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US Central Command (CENTCOM) has announced that it is establishing a task force aimed at preventing Iran from using land routes and the Caspian Sea to transport advanced weapons, sanctioned materials, and other equipment.

The fresh operation represents an expansion of American efforts to restrict the Islamic Republic’s access to new weapons and financial networks.

This comes after an eight-month naval blockade.

CENTCOM says it has already prevented Tehran from exporting billions of dollars in crude oil. Task Force Iron Gate, part of the new CENTCOM plan, will have “an internal staff of approximately 20 civilian and military personnel based in Tampa, Florida,” the US said.

“The new CENTCOM team will coordinate with other US government agencies on preventing the movement of advanced weapons systems, dual-use technologies, sanctioned materials, and illegal revenue streams across Iran’s land borders and the Caspian Sea,” it added.

The new move also comes after the midterm elections, with many critics of the Iran war now empowered in the US, who may use their power in Congress to try to rein in the war effort.

This means that the United States could have limited time to execute new operations. The question is whether this latest attempt to interdict trade at Iran’s land border will work.

It is also not clear what the US will be doing in order to cut off Iran from various weapons supplies. It is known that the regime continues to try to build missiles and drones. Iran also uses supplies from Russia and China to keep its military-industrial complex humming.

Iran’s various land borders

CENTCOM said it wants to “prevent Iran from using ground routes to transport advanced weapons and other materials.”

Understanding the layout of Iran’s land borders can help clarify what this means and how CENTCOM aims to operate in this case.

Iran’s longest border is with Iraq, 1,599 kilometers long. Next comes its long border with Turkmenistan at 1,148 km., and then Afghanistan at 921 km. Its border with Pakistan is similarly long, at around 900 km. It also has shorter borders with Azerbaijan (611 km.) and Turkey (534 km.). Lastly, it borders Armenia with a 44 km perimeter.

Trying to cut off Iran from these borders appears to be an immense task. The US has already pressured Iraq to cut off Iranian air routes, and there is some pressure to deal with the Iran border crossings as well.

There are numerous Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. How will all of this clandestine trade be stopped?

It’s not clear what Iran may be bringing in from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The US has good ties with Azerbaijan, and Turkey is a NATO member.

CENTCOM Commander directs formation of Task Force Iron Gate

Pakistan has complex ties with Iran. China has good relations with Pakistan and may use it as a conduit to supply Iran. However, Islamabad also has warm relations with the Trump administration. Significantly, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have the new Mecca Defense Alliance pact. This adds many pieces to the puzzle.

CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper will direct the Task Force Iron Gate team to coordinate with other US government agencies in addressing weapons trafficking and sanctions evasion across Iran’s borders, CENTCOM said over the weekend.

“The establishment of Task Force Iron Gate reinforces the success of our ironclad blockade against Iran at sea,” Cooper said in the statement, broadcast on Saturday. “Strengthening CENTCOM’s collaboration with US interagency partners will further constrain Iran’s ability to finance terrorism, rebuild weapons factories, and replenish its military.”

He added that the American naval blockade has prevented Iran from exporting over $25 billion in crude oil in recent months.

CENTCOM said strict enforcement continues against ships entering or departing Iranian ports.

This comes as the US Rewards for Justice program is also offering millions of dollars for information on Iran’s nuclear program. Will the two new initiatives pressure Iran? Will they cut Iran off from some supplies it needs for its weapons programs?

The establishment of the task force suggests that Washington is increasingly concerned about Iran’s ability to circumvent maritime restrictions via overland trade and transportation networks.

Unlike a naval blockade, which focuses on shipping routes and ports, monitoring land borders involves a complex network of roads, border crossings, and commercial transport companies. It appears to be a major challenge.

This post was originally published on here. 

Avigdor Liberman’s 2018 haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription proposal has reemerged as a potential basis for coalition negotiations after the Yisrael Beytenu chairman signaled on Sunday that he was willing to compromise with ultra-Orthodox parties. But how does the proposal compare with the draft legislation promoted by Boaz Bismuth in 2025, and would either framework meet the IDF’s growing manpower needs?

The 2018 proposal, developed by the Defense Ministry and the IDF during Liberman’s tenure as defense minister, sought to gradually increase haredi enlistment while preserving military service deferrals for yeshiva students. It established annual recruitment targets, financial penalties for institutions that failed to meet them, and a mechanism that could ultimately terminate the special exemption arrangement if recruitment targets were repeatedly missed.

Unlike Bismuth’s proposal, which introduced additional personal sanctions against individual yeshiva students, Liberman’s framework primarily targeted yeshiva funding and the continued validity of the exemption system itself. It also set a lower exemption age of 24, compared with 26 under Bismuth’s proposal.

The differences have taken on renewed political significance as Gadi Eisenkot prepares to receive the mandate to form a government. Liberman’s decision to lift his veto on cooperation with haredi parties has opened the door to coalition negotiations, although he maintains that his willingness to compromise does not amount to abandoning his support for universal conscription.

“Willingness to compromise does not mean abandoning values and principles,” Liberman wrote in a statement on Sunday, defending his change in political position amid criticism from commentators and journalists.

He emphasized that his 2018 proposal would require adjustments in light of the October 7 attacks and the subsequent increase in the military’s manpower requirements.

“It is clear to me that following the events of October 7, the law I proposed in 2018 also requires changes and adjustments, but it still constitutes a suitable basis for reaching agreements,” he wrote.

How do Liberman’s and Bismuth’s haredi draft proposals compare?

Liberman’s 2018 legislation was developed by a committee comprising representatives of the Defense Ministry and the IDF. It passed its first reading in the Knesset in July of that year.

The proposal aimed to increase military enlistment among ultra-Orthodox men without dismantling the existing yeshiva system. It allowed many students to continue deferring their service while establishing gradually increasing recruitment targets.

Bismuth’s 2025 proposal similarly preserved the possibility of service deferrals and exemptions but added personal restrictions intended to encourage enlistment.

Neither proposal established an immediate and equal military conscription requirement for all young haredi men.

One of the most significant differences between the proposals concerned the age at which yeshiva students could receive exemptions from military service. Liberman’s framework set the exemption age at 24, while Bismuth’s proposed legislation raised it to 26.

The enforcement mechanisms also differed substantially.

Under Liberman’s framework, annual recruitment targets were accompanied by financial sanctions against yeshivas if those targets were not met.

The proposal’s most consequential provision addressed prolonged failures to meet recruitment quotas. If actual enlistment remained below 85% of the annual target for three consecutive years, the amendment to the law would expire after an additional 12 months.

This meant that the special arrangement allowing military service deferrals and exemptions could not continue indefinitely if recruitment targets were repeatedly missed.

However, Liberman’s proposal did not establish a new system of personal sanctions against individual yeshiva students who failed to enlist.

Instead, its enforcement mechanisms focused primarily on financial penalties for religious institutions and the continued validity of the exemption system.

The committee that developed the framework also recommended expanding administrative sanctions against deserters and draft evaders.

Bismuth’s proposal, by contrast, introduced personal sanctions alongside financial penalties for yeshivas that failed to comply with the law.

Those proposed restrictions included limitations on overseas travel, obtaining a new driver’s license before age 23, and eligibility for certain government benefits and economic incentives.

However, the personal sanctions were not all designed to take effect automatically or immediately.

Some depended on the issuance of an enlistment order and the individual’s subsequent failure to report for duty. Others were linked to failures to meet broader recruitment targets, while certain restrictions were subject to age limits or delayed implementation dates.

The proposal also included provisions allowing sanctions to be eased or exemptions to be granted under specified circumstances.

For individual yeshiva students, Bismuth’s framework was therefore more stringent because it introduced additional personal restrictions.

On the exemption system as a whole, however, Liberman’s proposal established a potentially more far-reaching consequence for persistent failures to meet recruitment targets.

Under his framework, the special legislative arrangement could expire following three consecutive years of missed targets, subject to the stipulated 12-month transition period.

Bismuth’s proposal included review mechanisms, financial sanctions, and possible adjustments, but did not establish an equivalent automatic mechanism terminating the entire exemption arrangement.

The differences are also evident in the recruitment targets themselves.

Liberman’s framework established a target of 3,996 recruits in 2018, gradually increasing to 4,967 in 2021 and 6,208 in 2025.

One version of Bismuth’s framework set a target of 8,160 recruits over 18 months, averaging about 5,440 per year.

Under that version, up to 10% of the recruitment target could be met by individuals performing civilian service in security-related fields.

