The Knesset plenum passed on Tuesday the contentious bill that will temporarily freeze the arrests of haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft evaders, with 58 lawmakers voting in favor and 54 against.

The passage of the bill in its final readings comes following severe legal warnings that the legislation is unbalanced, along with outcry from bereaved families and IDF veterans, amid the IDF’s severe manpower shortage. 

The plenum broke into clashes when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived ahead of the vote.

🇮🇱 “Shame!” chants as Netanyahu arrives to vote on a controversial bill granting broader immunity to ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Jews from military service.

The draft exemption for the ultra-Orthodox community has been a long-standing, highly divisive issue in Israel.

Many secular… pic.twitter.com/iA33BeNmVj

— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) July 14, 2026

As Netanyahu entered the plenum, opposition lawmakers repeatedly shouted “disgrace” and “get out.” The prime minister left the chamber shortly afterward and did not return for the vote.

The legislation’s passage also comes after IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir warned on Monday that implementing such a law would create an array of national security problems. 

He stated that he opposes the bill’s implementation “completely and unequivocally.”

צעקות “בושה” מספסלי האופוזיציה לעבר ראש הממשלה נתניהו שהגיע למליאה לקראת ההצבעה להצעת חוק להקפאת מעצרי העריקים https://t.co/zY7XXqW96g pic.twitter.com/AauNofB4RR

— ערוץ כנסת 99 (@KnessetT) July 14, 2026

Among the issues raised by Zamir was that such a law would decrease recruitment both from the haredi community and from the general Israeli population by delegitimizing the idea of the IDF as the “nation’s army” in which everyone is equally obligated to serve.

Eyal Zamir warns IDF could soon collapse due to manpower shortage

Zamir has warned in recent months that the IDF could soon collapse if no solution is found for the manpower shortage.

The bill proposes a temporary halt on draft evader arrests to remain in effect from the date the law is published until November 30.

The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) has noted that the proposal could remain in effect beyond its stated expiration date because of the upcoming elections, which are scheduled for October 27.

Temporary legislation passed shortly before an election, which is due to expire during the election period, is automatically extended by roughly four months, as the Knesset does not function normally during that time. 

As a result, the arrangement is likely to remain in force for at least six months.

Ahead of the vote, Knesset Legal Adviser Sagit Afik asked lawmakers to declare whether they have family members classified as draft evaders; haredi MKs whose relatives could benefit from the legislation may have a conflict of interest.

The haredi parties – Shas and United Torah Judaism – both provided lists of the lawmakers who had relatives classified as draft evaders.

The disclosure statement provided by the United Torah Judaism Party included the names of seven members of the party’s list.

This sparked outrage among opposition lawmakers in the plenum, who demanded that haredi MKs disclose exactly how many of their relatives had been classified as draft evaders.

A group of MKs from within Netanyahu’s coaltion voted against the bill, including MK Dan Illouz (Likud), MK Yuli Edelstein (Likud), and Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel (New-Hope United Right).

Haskel resigned from her position as deputy foreign minister immediately after the bill passed.

Defense Minister Israel Katz arrived at the plenum to vote in favor.

It had been unclear whether the Religious Zionist Party, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, would support the bill.

Reported tensions between Smotrich’s party and the haredi parties

There had been reported tensions between Smotrich’s party and the haredi parties over which bills to advance first on the legislative agenda amid the coalition’s legislative blitz to pass its legislation during the Knesset’s last week before it goes into recess ahead of the elections.

Lawmakers from the Religious Zionist Party ultimatly voted in favor.

There had been earlier reports that an agreement was reached after negotiations, with both sides agreeing to support each other’s legislation in the plenum.

The bill’s proposal defines a yeshiva student as someone who studies Torah at a yeshiva regularly, for no less than 45 hours per week, or in a kollel for no less than 40 hours per week.

The proposal also stipulates that the defense minister will be responsible for compiling the list of yeshivas that would be relevant,  according to criteria that will be established in regulations.

The government has presented its stance that the freeze of arrests would be beneficial, arguing that arresting yeshiva students who evade military service has undermined efforts to encourage broader enlistment among haredi men.

Opponents and the Knesset’s legal advisor have argued that the bill is unbalanced largely because it only calls for halting the arrests of draft evaders without including any sanctions on them.

The Knesset’s legal advisory warned in its opinion on Sunday that the legislation could effectively exempt haredim from IDF service, failing to advance “equality in sharing the burden.”

Afik also warned the panel ahead of the vote that the legislative process undertaken to advance the bill was an improper part of “an improper legislative process.”

Bill undergone significant changes from first reading

Critics argue that the bill has undergone significant changes from the version that passed its first reading years ago, following dozens of committee discussions that reshaped its original framework in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

“Out of this long and complex legislative process, one small section was taken, and everything else was deleted. In my view, this raises a claim far more serious than merely a ‘new subject,’” Afik said.

The Knesset legal advisor added that even though she was told there was a time constraint to pass the bill before the Knesset recess, she said that “a lack of time cannot justify an improper legislative process.”

The bill is part of a series of haredi-backed bills being advanced, amid numerous reports of agreements between the haredi parties and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to advance coalition legislation.

Haredi parties had boycotted votes on coalition legislation when their bills were not advancing quickly enough.

The plenum agenda this week has been packed with controversial coaltion bills, such as the bill to weaken the role of the attorney-general, along with legislation for a sweeping reform of Israel’s broadcasting sector.

The Knesset plenum also passed on Monday the contentious legislation advanced by the haredi parties that will enshrine Torah study as a fundamental value in the country’s Basic Law.

Critics argue the Basic Law: Torah Study bill encourages draft evasion and changes the status of yeshiva students who do not serve, enabling them to continue receiving state benefits even amid the IDF’s severe manpower shortage.

The IDF has repeatedly warned of an urgent manpower shortage after more than two years of war.

In April, the High Court of Justice ordered that the state take concrete steps to revoke key financial benefits from draft evaders and to move toward criminal enforcement against haredi men who evade military service.

Immediately after the bill’s passage, multiple petitions were sent to the High Court of Justice against the legislation, calling for it to be struck down.

The petitions were filed by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel, along with the opposition parties Yesh Atid and Yisrael Beytenu. 

The Movement for Quality Government stated that “the coalition removed its final mask today and made it clear, loudly and unequivocally, that it discriminates between one person’s blood and another’s.”

Yisrael Beytenu leader MK Avigdor Liberman also condemned the legislation, calling it “one of the most shameful and irresponsible laws Israel has seen since its establishment.

Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report. 

The Knesset Security Cabinet, together with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, approved a budget proposal of NIS 1.3 million to establish new Israeli settlements in the West Bank on Tuesday. 

According to the decision, 34 new settlements will be established in the near future – nine in the Samaria region, seven in the Binyamin region, four in the Hebron area, seven in the Jordan Valley, six in the Gush Etzion area, and one in the Megilot Regional Council area. 

This will bring the total number of West Bank settlements established under the current government to 103.

The budget was approved in June, but the details of the plan to build new settlements were only made available to the public on Tuesday. 

National Missions Minister Orit Strock, Construction and Housing Minister Haim Katz, and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich submitted the proposal. 

Smotrich celebrated the announcement and pushed for more settlements. 

“We have made sure that… the establishment of new settlements in Judea and Samaria will not remain on paper, but will take shape and be implemented on the ground.”

“We are passing one budget decision after another,” Smotrich said. “Budget for roads, for infrastructure, and now also for buildings and caravans.”

“We will be moving forward with many more settlements this summer,” the finance minister predicted. “There is a huge demand for it.”

Budget approval marks ‘historic’ leap in West Bank Jewish settlement growth 

Orit Strock echoed Smotrich’s sentiments, emphasizing the sheer size of the projected building project. “There has never been a Zionist settlement decision of this magnitude in the entire history of [the State of Israel].”

“Investing in settlement [of the West Bank] strengthens our hold throughout Israel and secures our future,” Katz said. “The approved budget will allow us to begin development, establish neighborhoods, and lay infrastructure that will allow families to move in as soon as possible.”

“The Construction and Housing Ministry will work to remove barriers and accelerate the process, so that new settlements can quickly go from the planning phase to reality,” Katz added. 

Anna Barsky and Avi Ashkenazi contributed to this report.

