

Defense establishment resists major Syria withdrawal

Regarding Syria, almost no one in the Israeli defense establishment wants to withdraw much from Syria, despite a recent push by Washington on the issue, the Post has noted.

Despite zero attacks by Syria on Israel since Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa took power in December 2024, Israeli defense officials see how he has treated and massacred some of his own Syrian minority groups and believe he remains a product of al-Qaeda.

They mostly believe that his reluctance to attack Israel is an extended tactical delay because he has not yet fully taken control over his own existing territory.

Many of them regard Syria as a serious potential future danger since there is no formal mechanism for preventing the new Syrian army from growing its heavy weapons, including tanks and fighter jets.

Recent reports have suggested that Turkey will help Syria rebuild much of what Israel bombed in December 2024 when the Assad regime fell.

Defense officials reassess Israel’s strategic position on Iran

Moving on to Iran, a majority of Israeli defense officials believe Israel’s strategic position was better off after the June 2025 operation than it is now after the early 2026 operation, the Post has learned.

While initially current IDF officials talked about high achievements in destroying Iran’s military capacities in terms of missiles, drones, and rebuilding its threat capacities, many are aghast that Tehran now has the US deterred due to the Straits of Hormuz crisis.

Further, they are worried about America preventing Israel from attacking Iran in the future if needed, whereas there was no such question after June 2025, since Washington was less involved.

Also, following the early 2026 operation, the Islamic Republic succeeded in reestablishing a connection between the Iranian and Hezbollah fronts, which Jerusalem had succeeded in cutting off in June 2025.

In addition, Iran has now had months to recover from the attacks, and Israeli defense officials are critical of US President Donald Trump for failing to attack sufficiently to maintain pressure on Tehran.

Israeli defense officials split over future Iran nuclear deal

Besides those consensus issues, there is a split about any future deal with Iran.

Some Israeli defense officials insist that there be no deal unless Iran gives up uranium enrichment for an extended period of years.

Others believe that Trump has made it clear that he will not enforce this position, and believe that Jerusalem must be more realistic, pushing for some least bad scenarios compared to worse ones.

For example, some Israeli defense officials would support a deal with Iran, given that Trump seems very committed to such a deal, which allowed a significant volume of centrifuges as long as the amount of enriched uranium was close to zero.

Alternatively, they could live with a small amount of enriched uranium at low levels if there were close to zero centrifuges.

The key would be that Iran would not be able to have significant amounts of centrifuges and enriched uranium at the same time, because one without the other makes a nuclear bomb impossible in the short and medium term.

They would also insist, the Post has learned, on much tougher nuclear inspections than under the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal, such as anytime, anywhere inspections, as well as a ban on nuclear metallurgy weapons group activities.

None of this would eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat, but it would push back the threat farther than the JCPOA did and farther than the current situation.

Most Israeli defense officials are currently scratching their heads about how to prevent Iran from manufacturing a large new volume of ballistic missiles, since this is not even on Trump’s radar, but they at least believe the 2025 and 2026 operations bought Israel some time on this issue.

This post was originally published on here. 

Within the span of a few days, we went from reports of a possible American strike on Iran to its cancellation, and once again it became clear just how much a single message from Washington can shake an entire country.

I watch the zigzag of world leaders reach Israelis at exactly the moment we are trying to carve out some room to breathe during summer vacation, sabotaging our last chance for a respite.

Against the backdrop of the security developments of recent days, from reports of a broad American strike on Iran to US President Donald Trump’s decision to call it off, the sense sharpened once again of how deeply uncertainty has become woven into Israeli reality.

Even before decisions are made or facts are confirmed, the public space is filled with reports, assessments, interpretations and open questions about possible security developments. For the Israeli public, even when there are still no answers, the waiting itself, the attempt to decode every hint, already becomes a psychological burden of its own.

It happened again this week. For days, the reports dealt with the possibility of a broad American strike on Iran and then came Trump’s decision to cancel it. Within a short time, the headlines, the assessments, and the scenarios shifted once more, and social media erupted.

At that very moment, on NATAL’s helplines and in its clinics, the phones started ringing. “I just can’t hear the word maybe anymore, I feel like I’m falling apart.” This sentence, spoken this week in a choked voice by a mother on NATAL’s helpline, distilled what is happening in the psyche of an entire nation.

Anxiety levels, already at the edge, spiked further. Words spoken thousands of kilometers away pierce straight into the psyche of the people here at home.

The current timing is not coincidental. We are in the middle of summer vacation. After long months of tension, thousands of Israeli parents are trying to do the most basic and human thing: to give their children, and themselves, a few days of quiet. 

To take a breath, to connect, to go to the beach or on a short getaway – not as a luxury but as therapy, and as a vital need for mental health. To get through a single day without calculating the route to the nearest protected space.

And then a headline like this arrives, pulling the rug out from under our feet and turning the simple aspiration to sanity into a nerve-fraying, existential dilemma: Should we travel? Should we stay? Should we go to the beach, or is it better to stay close to a shelter? And, in the end, will we not find ourselves facing closed skies, or a reality that ignites in our hands?

As clinicians, we see that the psyche’s greatest enemy right now is not only the physical threat, but the endless fog. Uncertainty has become a quiet terror that erodes everyone’s mental defenses. The human brain, body, and mind would rather receive bad news, but clear and final, than live inside an eternal maybe. 

When there are facts, we know how to organize ourselves. But when the forecast changes three times a day, the brain gets stuck in a constant state of alert. The pulse races, the muscles tense, and the result is chronic stress that breeds extreme fatigue, irritability, and painful regressions in the clinic. 

“Just when I managed to calm down,” patients tell us, “everything floats back up again.”

Living in a wounded reality

For leaders around the world, ambiguity is a geopolitical tool. They play chess. But when these words land on Israeli ears, they undergo a destructive transformation. The public here is too wounded and too exhausted to listen to them with the cool detachment of political commentators. 

For us, half a sentence on X/Twitter or a vague statement in a studio is instantly colored with the shades of mortal danger. 

The psychological energy we spend trying to figure out what he meant this time is immense, and it comes at the expense of what truly matters: our children’s peace of mind, and our own ability to simply live in the present.

In times of emergency, leaders are the public’s emotional regulators. Their role is to generate stability and trust. When the leader of the world’s most powerful nation changes his messages without a clear rationale, the sense of threat and isolation only grows.

The public encounters a wounded reality, and within it, as therapists, we, too, find it harder to hold on to those hidden threads of security. This endless cycle of anxiety wears down all our resilience.

Our mental health, and our children’s, does not exist in a sterile vacuum – it is bound by hidden yet heavy threads to leadership responsibility, both local and global.

After all, “home” is not only a physically protected space, but first and foremost the psychological experience that someone is holding reality steady, allowing us simply to be – without having to stand guard every single moment.

The time has come for the leaders of the great powers to understand that their words and statements are not measured only on political chessboards, or as part of a media strategy in the studio.

Their words do not stay overseas; they land in our living rooms, shatter the routine of summer vacation, and are etched directly into the body, cracking, again, all of our inner sense of home.

The writer is a clinical social worker and director of the clinical unit at NATAL.

This post was originally published on here. 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei issued decrees on Monday appointing six military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials to leadership positions, filling vacancies left by commanders killed in Israeli and US strikes during Operations Roaring Lion and Epic Fury.

Ali Abdollahi was appointed as chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, with Kioumars Heydari named as his deputy.

Abdollahi was commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters before taking his new position, which had been vacant since the assassination of Abdolrahim Mousavi during Operation Roaring Lion.

Abdollahi rises to the top of Iran’s military leadership

Sanctioned by the United States since 2020, Abdollahi has a long career in the IRGC that has placed him firmly in Khamenei’s inner circle. He was among the first to join the Islamic Republic’s military following the 1979 revolution and served as a commander during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, according to WANA.

Abdollahi has also held positions as deputy commander of the Law Enforcement Forces, acting commander of the Police Forces, deputy interior minister for Security and Law Enforcement Affairs, governor of Gilan and Semnan provinces, deputy chief of the General Staff for Support and Industrial Research, and deputy commander of the IRGC Air Force.

Heydari, Abdollahi’s deputy, is a commander in Iran’s regular military and has little experience in the IRGC, despite beginning his service as a volunteer member of the Basij paramilitary force. He was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and added to the EU sanctions registry in 2022, before being sanctioned by the United Kingdom in 2023 for his involvement in the violent suppression of protests in Iran in 2019 and 2022.

Ahmad Vahidi formally named head of IRGC

Ahmad Vahidi, whose growing influence has been widely reported on, was also named as head of the IRGC, with Mostafa Izadi named as his deputy.

Vahidi is known for his role in the planning of Hezbollah’s 1994 Buenos Aires bombing of the AMIA building. The majority of the 85 people killed in the attack and the 300 wounded were members of the Jewish community.

One of the few people understood to have direct contact with Khamenei, Vahidi has reportedly gained significant influence over Iran’s military and negotiating strategy.

“Vahidi and his inner circle have brought not only Iran’s military response but also the country’s negotiating strategy under their control,” the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War said.

Izadi, Vahidi’s deputy, has spent four decades in the military and the IRGC, serving as a commander during the Iran-Iraq War before commanding the IRGC ground forces. Before his recent promotion, Iranian media reported he commanded the Cyber and Emerging Threats Headquarters at the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

Khamenei names new IRGC Navy and Basij commanders

Ali Azmaei, who has been sanctioned by the US since 2019, was named as head of the IRGC Navy, replacing Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an airstrike in March.

Azmaei had commanded the IRGC Navy’s Fifth Naval Region since its formation in 2012 and previously served as deputy commander of the IRGC Navy’s First Naval Region. He was promoted to brigadier general by Khamenei’s father and predecessor, Ali Khamenei, in April 2022.

Notably, Vahidi and Azmaei had already been operating as respective IRGC and IRGC Navy heads, but without any official published appointment from the Supreme Leader’s Office.