At first glance, Bismuth’s initial target appears higher than the target Liberman established for 2018. However, Bismuth’s annual average was lower than the target Liberman’s proposal established for 2025.

The figures do not represent identical periods or legislative arrangements operating under equivalent timetables.

Several versions of the recruitment targets were presented during the advancement of Bismuth’s framework. Each figure must therefore be examined in light of the specific legislative version and period it refers to.

Another significant difference concerns how recruits are counted.

Liberman’s framework established targets for national and civilian service separately from military enlistment targets.

Under one version of Bismuth’s proposal, civilian service in security-related fields could count toward the overall recruitment quota, up to 10% of the target.

Consequently, meeting the overall quota would not necessarily indicate that an equivalent number of new soldiers had joined the IDF.

The identity of those included in the recruitment figures has also sparked controversy.

One criticism of Bismuth’s framework concerned the possibility of counting young men who had already left the haredi community.

If a young man raised in the ultra-Orthodox community but no longer studying at a yeshiva is counted as a haredi recruit, meeting the recruitment target does not necessarily demonstrate increased enlistment among students attending active yeshivas.

Beyond these legal and numerical differences lies a fundamental change in Israel’s security requirements.

Liberman’s proposal was developed in 2018, five years before the October 7 attacks and the war that followed.

Since then, the haredi population has grown, while the IDF’s manpower requirements have increased significantly.

The Bank of Israel and other professional bodies have warned that the recruitment targets under discussion do not guarantee an increase in the number of soldiers sufficient to meet the military’s needs.

A framework that might have been considered a reasonable basis for regulating haredi conscription before the war does not necessarily provide an adequate response to current requirements.

This also explains why Liberman himself acknowledged that his original proposal would need to be updated.

The central questions are which changes he will demand and whether the haredi parties will be prepared to accept them.

At this stage, Liberman has not presented an updated version of the bill or specified which provisions of his original framework he considers nonnegotiable.

The distinction between the two proposals also illustrates the political complexity of reaching an agreement.

In 2018, the haredi parties opposed Liberman’s legislation because they regarded its recruitment targets, budgetary sanctions, and mechanism allowing the exemption arrangement to expire as threats to the yeshiva world.

With proposals that include personal sanctions now under consideration, Liberman’s earlier framework could appear to those parties to offer a more comfortable starting point for negotiations.

Nevertheless, his original proposal was not without costs for the haredi parties, and some ultra-Orthodox factions continue to oppose recruitment targets and sanctions.

There is therefore no basis for a sweeping conclusion that Bismuth’s framework is more stringent than Liberman’s, or vice versa.

Bismuth’s proposal is stricter on personal sanctions, while Liberman’s includes a tougher mechanism for addressing systematic failures to meet recruitment targets.

Differences in the exemption age, the number of recruits, and how they are counted further complicate the comparison.

From the perspective of the IDF’s current manpower needs, neither proposal, as originally formulated, independently guarantees a sufficient increase in the number of soldiers.

Could Liberman’s 2018 proposal help Eisenkot form a government?

The renewed attention surrounding Liberman’s proposal comes as Eisenkot faces the challenge of forming a coalition involving parties with sharply conflicting positions on military conscription.

If he receives the presidential mandate, Eisenkot is expected to lead coalition negotiations and will be responsible for reaching agreements with the haredi parties and other potential coalition partners.

Liberman has indicated that he is prepared to consider compromises based on previously proposed frameworks, including the legislation he advanced as defense minister in 2018.

He also referred to the Shkedi Report and the military conscription legislation promoted by the most recent coalition.

“In 2018, I submitted a draft law formulated by the IDF and the defense establishment,” Liberman wrote.

However, he did not demand that the original framework be adopted in its entirety, nor did he claim that Eisenkot intended to use it as the basis for coalition negotiations.

Haredi sources say discussions are already taking place between figures in the ultra-Orthodox parties and people close to Liberman, and that the removal of the veto on political cooperation is mutual.

According to the sources, the haredi parties have a long history of working with the Yisrael Beytenu chairman, and they believe their trust in him could even exceed their trust in Eisenkot.

Nevertheless, the sources expressed doubts about Eisenkot’s ability to bring Shas into a coalition, even if he reaches agreements with United Torah Judaism (UTJ).

UTJ has faced its own dilemma over coalition negotiations and the draft law, with the party declining to clarify whether its demand for conscription legislation would also apply to a potential Eisenkot-led government.

“It is no coincidence that Deri recommended Netanyahu,” the haredi sources said.

Without Shas, the Zionist change bloc and UTJ would hold only 55 Knesset seats.

The difficulty helps explain why Liberman is presenting compromise with the haredi parties as a political necessity rather than an ideological shift.

For the Yisrael Beytenu chairman, the alternative, a minority government dependent on Arab parties, remains unacceptable.

He reiterated that he would not support a government dependent on Ra’am or the Joint List, even if that position complicated efforts to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“Those who attack me for my attempts to reach understandings with the haredi parties are among the same people who prefer to establish a government dependent on Ra’am and the Joint List,” he argued.

Liberman accused some Arab party lawmakers of identifying with Hamas and made his opposition to such a coalition clear.

“That will not happen. I will not lend a hand to the establishment of such a government, which, in my view, would harm security and return Netanyahu to power,” he said.

He argued that the election results required a reassessment of the available political options.

“In the reality that has emerged, in order to prevent another election and put an end to the Netanyahu era, there is no choice but to make difficult decisions and reach conclusions on issues where flexibility can be shown, and understandings can be reached,” he wrote.

Despite his willingness to negotiate, Liberman insisted that his fundamental position on military conscription had not changed.

“I still believe that the correct model is a draft law for everyone,” he wrote.

“Reaching an understanding does not mean abandoning principles, and dialogue does not mean erasing red lines.”

Sources in haredi political circles believe that the ultra-Orthodox parties and Yisrael Beytenu would vote against a government dependent on Arab parties, although that remains an assessment rather than an official voting decision.

The challenge facing Eisenkot is therefore not simply persuading Liberman and the haredi parties to negotiate, but reconciling the competing demands of potential coalition partners whose positions on conscription and Arab party participation remain far apart.

Liberman also rejected allegations that his change of position was motivated by personal aspirations to become prime minister.

“I am not acting out of personal ambition to become prime minister at any cost,” he wrote.

“I have always emphasized that, as far as I am concerned, it is an option, not an obsession.”

He recalled that since 2019, he had received numerous offers from the opposing political camp, according to his account, and denied engaging in political maneuvers or attempting to undermine another candidate.

Liberman also emphasized his commitment to those serving in the military.

He noted that during his tenure as finance minister, the salaries of conscripted soldiers were raised by 50%, and the Mimadim LeLimudim (“From Uniforms to Studies”) program was included in the state budget.

He said that even under a future compromise, he would not abandon efforts to expand benefits and improve conditions for reservists and career military personnel.

The focus will now shift to Eisenkot, who must determine whether coalition agreements can be reached between the haredi parties and potential Zionist partners demanding substantial military enlistment and a more equal sharing of the defense burden.

The wording of any proposed legislation remains unknown, as does whether agreements can be reached with the haredi parties and whether other potential coalition partners would accept them.

For Liberman, the 2018 framework represents a possible reference point for negotiations, not a completed coalition agreement.

Lifting the veto makes dialogue possible, but it does not guarantee that the dispute over military conscription will be resolved.

This post was originally published on here. 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is focused on preventing Iran from acquiring advanced weapons and other materials. One of the new initiatives is to focus on the Caspian Sea as one of the routes that Iran has used during the war. This is not the first time the Caspian Sea has been in the spotlight.

The Caspian Sea has emerged as an increasingly important strategic corridor linking Iran and Russia, providing a route for commercial trade, military equipment, and sanctioned goods. The establishment of CENTCOM’s Task Force Iron Gate on November 7, aimed at restricting Iranian weapons transfers across land borders and the Caspian Sea, spotlights the growing importance of this inland waterway.

Russia has used the Caspian in the past to carry out airstrikes in Syria and Ukraine. As such, this area is already known to be militarily important to Russia. Iran has also invested in the Caspian in various ways. It maintained a naval presence there and expanded infrastructure along the coast, hoping to knit the coastline into a north-south trade corridor with Azerbaijan, Russia and Central Asia.

The Caspian is the world’s largest enclosed inland body of water. Five countries border it: Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. During the Soviet era, Iran and the Soviet Union were the only two major states on the sea. Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, newly independent countries emerged along its shores, transforming the region’s landscape.