US President Donald Trump said on Monday that the United States would charge 20% on cargoes for use of the Strait of Hormuz after a ceasefire with Iran broke down amid a dispute over Tehran’s efforts to maintain control over the strategic waterway.

Iran shut down the 21-mile-wide strait that was the main route for a fifth of world oil supplies and other vital goods, including fertilizers, when the US and Israel attacked it on February 28, causing a global energy shock.

This is why it matters, how Trump’s and Iran’s stances differ, and how it affects the rest of the world:

As recently as June 25, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said when meeting Gulf states and in response to Iran’s demand for fees that “no country on Earth has the right to charge for the use of international waterways” and that fees for shipping would never be part of any deal.

But Trump has previously mooted the possibility of the US charging tolls if the deal with Iran were to break down.

“There ​will be NO TOLLS in the ​Hormuz Strait for 60 days during the Cease Fire Period, and there ​will be NO TOLLS ​after the 60 day period has expired, ‌unless ⁠they are imposed by and for the United States of America, should the deal not ​be ​completed, for ⁠services rendered as the Guardian Angel to ​the countries of the ​Middle ⁠East for purposes of both past, present, and future reimbursement ⁠of ​costs,” he wrote in a social media post on June 20.

With the ceasefire in tatters, he now appears to have reverted to his earlier stance.

“The USA will be, from this point forward, known as ‘THE GUARDIAN OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT’, but as such, and as a matter of FAIRNESS, will be reimbursed, at the rate of 20% on all cargo shipped,” he said in a social media post on Monday.

Trump has not explained how such charges would be imposed nor what legal authority he could use to demand them for passage.

How is Trump’s toll demand different from Iran’s?

Iran has made its lasting control over the Strait, whose waters it shares with Oman, its main priority in negotiations, seeing it as its strongest strategic lever with the outside world and the best guarantee of its security against future attacks.

It believes Washington had accepted this in the wording of last month’s interim deal, which said Iran “will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only.”

However, the US interpreted that language to mean only that Iran should facilitate safe passage for vessels and not impose restrictions backed by force.

During the war, Tehran set up the Persian Gulf Strait Authority that it says any vessel passing through the waterway must coordinate with, and it insists ships should only transit near the Iranian shoreline. It has targeted vessels trying to pass along the Omani shore that did not seek its permission.

It has said it may eventually charge passage fees but has not detailed what they would be.

What was the toll situation like before the war?

The Strait comprises the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, with the maritime boundary running along the middle.

The UNCLOS maritime convention governing international sea law says states bordering straits cannot demand payment simply for permission to pass through.

However, they can impose limited fees for specific services such as piloting, tugging or port services, though these may not be levied more heavily on vessels from any particular countries.

Neither Iran nor the United States is a signatory to UNCLOS, but it is widely regarded as international law, and the Strait of Hormuz is recognized as an international strait.

In 1968, Iran and Oman agreed on a traffic scheme with the International Maritime Organization under which major vessels would use sea lanes along the middle of the Strait. Iranian mine-laying during the war has now made such passage unsafe according to the IMO.

Would other countries accept imposition of fees in Hormuz?

No such unilateral move to demand fees to traverse a strait has been made in modern history, shipping industry officials said.

Oman has held dialogue with Iran on the issue. It issued guidance last month for vessels transiting the Strait through its water that did not require any fees.

Gulf states, whose main access to the high seas for their vital energy exports lies through the Strait, are particularly concerned about fees.

Major consumers of Gulf energy products and fertilizers may also be alarmed, especially by Trump’s proposal for a 20% surcharge on cargoes. That could push up global oil prices significantly.

Iran vows to maintain control of Strait ‘under any circumstance’

This comes as a member of Iran’s National Security Commission, in an interview with the Iranian semi-official news agency Tasnim on Tuesday, vowed that Iran will resist external influence over the waterway’s future.

“We will not lose the Strait of Hormuz under any circumstances; even if a difficult war is ahead, we will resist there,” he stated.

The National Security Commission member also claimed that the US will not have the ability to compete with Iran in that arena, “despite all of Trump’s fantasies.”

US President Donald Trump wants Gulf states to reimburse the United States for the protection provided to them amid ongoing Iranian attacks, the president told reporters in the Oval Office on Monday.

“I want to be reimbursed because we’re protecting a very rich portion of the world. We’re spending money, so… we are going to be reimbursed for protection,” Trump told reporters.

The US doesn’t “need” those countries because “we have more oil than any other country in the world,” he asserted. “We’re protecting all of them, and we’ve done a very effective job.”

Trump previously said Washington would become the “guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” protecting the vital waterway, responsible for a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas, in exchange for a reimbursement rate of 20%. The plan was adapted on Tuesday evening to instead focus on investment deals.

Though potentially lucrative, Professor Chuck Freilich warned The Jerusalem Post that Trump’s “absurd demand” validated Tehran’s own demands for fees in Hormuz.

Iran’s FM Araghchi mocks Trump 20% demand, Tehran jockeys for Hormuz control

“Those Investments will be MASSIVE but, at the same time, extraordinarily good for them, and their future,” Trump wrote on social media. “As everyone is aware, we have the largest Dollar Investment into the United States, of any Country in History, but these new Investments will make that Number even larger, and we will see Factories, Plants, and Equipment pour into the United States at Historic levels, which will create additional millions of High Paying AMERICAN Jobs! America is WINNING again, winning like never before.

Though potentially lucrative, Professor Chuck Freilich warned The Jerusalem Post that Trump’s initial “absurd demand” validated Tehran’s own demands for fees in Hormuz.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had earlier mocked Trump’s demand for 20% fees for crossing the Strait of Hormuz, seemingly positioning Tehran as the preferred administrators.

“POTUS is absolutely right. Whoever provides secure and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz should be compensated for this service,” Araghchi wrote on social media. “Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER.”

Asked what Trump’s motives could be, Frieilich said that “money is his primary motivation in life; he thinks only in monetary terms.”

Though the financial demand on Gulf states may be a new development, Dr. Yoel Guzansky, the head of the Gulf Research Field at the Institute for National Security Studies, said that it was likely something Gulf states expected from Trump, who has built his identity on being a businessman.

“Trump, he is transactional, always looking for where the money is. He’s a businessman, he admits it, and he’s not ashamed of it; he’s proud of it, and the Gulf States understood that from the beginning,” Guzansky commented.

Asked how Gulf states would justify the cost of US protection, given that Washington’s military presence in the region has itself been cited by Iran as a justification for attacks, Guzansky responded that the security benefits of hosting US forces ultimately outweigh the risks and would likely tip the balance in favor of maintaining an American presence.

Without America’s presence in the region, Guzansky argued that many Gulf states would have been conquered by Iran, or at least subjected to Iranian attempts. “There’s a price to pay for US bases in the Gulf, but one cannot live without them because the threat of Iran is still there,” he asserted.

Though perhaps expected, Dr Kristian Alexander, a geopolitical analyst based in Dubai, told The Post that Gulf states would be uncomfortable with the relationship being reduced to “transactional” exchanges of protection for payment.

A gap in trust and expectations

“From the Gulf perspective, the relationship has never been one-sided. Gulf states host U.S. military bases, provide critical logistical infrastructure, facilitate intelligence cooperation, purchase substantial quantities of American defense equipment, and contribute to regional stability in ways that directly support U.S. strategic interests. They are therefore likely to argue that they already shoulder a significant share of the burden associated with the regional security architecture,” he argued.

Guzansky, however, contended that the problem would not be paying for America’s protection; the issue would lie with what that protection would look like.

“I think they expect more from the US, not just from this administration, but from the US as a whole, to do more for their defense than it has done so far during this war,” he commented. “There is a lot of disappointment in the Gulf with US strategy toward Iran and with the way the US conducted itself during the war. So yes, there is a transactional element, but the question is: what do we get in return? I think there is a gap between what the US understands as protection and what the Gulf states understand as protection.”

That gap in trust and expectations has largely contributed to the continued dialogue held between Gulf states and Iran, he continued, asserting that the talks and financial involvements were “not because they love Iran” but out of “fear.” Aware that the US “can’t wait to leave the Gulf,” the states are less likely to throw their full weight behind any US efforts, even as they build deeper military ties, because they need to maintain some level of appeasement because the US, while capable, cannot be fully relied upon.

Alexander suggested that the need to balance relations with the US and Iran would also create some difficulty in paying for protection.