Hossein Taeb was named commander of the IRGC’s Basij paramilitary forces. He has been sanctioned by the United States since 2010 for his involvement in violently suppressing protests in 2009.

His new mandate “calls for strengthening the Basij’s ‘public intelligence network,’ exploiting modern technologies, and expanding neighborhood organization” of the militia, Sina Toossi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, wrote on X/Twitter.

Khamenei appoints security council representative, political adviser

Mohsen Rezaee, who commanded the IRGC from 1981 until 1997, was appointed as Khamenei’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council. Rezaee, 71, is also wanted by Interpol over his involvement in the 1994 bombing in Argentina.

Additionally, Mohammed Bagher Zolghadr, who held several senior positions across the IRGC since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, including serving as deputy chief from 1997 until 2006, was appointed as Khamenei’s political adviser.

This post was originally published on here. 

Half of Afghan women now leave their homes only once or twice a month as Taliban-imposed restrictions curtail their freedom of movement and participation in public life, according to data released by UN Women on Wednesday.

As the Taliban prepare to mark the fifth anniversary of their return to power this week, Afghanistan remains the only country in the world to ban girls from secondary education and women from attending university, stated the UN agency, which promotes gender equality.

“Half a decade after the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan has systematically dismantled the rights of half its population, making it a global outlier with no parallel in the modern world,” UN Women said in a statement.

The Taliban-run Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which enforces many of the government’s rules on women, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The government’s chief spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, also did not immediately respond.

The Taliban have barred an estimated 2.4 million Afghan girls from secondary education since they regained power in Afghanistan in 2021, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization said on Tuesday.

UN Women said the Taliban authorities have issued more than 100 decrees targeting women and girls since taking power, institutionalizing discrimination and deepening what it described as the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis.

Taliban claim to respect women’s rights per Islamic law

The Taliban argue they respect women’s rights in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic law and Afghan culture.

More than half of women surveyed by the UN agency reported leaving home twice a month or less, while nearly three-quarters said they felt unsafe going out without a male guardian, known as a mahram.

The restrictions have also fueled a worsening mental health crisis, according to the UN agency. Seven in 10 women described their mental health as “bad” or “very bad,” citing isolation, loss of opportunities and limited access to support networks.

Afghan lawmakers continue to reduce women’s rights, legal protections

The agency warned that recent decrees had further weakened women’s legal protections. Measures introduced this year abolished legal equality between men and women before the law, strengthened men’s authority within marriage and made it more difficult for women to seek divorce, it said.

Women also remain largely excluded from the economy. Only 7% of women are employed compared with 84% of men, according to the UN Women report.

The agency said its report was based on a door-to-door survey of 2,190 people in February to March 2025 and telephone surveys of 2,811 people conducted in April to May 2026.

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The 15-point Gaza Board of Peace plan grants Hamas’s military wing $160 million in cash, Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman claimed in an X/Twitter post on Wednesday.

The claim followed a KAN report on Tuesday, which noted vague wording in the agreement saying that up to $400 million would be transferred to Gaza “suppliers and contract holders.”

According to Liberman, Hamas has an existing agreement with those same suppliers that $160 million of the total be transferred directly to the terror group’s military wing in cash.

היום ביקרתי בעוטף עזה, בכרם שלום, בבסיס האמריקאי החדש הנבנה סמוך למעבר, שאמור לקלוט את הכוח הבינלאומי שצפוי להתפרס ברצועה ולעזור לחמאס להשתקם מחדש, ובבארי שם נפגשתי עם רבש”צים.

מה שראיתי ושמעתי מדאיג מאוד, ואני רוצה לשתף את חברי הקבינט המדיני ביטחוני בכמה פרטים שראש הממשלה… pic.twitter.com/o3hGacVGzs

— אביגדור ליברמן (@AvigdorLiberman) August 12, 2026

Liberman says he reached these conclusions during a visit on Wednesday to the Gaza Envelope, including the Kerem Shalom Crossing and the still-under-construction US base. He described what he witnessed as “deeply alarming.”

He further claimed that “not a single (IDF) soldier remains” in the area between the Purple Line and Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip.

IDF ordered not to strike Hamas training exercise practicing invasion of Jewish settlements

Regarding IDF action in Gaza, Liberman described the military as being significantly hindered by both the United States and Israel’s political echelon.

“When the CENTCOM (US Central Command) commander visits the American base in the south, it means that Netanyahu has given up the ability to make security decisions independently, and even to move a patrol, American approval is required,” Liberman said.

He noted a recent incident he was alerted to during his trip, in which IDF commanders came across a group of 50 Hamas Nuhkba terrorists who were conducting a training exercise in which they practiced raiding a Jewish settlement.

“IDF commanders in the field requested to act immediately for a targeted neutralization of all the terrorists, but the directive from the political echelon was: ‘You don’t touch anyone, not even fire a single warning shot,'” he said.

“This is a capitulation to terror, and a return to the policy of containment and the conception that led to October 7.”

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The IDF conducted strikes in southern Lebanon on Wednesday, according to Israeli media outlets citing Lebanese reports.

The military later separately confirmed it had struck Mansouri, a municipality in Tyre, Army Radio reported.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) issued a statement claiming that the IDF was continuing its “assaults and violations of existing agreements and international laws” in Nabatieh, a city about 50 km northeast of Tyre. The statement made no mention of strikes in Tyre.

The LAF further claimed that Israeli forces had bombed a municipal building in Nabatieh, as well as a public school, a healthcare center, a daycare, and several private homes. 

These actions consistently hinder the LAF’s ability to operate in the pilot zones and work to return south Lebanese residents to their homes, the statement added. 

On July 20, 2026, Israel, the United States, and the Lebanese Army launched a security pilot program in southern Lebanon.

As part of the initiative, the IDF began withdrawing from and transferring security responsibility and deployment to the Lebanese Army in three villages: Bir al-Sana, Sarifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah. The LAF, in turn, is expected to clear the areas of Hezbollah operatives and weapons.

Lebanese Army is not doing enough to disarm Hezbollah in pilot area, sources tell ‘Post’

Notably, Israeli officials on Tuesday told The Jerusalem Post that even though roughly three weeks have passed since the pilot program to disarm Hezbollah began, the Lebanese Army is “not doing enough” on the ground.

In addition, the Alma Research and Education Center recently reported that Hezbollah’s civilian arm has continued to operate in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh throughout the pilot program.  

Aoun: Israel-Lebanon talks progressing, Israel won’t remain in Lebanon

The latest strikes come as diplomatic efforts between Israel and Lebanon continue, underscoring the challenges facing the two sides.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said negotiations with Israel were progressing while reaffirming that Lebanon would not accept a continued Israeli presence on any part of its territory, according to a statement posted to X/Twitter on Tuesday.

Aoun also said the framework agreement had helped curb the scale of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, which he said had encouraged more Lebanese to return to the country for the summer.
 
However, the president stressed that securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the return of Lebanese prisoners remained priorities in the negotiations.

Amichai Stein, Danielle Greyman-Kennard, and Jerusalem Post Staff contributed to this report.

This post was originally published on here. 

Increasingly dragged into a war it did not choose, Saudi Arabia is building regional defensive alliances that it hopes will keep its enemies at bay and help it respond more robustly to attacks by Iran and its network of regional allies.

But nascent attempts to construct a multinational maritime coalition in the Red Sea, and the decision to bring Turkey into a defense pact with the kingdom and Pakistan, have so far failed to ward off attacks, analysts and diplomats said.

The kingdom’s own military responses to attacks from Iran, Iraq and from Yemen’s Houthis, who last month opened a southern front against the kingdom and have attacked Saudi shipping, have so far been limited.

Riyadh faces a dilemma: how to deter attacks and protect the ambitious economic vision it is pursuing without becoming entangled in a broader conflict in the region sparked by the war between the US and Iran.

As one Middle Eastern official put it, “Saudi Arabia’s problem is that the kingdom’s enemies know it wants to avoid war. They are abusing that.”

The Saudi government media office did not respond to a request for comment for this story.

“This is all very concerning and is exactly what Saudi Arabia wanted to avoid,” said Aziz al-Ghashian, a Saudi analyst and senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum.

“Iran and its affiliates think Saudi won’t respond. They understood restraint as basically an acceptance of being targeted and this is why it was very important for Saudi to find a way to deter them. The trick is how to balance it,” he said.

After the defense pact was signed, the Houthis again attacked oil installations in the kingdom.

‘The final stages of de-escalatory and deterrence policies’

Since the US and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28, Saudi Arabia has tried to absorb attacks, choosing to first pursue a purely diplomatic path before beginning limited military responses that were kept secret.

It reached a tentative calm with Iran around the time an April ceasefire with the US went into effect and emerged as a safer haven in the Gulf.

The past few weeks have jeopardized much of that.

The kingdom has faced damaging attacks on critical oil infrastructure from Yemen and Iraq, as well as on its shipping via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.

Two weeks ago, Saudi Arabia and the US launched joint airstrikes targeting Iraqi militias they said were involved in the attacks on the kingdom. It was the first retaliation announced by the kingdom during the war, and came despite the Saudis having sought to avoid being seen as a co-belligerent with the US and Israel.

Two days later, Riyadh announced its intention to lead a maritime defense coalition in the Red Sea.

Last week, it announced the joint defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan in Mecca.

“This is Saudi Arabia’s way to signal to Iran that we are willing to go further up the ladder, of course [first that] of diplomacy before crossing the line of diplomacy to the other side,” said Yasmine Farouk, project director for the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula at Crisis Group.

“The way I see this pact and coalition is [Saudi] incrementally reaching the final stages of de-escalatory and deterrence policies,” she said, while still noting the coalitions were “trial balloons” and joint military action was currently unlikely.

Mecca defense agreement: Moving away from reliance on outside powers

Announced at Islam’s holiest site and after Friday prayers, the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan defense agreement carries the symbolic weight of Muslim nations pledging to defend each other as if they were one “Ummah,” or Muslim nation, according to Sultan Alamer, a non-resident scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program.