Historical trade across the sea dates back centuries, including commercial links between northern Iran and Russian ports. In modern times, the Caspian has become part of the International North-South Transport Corridor, a network connecting Russia to Iran and onward to Pakistan and India by rail, road, and maritime shipping. Iran was investing in this before the war began in February. Iran sought to shift its trade to China and Central Asia as it was cut off from the West.

Russian, Iranian ports handle agricultural trade, industrial goods, other cargo

Russia’s key Caspian ports include Astrakhan and Makhachkala, while Iran operates ports such as Bandar Anzali and Amirabad. These sites handle agricultural trade, such as grain, as well as the transport of industrial goods and other cargo.

The Caspian route became more important after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when Western sanctions increased pressure on both Moscow and Tehran. Unlike the Persian Gulf, the Caspian is not directly accessible to Western navies.

The sea is important for Moscow’s military moves. Russia launched strikes in Syria from the Caspian in 2015. In November 2024, the spokesman of the Ukrainian Navy, Dmytro Pletenchuk, said, “There are also missile carriers in the Caspian Sea that can launch Kalibr missiles, but the Russians more often use the Caspian Sea to launch strikes from the air.

They enter this water area specifically, and from there they have launch lines in order to fire at Ukraine. They are doing this most likely to prevent casualties among their own civilian population in the event of an accidental dropping of old missiles.”

In August 2025, a website named militarnyi.com noted that “Ukrainian forces have struck a Russian vessel in the Caspian Sea that was transporting military cargo from Iran, marking the first confirmed loss of its kind. The cargo ship Port Olya-4 was hit in an airstrike by Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces.” In December 2025, more strikes may have happened. In September 2026, a report claimed that Ukraine may have targeted the Russian warship Tatarstan.

After the US and Israeli strikes on Iran, the Caspian was in the crosshairs. For instance, Radio Free Europe noted in April that “while the inland waterway has served as a sanctuary for Iranian drones bound for the battlefields of Ukraine in Moscow’s ongoing full-scale invasion, Israel recently launched air strikes on Bandar Anzali, an Iranian naval outpost on the Caspian.

Growing media reports based on intelligence say the corridor is now being used to transfer Russian-produced weaponry back to the Middle East, bringing Israeli air strikes closer to Moscow’s backyard.” This may have hampered Russian arms shipments.

Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia brought new attention to Caspian shipping. According to an April 2023 Wall Street Journal report, Iran shipped more than 300,000 artillery shells and one million rounds of ammunition to Russia across the Caspian in 2023. Iran also supplied Shahed drones and technology that helped Russia establish domestic drone production. Now that Iran is under blockade via the Gulf, Tehran may need shipments from Russia.

The military relationship has also developed in the opposite direction. In May 2026, US officials told The New York Times that Russia was sending drone components to Iran through the Caspian, potentially helping Tehran replenish military capabilities following American and Israeli strikes. The report called the sea a “long-overlooked” trade corridor.

Iranian naval facilities in Caspian Sea struck in March 2026

The Caspian itself became a witness to the war in March 2026, when airstrikes hit Iranian naval facilities at Bandar Anzali. The March 18 strikes appear to have destroyed an Iranian Navy corvette, missile boats, and several auxiliary vessels. On July 25, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian forces had struck vessels involved in military cargo shipments connected to Iran, as well as a Russian warship. Ukraine dismissed Iranian threats of retaliation at the time.

Commercial shipping has continued despite the attacks. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, the number of active Iranian- and Russian-flagged vessels in the Caspian increased 21% year on year in August 2026, while general cargo capacity on the bilateral corridor rose 36%. The Caspian route faces limitations, including shallow waterways, restricted port capacity, and other challenges.

For the US, the challenge now is distinguishing civilian commerce from military shipments and sanctions evasion. Task Force Iron Gate indicates that the US increasingly views the Caspian as part of Iran’s wider military and economic supply network. The sea, once a commercial link between Russia and Iran, has become a strategic corridor linking two major conflicts.

How the US will implement its new policy in the Caspian remains unclear. The statement is certainly a warning to Iran and Russia. However, the US administration has sought to improve ties with Moscow. This means that the US would be wary of harming Russian shipping. In addition, countries on the Caspian may be wary of seeing the war spread to the sea. 

This post was originally published on here. 

An NBC News national exit poll put the Democratic share of the Jewish vote for the US House at 68%. A week earlier, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud emerged from Israel’s election as the largest party, with 27 of the Knesset’s 120 seats.

American Jews were voting on American concerns. Israelis brought their own fears and priorities to the ballot box. For years, I have told American Jewish leaders that they have neglected the Israeli Right. I have spent just as long trying to persuade Israelis to understand the communities abroad whose loyalty we so readily expect.

Democrats have won both houses of Congress. President Isaac Herzog has chosen Yashar’s Gadi Eisenkot to try to form Israel’s next government. We need relationships that can survive changes of government, disagreements over Israel and the discovery that our fellow Jews voted for someone we dislike.

A movement making responsibility for Diaspora a sustained force in Israeli politics

Ahead of the Jewish Federations’ General Assembly in Washington, I want to propose a three-year experiment: an Israeli citizens’ movement that makes responsibility for the Jewish world a sustained force in Israeli politics.

Call it a reverse AIPAC.

AIPAC organizes American support for Israel. This movement would organize Israelis to advocate to their own politicians about the concerns of Jews abroad. Israelis would join, pay dues, elect the leadership, and choose campaigns. A Jewish community facing the consequences of an Israeli decision would have people here prepared to take up its concerns.

Recently, I met an Israeli researcher who had organized a US delegation for prominent right-wing journalists, broadcasters and influencers, including outspoken Netanyahu supporters. I knew some of the names. Several had been harsh toward American Jewry.

The delegation was private; the names will remain private. The organizer is firmly on the Right. She explained that many participants would have refused an invitation from an organization they regarded as progressive. They trusted her.

She told me they returned with a more complicated understanding of American Jewish life. She is raising money for another cohort, and I offered to volunteer. I have been asking organizations to arrange encounters like these for years.

Consider whom those invitations reach. A room full of people already committed to this relationship can produce an encouraging photograph and leave the harder work untouched.

I know how marginal that work can feel. When I covered the Diaspora in Hebrew, I warned leaders that I would eventually have to move on because I saw no professional future on the beat. One major outlet offered an apparently brighter prospect: “Start with the Diaspora; eventually you’ll be a political reporter.” Covering Jews abroad was something an ambitious journalist could hope to recover from.

Our ignorance has consequences. A minister’s reckless statement can leave a rabbi, a student or a pastor abroad answering for it. Evangelicals, Republicans and pro-Israel Democrats deserve a partner who considers the difficulties he creates for them. Better advocacy requires reliable information and responsible Israeli conduct.

On Friday, CUFI Action Fund, the political arm of Christians United for Israel, challenged US Vice President JD Vance’s claim that the Iran war and the US-Israel relationship helped cause Republican losses. Our evangelical allies are defending this partnership inside their own political camp.

Jewish communities also deserve our interest in their own lives, including when they disagree with us. Israeli sovereignty gives us power whose consequences extend beyond our electorate. Listening to those affected belongs among the responsibilities of exercising it.

Gary Torgow, now JFNA’s chairman, urged Israel in 2021 to “invest time, effort and money to reengage the Diaspora community.” JFNA President and CEO Eric Fingerhut had put it more personally in 2020: “We love Israel, we love all the people of Israel – love us back.” This movement would give Israelis a way to answer them.

Run the pilot from 2027 through 2029. Aim for 10,000 Israeli members by the end of its third year. At full dues of NIS 30 a month, that membership would generate NIS 3.6 million annually for professional advocacy. Reduced dues should keep membership accessible. Start with a volunteer organizing committee; hire lobbyists as recurring Israeli dues cover the salaries.

Lobby 99 offers experience in recurring member funding and member-chosen priorities. Its socioeconomic remit excludes the political and religious disputes this movement would confront. Dan Lahav, a former deputy director-general of Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office who oversaw Diaspora affairs, has already argued for an effective Diaspora lobby in Israel.

Give every Israeli member one vote. Publish the accounts, cap individual contributions and limit leadership terms. Philanthropists could separately finance encounters, education, independent journalism and evaluation. Contributions should buy no additional votes or leadership seats.