“Gulf capitals have spent the past several years pursuing a strategy of strategic de-escalation with Iran. The GCC as a whole has increasingly prioritized crisis management over confrontation. Against that backdrop, rhetoric emphasizing ‘protection’ against Iran could complicate these carefully managed diplomatic efforts by reinforcing Tehran’s long-standing narrative that Gulf states are facilitating American pressure against Iran,” he argued.

Many of the Gulf states pushed for the conflict with Iran to be resolved through diplomacy, particularly Qatar and Oman, and the efforts eventually materialized in a failed Memorandum of Understanding that offered no real resolution to the Hormuz crisis and gifted Iran what many experts see as a financial lifeline.

“The US is the strongest military power in the world, but it faces many constraints on how it can use that power. The political will, if you may, was not there. So the Gulf states will do everything possible to strengthen their relations with the US, maintain a continued dialogue with Iran, and strengthen their own militaries. This is hedging, doing several things in parallel because none of these options is perfect. You hedge your bets, as you would with financial risks,” he explained.

Asked about Trump’s motivation in Washington receiving some kind of financial gain for its continued involvement, especially given that the war lacks popularity, Guzansky said he wasn’t sure, but it was possible that a continued military presence in the region would be “easier to sell as a business transaction.”

“There is a lot of opposition in the US, especially within the Republican Party, to what is called the ‘long war’ and foreign intervention. This is what I was referring to earlier, the pressure on Trump to step back, move away from the war, and cut his losses. But it is very difficult when the Strait of Hormuz is at stake, and the stakes are high. So would it be easier to sell this as a business transaction? Perhaps to some in the Republican Party, maybe. I really don’t know; I would only be guessing,” he concluded.

YouGov reported in March that only 28% of Americans strongly or somewhat support the war with Iran, while 59% oppose it. A slight majority of Republican voters (62%) supported the action, though that number fell to 33% when it came to non-Trump-supporting Republicans.

Alexander suggested that the payments might have more “mixed results” than anticipated.

“On one hand, they (the request for payments) reinforce US deterrence by signaling continued American willingness to secure the Strait of Hormuz,” he admitted.

“On the other, they could strengthen Iranian messaging that Washington’s military presence is driven as much by economic and commercial interests as by regional security. Tehran will almost certainly seek to exploit such statements in its information campaign, portraying the United States as treating Gulf security as a revenue-generating enterprise rather than a collective security commitment.”

The US needs to accelerate the pace of military strikes and target additional senior Iranian officials to push towards a resolution of the conflict, Beni Sabti, an Iran researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), said. 

In an interview with 103FM, Sabti stated that the escalation in the Strait of Hormuz is not bringing Iran closer to surrender. He described a combative leadership, despite severe blows and mounting domestic hardship, and argued that military pressure is pushing Tehran to intensify the confrontation. 

“An Iranian member of parliament tweeted, ‘We need to immediately obtain a nuclear bomb to protect our assets in the Strait of Hormuz,'” Sabti said. “This is the Iranian hubris and mindset, ‘They are pressing us even more? No problem, we will run even faster toward the nuclear bomb.’ They are definitely not going to give up.”

According to Sabti, the regime’s very survival gives the leadership a sense of victory. The central power mechanisms continue to function. 

“Because the few survived, just like Hamas, they are in a place where as long as two Revolutionary Guard generals are still standing, the regime is still standing,” he said. 

Sabti advocates for the US to deepen military strikes. 

“As long as they are not going back into central Iran and eliminating more senior officials there, this round can keep going and going. The Iranians even enjoy this situation; they keep operating in an emergency mode,” he stated.

Sabti also addressed the new leadership, saying that this state of emergency serves the current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and pointing out the difference between him and his father, the former supreme leader. 

“His father still used to talk about the economic situation or praise the Iranian national team at the World Cup. Mojtaba only talks about war. This is the best possible situation for the new regime; you keep it in emergency mode and give it life.”

Sabti compared the current regime to Hamas, saying that the choice was to prioritize the war over the concerns of the Iranian people. 

“We also asked this about Sinwar when he saw the buildings collapsing in Gaza, and he kept fighting. The image of him throwing away the stick at the last moment, that is suicide,” he said. “Instead of coming to their senses and saying, ‘I will save what I can,’ they keep going.”

Public unrest grows in Iran

The public is dealing with economic pressure, power outages and deep frustration. 

“These days there are small protests in Iran. Yesterday they used tear gas on them, something that had not happened since January. There is a lot of economic tension and frustration, including surprise power outages for almost the entire day,” he said. 

“In my opinion, the Iranians will not sit at home for long. Their internal argument is good for us,” he added. 

Iran is avoiding direct fire at Israel for now, Sabti explained, explaining that Iran is aware that Israel is waiting for an attack. 

Report of Ahmadinejad acting as Mossad agent ‘nonsense,’ Sabti says

Sabti addressed a report that former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had acted as a Mossad agent.

“In my opinion, that is nonsense. There is a difference between a meeting to establish contact and feel things out, and a person enlisting for you. It is possible there were attempts to lure him to Budapest, to show him respect, and to establish contact. But from there to turning him into an agent, I have a problem with that,” he said.

Additionally, Sabti expressed doubt over the possibility that Ahmadinejad operated without the knowledge of those around him. 

“We speak arrogantly about the Israeli side, but what about his bodyguards? Do you think someone sends Ahmadinejad alone? Aren’t there 10 ideologues of the regime around him? It is a little naive to think that way. If he were a Zionist agent, he would not be wandering around Iran now,” Sabti said. 

Having choked off shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is now signaling it could play its most dangerous card yet: using their Yemeni proxy organization, the Houthis, to shut the Bab el-Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea, opening a new front against Washington and putting two of the world’s most vital energy arteries at risk.

As US strikes deepen inside Iran and Houthi attacks escalate in tandem, analysts say Tehran is widening the conflict and seeking to increase pressure on Washington by extending the threat to global trade and energy supplies beyond the Gulf.

Iran has already demonstrated the power of its most valuable strategic asset by disrupting traffic through Hormuz. Now it appears ready to open a second pressure point at Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow waterway linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden through which Saudi oil exports and a substantial share of global shipping pass.

A senior Yemeni official warned on Monday that the country’s armed forces were prepared to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – a move he said could send oil prices soaring to $200 a barrel – if Saudi Arabia continued to attack Yemen, according to a report on Iran’s state-owned Press TV website.

Mohammed al-Farah, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau of Ansarullah, claimed Washington was inciting Saudi Arabia to strike Yemen and that such a provocation would never be in the interest of the United States.

“If the current situation aggravates, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz will be closed in an operational alliance. Oil prices would then skyrocket to $200 a barrel in a dreadful shock,” he warned.

If Hormuz is Tehran’s strongest strategic lever, Bab el-Mandeb may be its last major reserve, analysts said.

“Iran is willing to go all the way,” Middle East scholar Fawaz Gerges told Reuters. He said Tehran was showing Washington it could threaten both chokepoints simultaneously, transforming the conflict from a bilateral confrontation into a challenge to the sea lanes underpinning global energy trade.

“Now (Tehran) is escalating both near and wide. The message is that not only Hormuz, but Bab al-Mandab, is at risk.”

Relentless rise in tensions outweighs risk of return to all-out war

The danger, analysts say, is less an immediate return to all-out war than a slow but relentless “mission creep” in which each side raises the stakes without crossing into direct confrontation.

As the conflict spreads from the Gulf to the Red Sea, the growing threat to trade and energy supplies could also increase pressure on Washington and Tehran to return to negotiations before the world’s two most important oil chokepoints become the conflict’s defining battleground.

Dennis Ross, a former US Middle East peace negotiator, said from Washington’s point of view, “the issue is, how do you change the Iranian calculus to the point where they’re ready, again, to talk, but not just to talk, but actually to work out an arrangement that is … acceptable.”

Houthi history of attacks on commercial shipping

The Houthis have already shown they can choke global commerce through the Bab el-Mandeb. After the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, the Iran-backed terrorist group launched attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, claiming it was targeting vessels linked to Israel in support of Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.

The campaign forced major shipping companies to reroute vessels around southern Africa, raising transport costs, and prompted US and British airstrikes as well as a multinational naval mission to protect shipping.

Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies, described the latest Houthi threat as “another nuclear option” for Iran after Hormuz – one it would deploy only if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) concluded that a return to all-out war had become unavoidable.

But he warned that if Washington intensified strikes on Iran’s critical infrastructure, Tehran could respond by using its Yemeni allies to close Bab el-Mandeb, compounding the economic shock already caused by the Strait of Hormuz.

Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Center, said Gulf states increasingly believe diplomacy with Iran has reached its limits, despite the high cost that any wider confrontation would impose on the region.

“Both a victorious Iran and a defeated Iran carry consequences for the region,” said Sager, adding that “many Gulf states may consider the costs of the latter to be more acceptable if they lead to a more stable regional security environment.”

He said the Houthis retain the capability to disrupt navigation through Bab el-Mandeb but are unlikely to escalate without clear direction from Tehran. Any Houthi attempt to threaten shipping, he added, could trigger a broader military response from the United States and its partners aimed at significantly degrading the group’s capabilities.

The war, which began in late February, has destabilized the Gulf and spread across the region, with Iran attacking US bases in multiple countries.

More than 1,000 days have passed since October 7, and I want to use this moment to invite you to a repulsive but necessary thought experiment. Imagine October 7 happens again. Yes, with all its horrors, its terror, its dead. Everything repeats. And now I want to ask: In that case, would the government be responsible?

This is the point where half the country will probably snort in contempt: “What does that have to do with anything? What are you trying to prove?” Bear with me. What this thought experiment is designed to expose are two deep failures: one serious, the other catastrophic.

The first failure is that every argument put forward to explain why the government and its head bear no responsibility for October 7 is, in practice, an infinitely reusable argument. No matter how many times October 7 happens, the same excuses work again and again. This time it will be the current IDF chief of staff, Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, who failed to warn in time. Next time it will be whoever replaces him.

Because the public cannot be exposed to all the raw intelligence, what happens here is exactly what Hannah Arendt described as the most effective way to kill truth: turning it into opinion. And when everything becomes a matter of opinion, on the second or third October 7, every citizen assigns blame purely according to their political tribe.

The need for a functioning system of accountability

The second failure, the catastrophic one, goes to the foundation of democratic governance itself. A state can survive only when there is a functioning system of accountability, in which leadership is genuinely answerable to the people. In Israel, that accountability has been completely distorted.

In the classical republican tradition, corruption means preferring private gain over the common good. In Israel today, the prevailing logic has become: If something is not criminal, it is acceptable. That distortion has seeped deep into politics.

“What is right is what the people want,” where “the people” translates in practice to a coalition majority. The current logic runs: Since there is no political alternative and the public keeps voting for the same leadership, that leadership must be fine, and therefore October 7 is not its responsibility and certainly not its fault. The ballot box has been transformed from a tool of civic oversight into a machine for laundering guilt.

The real problem is that leadership needs the concept of guilt in order to correct itself. In a healthy democracy, we would work hard to ensure that public representatives and security chiefs who fail in their duties are forced to genuinely reckon with that failure before anything else. But in Israel today, guilt has vanished.

The relationship between the public and its representatives

Subordinating morality to electoral outcomes has produced a society where anything not criminal is acceptable, and anything that cannot be translated into votes simply does not exist. Even if 27 more October 7s were to occur, the art of deflecting responsibility would go on clearing everyone who deserves to be held to account.

Supporters of the current coalition will argue, not without reason: “What do you want from us? There is no other right-wing, security-minded alternative to vote for.” Without entering that political debate, I will say only this: Contrary to what many believe, casting a ballot is probably the least significant civic act available to a citizen.

What actually matters is the ongoing relationship between the public and its representatives: the daily demand for accountability, the refusal to let failure disappear into the news cycle. If representatives were forced to come to the public first with a genuine reckoning, and only then did citizens vote according to their own preferences, we would be in far better shape.

In the current situation, where each side rallies reflexively to protect its own leader, the arrogance is not even concealed. And accountability is dead.

The writer is the CEO of the Ribo Center.

The New York Times publication on Monday of meticulously detailed Mossad plans to recruit, pick up, and prepare former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to take over the Islamic Republic from the current regime raised a new question: Was the Ahmadinejad plan a success or a failure?

Between foreign reports, public confirmation by former head of Military Intelligence Tamir Hayman, and The Jerusalem Post’s own Western sources, it has been known now for some time that the Mossad sought to replace Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The New York Times had previous, more speculative reports on the issue which were eventually confirmed by Hayman to the PBS network, and which created the space for the Post to receive confirmation, though Israeli journalists often cannot publish all that they know.

From the perspective of the end of the story, with Ahmadinejad under house arrest, the details of the plan blown out into the open, likely by American sources seeking to block future Israeli adventurism (as they see it) with regime change in Iran, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still firmly in control of the country – the plot was an abject failure, clouding other recent successes.

But from an Israeli perspective, if the US had acted differently, everything might have gone differently.

Hayman had told PBS, “Regarding Ahmadinejad, there was a sequence of special operations, very, very unique that was supposed to happen. And Ahmadinejad was a part of that sequence. The rest of the operations are not fully disclosed to the public, except for the Kurdish invasion.”      

Questioned why the plan to replace Khamenei with Ahmadinejad failed, Hayman replied: “Because the centerpiece of all the sequence should have been started with the Kurdish invasion. According to what was published is that Erdogan, who really considered the Kurdish as a strategic threat to the stability of Turkey, convinced Trump that it’s a bad idea to give the Kurds a state. And backing the Kurds goes against the interest of Turkey. And I think that had something to do with the decision of Trump to cancel this operation.”

US was originator of using Kurds to topple Iran’s regime

Sources close to former Mossad chief David Barnea previously told the Post that in many ways, the US was the originator of the idea of toppling the Islamic regime by using the Kurds to initiate an internal ground thrust. In fact, in 2003, the Americans had already used the Kurds in joint operations to help bring down Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

These sources emphasized that many of the same Kurds involved in that historic ground operation and who entered Baghdad – including Massoud Barzani, the first man who entered Hussein’s palace – were the ones who Israel was hoping to activate against Iran’s Islamic regime.

Both the Iraqi and Iranian Kurds have significant fighting capabilities, without additional training beyond what they had already received, according to sources. Utilizing the Kurds in the 2026 war would have saved the US from deploying and endangering its own ground forces.
In that respect, Israeli sources viewed this concept as something that should be even easier to swallow for Washington.

Stunningly, Israel was prepared to provide the Kurds not only with a no-fly zone, but with continuous aerial firepower to help them advance against any Iranian force that would have tried to assemble to block their path forward.

Weapons that the Kurds received both from the US and the Mossad – many of which were “re-tasked” after the IDF captured the arms from Hamas in Gaza or from Hezbollah in Lebanon, and training the Kurds received from Israelis, enabled the fighters to be fully ready to go.

There is a debate regarding whether US President Donald Trump was convinced to veto the operation by some of his own top officials, or by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Even within Israel, some officials doubted that such an operation would work. 

But Mossad officials and sources close to Barnea said that most of the agencies’ operations require faith, and that the spymasters have already pulled off a long list of operations that have boggled the imagination.

Although CIA director John Ratcliff has been reported as having taken a strong position against the Kurdish intervention, Mossad sources have said that he never told Israelis that he was against it. 

Furthermore, they note the public reports that the CIA provided the Kurds with weapons, meaning that the American clandestine agency acted in ways that could have helped the operation happen.

Israeli sources have accused American officials within the White House of leaking the plan to Erdogan to help the Turkish president get to Trump in time to stop the operation before it could be rolled out.

It is also noteworthy that during the war, the IDF started to bomb the Iranian regime and Basij forces in the Kurdish areas, as the IDF publicized. 

However, while the IDF later said that 100% of “critical” and “essential” targets had been struck, the Post has learned that possibly only around 10% of the targets to help the Kurds strike the Iranian regime forces were actually hit.

These targets were not included in the broader operation numbers, because they were considered part of a separate stage of the war that never fully kicked in. In this plan, about eight million Kurds, and many other minorities such as the Sunnis and the Baluchis, could have been brought into the regime-toppling effort, like an avalanche.

No strikes on Iran’s heart, energy sector complicated plan

Another piece of the plan which Trump vetoed was Israeli strikes on the heart of Iran’s and the regime’s energy sector and remaining economic power.

Trump allowed Israel a bit of leeway in this area, but then slammed the door shut in the most public way possible.