But in practice, the roles appear less clear.

On Saturday, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the pact was technically the same as NATO’s Article 5 and would require consultations between all parties to determine what sort of support to provide any attacked country, if they ask for any.

Islamabad under its pre-existing defense pact with Saudi Arabia had sought to avoid becoming engaged militarily with Iran or its allies and managed to do so despite Saudi Arabia facing hundreds of missile and drone attacks.

Iran has framed the agreement as a step away from reliance on outside powers, apparently a reference to the United States, and said it saw no reason to be concerned, “so long as it correctly identifies the enemy and the threat.”

Yemen’s Houthis: Saudi Arabia’s latest headache

On Saudi Arabia’s southern border, Yemen’s Houthis last month ended a four-year truce, declaring a naval blockade on the kingdom and firing on its oil infrastructure.

The Houthi attacks have shown the kingdom’s continued vulnerability to asymmetric warfare and revived memories of the 2019 crisis when Saudi oil production halved after Houthi drone and missile attacks that were planned by Iran, according to Reuters reporting.

Yemen is a particular sore spot for the kingdom, which led a military intervention in 2015 after the Iran-backed Houthis stormed the capital Sanaa, resulting in an international outcry over the high toll from war and famine.

With Yemen once again edging towards war, Riyadh this time wants the Yemeni government to lead any offensive that takes place, and had said a multi-national maritime coalition was needed to defend Red Sea shipping.

Invitations were sent out just a few days before the first meeting, several people who attended said, showing the urgency with which Saudi was approaching the mission.

So far, 14 regional countries have signed on, with more expected to join. Western diplomats say European nations are still deliberating whether to join, concerned about how far they would potentially become involved in a war in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia wants to announce its official formation as soon as possible, with meetings planned this week in Jeddah.

This post was originally published on here. 

The Middle East, North Africa, and South Africa form a region of extremes: giant oilfields and gas hubs, world-leading phosphate mines and platinum deposits, some of the planet’s driest landscapes, and coastlines rich in fish.

When people talk about natural resources in the Middle East and North Africa, they usually mean one thing: oil. It’s true that this region pumps out roughly 30% of the world’s oil and close to a fifth of its natural gas, thanks largely to Gulf producers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar. But the real picture is much more complicated and, in many ways, more surprising.

Across the region, some countries sit on world-class mineral deposits, others have enviable coastlines teeming with fish, and many struggle with a far more basic resource problem: not enough water or fertile land.

How those pieces fit together helps explain why some economies boom on exports, while others worry about food and water first, and revenue second.

Oil and gas shape the Gulf

The six Gulf Cooperation Council states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, collectively hold some of the largest and cheapest-to-produce oil and gas reserves on the planet.

Saudi Arabia alone has an estimated 267 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, Kuwait has more than 100 billion, and the UAE has close to 100 billion. At current production rates, those reserves are expected to last many decades.

This abundance has clear economic effects. Gulf governments fund a large share of their budgets from oil and gas revenues.

Those earnings pay for everything from public-sector salaries to infrastructure, schools, and generous social benefits. When oil prices rise, Gulf fiscal surpluses swell; when prices fall, budgets tighten, and diversification talk returns to the table.

But even within the Gulf, there are contrasts. Bahrain has very modest oil reserves compared with its neighbors and produces only a small fraction of the barrels Saudi Arabia does.

Oman has less oil than the big Gulf exporters, but more gas and minerals, and it has invested in logistics and industry.

The smaller resource base has pushed both countries to lean harder into non-oil sectors such as finance, logistics, and tourism.

Outside the Gulf, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt are the heavyweights of North African oil and gas. Algeria is Africa’s largest natural gas producer and a major exporter to Europe; Libya’s oil reserves are among the biggest in Africa; Egypt has turned newly discovered offshore gas fields into a growing export business.

In all three, hydrocarbons have shaped politics, foreign policy, and economic fortunes, and created vulnerability to price swings and domestic unrest affecting output.

Israel, in contrast, illustrates a different kind of energy story. It barely produces any oil, but recent offshore gas discoveries, such as the Tamar and Leviathan fields, have transformed it from a gas importer into a regional supplier.

Israeli gas now helps power its own economy and is exported via pipelines and liquefied natural gas deals that link it to neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan. For a small country without major oil, that shift reduces energy dependence and creates a new export stream.

Water and land scarcity pose a growing challenge

If oil is the headline resource, water is the quiet crisis. The Middle East and North Africa region has about 6% of the world’s population but less than 2% of its renewable water supply. It is the world’s driest region, with 12 of the world’s most water-scarce countries, including Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

On average, people in the region have just over 1,100 cubic meters of renewable water per person per year, compared with a global average of roughly 7,000 to 8,500 cubic meters. That figure is projected to drop further as populations grow and demand rises.

In Jordan, per capita renewable water availability is only about 60 cubic meters per year, far below the 500 cubic meters threshold often used to define absolute water scarcity.

This scarcity has direct economic consequences. Agriculture, which in many countries uses more than 80% of available water, becomes harder to sustain. In places like Morocco, Syria, and Yemen, farming consumes nearly all accessible water resources. Governments respond by investing heavily in dams, desalination plants, and water-saving technologies, and by importing more food.

The contrast is clear when comparing resource maps. Saudi Arabia may look rich in oil, but it has very little arable land and almost no renewable freshwater. Jordan depends on a handful of overdrawn aquifers and the shrinking Jordan River. Israel, too, is water-stressed, but it has invested in large desalination plants and advanced irrigation, turning water scarcity into a driver of technology and policy innovation.

North Africa has more surface water than the Gulf, especially in the Nile and some river systems in Morocco and Algeria, but large stretches of land are still arid or semi-arid. The region is overwhelmingly desert, about 84% of its land, which limits how much cropland can expand.

Between 2003 and 2018, cropland in the wider Middle East and North Africa shrank by 2.4% while the population grew by about 35%, increasing pressure on land and water. The population is forecast to increase by an additional 40% by 2050, according to the World Bank.

Minerals provide a less visible source of wealth

Oil and gas may dominate headlines, but minerals quietly underpin both local economies and global supply chains.

Morocco is a striking example. Beneath its soil lie roughly 50 billion metric tons of phosphate rock, about 70% of the world’s known reserves. Phosphate is an essential fertilizer ingredient, which means Morocco’s deposits are indirectly tied to global food production.

A state-owned company, OCP Group, has turned this resource into a massive export industry, making Morocco a key player in global fertilizer markets and a magnet for investment in chemical processing.

South Africa, which sits just beyond the traditional Middle East and North Africa boundary, is another mineral superpower. Its Bushveld Complex holds about 75% of the world’s platinum-group metals, key ingredients for catalytic converters, hydrogen fuel cells, and various high-tech applications.

US Geological Survey data indicate that South Africa accounts for the majority of global platinum-group metal reserves and a large share of annual production. It also has enormous manganese resources, primarily a steel-making metal, with estimates suggesting roughly 70% of the world’s manganese resources are located there.

These minerals give South Africa an outsized role in global mining and metal markets, even though it doesn’t have the oil wealth of Gulf states. Mining contributes significantly to South Africa’s GDP and export earnings, shaping its foreign trade and industrial base.

Elsewhere in North Africa and the wider Middle East, mineral resources are more modest but still important. Algeria and Tunisia have various metal and nonmetal deposits, though not on South Africa’s scale.

Jordan, for instance, has phosphates and potash that feed into fertilizer exports and the chemical industry more than they do into raw material exports alone.

Fisheries turn coastlines into an overlooked resource

The Middle East and North Africa may look like a stretch of desert on a map, but along its coasts the sea tells a different story. In several places, the waters teem with fish, turning long shorelines into a valuable, if often overlooked, natural resource.

Morocco, with its long Atlantic and Mediterranean coastline, has built a sizable fishing industry. Recent analyses by the Food and Agriculture Organization and academic sources show that Morocco produces around 1.4 million tons of seafood annually and ranks as Africa’s top fish producer and leading fish exporter by value.

Sardines alone make up well over half of the capture production. This steady flow of fish supports tens of thousands of jobs, from fishing crews to processing plants, and earns foreign currency, diversifying Morocco’s export base beyond phosphates and agriculture.

Other North African states, including Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia, also benefit from fisheries, though not on Morocco’s scale. Egypt’s Nile-based aquaculture and Mediterranean fisheries contribute to domestic food supplies and rural employment, even as the country struggles with water scarcity and pollution.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, fisheries are smaller and more pressured. Coastal countries such as Lebanon and Syria have access to maritime resources, but overfishing, pollution and, in Syria’s case, war have limited their potential. Here, fisheries play more of a role in local food and livelihoods than as a major export engine.

Natural resource wealth does not guarantee prosperity

One of the most surprising lessons from looking at this resource map is that abundance does not automatically translate into broad-based prosperity, and scarcity does not doom a country to poverty.

Resource-rich economies such as Libya and Algeria show how political instability, conflict, or governance problems can blunt the benefits of oil and gas wealth. Production disruptions, uneven revenue distribution, and weak institutions can leave citizens feeling little of the theoretical riches beneath their feet.

On the flip side, countries with fewer traditional resources have learned to specialize. Israel and Jordan, both short on oil and water, have invested in technology sectors, services and, in Israel’s case, high-tech agriculture and desalination.

Gulf states with oil wealth but limited land have poured money into transport hubs, tourism, finance, and renewable energy projects to prepare for a future in which fossil fuels may play a smaller role.

Across the whole region, water and land constraints force hard choices. Governments decide how much scarce water to allocate to farmers versus cities, how much food to produce domestically versus import, and how to manage environmental risks such as salinization and land degradation.

Those decisions, more than the size of an oilfield or mineral deposit, shape the daily lives of most citizens.

A region defined by abundance and scarcity

Put together, the Middle East, North Africa, and South Africa form a region of extremes: giant oilfields and gas hubs, world-leading phosphate mines and platinum deposits, some of the planet’s driest landscapes, and coastlines rich in fish. The mix of abundance and scarcity is what makes the region’s resource picture so striking.