A rotating Diaspora council, spanning countries, religious streams, generations and people outside established organizations, should have the right to propose campaigns, receive answers and publish disagreement. Israeli members would elect the movement’s leadership. Participation would confer no vote in Israel’s elections.

Begin with specific work: consultation before changing rules affecting Jewish visitors and communities; dependable access to prayer at the Western Wall; and hearings about the consequences abroad of Israeli decisions. Local Jewish communities should be heard before ministers embrace foreign political movements whose histories those communities know. Members could meet their own parties’ representatives, organize Knesset hearings and publish an annual record of commitments kept and broken. A politician should encounter this concern at a local party meeting as well as on a visit to New York.

Encounters and journalism would help members understand Jewish communities abroad. Expand trusted encounters like the researcher’s delegation. Give Israeli journalists fellowships to cover Jewish life regularly, with editors committing to publication. Test the monthly bilingual review I have proposed: the same reporting and arguments, in the same order and framing, in Hebrew and English, with readers responding to one another.

Birthright, Masa Israel Journey, the Z3 Project, the Jewish Agency’s Partnership2Gether, Gesher, the Ruderman Family Foundation and President Isaac Herzog’s Voice of the People already offer experience and relationships. The pilot should work with them and explain what it adds.

Research should begin when the pilot launches. Independent researchers should establish a baseline, follow participants and comparable nonparticipants, and repeat surveys annually. Measure knowledge of Jewish communities, sustained personal contact, and willingness to engage across disagreement. Publish membership renewals, the range of people joining, official responses, and completed policy changes alongside those findings.

An independent review of movement’s effectiveness after three years

Agree on the measures before launch and publish disappointing results too. After three years, an independent review should recommend expansion, revision or closure. Funders should know when an experiment fails.

The movement could easily become another gathering of Israelis who already agree. Its founders would have to recruit across political and religious divisions and keep members involved when campaigns challenged their own loyalties. Israelis exhausted by war and reserve duty would need room to explain their lives as fully as the Jews they were meeting.

I want the people leaving the GA to have something concrete to help establish, and Israelis to assume responsibility for keeping it alive.

When a politician next speaks recklessly about Jews abroad, I want an Israeli who voted for him to object.

This post was originally published on here. 

Malicious actors are carrying out a “well-orchestrated and well-funded” disinformation campaign relating to Israel’s activities in Mexico, Israeli Ambassador to Mexico Yoed Magen claimed during a press conference on Friday.

The veteran diplomat convened the gathering to address what he referred to as “an alarming campaign of hatred and incitement against Israel on social media” in recent weeks.

The campaign, he continued, involves “blatant lies” and “false claims,” specifically conspiracy theories related to Israel’s relationship with Mexico.

“It is clear that the campaign is well orchestrated and well funded,” he told the press on Friday. “It includes ridiculous accusations bordering on delusion, such as claims that Israel is stealing Mexico’s water or wants to control it, or that former Israeli soldiers are infiltrating Chiapas or that Israel seeks to colonize Mexico, among other things.”

“These lies distort reality and create a false perception of Israel,” he stressed.

Magen: Campaign exploited to ‘promote hatred, delegitimize Israel’

Magen also alleged that the campaign is being exploited by various actors, both in Mexico and abroad, “including Palestinians,” to “promote hatred, delegitimize Israel, and damage its good relations with Mexico.”

Magen then specifically addressed the accusation that Israel is seeking to take control of Mexican water.

He told the press that Israel is a “world leader” in water management, having become self-sufficient in water more than 25 years ago, allowing it to supply water even to its neighbors, including Jordan and the Palestinians.

“Since our independence, we have invested heavily in research and the development of irrigation solutions, water technologies, and precision agriculture,” Magen said, before listing some of Israel’s water-related achievements, such as collecting and treating 94% of wastewater and reusing 87% of it.

Over the years, he continued, Israeli experts and companies have gained extremely valuable experience and knowledge and want to share it with other countries, not just Mexico.

For this reason, Magen said Israel is invited to different Mexican states to understand their challenges and share best practices and solutions.

This includes, for example, a recent trip by Israeli representatives to the Agro Expo in Yucatán.

Magen also rejected allegations that Israel was seeking control over water resources in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua.

The accusations emerged three years ago following a 2023 cooperation agreement between the state government and Israel’s international development agency, MASHAV, which activists have criticized over concerns about foreign involvement in water infrastructure.

Magen said the agreement’s purpose was to draw on Israeli expertise to address the state’s water challenges, but the operational component of the agreement was never signed and never implemented.

The agreement has been hotly protested by locals in recent months, including a larger protest at the start of August where Chihuahuans marched with signs reading ‘Water is for Mexicans, not for Zionists.’

Regarding accusations of Israeli soldiers infiltrating Chiapas, Magen said thousands of Israelis travel to South America and Central America for their ‘big trip’ after finishing the army. Some, he added, put the “Israeli spirit of volunteerism into practice” by volunteering in schools and communities or helping provide humanitarian assistance.

“It is important to clarify that these young people volunteer in many Latin American countries and, in fact, throughout the world. They always coordinate their activities with local authorities,” he said.

Magen concluded by expressing hope that his explanations “will clear up any misunderstandings that may have been deliberately caused by this campaign, this campaign of hatred against Israel, a campaign that seeks to damage relations between our two peoples.”

In recent weeks, claims have circulated on social media that Israeli soldiers were authorized to enter an indigenous school in Chiapas, a southern Mexican state known for having one of the nation’s largest indigenous populations.

The controversy largely emerged due to pro-Palestinian solidarity groups, which called for an investigation into the presence of Israelis at schools in Zinacantán, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, and Chamula.

According to testimonies and photographs circulated online, approximately 25 individuals identified by those making the allegations as IDF members appeared alongside Tsotsil children during school activities.

The visitors seem to have been coordinated by the Israeli nonprofit organization Heroes for Life, known in Spanish as Héroes por la Vida, which organizes short-term (usually two-week) humanitarian volunteer trips for Israeli backpackers and recently discharged IDF soldiers traveling abroad.

Heroes for Life volunteers helped renovate, paint schools, taught classes

The individuals reportedly helped renovate and paint schools and taught English, science, and music classes.

On November 3, the Chiapas Education Department denied authorizing current or former members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to enter public schools in indigenous communities in the Los Altos region.

The department’s head, Roger Adrián Mandujano Ayala, told the press he was aware of members of a foreign organization participating in activities at a school, although he said their entry appeared to have been arranged directly with parents.

This post was originally published on here. 

A Tel Aviv man with 14 previous convictions has been charged with breaking into a yeshiva on Rothschild Boulevard and stealing approximately 10 pairs of tefillin, a charity box, and other valuables, according to an indictment filed over the weekend.

The suspect, Roy Cohen, a Tel Aviv resident in his 40s who has previously served lengthy prison sentences, told investigators that he did not recognize himself in surveillance footage presented to him. He also claimed to be homeless.

According to the indictment, Cohen arrived at the yeshiva at approximately 9:30 p.m. on October 29, forced open the entrance door, and entered the building.

He allegedly stole approximately 10 pairs of tefillin, each valued at NIS 2,500, bringing their total estimated value to NIS 25,000.

Other items reported stolen included a cellphone worth approximately NIS 2,000, a watch, cash, and a charity box containing money.

Police identify suspect following investigation

Officers from the Lev Tel Aviv Police Station in the Yarkon District launched an investigation following the break-in and were able to identify Cohen as a suspect.

Cohen was arrested on November 3 and taken in for questioning. During his interrogation, he claimed that he did not recognize himself in the footage shown to him and told investigators that he was homeless.

He was taken into custody following the interrogation.

Police said Cohen has a criminal record that includes 14 previous convictions, for which he has served lengthy prison sentences over the years.

Following the investigation, the Tel Aviv District Prosecution Unit filed an indictment charging Cohen with breaking into a nonresidential building and theft.

Prosecutors also requested that the court order Cohen to remain in custody until the conclusion of legal proceedings against him.

This post was originally published on here. 

Iran continues to feel pressure from US sanctions and the blockade in the Gulf. Iran is also confronted by a new campaign by the US to cut it off from supplies going through its land borders and the Caspian Sea. As Tehran feels pressure, the militias it backs in Iraq may lash out. Iran has spread the current war to Iraq and has sought for decades to influence Iraqi politics using militias and political groups.