What would have happened with Ahmadinejad if the Kurds had been allowed to go forward, the IDF had struck the other 90% of targets related to the Kurdish operation, and the air force had been allowed to take out more of the regime’s energy sector and power?

The New York Times leaves the impression that Ahmadinejad was unhappy with the operation to spring him from his home and that he broke with his Israeli recruiters over that and the overall state of the war.

But what if the overall state of the war had gone differently if all of the Israeli plans had been allowed to go forward?

Might Ahmadinejad himself have stayed on plan against the Iranian regime?

If so, then the entire saga has a different look.

It would mean that the Mossad pulled off one of the most brilliant recruiting approaches in history, turning Israel’s once greatest enemy against his own regime.

It would mean that the agency secured Ahmadinejad physically at the precise moment necessary to utilize him to help overthrow the Islamic regime.

It would mean that the agency may have only failed in the sense that Trump did not allow its full plans to play out, leaving its biggest failure not that Ahmadinejad and the rest might not have worked, but that it did not see that Trump would scrap key large parts of the program.

Until top Israeli and American officials come forward on the record, some of this will remain a mystery.

But rushing to judgment in the meantime about whether the Ahmadinejad plan was a success or failure may be premature.

We do not honor Theodor Herzl and Ze’ev Jabotinsky by placing wreaths in their memory. We honor them by asking whether the Jewish people still dare to live by what they taught.

Herzl died on July 3, 1904, having given his life to a people that did not yet fully understand him. Jabotinsky is remembered days later on 29 Tamuz, the date Israel set aside to honor his life and vision. 

Their memorial days arrive together like a warning. Not because they were the same man. They were not. Not because they offered the same politics. They did not. But because both understood the same truth before comfortable Jews were ready to admit it.

Jewish survival cannot depend on the goodwill of others.

That was the Zionist rupture. That was the scandal. That was why so many Jews thought Herzl was a dreamer and Jabotinsky was a madman. Herzl looked at Europe and saw that emancipation had not solved the Jewish question; it had only dressed it in better clothes. Jabotinsky looked at Jewish vulnerability and understood that pity was not protection, sympathy was not security, and moral innocence would not stop those determined to destroy us.

They were not prophets because they predicted every detail. They were prophets because they understood the pattern before polite society was willing to see it.

We are living through another moment in which that pattern is impossible to ignore. For decades, much of the Jewish world allowed itself to believe that Diaspora security had become stable, elite acceptance was permanent, Holocaust memory would restrain civilized societies, Israel’s strength would be respected, and antisemitism could be managed through education, alliances, statements, and better public relations.

October 7 shattered that illusion.

In major Jewish population centers, the clock has been pushed backward. Jews who were told they were fully at home now gauge how visible they can be. Jewish students weigh the cost of speaking. Synagogues require guards. Israeli restaurants become targets. Zionism becomes a slur. 

Governments that once spoke endlessly about Jewish safety now reward Palestinian statehood, even as the wounds of massacre, hostages, and more than two years of war remain central to Jewish trauma. This is not only rising antisemitism. It is the reversal of Jewish leverage.

Herzl would have recognized it. 

Jabotinsky would have recognized it faster.

Herzl did not ask Europe to love the Jews. He asked Jews to stop outsourcing their future to Europe. His genius was not merely that he dreamed of a state. Dreamers are not rare. His genius was that he understood Jewish dignity required instruments: congresses, diplomacy, capital, law, land, institutions, and sovereignty. 

In The Jewish State, published in 1896 as a modern solution to the Jewish question, Herzl made a claim polite Jews did not want to hear: the Jewish problem was political, and therefore the answer had to be political.

That is why Herzl still matters. He did not sentimentalize Jewish suffering; he organized it. He took Jewish humiliation and turned it into a program. He took the scattered anxieties of a people and turned them into a congress. He took the dream of return and dragged it out of prayer and into statecraft.

Herzl gave Jewish longing an address.

The Zionist answer to history

Jabotinsky gave Jewish longing a spine.

He did not teach Jews to worship force. That is the lazy caricature. He taught Jews that weakness does not become moral because it is Jewish. A people that cannot defend itself becomes an object of negotiation by others. A people that cannot say no will eventually be told where it may live, what it may call itself, how visible it may be, and whether its grief is politically convenient.

Jabotinsky understood deterrence not as cruelty, but as mercy toward one’s own people. He understood that Jewish life could not depend on the conscience of hostile majorities. He understood that dignity without strength becomes theater. He understood that a Jew who cannot defend his body will eventually be asked to apologize for having one.

That is the part of Jewish power the modern Jewish world still struggles to say aloud.

We are comfortable with Jewish memory. We are comfortable with Jewish grief. We are comfortable with Jewish achievement, philanthropy, trauma, and moral witness. But Jewish power still embarrasses too many Jews. 

We want Israel to rescue us, but resent the hardness required for rescue. We want governments to protect us, but shrink from building the leverage that makes protection politically unavoidable. We want the world to understand us, while Herzl and Jabotinsky taught that a people that needs to be understood before it is safe is already in danger.

Power is not a sin.

Power is not domination. It is not brutality. It is not the worship of force. Power is the ability of a people to make its survival non-negotiable.

That is the Zionist answer to history.

Herzl gave that answer instruments. Jabotinsky gave it discipline. Herzl taught Jews that sympathy was not a strategy. Jabotinsky taught Jews that security was not a favor. Together, they shattered the most dangerous Jewish illusion: that goodness alone could protect us.

Goodness is not enough. Memory is not enough. Victimhood is not enough. Being right is not enough. The world does not reward Jews for being innocent. It respects Jews when Jewish innocence is backed by Jewish power.

That lesson cannot remain trapped inside Zionist history. It must shape Jewish life now: not only in Israel, but across the Diaspora. Not an army in every community. Not paranoia. Not domination. But a civic, cultural, political, and physical seriousness that forms Jews before the crisis arrives.

Herzl and Jabotinsky did not give us a museum of Zionism. They gave us a doctrine of Jewish adulthood.

A child begs to be protected. An adult builds power.

A frightened community asks why the world has abandoned it. A serious community makes abandonment costly.

A weak people pleads for sympathy. A sovereign people builds instruments. A proud people builds spine.

That is what they taught. That is what we forgot.

So yes, place the wreaths. Say the prayers. Mark the dates. Quote the speeches. Teach their names to children. But do not turn Herzl and Jabotinsky into marble men whose lessons are too dangerous to live by.

Herzl did not die so Jews could become better beggars. Jabotinsky did not die so Jews could become better victims. They left us a doctrine: build power, wield it with discipline, and never apologize for surviving.

That is not extremism.

That is Zionism.

The author is founder and CEO of The Israel Innovation Fund (TIIF). His upcoming book is titled What Is Zionism?: Why Never Again Is Not Enough.

Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi arrived in Washington on Monday for a long-anticipated visit. The new prime minister is seeking to increase ties with the US.

Iraq is at another crossroads today as the Iraqi leader is trying to rein in Iranian-backed militias and also manage the withdrawal of US forces who are in Iraq as part of the war on ISIS.

The US had withdrawn from Iraq in 2011 but returned in 2014 to help Iraq fight ISIS. The US also has an important presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Iraq is already a kind of frontline between the US and Iran. After the US and Israel began strikes on Iran on February 28, the Iranians operationalized militias in Iraq.

Those groups carried out hundreds of attacks on US diplomatic facilities and other sites. Kataib Hezbollah, one of the militias, kidnapped US journalist Shelly Kittelson.

Zaidi meets with US Special Envoy Tom Barrack

She was released after a week of being held. Kataib Hezbollah is the same militia that kidnapped researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov in March 2023. She was only released in September 2025.

According to a list of Zaidi’s meetings in Washington, he will remain in the American capital until Saturday. On Tuesday, the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office said that “Prime Minister Mr. Ali Falih Al-Zaidi received, yesterday evening Monday Baghdad time, at his residence in the US capital Washington, the US President’s Special Envoy to Iraq, Mr. Tom Barrack.”

Barrack has played a key role as the US envoy to Syria and ambassador to Turkey. He also recently became envoy to Iraq, uniting his roles with Syria. This is important because it means he is the point person for US policy on these two key countries.