Oil and gas revenues in the Gulf and North Africa power budgets and exports. Phosphates in Morocco and minerals in South Africa tie the region into global food and clean-energy supply chains. Water and arable land shortages constrain agriculture and push countries to innovate or import. Fisheries provide jobs and food where geography is favorable.

The map of natural resources under and around these countries is not just a backdrop. It’s one of the main reasons their economies look the way they do, and why their futures will be shaped as much by invisible aquifers and mineral seams as by the oil wells that have long dominated the headlines.

This post was originally published on here. 

Blue Bird Airways will significantly expand its Israel-Italy operations in September, offering direct flights from Tel Aviv to four Italian destinations, the airline announced.

The Greek carrier will add Rome, Bologna and Naples to its schedule, alongside its existing service to Bergamo, near Milan, which has been operating since May 2026.

The expansion will make Italy one of Blue Bird Airways’ main markets from Ben-Gurion Airport, with some routes operating daily and others several times a week.

New routes connect Tel Aviv with Rome, Bologna and Naples

Flights to Rome are scheduled to begin on September 3 with three weekly services. From September 13, the route is expected to operate daily.

Flights to Bologna will begin on September 2 and operate three times a week, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.

Service to Naples is scheduled to launch on September 16 with two weekly flights, on Wednesdays and Fridays. From September 25, a Monday flight will be added, bringing the route to three weekly services.

Blue Bird’s existing Bergamo route will continue operating daily, giving passengers access to Milan and northern Italy.

Blue Bird and TUS Airways to operate Italy flights

The flights will be operated by Blue Bird Airways and TUS Airways. Both airlines are owned by Kavei Hufsha, also known in English as Holiday Lines, which is owned by Arnon Englender and Ami Cohen.

Tickets are available through the airlines’ websites, travel agents, and flight-search platforms in Israel and abroad.

“Italy continues to be one of the most popular vacation destinations for Israelis, as reflected in both demand and Ben-Gurion Airport statistics showing a rise in passenger traffic to the country,” Englender said.

He said operating flights to four Italian destinations would give travelers more options for reaching different parts of the country.

“Expanding our operations to four destinations allows us to offer a broader response to travelers, whether they are planning a vacation in northern, central or southern Italy,” Englender said.

He also pointed to the timing of the new routes ahead of the autumn travel season and the Jewish High Holidays.

“Autumn is one of the best times to travel in Italy, featuring pleasant weather, fewer crowds, and coinciding with the Jewish High Holidays, allowing for longer and more flexible trips,” he said.

The company said round-trip fares would start at €270.

“We believe the combination of diverse destinations, high frequencies and competitive round-trip prices starting from €270 will drive continued growth in passenger traffic between the countries,” Englender said.

This post was originally published on here. 

There were no discussions between Iran and the United States to extend their ceasefire because, from Tehran’s perspective, the deal had no start date and therefore had nothing to extend, a senior Iranian source told Reuters on Wednesday.

The source’s comments came after Turkey’s Anadolu news agency, citing Pakistani government sources, reported on Wednesday that Tehran and Washington had agreed to extend a 60-day ceasefire under their interim deal signed in June.

The deal declared an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts”, but quickly unraveled, with US President Donald Trump saying it was “over” on July 7 and Iran’s foreign ministry declaring it “suspended” a week later.

“There is no talk of an extension because, from Iran’s perspective, there is no period that began and therefore nothing to extend. The United States violated the interim agreement 48 hours after it was reached and withdrew from it a few days later,” the source told Reuters.

In the agreement, the 60-day period refers to an extendable timeframe within which Iran and the US were expected to reach a final deal limiting Tehran’s nuclear program and lifting US sanctions.

Iran issues its requirements before returning to the negotiation table

A series of requirements, such as a ceasefire in Lebanon, free navigation in the Gulf, and waivers for Iran to sell its oil, were viewed as necessary before entering the further negotiation period.

“One of the issues that is being discussed via mediators is the US returning to the interim agreement and defining a timeframe for implementing the commitments. There has been absolutely no progress on this issue,” the source added.

This post was originally published on here. 

Hamas may potentially receive up to $400 million in debt relief under the 15-point Gaza Board of Peace (BoP) plan, KAN News reported on Tuesday.

The report is based on Article 5 of the agreement, which KAN described as containing vague wording that says the money will be transferred to “suppliers and contract holders,” without specifically stipulating that such recipients cannot be related to the terrorist organization. 

The BoP confirmed the language of the agreement, according to KAN, but insisted that the funds “will not cover corruption, financial mismanagement, or anything related to the organization’s terrorist record.”

A BoP source further told KAN that the funds would only be transferred to public employees “who have not received payment (from Hamas), or to suppliers and contractors who provided services to the population and are still entitled to the money.”

BoP Director-General disputes claims of funding for Hamas

On Wednesday, BoP Director-General Nikolay Mladenov disputed the KAN report, saying on X/Twitter that “such a proposal has not been discussed, negotiated, considered, and will not be on the agenda in the future.”

הטענות בדבר הסכם כספי בין BoardofPeace@ לבין חמאס הן שקריות. הצעה כזו לא נדונה, לא נוהל עליה משא ומתן, לא נשקלה, ולא תהיה על הפרק גם בעתיד.

בימים האחרונים החל לפעול מנגנון לניטור הפרות. כל הפרה שתואמת תטופל.

מועצת השלום הוקמה במסגרת תכנית הנשיא טראמפ לעזה ובהתאם להחלטת מועצת…

— Nickolay E. MLADENOV (@nmladenov) August 12, 2026

“Hamas will have no role in the Gaza administration and will have no access to funds,” Mladenov wrote.

“The Peace Council’s funds are not channeled through Hamas. Every contract is vetted and approved, every work is verified before payment, and all accounts are open to full scrutiny by the donor governments.”

“The International Stabilization Force is designed to support disarmament and the establishment of a civilian government in which Hamas has no part,” he added. “This has been our position from the beginning and has not changed.”

Mladenov concluded by noting that the issues facing Gaza are challenging enough as it is, saying, “there is no need to invent more.”

This post was originally published on here. 

A woman and her partner were indicted on Wednesday in an exceptionally severe child sexual abuse case involving her two daughters and two infant relatives, the State Attorney’s Office announced. 

The woman, 33, and the man, 43, both from central Israel, are accused of numerous sexual offenses against the four children. The woman’s daughters were between eight and 12-years-old at the time of the alleged offenses, while the other two children were between approximately one and three.

The Central District Attorney’s Office filed the indictment with the Central District Court in Lod and asked that both defendants remain in custody throughout the proceedings.

Woman, partner, exchanged child sexual abuse material 

According to the indictment, the defendants met through a dating application about a year and a half ago and began an intimate relationship. Prosecutors alleged that they exchanged child sexual abuse material and discussed sexual fantasies involving the woman’s daughters.

The indictment alleges that the woman, either at her own initiative or at the man’s request, repeatedly photographed, filmed and recorded her daughters in intimate situations, including while partially dressed or naked, and sent the material to him.

Prosecutors said the man praised the material, used it for sexual gratification and encouraged the woman to continue producing it.

The indictment further alleges that, during two meetings at the woman’s home, the defendants engaged in sexual activity while one or both daughters were asleep in the room. On another occasion, prosecutors said, the man committed indecent acts against the girls while visiting the woman and her daughters during a vacation.

The most serious allegations concern two very young members of the woman’s family. Prosecutors allege that the woman sexually assaulted both children, filmed the acts at the man’s request and sent him the recordings immediately afterward.

The indictment portrays the abuse as part of an effort by the woman to satisfy the man’s sexual demands and preserve their relationship. Prosecutors stressed that this remains their allegation and has not yet been tested in court.

Defendants accused of attempting to conceal evidence

The defendants are also accused of attempting to conceal evidence. Shortly after she was questioned, the woman allegedly deleted their correspondence from her cellphone with the intention of obstructing the investigation. Investigators later recovered the messages, according to the indictment.

Prosecutors said the defendants had also routinely deleted parts of their correspondence and that the man repeatedly urged the woman to erase the photographs and videos documenting the alleged abuse.

The charges include rape of a minor family member, soliciting the rape of a minor family member, committing indecent acts against children, using children to produce sexual abuse material, publishing and possessing such material, and obstructing justice. Each defendant was charged according to their alleged role.

In its request to keep the pair in custody, the prosecution said the alleged offenses were systematic and prolonged and involved extremely young and vulnerable children. The nature of the acts demonstrated that both defendants posed a serious danger to the public, prosecutors argued.

This post was originally published on here. 

Hamas has intensified interrogations and torture against Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip since the ceasefire came into effect in October 2025, IDF Arabic Spokesperson Lt.-Col. Ella Waweya said on Wednesday.

The IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) say that Hamas has ramped up efforts to bolster its authority over residents throughout the Gaza Strip.

“The torture operations and harsh investigations carried out by the terrorist organization Hamas against civilians from all segments of society do not spare minors or women, and are conducted using public facilities,” Waweya wrote in a post on X/Twitter.

#عاجل وخطير ⚠️
أهالي قطاع غزة، انتبهوا
🔴 منذ دخول وقف إطلاق النار حيّز التنفيذ في أكتوبر 2025، يرصد جيش الدفاع الإسرائيلي والشاباك أن حركة حماس الإرهابية كثّفت تنفيذ التحقيقات وعمليات التعذيب بحقكم

⭕️ بعد دخول وقف إطلاق النار حيّز التنفيذ في شهر أكتوبر 2025، يرصد جيش الدفاع… pic.twitter.com/IKrlWCmfNy

— Lieutenant Colonel Ella Waweya | إيلا واوية (@CaptainElla1) August 12, 2026

“The terrorist organization Hamas pursues a rejected strategy that involves exploiting civilian buildings, including schools, hospitals, mosques, and government institutions for military purposes,” the post continued.