One of the militias, Kataib Hezbollah, slammed Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi over the weekend. “The security chief of pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah on Saturday accused Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and his top aide of amassing billions of dollars in alleged illicit wealth, while denying that the armed group controls commercial contracts at Iraqi airports and threatening to expose alleged plots targeting the Kurdistan Region’s Khor Mor gas field,” Rudaw media reported.

“How was your massive financial empire built, which Mr. al-Zaidi acknowledged, amounting to nearly [21] trillion dinars – that is, more than [13] billion dollars? And how was this wealth collected in a period of time not exceeding [10] years, so that perhaps hardworking youth may benefit from it in earning their livelihood,” Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, Kataib Hezbollah’s security chief, wrote in a statement published on Telegram.

This illustrates how Kataib Hezbollah is now trying to challenge the Iraqi government and its leader. Kataib Hezbollah, like its counterpart in Lebanon, Hezbollah, is a key part of the Iranian proxy network. Kataib Hezbollah has carried out attacks on US forces in Iraq in the past. It has also attacked Saudi Arabia and killed three American service members in Jordan in January 2024. It also kidnapped researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov. 

Rudaw notes that “Assaf also warned against opening files concerning alleged plots to target the Kurdistan Region’s Khor Mor gas field, saying: ‘We do not want to air dirty laundry in public, nor open the files of [Khor Mor] and the incitement to target it for the purpose of extorting the UAE; for whoever’s house is made of glass should not throw stones at people.’”

The Khor Mor field is in the Kurdistan Region between Sulimaniyeh and Kirkuk. It is key to the Kurdistan Region’s energy grid. Kataib Hezbollah may be feeling pressure from Baghdad. Zaidi has demanded that groups like Kataib Hezbollah hand over their arms to the government. There are a dozen similar groups in Iraq, militias of various sizes backed by Iran. These include Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Kataib al-Imam Ali and others.

Iran-backed militias in Iraq have played a central role in expanding Tehran’s influence in the country, particularly through their involvement in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Several of these groups have been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the United States, reflecting their involvement in attacks and other activities linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Kataib Hezbollah was designated an FTO in July 2009. The group has been linked to attacks on US forces in Iraq and the wider region. The US designated Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, as an FTO in January 2020. Both organizations have maintained close relationships with Iran while also participating in Iraq’s political and security landscape.

Iran backing militias in Iraq to expand influence

In September 2025, the US expanded its FTO designations to include four additional Iraqi militias: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, led by Akram al-Kaabi; Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, associated with Abu Alaa al-Walaei; Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya; and Kataib al-Imam Ali. These organizations had previously been subject to US terrorism-related sanctions.

Other influential Iran-backed factions have not been designated FTOs. These include the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, which has longstanding ties to Iran and significant influence within Iraq’s political and security institutions. Saraya al-Khorasani and Kataib Jund al-Imam are also associated with Iran-aligned militia networks.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq serves as an umbrella identity used by several Iran-backed factions to claim attacks. The PMF itself, which includes numerous armed groups with differing allegiances, is not designated an FTO by the United States.

Rudaw adds that “Zaidi initially set the end of September as the deadline for armed factions to surrender their weapons, coinciding with the end of the United States-led coalition’s military mission in Iraq, before extending the timetable to the end of June 2027.” This is one reason the militias feel pressure.

Iran-backed militias involved in Mosul airport corruption

Meanwhile, the militias appear to have been involved in corruption at Mosul airport. Mosul was liberated from ISIS in June 2017. It has been reconstructed. However, militias took over swaths of the Nineveh plains and have played a role in Mosul. “Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on Saturday ordered the cancellation of three commercial contracts at Mosul International Airport over the companies’ alleged links to armed groups, directing that the contracts be awarded to international firms,” Rudaw noted.

According to the Iraqi News Agency (INA), citing a source, Zaidi has directed “the cancellation of the contract of ‘Sky Plus’ company for leasing counters at Mosul Airport against the backdrop of its links to armed groups, and its referral to international companies.”

In his recent statement, Assaf dismissed reports by the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya television network alleging that Kataib Hezbollah controls contracts inside Iraqi airports as a “blatant lie” and part of a “media war” waged against the pro-Iran Axis of Resistance, Rudaw noted.

This post was originally published on here. 

Head of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, Arye Deri, announced Sunday that he would withdraw from the party list and would not be a member of the 26th Knesset.

The move means Deri will no longer serve as a member of Knesset, but will retain his position as Shas’s political leader, continuing to oversee the party’s direction and coalition negotiations.

His resignation will also allow the next eligible candidate on Shas’s electoral list to enter the Knesset in his place.

The announcement comes days after the Shas Council of Torah Sages rejected Deri’s request to step down as party leader on Wednesday, following the party’s heavy losses in last month’s election.

Shas won just six seats, down from 11 in the outgoing Knesset, its weakest result in more than two decades.

Shas rabbis initally reject Deri’s resignation request

Shas had initially denied reports that Deri had submitted a resignation letter, rejecting claims that he had formally announced he was leaving either the Knesset or the party leadership.

In a letter last Wednesday, the council said it had “heard with great sorrow” Deri’s request and would “forbid him from leaving his position in the movement.

“We are confident that he will fulfill the will of the sages, as he has always done,” the letter said.

Deri said he accepted the council’s “unequivocal directive” and would remain in his post. “I accept it without hesitation or reservation, and thank the rabbis for the trust and support they have given me throughout the way,” he said.

Keshet Neev contributed to this article.

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Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot officially received the mandate to form a government from President Isaac Herzog on Sunday during a ceremony at the President’s Residence, as the opposition bloc seeking to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued its efforts to secure coalition partners.

Eisenkot will have 28 days to form a government, and the president may grant an extension of up to 14 additional days if necessary.

Eisenkot receives 67 recommendations in the week following elections 

The Yashar leader received 67 recommendations during consultations Herzog held throughout last week with representatives of all the parties set to serve in the incoming Knesset. Meanwhile, Netanyahu received 46 recommendations.

Eisenkot received the backing of both Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, although their recommendations do not commit them to ultimately joining his coalition.

The election results showed a political deadlock in which no bloc received a 61-seat Knesset majority, making the path to forming the next government unclear. Netanyahu’s bloc secured 53 seats, while the opposition bloc won 48. The Arab parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, won a record-breaking 19 seats combined.

If the candidate fails to form a government within the allotted time, informs Herzog that the effort has failed, or presents a government that fails to win a confidence vote, the president must decide within three days whether to assign the task to another MK or inform the Knesset speaker that he sees no possibility of forming a government.

Meanwhile, in Netanyahu’s bloc, the parties that recommended the prime minister included Likud, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit,  Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist Party (RZP), Moshe Feiglin’s Zehut, and Arye Deri’s Shas.

The haredi (ultra-Orthodox) United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party, a longtime coalition partner of Netanyahu, declined to recommend a candidate for prime minister.

UTJ’s decision to abstain comes amid reported tensions between the haredi party and Netanyahu, and it benefits the opposition bloc seeking to replace him. Opposition party leaders have recently signaled greater openness to including haredi parties in their coalition, beginning negotiations with them.

The political deadlock could ultimately lead to another election, although the parties may still reach an agreement through coalition negotiations. Other possible outcomes include a unity government between Netanyahu and members of Eisenkot’s bloc, or a minority government.

What happens next?

Under Israeli law, if the candidate who receives the mandate fails to form a government within the allotted time, informs Herzog that the effort has failed, or presents a government that fails to win a confidence vote, the president must decide within three days whether to assign the task to another MK or inform the Knesset speaker that he sees no possibility of forming a government.

A second candidate would then have 28 days to establish a coalition, without the possibility of an extension.

If the second attempt also fails, or Herzog decides not to appoint another candidate, a 21-day period begins during which at least 61 MKs can jointly request that the president assign the task to a particular lawmaker. That candidate would have 14 days to form a government.

Should all attempts fail, the Knesset would be dissolved, and another election would be held. Until a new government wins the Knesset’s confidence and takes office, the outgoing government remains in place in a caretaker capacity.

Shir Perets contributed to this report.

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The Druze community has faced more than double the amount of violent and incendiary discourse on Israeli social media since the elections last month, a FakeReporter report released last week found.

FakeReporter found that online hate speech against the Druze increased by 106% from Election Day until October 30, when activity peaked because some Right-wing conspiracists began pushing claims that Arab voters stole the election.

The report, first reported by Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, emphasized that the accounts leading the trend were all associated with current coalition parties.