Victoria J. Taylor, Director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council and Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran at the US Department of State, noted on X/Twitter that “Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi arrives in Washington this week in a true test: Can he convince the Trump administration that the partnership with Baghdad is still worth the effort? My new article on the tough equation he faces between disarming the militias and pleasing Washington without provoking Tehran.”

Iraq’s PMO said that “during the meeting, prospects for joint cooperation between Iraq and the United States of America were discussed. The meeting also witnessed a review of the course of economic relations between the two countries, the developments it has seen over the recent period, and ways to expand areas of cooperation and partnership.”

The office also said, “The meeting addressed developments in the regional situation, the importance of supporting efforts aimed at enhancing security and stability and reducing levels of tension, and the pivotal role that Iraq can play in bringing viewpoints closer together and contributing to de-escalating the situation at the regional level.”

Amberin Zaman, writing at Al-Monitor, noted that “on first foreign trip, Iraqi PM Zaidi woos Trump but Iran casts long shadow.” She notes that “Iraq’s new prime minister is in Washington promising business deals and closer ties with the United States, but convincing the Trump administration he can rein in Iran-backed militias may prove his toughest challenge.”

Efforts to restore pipelines through Middle East, Iraq, Syria

Her article notes a few key issues that will be spotlighted during the visit. “Zaidi, a former entrepreneur, is expected to announce a host of deals, many of them linked to energy, as part of a business-first agenda meant to diversify US-Iraqi ties beyond their primarily security-driven focus, administration sources speaking on background told Al-Monitor.”

There is an effort to restore a pipeline from Kirkuk, Iraq, to Syria.

In addition, she adds, “security, however, remains the Trump administration’s top priority with Baghdad, above all the disarming and disbanding of Iran-backed militias.

The groups, which were formed in 2014 initially to fight the Islamic State, repeatedly attacked US military installations inside Iraq as well as targets across the Gulf during the latest Iran conflict.”

Meanwhile, expert Ali Al-Mikdam noted on X that “Washington views the trip as an opportunity to redefine the framework of its relationship with Baghdad, with reducing Iranian influence and curbing armed factions at the top of its agenda. Iraq, meanwhile, seeks to establish a stable strategic partnership that safeguards its security and economic interests.”

He adds that “the outcome of this visit will not only shape the future of Baghdad–Washington relations but could also redefine Iraq’s regional position in the period ahead. Yet its success will ultimately depend on domestic political will.”

The pro-Iran Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) slammed the Iraqi premier’s visit to Washington. Meanwhile, Rudaw media in Erbil in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq noted that “Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi commenced his high-profile visit to the United States on Monday, where he is scheduled to meet with senior US officials, including President Donald Trump.”

It is not clear if and when that meeting will happen. Zaidi is accompanied on his trip by a variety of media outlets, including Rudaw.

The IDF announced on Tuesday that Col. “G.” will become the first woman in Israeli Air Force history to be promoted to the rank of brigadier-general.

G. has commanded the Uvda Air Force base since May 2024 until now, and her next post will be to serve in the strategically crucial role of Air Force attaché in Washington, where critical decisions about the two countries’ aerial cooperation are taken on a daily basis.

At 42 years old, G. had already broken new ground as the first female base chief in Air Force history.

In 2019, G. became the first woman to command an Air Force squadron, managing the Nachshon intelligence-collection squadron.

One prior woman had risen to the rank of brigadier-general in the IDF Ground Forces, before being transferred to a post within the Air Force, but G. is the first woman to be promoted up the ranks by the Air Force to this rank.

G. achieves third highest rank in IDF

A brigadier-general is the third-highest rank in the Israeli military, with fewer than 20 Maj.-Gens. serving in the IDF General Staff, and the only Lt.-Gen. being the IDF chief himself. 

There have been three female major-generals: the current Head of the Military Court of Appeals, Orli Markman; Orna Barbivai, who served as the head of the manpower directorate; and Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, who served as the Military Advocate-General.

There are other female brigadier-generals, such as Brig.-Gen. Yael Grosman in the C4I and Cyber Defense Directorate, but they are still few and far between, and earning that rank in the Air Force is considered especially difficult.

Zamir announces additional appointments

Additional appointments made by IDF Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir at the same time included promoting Brig.-Gen. Omer Cohen to take command of the 91st Division.

Cohen had recently been in a senior desk job at IDF headquarters after having served for much of the war as the chief of the IDF Commando Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. Beni Aharon was promoted from commanding the 146th Division to commanding the more prominent 36th Division. Prior to this, Aharon had led one of the key armored commands for much of the war.

Next, Brig.-Gen. Oren Simcha was promoted to take charge of the Southern Command’s 162nd Division.

In addition, Brig.-Gen. “Y.” was appointed to the number two post in the Air Force, potentially setting him up as a future Air Force chief following Maj.-Gen. Omer Tischler, who just took office in May.

It is still undecided what will follow next for outgoing 36th Division commander Brig.-Gen. Yiftach Norkin, outgoing 91st Division commander Brig.-Gen. Yuval Gez, and outgoing 162nd Division commander Brig.-Gen. Sagiv Dahan. 

There were also many other appointments at the rank of brigadier-general and colonel.

The government is expected on Tuesday to discuss diverting some NIS 568 million from the five-year plan for developing Israel’s Arab society to fund Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) activity and the work of the police and other enforcement bodies against organized crime.

Ahead of the discussion, the Mossawa Center for the Rights of Arab Citizens appealed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, demanding that the move be stopped. It said it is considering legal action if the proposal is approved.

The proposal now on the government’s table has broader significance than the amount alone suggests. If approved, it would signal a shift in the government’s priorities toward Arab society: Resources intended for economic development, employment, and narrowing gaps would instead be directed to enforcement, intelligence, and security activity against criminal organizations.

The budget is to be taken from government decision 550, which was approved in 2021 to reduce economic and social gaps between Arab society and the rest of the population. The plan includes budgets for employment, vocational training, education, transportation, infrastructure, industrial zones, and strengthening local authorities.

According to a statement from Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs, the combined budget allocated to the Shin Bet and the police will amount to about NIS 567 million.

The sum now being brought for approval differs from the amounts mentioned in recent weeks. Earlier, amounts ranging from NIS 1 billion to NIS 1.3 billion were discussed, and an internal government document examined the possibility of diverting up to NIS 1.4 billion from the five-year plan’s budgets. The proposal to be discussed now is smaller in scope and stands at about NIS 568 million.

The money is intended to finance expanded intelligence and enforcement capabilities against criminal organizations, weapons smuggling, arms trafficking, extortion, and criminal takeovers of tenders and local authorities. The plan also includes strengthening intelligence units, expanding Lahav 433 operations, and developing technological tools to deal with criminal organizations.

The Shin Bet inclusion could help solve criminal cases in Arab society

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Social Equality Minister May Golan are presenting the inclusion of the Shin Bet in the move as a necessary step in light of the number of people murdered and the low rate of solved cases in Arab society.

Government sources clarify that the service is not supposed to replace the police in investigating routine criminal offenses and that its activity will focus mainly on weapons smuggling, criminal organizations, and incidents with a security connection. So far, the full scope of the powers to be exercised and the exact division of the budget among the Shin Bet, the police, and other bodies have not been made public.

In the urgent letter, Mossawa argued that the government seeks to finance the fight against crime with funds intended to address the social and economic conditions that allow it to spread.

According to Salem Abbasi, head of the socioeconomic unit at the center, diverting budgets intended to address long-standing discrimination undermines the principle of equality, the binding status of decision 550, and the social and economic goals set out in it.

“The decision will lead to widening gaps, weakening prevention mechanisms, and deepening the structural conditions that fuel crime and violence,” Abbasi wrote.

In his view, cutting employment, training, and development programs could increase idleness, weaken local authorities, and reduce the options open to young people exposed to the influence of criminal organizations.

One of the central claims in Mossawa’s appeal concerns an alternative funding source. According to information that the center says it received from the National Security Ministry, there is a remaining budget balance of about NIS 750 million under government decision 549, the dedicated plan to fight crime and violence in Arab society. The center argues that these funds could cover enforcement needs without cutting into the civilian development budget designed to narrow gaps.

Another claim concerns the way the proposal was advanced. According to the letter, on June 14, acting Prime Minister’s Office Director-General Drorit Steinmetz committed that the discussion on diverting the budgets would take place only in the final quarter of the 2026 budget year.