Arbitrary detentions, physical violence, psychological harm recorded under Hamas rule

She further stated that these facilities are host to arbitrary detentions and torture operations against ordinary residents who are summoned for questioning, and not just against political opponents of Hamas.

Hamas employs physical violence, blackmail, psychological threats and harm, prolonged isolation, and a range of other forms of mistreatment, the IDF said.

“The terrorist movement that led the Gaza Strip into destruction and ruin persists in spreading destruction and inflicting harm on you, the residents,” Waweya concluded.

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Iran’s last weapon

Iran has delivered a sweeping set of demands that the United States must meet before the Strait of Hormuz can be reopened to maritime traffic. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been fighting a war with the Great Satan, America, and the Little Satan, Israel, for 46 years.

Iran’s most powerful strategy has been to use proxies and drones. The proxies are on life support, but not their drones. They are able to keep the Gulf destabilized with these drones and also hit American bases, despite the fact that the US and Israel have neutralized more than 90% of those missiles.

Bombing bridges and power plants is not the answer. It will only hurt the Persian people who are crying out for freedom.

Why isn’t Iran attacking Israel?

To understand what is happening, one must ask a simple question: Why is Iran not attacking Israel?

The answer is that Israel fought one of the first true drone wars involving a great power. But what Israel did that was most effective was target Iranian leadership, such as Razi Mousavi, senior IRGC general and overseer of Syrian-Iran military coordination; Mohammad Reza Zahedi, IRGC Quds Force commander for Lebanon and Syria; Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader; Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council; Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij internal security forces; Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the IRGC Navy; and dozens, if not hundreds, of other Iranian leaders.

Iran is not attacking Israel because Israel targeted the top leadership of Iran, primarily through drone warfare. Cutting off the head of the snake is the key to keeping those snakes from procreating.

Trump has broken Iran’s war machine

What Donald Trump has achieved in the Iran war is astonishing, despite the liberal, godless media attacking him and claiming he has failed. Iran’s nuclear backbone has been broken, and its war machine is in shambles.

The next phase of the war does not have to be a major military operation. Quite the contrary, the US has the largest inventory of advanced drones in the world, but needs to manufacture 10 times that amount.

Iran’s only power left is its drones. They are trying to smuggle more of those fiber-optic drones to Hezbollah through Syria and Iraq and hit US bases in Iran, Kuwait, and Jordan.

The new battlefield: Drones and cyberwarfare

During Operation Roaring Lion-Epic Fury, Israel simultaneously executed the largest cyberattack in history, knocking Iran’s Internet down to roughly 4 percent of normal capacity and creating a nationwide digital fog that disrupted government services, media, energy, and infrastructure. All of this was coordinated to precede and support the kinetic strikes, including hacking state TV and jamming GPS.

The US needs to adopt the same long-term strategy with Iran. Iran will continue using its drones because there are too many of them, they are too well hidden, and they are too inexpensive. The FPV drones cost as little as $300 and are 3D-printed by Hezbollah. They have become the single deadliest weapon against Israeli troops in Lebanon.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has launched a drone dominance program, calling for over 300,000 small, one-way strike drones to be fielded across the services by 2028. The Army has announced plans to get up to 1 million drones.

The Strait of Hormuz cannot be ignored

The Strait of Hormuz, a 21-mile waterway, cannot be protected sufficiently with air and naval power alone because of Iranian drones.

Iran’s Shahed-136 drone is about the size of a king-size mattress. That drone has a range of 500 miles and costs between $20,000 and $35,000 to produce. Iran has thousands of them.

Iran is a very big country, one and a half times the size of California. Those drones can be anywhere. They can be underground, they can be in crevices, and they can be hidden in the mountains.

Defeat the drones by hunting the snake

The question is: How do you defeat Iran’s drones?

You defeat them with our own drones, but you do it the same way the Israelis have done it. It’s not a big military operation. It’s a smaller operation targeting Iranian leadership.

You can be sure of one thing: It will be successful. Israel has already proven it. That’s why Iran is not striking Israel.

Iranian leadership cannot and will not continue down its apocalyptic path if it realizes it is going to cost them their lives.

They brag about wanting 72 virgins, but the US can give them 72 Virginians: American young warriors with the backbone of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Abraham Lincoln, using the most advanced AI-driven technology to target these devils.

Forcing them to feel the heat until they see the light is going to take patience and time. But ultimately, the Islamic Nazi regime can be defeated. And when it is, the Persian people will rise up like lions to take back their country.

The writer has written 120 books, is a #1 New York Times bestselling author, and Nobel Peace Prize nominee. He is the founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, the Ten Boom Museum in Holland, and Churches United with Israel, one of the largest Christian Zionist networks in America.

This post was originally published on here. 

The Anti-Defamation League has released two new reports on Wednesday that claim that antisemitism on US college and university campuses has increasingly moved beyond public protests and encampments to take root directly inside classrooms, curricula, and faculty networks.

The ADL announced in conjunction with the reports the launch of a new Campus Classroom Reporting (CCR) mechanism, a confidential channel designed for students, staff, and faculty to report and seek support regarding classroom-based bias. 

The report titled Antisemitism Among Faculty and in the Classroom: Trends, Patterns and Institutional Dynamics claimed to have identified recurring patterns such as pro-terrorism narratives introduced into coursework, extra credit offered for attending anti-Israel rallies, and faculty singling out Jewish and Israeli students in class. 

The second report, The Faculty Factor: Inside the Networks Driving Anti-Israel and Anti-Zionist Activism on Campus, mapped how organized faculty networks have deepened ties with student activist groups since the 2024 encampment wave and shielded them from accountability. 

The ADL’s reports are drawn from tracking data, institutional analysis, and surveys of the campus climate. While public attention has largely focused on visible student demonstrations, the new research aims to address what it claims happens behind closed classroom doors, areas traditionally hidden from outside scrutiny. 

The report stated that the ADL tracked 1,694 antisemitic incidents on US campuses in 2024 and 583 in 2025. Although overall year-over-year public incidents declined, the research claimed that faculty conduct and instructional framing continue to foster a sustained, hostile environment for Jewish and Israeli students. 

The report identified several recurring patterns in which it claims education is blurred with political advocacy, creating environments that can marginalize or intimidate Jewish and Israeli students. Among the examples highlighted by the report, it is claimed that coursework allegedly incorporated readings from leaders of designated terrorist organizations, such as Ghassan Kanafani and Leila Khaled of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

University of California, Irvine professor: Oct. 7 a ‘gift from Allah to the world’

It noted a November 2023 remark attributed to a University of California, Irvine professor describing the October 7 Hamas attacks as a “gift from Allah to the world” and a “golden opportunity.” Similarly, it pointed to a Cornell University professor who allegedly stated publicly in October 2023 that he was “exhilarated” by the attack. 

The report detailed additional claims that Israeli and Jewish students were personally targeted or held accountable for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and prior Israeli military service. According to the report, these classroom dynamics often single out Jewish and Israeli students by treating them as representatives or extensions of the Israeli government. 

The publication highlighted instances where an Israeli student at Columbia University who had served in a combat role was allegedly referred to by a professor as “one of the murderers.” It also claimed another student was told, “It’s such a shame that your people survived in order to commit mass genocide.” 

Furthermore, the report claimed that course descriptions and syllabi at prominent institutions, including Stanford, Princeton, Northwestern, and UC Berkeley, frequently present contested political claims about Israel and Zionism as settled historical fact. For example, it cited a Princeton course on Gender, Reproduction and Genocide that featured reading lists focusing on what the course described as “Israel’s genocidal project,” alongside a Northwestern national cinema course description framing the conflict as an “ongoing genocide.”

The ADL report also shed light on how academic incentives and subtle pressures to conform affect campus life, noting that students can feel deeply alienated or pressured when political engagement is tied to coursework. The publication recorded instances where it claimed students were offered extra credit for attending anti-Israel walkouts and rallies, or where classes were canceled entirely in favor of protest participation.

According to the findings, these structural pressures and biased classroom dynamics can create an intimidating atmosphere for Jewish and pro-Israel students. For students whose Zionism or connection to Israel is a core component of their identity, such environments risk making them feel that their beliefs are unwelcome, forcing many to self-censor or hide their backgrounds to avoid academic penalties or social ostracism.

The report The Faculty Factor: Inside the Networks Driving Anti-Israel and Anti-Zionist Activism on Campus examined how organized faculty networks and unions operate across institutions to shape campus climate and policy. According to the findings, groups such as Faculty and Staff for Justice in Palestine (FSJP), which spans over 130 university chapters, allegedly leverage their institutional authority, tenure protections, and access to administrative channels to provide crucial backing for student activist groups, including Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapters.  

Report highlights professors’ explicit recognition of titles’ strategic weight

The report highlighted how professors explicitly recognize the strategic weight of their titles, quoting University of Illinois Associate Professor Maryam Kashani, who noted regarding faculty presence in activism, “I think there’s a certain legitimacy that comes with the letters before our names.”

The report claimed these networks helped coordinate faculty participation during the 2024 campus encampments, with professors at institutions like New York University and Columbia University forming physical barriers to impede law enforcement, and professors at Northwestern University locking arms to block university police. It further noted instances of faculty canceling classes in solidarity or holding classes and office hours directly inside protest encampment zones, such as at Columbia University, where Jewish students noted that Zionists were explicitly unwelcome. 

The publication detailed how professional associations and faculty unions, including the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the California Faculty Association (CFA), have increasingly utilized their platforms to pass Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) resolutions, push for clemency or amnesty for student protesters facing disciplinary action, and actively oppose the adoption of formal tools like the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. 

For instance, the report highlighted actions such as the CFA circulating political candidate questionnaires asking if respondents accepted contributions or endorsements from groups like the Jewish Public Affairs Committee of California (JPAC), alongside instances where Melina Abdullah, the CFA’s Political Action & Legislation Committee Chair, streamed a class advocating against a state bill protecting Jewish and Israeli students. 