Pro-government accounts on X included pictures of polling stations in Druze villages with captions such as “the Druze are ungrateful. They betrayed Netanyahu and stabbed him in the back,” while also including false claims about low percentages of Druze support for Likud.

Between October 27 and October 31, FakeReporter identified 952 posts mentioning the Druze community among X accounts it classified as part of the “poison machine.”

Online anti-Druze sentiment comes after Likud received 5% more Druze votes than in 2022

However, the hate comments came after Druze support for Netanyahu’s Likud rose. 

While a majority of Druze voters chose Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar or Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beytenu, support for Likud rose among Druze voters by 5% since the last election.

FakeReporter noted that in the 2026 Knesset elections, Likud received 16% of overall Druze votes, as compared to 11% in the 2022 election. However, Druze support for Likud fell from its overall high in 2021, when the party received an overall Druze vote share.

Notably, Yashar and Yisrael Beiteinu both have Druze candidates who will serve in the 26th Knesset: Kamil Abu Rukun was 13th on Yashar’s list, and MK Hamad Amar was 7th on Yisrael Beiteinu’s list.

‘I spit on you’: Pro-government accounts claim Israeli Druze ungrateful to Netanyahu

Several of the comments portrayed the Druze community as traitors to Israel.

“Very unfortunate… but says a lot about the Arab character… I spit on you,” one post, with 64,400 views, reads.

Others characterized the Druze community as inseparable from other Arabic-speaking communities in Israel.

Another user posted that the Druze community “are no longer my brothers. You have Muslim brothers. Wretched traitors.” That post received 27,000 views.

Some of the comments identified by FakeReporter accused the Druze of being “ungrateful” to Netanyahu and to Israel, and accused them of bringing the “…next massacre upon your Druze brothers in Syria.”

“After these elections I understood that it is only a matter of interest and apparently if they were strong, they too would slaughter me if only they could… In my opinion, these ungrateful people should be transferred to Syria and Lebanon.”

A small minority of the hate comments called for the Druze community to be expelled from the country.

“The Druze are traitors who should have been murdered… What have we seen? That one must not trust the gentiles,” one comment read.

“The Druze are Arabs exactly like Hamas; they too should be expelled from here,” another read.

Most of the comments that called for expelling the Druze from Israel had only a few dozen views.

Notably, FakeReporter noted that it identified a 428% increase in the amount of negative and inflammatory discourse against Arab Israelis two days after the elections, approximately when coalition supporters began claiming the election was stolen.

FakeReporter CEO Nir Rosen noted that “this is not just an attack against the Druze community, but part of a broader discourse of delegitimization of the election results, and of populations that voted contrary to the political expectations of profiles belonging to the poison machine.”

Some of the accounts that led the vitriolic comments against the Druze had tens of thousands of followers, and several were followed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s son, Yair.

“This is dangerous discourse that undermines the social fabric in Israel and harms its democratic foundations,” Rosen said.

“When incitement against entire populations becomes intertwined with attempts to undermine the legitimacy of election results, the danger is not only in deepening hatred and division, but also in refusing to accept the voters’ decision and deteriorating into violent confrontations.”

This post was originally published on here. 

After heavy rains caused flooding and swept away tents in Gaza on Saturday, Hamas blamed Israel for the situation.

Security officials rejected the criticism on Sunday morning, saying that as part of preparations for winter weather, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Gaza Board of Peace, and the UN had already transported a variety of supplies to the enclave.

Officials stated that 91,000 new tents, waterproof tarps, and 9,000 truckloads of clothing and blankets were among the equipment delivered to offset the flood damage.

COGAT also encouraged aid organizations and countries to continue donating supplies and assisting in humanitarian efforts.

Permanent buildings not to be reconstructed until Hamas disarms, security officials say

Meanwhile, security officials asserted that for as long as Hamas refuses to disarm and the Gaza Strip is not demilitarized, equipment for the reconstruction of buildings in Gaza and mobile homes will not be allowed in.

“Even now, Hamas is exploiting the aid entering the Gaza Strip to rebuild its military wing. It is not stopping its rearmament. It is exploiting the civilian environment and the entry of reconstruction equipment. We knew in advance that this would be the situation in winter, and therefore COGAT prepared for it,” a security official added.

The same security official explained that “the situation now is the best it has been since the war began. During previous winters, there was military maneuvering, restrictions on the entry of general equipment, and population displacement. There are difficulties in the Gaza Strip. There is no doubt. But they are not comparable to what existed at the height of the war.”

Security officials are waiting to see what new government will be formed in Gaza, what its policy on reconstruction will be, and whether it will insist on Hamas being disarmed.

COGAT prepared for Hamas campaign blaming Israel for flooding

As first reported by Walla, COGAT prepared for a coordinated Hamas campaign amid the winter storm that caused flooding in the Gaza Strip.

On Saturday, heavy rains and winds that had battered the Gaza Strip since Friday night flooded displacement camps, damaged tents, and left families without dry shelter. Hamas said that approximately 70,000 tents were flooded within 12 hours and estimated the initial direct damage at approximately $3 million.

Hamas launched a campaign against Israel, blaming it for the harsh winter conditions, while members of the terrorist organization uploaded photos and videos to social media.

Gaza’s Hamas-run Civil Defense said it had received 2,166 distress calls since the storm began but had managed to respond to only 218 of them.

The organization’s spokesperson, Mahmoud Basal, said that displacement camps, shelters, and entire areas had been flooded, with water levels reaching approximately 1.5 meters in some locations. According to him, shortages of equipment and rescue tools forced teams to limit themselves to providing help to many families.

According to Palestinian and Arab media reports, the flooding affected tents in the area of Gaza City’s port, western Deir al-Balah, the northern part of the Nuseirat camp, and areas of Jabalya and Beit Lahiya.

Water entered shelters, soaking mattresses, blankets, clothing, and personal belongings. Families attempted to remove the water with buckets or prevent it from reaching their tents by using sand.

This post was originally published on here. 

Significant policy differences between the Mossad and the IDF regarding Iran have once again become the norm after the Israeli defense establishment experienced a period of greater unanimity on the issue from 2023 to 2025, sources have told The Jerusalem Post.

The latest battle was regarding how aggressive to be about pushing for a joint US-Israel operation against Iran before the Israeli election.

Mossad director Roman Gofman was in favor, backing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir was opposed.

Despite that conflict, sources close to the Mossad told the Post that Channel 12 reports claiming Gofman supported an operation in the recent period were false.

Rather, they said that the debate centered on whether Gofman is most concerned about using a joint offensive opportunity with the US against Iran before that window closes.

Zamir has been more concerned that an attack during this sensitive election season could harm the legitimacy of any operation and be abused by Netanyahu against his rivals.

These debates have not been black and white, and there are circumstances in which Zamir would favor an attack on Iran and where Gofman might oppose one, but those are the general debate lines.

Both IDF, Mossad favored striking Iran in 2025, 2026 operations

In June 2025 and in early 2026, both the IDF and the Mossad were in favor of striking Iran with major operations.

In June 2025, they debated who would lead certain matters, but both sides eventually reached an understanding.

In 2023-2024, both the IDF and the Mossad favored taking more time to fully prepare to take out a wide range of Iranian targets before initiating a major strike.

The sides started to differ regarding the goals of the early 2026 operation.

Then-Mossad director David Barnea was all in to try to push for regime change with several practical plans that included the Kurds and – according to foreign sources – former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with the IDF being opposed to or lukewarm about such plans.

Generally, the IDF has been more doubtful that regime change is achievable in the short or medium term, while the Mossad, whether under Barnea or Gofman, has been more optimistic.

Mossad, IDF debated return to JCPOA in 2022

In June 2022, both the Mossad and the IDF debated whether returning to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a wise strategy.

Back in 2018, the Mossad favored convincing the US to pull out of the JCPOA, while the IDF favored staying in the deal, at least until close to 2024, when some of its limits – which Iran was then observing – would expire.

From 2010 to 2012, the Mossad and the IDF united against Netanyahu and then-defense minister Ehud Barak’s possible plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program.

They said that such an attack would prematurely draw the region into danger and chaos long before Iran was even near a nuclear weapon.

Netanyahu and Barak warned that, absent an attack, nuclear items would be moved to Iran’s underground Fordow nuclear facility, which would make it impossible for Israel to strike without help from the US, which, at the time, was considered doubtful.

This post was originally published on here. 

Seven people were killed and 112 were injured when two passenger trains collided south of Cairo on Sunday, Egypt’s Health Ministry said, according to BBC reporting and UPI. The ministry said 45 people sent to hospital had been discharged.