Mossawa says this created a legitimate expectation among government ministries, authorities, and the bodies implementing the programs. According to the center, the discussion was ultimately moved to an earlier date without sufficient professional discussion, without a corrective, reasoned decision, and in violation of the timetable presented to the relevant parties.

“The government’s conduct is tainted by bad faith, extreme unreasonableness, and arbitrary governance, alongside ultra vires action, breach of a governmental promise, and harm to the right to equality,” said Suha Salman Musa, co-director of Mossawa. “The attempt to harm the budgets of decision 550 is dangerous, unequal, and irresponsible.”

The government justifies the move, among other things, by saying that a large portion of the budgets under plan 550 has not yet been implemented. Documents prepared ahead of the discussion argue that execution rates are below plan and that part of the money can be diverted without harming essential projects. Professional officials reject that conclusion and stress that, in infrastructure and development projects, years can pass between budget approval, the signing of commitments, and payment.

Social organizations and professionals are also criticizing the portrayal of the budgets as unused funds. Data from the Knesset Research and Information Center show that, by the end of 2024, billions of shekels had been allocated under decision 550, but many projects involve an inherent gap between allocation, commitment, and payment.

Money that has not yet been transferred in practice may already be earmarked for tenders, planning, or works in the implementation stage, and diverting it could delay or cancel them.

Shin Bet enters the realm of police responsibility

Beyond the budget debate, there is also a dispute over expanding the Shin Bet’s activity into a field that until now was under police responsibility.

The Shin Bet Law assigns the service the task of thwarting terrorism, espionage, and threats to state security, and its inclusion in the fight against civilian crime raises legal and public questions. The government says the Shin Bet’s activity will be limited to cases with a security connection, mainly in the areas of weapons smuggling and criminal organizations.

Critics of the move fear an expansion in the use of the service’s intelligence tools against Israeli citizens and a blurring of the line between security activity and criminal enforcement.

The government discussion concerns the budget transfer, but approval of the proposal is not expected to end the dispute. Mossawa has already said it is considering petitioning the courts, and any possible legal proceedings would center on the legality of the diversion, the government’s priorities, and the scope of the Shin Bet’s authority in the fight against crime in Arab society.

A long-term development plan aimed at turning the Galilee into a major center of innovation, employment and community growth was presented last week at a gathering of business leaders and American Jewish community figures in New York.

The meeting, hosted by Erel Margalit at Margalit Startup City in SoHo, focused on building an economy in northern Israel that can attract companies, entrepreneurs, investment and young families following nearly three years of war and disruption.

The strategy, led by Margalit Startup City Galil, combines technology, research, academia, advanced agriculture, local business development, education and culture.

“The day after begins now,” said Margalit, founder and executive chairman of Jerusalem Venture Partners and Margalit Startup City.

“If we simply restore the Galilee to what it was before the war, we haven’t solved the problem. We need to create new growth engines, high-quality jobs and opportunities that will encourage people to build their future in the region.”

From wartime disruption to regional growth

The initiative began before the outbreak of the war, when Margalit promoted the creation of an innovation-based economy connecting research institutions, universities and industry in northern Israel.

More than a decade ago, he began advancing plans for a technology incubator in Kiryat Shmona, with a focus on food technology, advanced agriculture and climate technology.

The war placed that model under severe pressure. Northern communities were evacuated, businesses closed, start-ups moved their operations elsewhere and entrepreneurs, researchers and students were dispersed across Israel.

Margalit Startup City Galil subsequently worked with the Israel Innovation Authority, MIGAL Galilee Research Institute, Tel-Hai University and JNF-USA to keep the region’s innovation ecosystem operating.

Companies that relocated received mentorship, operational support, assistance applying for grants and investment, and introductions to strategic partners and international markets, according to the organizers.

Education, leadership and community programs also continued during the war in an effort to maintain connections between residents, businesses and regional institutions.

According to figures presented at the New York meeting, 32 start-ups have returned to the Galilee. More than 100 start-ups had operated in the region before the war.

start-ups secure grants and create jobs

Participants were told that the Galilee innovation center has evaluated more than 150 start-ups from the Galilee and Golan Heights in recent years.

Companies supported by the center have created more than 50 jobs and received approximately $3 million in grants from the Israel Innovation Authority. The initiative also connects entrepreneurs with mentors, investors and industry experts.

Dr. Noam Yosef, CEO of Gaia, the Galilee Innovation Center established by Margalit Startup City, JVP and MIGAL with support from the Israel Innovation Authority, said the goal was to create companies rooted in the region.

“Over the past several years, together with the Israel Innovation Authority and partners from industry, academia and the investment community, we’ve built an infrastructure that enables entrepreneurs and technology companies to grow from within the region,” Yosef said.

“Even during the war, we continued supporting companies, raising resources, connecting founders with investors and strategic partners, and opening doors to new markets.”

Yosef said the center was seeking to develop internationally competitive companies in food-tech, advanced agriculture and climate technology.

start-ups operating within the ecosystem include YoEgg, WonderVeggies, DYGO and Greeneye Technology.

The New York gathering included Ilan Kaufthal of the Russell Berrie Foundation, along with representatives of JNF-USA and UJA-Federation of New York, organizations that have supported development projects in the Galilee.

Margalit also invited executives from American technology, cybersecurity, software and industrial companies. Organizers said they hoped the executives would provide professional expertise, international connections and investment opportunities.

“These leaders bring decades of experience building companies, developing breakthrough technologies, creating international partnerships and scaling organizations,” Margalit said.

“Our goal is to channel that experience into building the next generation of growth in the Galilee.”

Local businesses, education and culture

The development plan also includes small and medium-sized businesses, including manufacturers, farmers, restaurants, retailers and family-owned companies.

Participants discussed expanding Galilocals, an initiative established to strengthen local businesses throughout northern Israel and connect them with customers and new markets.

Community programs are another component of the strategy. More than 55,000 children and teenagers have participated in educational, leadership and volunteer programs operated by the nonprofit Bakehila across 27 communities and 75 schools, according to figures presented at the meeting.

Galiladies, another regional program, works to develop women’s leadership and connect women with entrepreneurship, business and civic initiatives.

Jacqui Schneider, vice chair of Women for Israel at JNF-USA, said the projects offered grounds for optimism about the region’s future.

“We’re proud to support the extensive work being led by the center for the benefit of the entire region,” Schneider said. “The initiatives already underway and those now taking shape give us real optimism about the future of the Galilee.”

The meeting also featured plans for StartArt, a performing arts and cultural center intended to serve Galilee residents.

Or Nadav Argov, director of strategic partnerships at Gaia and Margalit Startup City Galil, said cultural institutions would play an important role in encouraging younger residents to remain in the region.

“We believe real regional growth happens when, alongside the companies being built here, local residents are given opportunities to develop skills, build networks and become active partners in the region’s economic, social and cultural future,” Argov said.

“Creating a regional performing arts and cultural center is the next step in that vision. It will be a significant addition for Galilee residents and especially for the younger generation choosing to build their future there.”

Schneider said attracting families and businesses would require investment in both technology and community infrastructure.

“Our mission is to strengthen and develop northern Israel by creating communities that attract young families, businesses and jobs,” she said. “Investing in people and communities is just as important as investing in technology.”

Iran attacked two UAE supertanker vessels in the recent round of Iranian-US fighting. According to The National, the attack killed one sailor and injured eight people. The UAE is outraged, and other Gulf countries are lining up to back Abu Dhabi.

The killing comes after days of US airstrikes on Iran and Iranian attacks across the region. Iran began this round with attacks on vessels in the Gulf on July 6-7.

“The UAE Ministry of Defense said early on Tuesday that the Mombasa and Al Bahyah were struck by two Iranian cruise missiles in the south of the strait,” The National noted. “The targeting resulted in the death of one crew member of the tanker Mombasa, of Indian nationality, and the injury of eight others, including four serious injuries,” the ministry said. The two ships; Al Bahyah and Mombasa B “sustained significant damage in the attacks.” Iran also attacked the GFS Galaxy, a Cypriot-flagged vessel, on Saturday.

According to Al-Ain News in the UAE, the attack has also angered India. New Delhi summoned the Iranian ambassador after an Indian citizen was killed in Iran’s attacks. The Indian citizen was one of 30 Indian citizens out of 46 crew members on the two ships that were attacked. 