Additionally, the report pointed to survey data where nearly three-quarters of responding Jewish-identifying faculty reported observing anti-Jewish activity originating from colleagues, with one respondent stating, “Faculty are not talking to me because they know I’m a Zionist.” 

Emphasizing the scope of these concerns, ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt stated, “Universities cannot claim to be addressing antisemitism seriously if they ignore what happens behind the classroom door and inside faculty governance.”

To combat what the ADL claims is widespread underreporting of classroom bias, where the vast majority of witnesses traditionally stay silent, the newly launched Campus Classroom Reporting mechanism offers a low-barrier, confidential space to surface concerns, request guidance, and help the organization track institutional trends. 

This post was originally published on here. 

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Employment in the West Bank rose by 4.6% in the second quarter of 2026, bringing the Palestinian workforce to 733,000, according to new data published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) on Tuesday.

The bureau attributed the rise to increased employment in the commerce, restaurant and hotel sectors, which were heavily affected when tourism to the West Bank plummeted amid the regional instability triggered by Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Already struggling with the loss of tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic, cities such as Bethlehem, where tourism accounts for 70% of annual income, suffered major losses.

Following the October 7 attack, 96% of businesses reported decreased activity and 42.1% reduced their workforces, according to a 2024 report by UN Trade and Development. The decline amounted to the loss of 306,000 jobs and pushed unemployment to 32%. These losses came in addition to the 140,000 Palestinian workers with permits to work in Israel whose permits were revoked following October 7.

The majority of Palestinians, 680,000, were employed in the local market, an increase of around 27,000 workers from the first quarter.

The unemployment rate among those aged 15 and above stood at 27.9% in the second quarter, amounting to around 284,000 people, while total labor underutilization stood at about 29.9%. According to International Labour Organization standards, the unemployment rate among men in the West Bank reached 27.2%, compared with 30.5% among women.

Employment increases but wages remain low

Though employment is increasing in the West Bank, wages remain low compared with Israel, with the average daily wage standing at NIS 134.3, just over half of Israel’s minimum daily wage of NIS 257.75.

Around 53,000 Palestinians were working in Israel or Israeli settlements in the West Bank during the second quarter, an increase of around 5,000 workers compared with the first quarter. Around 35,000 of these workers were employed in Israel. The average daily wage for wage employees in Israel and Israeli settlements fell slightly to NIS 263.4 in the second quarter of 2026, compared with NIS 287.1 in the first quarter.

The survey also found that Palestinians in the West Bank worked an average of 41.6 hours per week and 22.4 days per month.

According to the bureau, 66.1% of employed persons were wage employees, 23.4% were self-employed, 6% were employers, and 4.5% were unpaid family members.

A significant 42.1% of wage employees in the private sector were hired without an employment contract, while only 35.5% said they received contributions to a pension fund or financial compensation upon leaving their position.

Less than half of female wage employees receive paid maternity leave

Additionally, less than half (49.8%) of female wage employees received paid maternity leave, despite being entitled to 10 weeks of paid maternity leave and protections against termination while on leave.

More than one in 10 (15.5%) wage employees in the private sector received a monthly wage below the minimum wage of NIS 1,880 in the West Bank during the second quarter of 2026.  

This post was originally published on here. 

The Likud’s top internal court approved on Wednesday a reserved slot on the party’s Knesset slate for senior minister Haim Katz, which was selected by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one day after blocking a vote on the move.

The three-judge panel approved Katz’s placement by a majority, after unanimously approving reserved slots for Defense Minister Israel Katz and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar on Tuesday.

The court found on Wednesday that the party’s election rules allow Likud chairman Netanyahu to use his allotted slots to shape a slate representing the party’s different constituencies.

Netanyahu was granted the authority to determine eight slots within the first 30 spots on the party list last month following a vote on the controversial decision by the Likud Central Committee.

Likud announced late on Tuesday night that the defense minister should receive a reserved slot, in order to “allow him to focus on security needs rather than engage in politics at this time.”

The party also stated that Sa’ar would receive a reserved slot as part of the merger agreement between his party and the Likud, and that Haim Katz would receive a slot due to his senior position in the party as the Likud Central Committee chairperson.

Slots were approved by the Likud’s secretariat

The decision to grant the three ministers reserved slots required approval from the Likud’s secretariat. While the foreign and defense ministers’ slots were approved, the court issued an interim order blocking Katz’s slot because he had already registered for the August 17 primaries and begun campaigning.

The court said in its final decision on Wednesday that reserving a place for a veteran lawmaker who had intended to compete in the primary was less disruptive to other candidates than using the slot for an outside contender.

All three ministers will now receive the reserved slots on the party’s list that were granted to them by Netanyahu.

The changes to the party’s primaries that have expanded Netanyahu’s control over the Knesset list have led to fierce internal tensions, with some party members in favor and others strongly against.

A fierce critic of changing the system has been MK Tally Gotliv, who is viewed as a candidate who would receive broad support from registered party members.

Gotliv sharply criticized the Tuesday decision to reserve the slots for the three ministers, condemning the defense minister.

She called the decision to grant the defense minister a reserved slot, “a disgraceful move that mocks Likud voters, who understand one thing more than all the veteran ministers: the need to fight the legal establishment that is persecuting the right-wing government and right-wing figures.”

Netanyahu reportedly has held several meetings with the Likud Central Committee chairman Katz, seeking to bridge disagreements over the primary system and secure internal support for changing the system.

There were also reports that Netanyahu has threatened to leave Likud if the proposed changes were not advanced.

Those within the party who oppose changing the primaries have argued that it will cause those who would otherwise score highly in the primaries to fall further down the list.

The Likud has for years prided itself on conducting primaries in which over 100,000 of its registered members are eligible to vote for the Knesset list. Netanyahu pushed to change the system in recent weeks ahead of the primaries, which were set for August 17.

Parties are not required to hold primaries in Israel, and only a few do so.

The Likud primaries are expected to be highly competitive. Likud currently has around 40 ministers and MKs serving in the government and Knesset, but recent polls project the party winning only about 25 seats, leaving many at risk of losing their places on the party’s Knesset list.

The debate on how to hold the Likud primaries comes ahead of the general elections, which are set to take place on October 27.

The tensions surrounding the slots also come after the Tel Aviv District Court on Monday rejected Likud MK Afif Abed’s attempt to restore a narrowly approved change allowing current and former MKs, ministers and deputy ministers to run in the party’s district primaries, leaving the restrictions in place ahead of the August 17 vote.

Likud had announced Monday that Netanyahu’s first reserved slot would go to entrepreneur and businessman Oren Dobronsky.

This post was originally published on here. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky halted Ukraine’s drone campaign against oil tankers in the Black Sea after a request from US Vice President JD Vance, The Financial Times reported, citing Ukrainian officials. 

According to the report, Washington was upset that Kyiv was harming US companies by targeting tankers hauling crude oil from Kazakhstan to a Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal in Russia’s Novorossiysk port.

Ukrainian officials and other people familiar with the matter said that Vance asked Zelensky to stop the attacks during a call on July 31. Since that call, Ukraine has not struck tankers in the CPC terminal, officials told the FT. 

Ukraine agreed to not target non-Russian ships, so long as they were not sanctioned by Ukraine or carrying any Russian cargo.  

“We very carefully listen to our American partners,” one senior Ukrainian official told the FT. The official added that Ukraine established “mechanisms” in response to Vance’s request.

Drone campaign brought war to Russia, aimed to cut off resources

Ukraine’s drone campaign on the port aimed to cut off revenue from the Kremlin and bring more of the war to Russia. 

A US official confirmed the FT report and added that the administration views the CPC as a “vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets that serves as an alternative to Russian energy supplies.”

Notably, US energy companies Chevron and ExxonMobil own stakes in CPC, which is Kazakhstan’s main oil route. 

 The CPC terminal has reportedly been “a regular part of the conversation with the US and the Kazakh governments”, the Ukrainian official told the FT.

Notably, this is not the first time the US has requested that Ukraine refrain from hitting US industry interests in Russia. 

In February, former Ukrainian ambassador to the US Olha Stefanishyna received a démarche from the US State Department noting its disapproval of Ukrainian strikes on Novorossiysk. 

Ukrainian strikes on the CPC terminal caused turmoil for oil markets, leading Kazakhstan to stop piping oil to the port city and doubling shipping rates.

Notably, in a July 17 attack, a ship chartered by Exxon was hit in a Ukrainian strike as it was waiting to load. 

The chaos in Novorossiysk came as the US has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz in Iran, which has affected oil markets worldwide and made Kazakh oil all the more vital. 

JD Vance proved to be combative with Zelensky, Ukraine prioritizes US munitions

Vance has notoriously been one of the most combative figures in the trump administration’s handling of the war. He repeatedly berated Zelensky in the Oval Office in 2025, implying that the Ukrainian president was not offering enough gratitude for “the president who is trying to save your country.”

Vance has gone so far as to say that stopping aid to Ukraine was one of his proudest achievements in his tenure as vice president. 

“It’s one of the things I’m proudest… we’ve told Europe that if you want to buy weapons, you can, but the US is not buying weapons and sending them to Ukraine anymore,” Vance said in April. 

People familiar with the call told the FT that Zelensky agreed to stopping the strikes on CPC because he is still seeking the license to produce Patriot missiles that US President Trump publicly pledged to give him earlier this summer. 

Zelensky reportedly stressed to Vance that Patriot missiles, along with other interceptors and air defense missiles, were “top priority” for Ukraine. 

Elsewhere in Russia, Ukraine has stepped up its attacks on Moscow’s oil and shipping infrastructure. 

In the month of August alone, Ukrainian drones have hit three Russian oil refineries, an airfield, and a warehouse for Russian shipping giant Wildberries. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Leadership decapitation is frequently treated as a measure of success in conflicts involving centralized authoritarian systems and irregular security organizations. Removing senior commanders can disrupt command and control, degrade institutional knowledge, create succession problems, and generate uncertainty throughout the security apparatus.