A train travelling from Giza to Fayoum struck the rear of another train heading from Cairo to Aswan between the Kafr Ammar and Al-Raqqa stations, according to the Egyptian National Railways Authority, as reported by UPI. Several carriages derailed, and the cause remained under investigation.

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said he had directed state agencies to provide medical care for the injured, investigate the circumstances of the collision promptly and hold accountable anyone found negligent. He offered condolences to the families of those killed and wished the injured a speedy recovery.

This is a developing story.

This post was originally published on here. 

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir claimed that Israel Police Commissioner Insp.-Gen. Danny Levy was being blackmailed by Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, accusing her of pressuring the police chief and influencing his conduct following the elections, in an interview on 103FM on Sunday.

“Unfortunately, the police commissioner is being blackmailed,” Ben-Gvir said. Asked who was blackmailing him, Ben-Gvir replied, “The attorney-general.”

“Google it,” Ben-Gvir continued. “It’s not that complicated to understand why the police commissioner did a complete 180. He was a police commissioner who implemented government policy, and I was pleased with him. She puts pressure on him; she screams at him in meetings. He gets shouted at by her, and she has several things she uses to pressure him.”

Asked what those issues were, Ben-Gvir instead brought up the head of the Israel Police Spokesperson’s Division.

“Arieh Doron, look into his role in this story,” he said.

“Google ‘the police commissioner’s building violations,’ and see who the building inspectors for his house were. The attorney-general is terrorizing people,” Ben-Gvir added.

Ben-Gvir outraged over reports Balet didn’t involve Shin Bet

Ben-Gvir continued, “If the police commissioner had shared these things with me, I would have told him, ‘Shame on you if you commit building violations, and shame on you if you hire building inspectors you’re not allowed to hire.

I don’t even let the grocery store give me a one-shekel discount. People bring me gifts, and I tell them I can’t accept them. If you’re a public figure, protect yourself, because everyone is watching your every move.'”

Ben-Gvir also sharply criticized Maj.-Gen. Boaz Balet, head of the Israel Police Investigations and Intelligence Division, following reports that Balet had prohibited police from transferring investigative materials to the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) in a case concerning election integrity.

“I think Boaz Balet is the attorney-general’s emissary for closing cases, covering things up and sweeping them under the rug,” Ben-Gvir said.

“Boaz Balet is a fraud; he is a liar who has taken control of the Investigations and Intelligence Division and is running it as though it belongs to him. The investigation was with Manny Binyamin. What is he doing there?”

Ben-Gvir expressed outrage over the report that Balet had decided not to involve the Shin Bet in matters concerning election integrity.

“Zini is talking about NIS 100 million that was transferred. We saw the vouchers. The suspicion is Qatar, and it’s clear there were various attempts at interference here. It’s also clear that in the prisons they passed materials to the Joint List,” he added.

Ben-Gvir was also confronted with remarks by his aide and fellow party member, Hanamel Dorfman, who argued that the high voter turnout for Arab parties was actually a protest vote by the Arab public against Ben-Gvir’s policies at the National Security Ministry.

Responding directly to Grinzaig, Ben-Gvir said, “You kept saying Ben-Gvir was worth nothing, and suddenly it’s blowing up in your face. Suddenly it turns out that the very people you told everyone I had no influence over all went to the polls to bring me down? That’s the best compliment I’ve ever received.”

“The claim that if the Arabs came out because of me, to bring down Itamar Ben-Gvir, that’s the best proof that I’ve done what hasn’t been done in 40 or 50 years,” Ben-Gvir added.

Brig.-Gen. Arieh Doron declined to comment on the remarks.

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A military-grade laser weapon system has been deployed as part of the air-defense network protecting President Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate, US security agencies have confirmed. 

Officials from NORAD and US Northern Command confirmed to The War Zone that counter-drone and air-defense capabilities had been deployed in and around Mar-a-Lago at the request of the US Secret Service, citing a heightened security environment while declining to disclose operational details. 

“These assets add a complementary layer of technology to enhance protection,” the statement said.

The system, AeroVironment’s LOCUST, is a high-energy laser designed to detect, track, and disable Group 1 through Group 3 (quadcopters, small drones, and fixed-wing aircraft that weigh up to 600 kilograms) using directed-energy technology. The system can be deployed in a fixed or mobile configuration, moved on a pallet, or mounted on a vehicle.

The Secret Service was quoted as saying that the agency “is operating in a heightened threat environment, and we continuously adapt our protective operations to incorporate cutting-edge tools, technologies, and methods to safeguard our protectees.”

According to The War Zone, at Mar-a-Largo the system is mounted on a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and operates as part of a larger defensive network alongside radar systems, infrared sensors, electronic countermeasures such as jamming systems, and AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range air-defense systems mounted on a floating platform.

Earlier this year, AeroVironment unveiled its LOCUST X3, and it is unclear which version has been deployed.

The LOCUST X3 features a scalable 20-35+ kilowatt laser and a modular beam director, and it uses AI to detect, track, and engage threats.

AeroVironment space, cyber, and directed energy president Mary Clum was quoted by Army Technology as saying that the upgraded HPL “transforms how defenders respond to the challenge of massed drone attacks. Its modular design and advanced AI allow for resilient, adaptive protection of critical assets on any platform, at the tactical edge, or at fixed sites. With LOCUST X3, operators can now counter high-volume threats with unmatched speed, precision, and affordability.”

In September, the company was awarded a contract of approximately $464.8 million by the US Army Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires. The contract marks the first-ever production for the high-energy laser weapon system in US history, allowing the US Army to field a scalable solution against hostile unmanned aerial systems.

The contract will have the company deliver dozens of LOCUST X3 to the US Army to advance its layered air defense capabilities, “While also solidifying directed energy as a cornerstone of future battlefield operations,” the company said in a statement at the time.

Low-cost, highly precise

The reported deployment marks another real-world use of counter-drone laser technology as the US military continues to expand the operational role of directed-energy weapons.

Driven by the pressing need to counter increasingly available weaponry like drones, governments and militaries around the world have been working to develop and deploy high-power laser technology. Hostile forces are flooding battlefields with low-cost but sometimes highly precise weapons, which, despite their affordability, can inflict significant damage. 

The growing proliferation of such weapons, including UAVs and guided munitions, poses a meaningful threat, necessitating defenses like high-power laser systems to neutralize them before they can cause harm. 

According to AeroVironment, LOCUST can engage a threat at less than $10 per shot, compared to more traditional kinetic weapons that can cost millions of dollars. The systems are designed to detect, engage, and defeat threats within seconds, delivering a highly accurate strike as soon as the threat is identified. 

A report by Army Technology said that the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of War have established a safety agreement allowing the LOCUST system to be operated in US airspace.

This is meant to enable rapid response to provide a higher level of protection for both military and civilian targets. 

This post was originally published on here. 

Fourteen foreign nationals and three Palestinians were detained on suspicion of involvement in disturbances near Ras Karkar in the West Bank on Saturday, Israel Police said on Sunday.

Following questioning by the Judea and Samaria District Police, the cases of the foreign nationals were referred to the Population and Immigration Authority for hearings and decisions on their possible deportation from Israel.

According to a police statement, the incident occurred on Saturday after authorities received a report of a disturbance in the Samaria region. IDF troops and Border Police officers from the Judea and Samaria District were dispatched to the scene and detained 17 suspects on suspicion of involvement in the disturbance and violating a lawful order.

Officers from the Modi’in Illit police station also arrived at the scene, and the suspects were taken to the station for questioning.

During the investigation, conducted in cooperation with the foreign nationals desk of the Judea and Samaria District Police’s Central Unit, investigators raised suspicions that the foreign nationals had traveled to the area to provoke confrontations and clashes on the ground and promote media campaigns against Israel, allegedly intended to attract international attention.

Suspects thought to support BDS movement against Israel

Police further stated that several of the suspects were believed to support the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which advocates boycotts of Israel. Some were also suspected of expressing support for organizations that police described as anti-Israel and presenting them as legitimate groups.

Following the completion of questioning of the 14 foreign nationals, and after police said investigators had established an evidentiary basis for the suspicions against them, the investigation materials were transferred to the Population and Immigration Authority for review.

The move was carried out in coordination with the Foreign Ministry and the Population Administration at the Interior Ministry, enabling the authority to conduct hearings and determine whether the foreign nationals should be deported from Israel.

Police said the move was part of broader cooperation among the relevant authorities to prevent similar activities at various locations throughout Judea and Samaria.

The investigation into the remaining suspects is ongoing.

The Judea and Samaria District Police said it would continue taking action against incidents of friction and violence, including during the olive harvest season, as well as against what police described as manifestations of incitement, agitation, and identification with terrorist organizations.

According to police, such activities could lead to disturbances and endanger public safety.

This post was originally published on here. 

Israeli airline Israir is in preliminary talks to buy its main local rival Arkia in a bid to better compete against foreign carriers, Chief Executive Uri Sirkis said in a letter to staff.

Local media have reported that privately owned Arkia has recently suffered a loss, and though its results have not been published its owners said the airline had fallen into a “crisis” and they were working to find a solution.

Arkia stressed “its operations continue as usual” and it was “looking forward, making the adjustments required by a changing reality, maintaining operational stability, and continuing to develop its activity.”

Israir, valued at $144 million, and privately held Arkia are the second- and third-largest Israeli airlines behind flag carrier El Al.

In a letter to employees over the weekend seen by Reuters, Sirkis said that while Arkia is a worthy and respected competitor, Israir has invested more heavily in infrastructure, technology, and future development – including the purchase of eight aircraft, forming partnerships with hotels, and taking a stake in a credit card firm.

“That gives us a significant advantage today,” Sirkis said. “All these investments together place us as a significant potential buyer. Now there is an opportunity to leverage this infrastructure.”

Israir aims to carry 3.5 million passengers by 2030

He noted that Israir aims to carry 3.5 million passengers by 2030, with a fleet of some 20 aircraft.

“If the move is approved.. we will create an amazing aviation group that will compete on price and service against the major international airlines operating in Israel,” Sirkis said, adding it would create “significant annual savings in operating expenses and allow us to build a real competitive challenger under the Israeli flag.”

“This is not a takeover move; it is a move to strengthen Israeli aviation. It is a move that secures the future of all of us, of Israir and of Arkia alike” and “could change the map of Israeli aviation.”

Israir holds a 12% market share of passengers using Ben-Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv so far in 2026, while Arkia has nearly 11%. They have traditionally mainly operated on domestic routes and to Europe, but recently both have begun longer-haul flights to New York.

Arkia also now flies to destinations in Asia, such as Thailand and Vietnam, and plans flights to the Philippines starting in January.

Arkia reportedly loses $30 million in 2026

Israeli media have reported that Arkia made a loss of $30 million over the first three quarters of 2026, though Arkia says that as a private company it does not publish its financial results, so data are not official. Media also reported that its owners were considering a capital injection.

Arkia is owned by the Nakash brothers, who said in a statement: “The Nakash Group is working to find solutions to the crisis Arkia has fallen into, with the aim of rehabilitating the company and bringing about its recovery. Its approach is uncompromising, professional, and long-term, with the well-being of passengers and employees at the forefront.”

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A Siberian burial mound from the ancient Scythian culture dating to 2,800 years ago has yielded the oldest-known evidence for the use of cannabis for its mind-altering effects, with scientists finding its seeds among the grave goods and human hair bearing its chemical signatures inside the tomb.

Researchers said the evidence was unearthed in a monumental burial structure, around 460 feet in diameter, located in the Uyuk Valley of Russia’s remote Republic of Tyva. The tomb in southern Siberia was the last resting place of high-ranking members of Scythian society, known for its expertise in horseback warfare and gold craftsmanship, and its relatively nomadic lifestyle across the Eurasian steppe.

Cannabis is a versatile plant that has been used and domesticated for thousands of years not only for psychoactive purposes, getting high, but also for its fiber and oilseed production. It is one of today’s most commonly used intoxicants. But figuring out the history of its psychoactive use has been difficult because of the perishable nature of plant remains.

“There is a lot of speculation about the use of psychoactive drugs in the past, but very rarely do we find concrete evidence and can actually confirm that a plant was consumed for this purpose,” said archaeologist Gino Caspari of the University of Bern in Switzerland and the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology in Germany, who led the study published in the journal Science.

“The reason for this is that plant matter and human soft tissue rarely survive, and even rarer is their preservation in the same context. Our study shows the earliest direct evidence of psychoactive cannabis consumption,” Caspari said.

This conclusion is underscored by the fact that the discovery comes in the context of a burial site and elaborate funerary rituals. The site predates the oldest previous evidence from the first millennium BCE for mind-altering use of cannabis such as evidence of implements in which it was burned from the Middle East and the Pamir Mountains in Central Asia.

The researchers recovered more than 1,400 cannabis seeds associated with burials inside the Siberian tomb, and used a scientific dating technique to trace their age to the early 8th century BCE.

“Things of value in the world of the living often made it into the burial context as an offering in this region,” Caspari said.

 Evidence found in hair braids

Chemical analysis of braids of hair from the bodies of several people found in the central burial chamber identified chemical signatures consistent with THC, the psychoactive compound in cannabis, and traces of cannabinol, a compound related to THC.

“The human body does build cannabis-related molecules like THC and CBD into the hair. That’s how drug tests work,” Caspari said. “We cannot really say how they consumed it based on the hair alone, but considering later evidence in the region it seems likely that it was inhaled.”

The burial mound was constructed using larch tree logs and clay, and the entire assemblage is encased in thousands of tons of stones. The researchers recovered items inside crafted in an artistic form called the Scythian animal style, as well as a number of unusual gold objects.

On the mound’s surface, Caspari said, the Scythians apparently performed animal sacrifices of dozens of horses and probably also of people, considering the scattered human bones found among the remains.

“Finding cannabis in a large burial already indicates that this has to be seen in a ritual context. We have found that both animal and human sacrifices might have been built up on the surface of the mound in the form of a spectral cavalcade. Propped up on stakes, the horses and dead riders would feature as a display of extreme social power within the steppe communities,” Caspari said.

Cannabis seeds in good state of preservation

The Scythians came into contact with rich cultures of their time including ancient Greece, as documented by 5th century BCE historian Herodotus.

“Herodotus described the spectral cavalcade ritual but we were always quite hesitant to believe his writings, as he tends to drift into the fantastic. After finding the remains in southern Siberia, we know that at least some of his descriptions about the steppe peoples had some truth,” Caspari said.

The seeds discovered at the site were in a good state of preservation.

“This is where it gets even more exciting. We have started sequencing some of the seeds, and we have really well-preserved DNA,” Caspari said. “That’s even rarer than having plant remains themselves, and it is currently the oldest cannabis DNA known. I think over the coming years we will be able to add details and partially rewrite the domestication history of this important crop.”

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The Kinneret‘s water level rose by just one centimeter over the weekend after record rainfall hit central and northern Israel, reaching 213.70 meters below sea level on Sunday, the Water Authority announced, with the lake still 39 centimeters lower than at the same time last year.

Water Authority spokesperson Itay Dudi said approximately 20 millimeters of rain fell over the lake during the weekend, while the flow of the Jordan River stood at six cubic meters per second.

“The effect of the rain on the river is still small to negligible,” Dudi said, adding that most of the rainfall from the current weather system was concentrated along Israel’s coastal plain, particularly in the south.

Dudi added that, “Over the past decade, there were three winters with worse figures: Exactly one decade ago, the water level was 3 cm higher than it is today.”

According to additional figures released by the Water Authority, the lake’s current level is among the lowest recorded for November 8 over the past decade. In 2017, the water level was 58 centimeters lower than today, while in 2018, it was 94 centimeters lower.

Kinneret water levels affected by desalination disruptions

The latest figures follow a decline in the Kinneret in September, when disruptions at Israel’s desalination plants forced authorities to pump more water from the lake to maintain the country’s supply.

As The Jerusalem Post previously reported, an algal bloom crisis forced desalination plants in southern Israel to shut down for nearly two weeks, prompting authorities to draw about 3.3 million cubic meters of water from the lake over 10 days.

During that time, the Kinneret’s water level dropped by 10 centimeters, reaching 213.50 meters below sea level on September 9, its lowest level for that date since 2018.

The disruptions also temporarily reversed Israel’s recent approach to managing the lake. In recent years, the Reverse National Water Carrier project has transferred desalinated water into the Kinneret to replenish the reservoir.

By September 10, all six desalination plants had resumed operations, although only the Hadera facility was operating at full capacity, while the remaining plants reportedly operated at about half capacity.

Eli Ashkenazi contributed to this report.

This post was originally published on here.