Yet the strategic effect of leadership targeting ultimately depends on a more difficult question: whether the removal of individuals changes the institutions and strategic logic that produced them. Iran’s recent reconstruction of its military and security hierarchy provides an important case study.

The emerging evidence suggests that the Islamic Republic has suffered substantial personnel losses without undergoing a comparable transformation of its security doctrine. Instead, Tehran appears to be rebuilding around an older revolutionary-security elite whose professional experiences combine conventional command, intelligence operations, asymmetric warfare, ideological enforcement, and domestic coercion.

This distinction is essential for evaluating claims of political or strategic transformation in Iran. A change of leadership is not necessarily a change of regime, just as the destruction of a command echelon does not necessarily destroy the institutional system beneath it. Political orders reproduce themselves through organizations, doctrines, networks, incentives, and institutional memory.

If these mechanisms remain functional, leadership losses can produce disruption without producing transformation. The recent Iranian appointments therefore should be analyzed not simply as biographies of individual commanders but as indicators of the functions the regime considers most important to its survival.

The importance of institutional memory

Ali Abdollahi’s appointment as chief of the General Staff illustrates the importance of institutional memory. Abdollahi belongs to the revolutionary-security generation that emerged with the Islamic Republic itself. His career began in the security institutions created after the 1979 revolution and continued within the newly established Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

His elevation does not represent an obvious generational transition. Rather, it suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, Tehran continues to assign considerable value to figures whose institutional identities were formed during the consolidation of the revolutionary state.

The appointment of Kiomars Heydari as deputy chief of the General Staff points toward a second development: the decreasing conceptual distance between national defense and regime defense. Heydari previously described the Army Ground Forces’ participation in suppressing the November 2019 protests as a “proud” mission and later referred dismissively to protesters during the 2022 unrest.

The importance of these statements lies in the institutional position from which they were made. Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, has historically possessed a different organizational identity from the more explicitly ideological IRGC. The incorporation of domestic regime-preservation functions into the professional identity of senior Artesh commanders therefore suggests a broader evolution in Iranian civil-military relations.

From the perspective of political theory, this development reflects a fundamental distinction between state security and regime security. The state represents an enduring political and institutional order; the regime represents the particular configuration of authority governing it. In consolidated political systems, the survival of a government is not identical to the survival of the state.

Leaders can lose power and governments can change without threatening the existence of the country. Authoritarian systems, particularly revolutionary authoritarian systems, have stronger incentives to collapse this distinction. Political opposition can consequently be interpreted as a security problem, popular mobilization as destabilization, and institutional independence as a potential threat to regime continuity.

This dynamic helps explain why Iran’s new command structure appears simultaneously oriented outward and inward.

Ahmad Vahidi’s appointment to command the IRGC represents the external dimension. His career developed through intelligence work and the external-operations apparatus that eventually evolved into the IRGC Quds Force. Argentine prosecutors have accused him of involvement in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, in which 85 people were killed, and Interpol issued a Red Notice in connection with the investigation. These allegations are not equivalent to a criminal conviction, but his professional background nevertheless places him within the institutional history of Iranian intelligence, unconventional warfare, and extraterritorial security operations.

Tehran’s strategic approach to its international conflicts

The strategic importance of that experience extends beyond the individual commander. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran has developed methods for compensating for conventional military disadvantages through asymmetric capabilities. Proxy and partner networks, ballistic missiles, unmanned systems, maritime pressure, intelligence operations, and unconventional warfare have allowed the Islamic Republic to threaten adversaries possessing substantially greater conventional military power.

This strategic approach has been especially important in Iran’s confrontation with the United States and Israel. The appointment of commanders whose careers were formed within this security culture therefore provides little evidence that leadership turnover has altered Tehran’s fundamental perception of either country.

Hossein Taeb’s return to command the Basij reveals the domestic counterpart of this strategy. Taeb’s career has included service within the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and senior positions in the Guards’ intelligence apparatus. The United States sanctioned him in 2010 for serious human-rights abuses, and the European Union subsequently imposed restrictive measures related to serious violations of Iranian citizens’ rights. The institutional significance of his appointment is particularly important because the Basij operates at the intersection of military organization, ideological mobilization, social penetration, surveillance, and internal security.

The Basij’s presence within universities, workplaces, neighborhoods, public institutions, and other sectors of Iranian society gives it a function fundamentally different from a conventional reserve force. It provides the regime with organizational depth inside the population. In periods of stability, this infrastructure supports ideological mobilization and social control. During periods of unrest, the same infrastructure can provide intelligence, manpower, surveillance, and coercive capacity. Placing an experienced intelligence figure at the head of such an organization suggests that domestic instability occupies a significant position in the regime’s current threat assessment.

The resulting command structure can therefore be understood as a dual-front security architecture. Externally, Tehran requires institutions capable of deterring or imposing costs on the United States and Israel despite the degradation of elements of its conventional and senior command structure. Internally, it requires organizations capable of identifying, monitoring, fragmenting, and suppressing political mobilization before it becomes an existential challenge. These missions are institutionally different, but within the regime’s security worldview they increasingly converge.

This convergence is consistent with the political psychology of a besieged revolutionary state. The Islamic Republic has historically interpreted foreign and domestic threats as interconnected. External adversaries are frequently accused of exploiting domestic dissent, while internal opposition is regularly framed as vulnerable to foreign manipulation. Such a worldview produces an important security consequence: military setbacks abroad can generate increased coercion at home because external vulnerability heightens the leadership’s fear of internal destabilization.

The process can become self-reinforcing. Military setbacks weaken perceptions of regime strength. Intelligence penetration increases elite suspicion. Economic deterioration contributes to popular dissatisfaction. Public unrest encourages expanded surveillance and coercion. Greater repression widens the political distance between state and society, which in turn increases the regime’s perception of domestic insecurity. A government organized increasingly around this cycle may become more security-oriented as it becomes weaker, not less.

This observation complicates assumptions that sustained military pressure necessarily produces political moderation. Authoritarian regimes confronted by severe external threats do not follow a single trajectory. Some negotiate, some fragment, and some intensify repression while transferring greater authority to security institutions. The Iranian appointments suggest that the Islamic Republic is currently emphasizing institutional consolidation. The organizations most useful for surviving external conflict and domestic instability—military command, intelligence, the IRGC, and the Basij—are consequently likely to acquire greater political importance.

A conventional military dictatorship?

This does not mean that Iran has become a conventional military dictatorship. Clerical institutions, civilian bureaucracies, economic networks, the regular armed forces, and political factions continue to exist. The more useful analytical concept is a shift in the center of gravity of political power. Under sustained security pressure, institutions controlling weapons, intelligence, surveillance, ideological mobilization, and coercive capacity become increasingly indispensable. Formal constitutional structures can remain intact even as the practical distribution of influence moves toward the security establishment.

There is nevertheless a paradox in the Islamic Republic’s response. Its ability to replace senior commanders demonstrates institutional resilience. Leadership targeting has not automatically produced organizational collapse. Vacancies have been filled and command relationships reconstructed. For US and Israeli defense planners, this is an important warning against equating successful decapitation operations with strategic defeat of the adversary.

At the same time, the identity of the replacements reveals a potential structural weakness. Nearly five decades after the revolution, Tehran continues to rely heavily on an aging revolutionary-security generation when searching for individuals considered sufficiently experienced, ideologically reliable, institutionally connected, and politically trustworthy. The regime demonstrates an ability to regenerate leadership, but it appears to do so from a relatively narrow political and professional pool. Institutional continuity can therefore be both a source of resilience and evidence of stagnation.

For the United States and Israel, the principal implication is that assessments of Iranian military degradation should move beyond battle-damage metrics. The number of commanders killed, missile launchers destroyed, facilities damaged, or units disrupted matters operationally, but strategic assessment must also examine institutional regeneration. Can the regime restore command relationships? Can it preserve intelligence networks? Can it reconstruct proxy and partner capabilities? Can it maintain internal coercive capacity? Most importantly, does the strategic doctrine guiding these organizations survive the individuals who previously implemented it?

Iran’s new hierarchy suggests that the answer to the final question is, for now, yes. The individuals have changed, but the security system continues to reproduce commanders shaped by the same broad institutional environment. Hostility toward the United States and Israel remains embedded in the strategic culture of the organizations from which these leaders emerge, while the regime’s domestic-security institutions continue to treat political instability as a potential existential threat.

The emerging Iranian order should therefore be understood neither as evidence of successful regime transformation nor as proof that military pressure has failed. It represents something more complicated: an authoritarian security system adapting to attrition while attempting to preserve its core strategic logic. Tehran is rebuilding a command structure capable of operating on two fronts—deterrence, asymmetric confrontation, and strategic competition abroad; surveillance, ideological control, and coercion at home.

The larger lesson extends beyond Iran. Leadership decapitation can weaken an adversary, but the strategic effect depends upon whether the institutions beneath the targeted leadership can reproduce themselves. Revolutionary regimes survive not only through individual leaders but through organizational memory, coercive networks, ideological narratives, and systems for selecting trusted successors. Destroying commanders can create tactical and operational opportunities. Transforming the political-security system that continually generates replacements is a fundamentally different problem.

Iran today illustrates that distinction. Its military hierarchy has suffered substantial disruption, but its response has been to reconstruct itself around veterans of the same revolutionary-security tradition. For Washington and Jerusalem, the implication is sobering: the next phase of competition with Tehran will not be determined solely by how much of Iran’s military infrastructure has been destroyed, but by whether the Islamic Republic retains the institutional capacity to regenerate, adapt, and continue imposing costs abroad while preserving political control at home.

This post was originally published on here. 

Three nonprofit organizations petitioned the Jerusalem District Court to overturn the approval of a plan to build a yeshiva and dormitory for foreign students on public land in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of east Jerusalem.

Ir Amim, the Sheikh Jarrah Welfare Association, and the Umm Lison Women’s Association filed the petition against the Jerusalem district and local planning committees, senior planning officials, and the Ohr Somayach institutions, which initiated the plan.

The petitioners also asked the court, sitting as an Administrative Affairs Court, to freeze the plan while it considers their challenge. They specifically asked that the plan not be formally published as approved or otherwise advanced until the court issues a ruling.

At the center of the dispute is a 4.3-dunam site on Pierre van Paassen Street in the Nahalat Shimon section of Sheikh Jarrah, according to official planning records.

The records list the land as state-owned and show that an earlier plan designated it for public use. The petitioners said the site had originally been privately owned Palestinian land and was expropriated by the state for a public building intended to serve neighborhood residents.

They argued that the district planning committee’s decision would instead divert one of the limited sites available for east Jerusalem public services toward a yeshiva and dormitory intended primarily for students from abroad.

East Jerusalem faces public building shortage, according to petition

According to the petition, east Jerusalem faces a severe shortage of public buildings, including a shortage of approximately 2,000 classrooms, based on Jerusalem Municipality figures.

The petitioners said a professional assessment prepared at the district committee’s request also identified a significant shortage of public buildings in Sheikh Jarrah itself. They further said the state has previously identified the lack of available public land as one of the main obstacles to addressing those shortages.

Ohr Somayach received authorization from the Israel Land Authority to plan the project, but the land has not yet been formally allocated to the institution, according to the court filing.

During the approval process, the plan’s wording was changed to replace explicit references to a yeshiva, study hall, and dormitory with broader permitted uses, including religion, culture, and education, the petitioners said.

They argued that the changes were largely cosmetic because Ohr Somayach remained the plan’s developer and the project continued to be intended for the same purpose. They also said the decision to designate 40% of the plot as public open space did not address their objections to the planned building.

The petition challenges three decisions connected to the project: an extension granted to complete the planning process, the district committee’s approval of the plan, and the district committee chairman’s refusal to allow an appeal against that approval.

Official planning records show that the plan was submitted in 2013. The petitioners said it was approved only this year after remaining dormant for several years and argued that officials did not adequately explain why the planning process was extended.

They further argued that the planning authorities did not provide sufficient justification for departing from the land’s previously designated purpose and that the decision was therefore unlawful.

In their request for a temporary freeze, the petitioners acknowledged that construction was not imminent because the land must still be allocated and the project must go through the building-permit process.

However, they said allowing the plan to take effect could make it more difficult for the court to cancel the approval later.

The petitioners said they would withdraw the request for a freeze if the respondents agreed that publishing or advancing the plan would not affect the court’s consideration of the case or be used to argue that the project had progressed too far to reverse.

Sheikh Jarrah, a focal point of Israeli-Palestinian disputes

Sheikh Jarrah has long been a focal point of Israeli-Palestinian disputes over land and housing. Attempts to evict Palestinian families from contested properties in the neighborhood prompted protests and clashes in 2021 and became a flashpoint in the lead-up to 11 days of fighting between Israel and Hamas.

“The yeshiva project is part of the wider series of moves threatening Sheikh Jarrah residents,” Ir Amim researcher Aviv Tatarsky said, accusing the state of coordinating with settler organizations to transfer Palestinian property in the neighborhood.

The case has not yet been assigned to a judge, and no decision has been issued on the request to freeze the plan.

This post was originally published on here. 

As the US-Iran war progressed, Iran adapted how it attacked US military bases in the Middle East, which forced the US to use its already scarce supply of Patriot interceptors, The New York Times reported on Tuesday.

During five days in June, Iran launched waves of drones and missiles at US forces on three bases in Jordan, aiming to overwhelm American air defenses. The IRGC used missiles that could suddenly change course, forcing the US to use scarce interceptor missiles, the NYT reported.

On July 17, an Iranian strike in Jordan hit a housing unit on a US base, killing three soldiers.

A statement from US Central Command (CENTCOM) on July 18 said that “On July 17, two US service members in Jordan were killed in action as CENTCOM and partner forces defended against Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks. Additionally, one service member is currently missing in action.”

Responding to the fatal attack, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the NYT, “We shot down almost all the missiles; one leaked through.”

As the war has progressed, Iran has become more tactical and skilled with its strikes, learning how to evade US air defenses as the conflict has spread across the region, according to NYT reports.

Simultaneously, the US was running through its stockpile of interceptor missiles.

The US Army had used up “virtually all” of its highly accurate long-range missiles during the five-month war with Iran, according to a Reuters report on August 4.

These long-range munitions allow the military to carry out accurate strikes from a safe distance, playing a crucial role in the US-Iran conflict.

US munitions shortage after months of war

The Pentagon has fewer than 1,700 Patriot interceptors left, a source told the NYT.

When asked for comment on the stockpile data, the White House issued a statement from Trump, saying the US had “far more munitions than anyone in the world” and “far more than we need,” Reuters reported.

“Our defense companies are, at this moment, making more munitions than they have ever made before, in addition to expanding their plants and equipment at record levels,” Trump said.

The munitions shortage has an impact beyond the US-Iran conflict. The Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) stockpile, a short-range missile also in demand by Ukraine, is drained to the extent that there’s basically none left, Reuters reported.

Between February and July, the US had used around 65% of its Patriot interceptors.

This post was originally published on here. 

Minnesota Democrats chose the state’s Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan as their nominee to the US Senate on Tuesday, according to US media projections.

Flanagan, a progressive, will face off against Republican nominee and sports broadcaster Michele Tafoya in the November general election for the seat left open by the retirement of Democratic senator Tina Smith. 

A pair of Democratic primaries in Minnesota on Tuesday were among a string of high-profile battles between progressive and moderate candidates, where Israel and the pro-Israel lobby serve as key wedge issues. 

The state’s highest-profile race was the US Senate primary between Rep. Angie Craig, who has been endorsed by the pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC, and Lieutenant Gov. Peggy Flanagan, who said she would reject AIPAC’s money and accuses Israel of committing genocide.

The race, and the candidates’ sparring over AIPAC, comes as the lobby and Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have become increasingly unpopular among Democratic voters. Israel is also an issue in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in neighboring Wisconsin taking place on Tuesday. 

Flanagan has referred to Craig as “AIPAC’s candidate” in the Senate race, which prompted Craig to distance herself from the group’s spending during a TV debate in June.

“AIPAC has not contributed at all, the PAC, to my Senate campaign,” said Craig, whose wife, Cheryl Greene, is Jewish. “Not one penny.”

Flanagan countered that, while AIPAC itself has not donated to Craig’s campaign, it has held fundraisers for the four-term congresswoman. AIPAC did not respond to a request for comment.

Minnesota republicans nominate Lisa Demuth for governor over former MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell

Minnesota Republicans chose state Representative Lisa Demuth as their nominee for governor, defeating former MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, who had the endorsement of US President Donald Trump, according to US media projections.

She will face Democratic nominee Senator Amy Klobuchar in the November general election.

This post was originally published on here. 

IDF observers identified several Palestinian suspects in the northern Gaza Strip on Tuesday afternoon as they approached the Yellow Line and managed to steal iron pipes. The information was quickly relayed to a force operating in the area, which deployed a drone toward the suspects, but the attempt was unsuccessful, and the Palestinians escaped unharmed.

The Palestinians did not cross the Yellow Line, but they did manage to steal the pipes a short distance away, a security official familiar with the details of the incident said.

An investigation conducted in the field described the incident as “not good,” as commanders on the ground said the IDF’s response time should have been faster and concerns were raised over Hamas potentially testing IDF troops’ alertness.

Commanders in the sector were concerned that the pipes could have provided both an opportunity to test IDF response time and to locate raw materials for manufacturing rockets.

Following the incident, procedures in the area were clarified.

However, the security official said the incident was unrelated to the rules of engagement, as there is no lack of clarity among forces on the ground regarding the removal of an immediate threat and the handling of unusual incidents.

The official also stressed that the incident occurred three kilometers from the Israeli border.

Security, readiness around engineering work along Yellow Line to be strengthened

Following the incident, the decision was made to strengthen security and readiness around the engineering work the IDF is carrying out along the Yellow Line.

According to the security official, additional underground infrastructure has been uncovered in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, and the IDF is preparing to destroy it.

At the same time, the Defense Ministry and the IDF’s Technology and Logistics Directorate are reinforcing security measures at military posts and along the Yellow Line.

Last week, Walla reported that the IDF’s hands are tied when it comes to carrying out targeted killings under instructions from the political echelon.

However, an official and authorized political source told Walla that, over the past week, the IDF had not submitted any request to carry out a targeted killing in the Gaza Strip.

This post was originally published on here. 

Russian-Israeli historian Artyom Kirpichenok, 51, reportedly disappeared after arriving in Israel last week.

Kirpichenok landed at Ben-Gurion Airport on August 2 on a flight from Yerevan.

He returned to Israel for a conference he was meant to host but has not been heard from since. Loved ones and colleagues who tried to contact him were unsuccessful.

Kirpichenok immigrated to Israel in the 1990s, graduated from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and lived in the country for nearly 15 years.

He then returned to Russia, where he adopted a critical stance about the Jewish state and Zionism.

Russian embassy says it contacted relevant Israeli authorities 

Russia’s Ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov, said he had submitted a request to the relevant Israeli authorities but did not say whether he had heard back.

“We have taken note of reports published by several Russian media outlets concerning journalist and Middle East scholar Artem Kirpichenok, who was reportedly detained by law enforcement authorities in Israel on August 2,” a statement from Russia’s Embassy in Israel said.

“To date, the embassy has not received any inquiries from Kirpichenok’s relatives, friends, or colleagues. Nevertheless, we have submitted a relevant request to the appropriate Israeli authorities. We are monitoring the matter,” the embassy added.

Russian journalist and former State Duma representative Daria Mitina claimed that Kirpichenok was being held in prison by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service).

“Unfortunately, our worst fears have been confirmed. Artem Ivanovich Kirpichenok is in prison, in the custody of Israel’s Shin Bet security service,” she wrote, adding that the case needs “maximum public attention.”

This post was originally published on here.