Gulf solidarity is now emerging in an even larger way than before. While some countries want an agreement that will end the fighting, they are also outraged by Iran’s new attacks. Iran has purposely caused a crisis since July 6 and 7. Iran is seeking to prevent vessels from traveling the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz near Oman. Iran wants to impose a fee system on ships, which would create an international crisis at similar maritime chokepoints.

Al-Ain media in the UAE noted that after the attacks, “strong messages of solidarity were conveyed through strongly worded Gulf condemnations of an aggressive Iranian attack targeting two Emirati oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.”

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries affirmed their solidarity with the United Arab Emirates and their support for all measures the UAE has taken to protect its security, sovereignty, and the safety of its facilities and vital interests.

Abu Dhabi defends right to respond to Iran attacks

The GCC is calling on the UN to do something and seek to deter Iran. “The UAE Ministry of Defense announced early Tuesday that the two national tankers, Mombasa and Al Bahia, were targeted by two Iranian cruise missiles in the southern passage of the Strait of Hormuz in Omani territorial waters,” Al-Ain noted. “An Iranian attack resulted in the death of one crew member of the tanker (Mombasa) of Indian nationality, and the injury of eight, including four whose injuries were described as serious (six of Indian nationality, and two of Ukrainian nationality),” it added.

Abu Dhabi is saying it has a right to respond to the Iranian attacks. “The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained in a statement that this aggressive Iranian attack constitutes a flagrant violation of Security Council Resolution 2817, which stressed freedom of navigation and rejected targeting commercial vessels or disrupting international maritime routes,” the report said. “In another statement, the UAE Ministry of Defense stated that the country reserves its full right to respond to this escalation and to take all necessary measures to protect its territory, its people and residents, in order to preserve its sovereignty, security and stability and protect its national interests and capabilities.”

The GCC called the latest attack a “terrorist attack on the two Emirati oil tankers represents a blatant violation and a serious breach of the principles of international law and the rules of freedom of maritime navigation.” Now the GCC says it “stands united with the United Arab Emirates and supports all measures it takes to protect its security, sovereignty, and the safety of its facilities and vital interests.”

Bahrain expresses full support for UAE

Bahrain also said it is supporting the UAE with full solidarity. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, and Qatar are some of the countries Iran has attacked in the last week. The Kingdom of Bahrain expressed its “strong condemnation and denunciation of the Iranian terrorist attack,” considering it “a dangerous escalation that threatens regional security and stability, and a grave violation of the provisions of international law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Security Council Resolution No. (2817).”

Qatar also issued a statement describing the “serious violation of the safety of international navigation, a direct threat to the security of global energy supplies, and a clear and explicit breach of the rules of international law.” Back on July 7, Iran attacked a Qatari LNG vessel, which helped kick off this latest round of US responses. The US has increased airstrikes over the last few days.

It is clear that the UAE wants a full-court press in terms of condemnation. The killing of crew is a red line, and there will need to be more responses now. It remains to be seen if the UAE will carry out retaliatory strikes. The US is also striking Iran. Iran does not appear ready to climb down yet. 

Some people are just hard to like. You see them coming, and you hope you can avoid them. Sen. Lindsey Graham was not that person. 

The opposite was true of Graham. Being around him was like being around a true friend, and that’s exactly what he was to me for over 20 years.

I last communicated with Graham just a few days before I received the message on Sunday morning that he had died. It took me a while to process that message. He was always so full of life that somehow the word “death” and Graham didn’t belong in the same sentence.

For those who don’t know, Graham grew up in the same kind of Southern poverty I did, but he faced some very tough challenges beyond just lack of money. His parents owned a bar and pool hall, and Graham worked cleaning it up after closing hours.

Within 15 months, both his parents died. Graham was 21 and left with the responsibility of either taking care of his little sister or standing by as she was declared an orphan and put into a foster home. He enlisted in the United States Air Force so he would have a paycheck and be able to support her, and legally adopted her to keep her from being put in foster care.

He could have complained and whined as to how unfair life was. He didn’t. He worked – hard. He took care of his little sister as she grew up and watched her find her own success.

Graham completed college and law school, became an officer in the air force, where he served in the reserves for 33 years, and completed his military service as a colonel. He was elected to the US House of Representatives and then to the US Senate. 

He went from cleaning a bar to becoming one of the most respected and effective senators on Capitol Hill. He didn’t talk about the American Dream – he lived it and demonstrated it.

He loved Israel. He loved Israel because he loved America and understood that the partnership between the US and Israel was an incredible benefit to both nations and to freedom. He often said that Israel’s enemies are America’s enemies. He was right. 

His critics called him a warmonger. Nonsense! He didn’t love war, but he knew that nations built on hate and death like Iran were a threat to freedom and peace everywhere. His view was that strength is more likely to bring peace than weakness and capitulation. He was right again.

On several occasions, when I would be in Israel with a group of American pilgrims seeing the Holy Land, I’d see Graham at the David Citadel Hotel or somewhere in Jerusalem. He was usually with his best friends, former senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman, or as McCain’s daughter Meghan called them, “The three amigos.”

Heart for the world

Graham had a sense of humor that was contagious, engaging, and disarming. If there was one thing I loved about him, it was that he took his work and the issues of the world seriously, but he never took himself that seriously. 

Unlike many political figures I’ve known, he didn’t elbow his way to every microphone or jump in front of every camera to be seen or heard. He was great on TV for sure, but his real work was behind the scenes, working the room and winning over fellow Republicans and reluctant Democrats alike.

He was willing to do what he believed was right, even if it made some in his own Republican party livid. Yet despite those who unfairly labeled him a “RINO” (Republican in Name Only) and sought to defeat him, the people of his beloved South Carolina continued to reelect him. 

He had a heart for the world, but he also always had time for kids who wanted to snap a photo with him or a veteran who wanted to ask his help. His love and patience with people extended to those who were just like he was growing up. 

He never forgot where he came from or who he was. He was never ashamed of where he’d been because he could be grateful for where he’d come and where he was going.

America lost a true statesman. Israel lost one of its best friends and strongest defenders. South Carolina lost a very effective and compassionate senator. And I lost a dear personal friend.

But instead of being filled with sadness, I will rejoice and celebrate the life of one who left an indelible mark on us all. And as the Book of Psalms said, “Weeping may last for the night, but joy comes in the morning.” Good night, my friend. I’ll see you in the morning!

The writer is the US ambassador to Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bears full responsibility for an “absurd” Iran strategy built around the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, former senior defense official and Iran nuclear expert Avner Vilan said in an interview with 103FM on Tuesday.

Speaking with Or Heller and Amichai Attali, Vilan praised the Mossad’s reported ability to reach former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but questioned the strategic purpose of attempting to recruit him.

“They managed to reach him, and they managed to speak with him. Operationally, that is impressive,” Vilan said. “But we need to stop being dazzled by it and ask ourselves: What was it for?”

Vilan described Israel’s broader plan as “absurd,” arguing that its goals were disconnected from the situation on the ground.

“Full responsibility for this lies with Benjamin Netanyahu, who decided to go to war with Khamenei’s assassination as an objective,” Vilan said. “He took a risk, and in my view, it was an absurd risk.”

“It did not correspond with reality,” he continued. “It failed miserably, and we are paying the price for it now.”

Ahmadinejad was an unlikely intelligence target

Despite his criticism of the broader strategy, Vilan said the Mossad’s reported ability to establish contact with Ahmadinejad was extraordinary.

“Even by the standards of espionage operations, this is unusual,” he said. “You do not recruit a country’s president every day, certainly not the president of Iran.”

Vilan said Ahmadinejad’s position as an outsider within the Iranian establishment may have made him more approachable than other senior figures.

“But you need to understand who this man is,” he said. “He was always something of an outsider, a kind of troll. Even when he was president, he was not the most powerful man in Iran.”

Vilan said this may explain why the Mossad was able to reach Ahmadinejad rather than other prominent Iranian officials.

Contact does not mean complete allegiance

Vilan cautioned that intelligence recruitment is rarely straightforward and that contact with a foreign intelligence agency does not necessarily mean that a source has fully changed sides.

“In these situations, it is not as though you wake up one morning and suddenly become a committed Zionist,” he said. “He met with the Mossad chief, but there is a spectrum. You can meet and do certain things, but that does not mean you are 100% on our side.”

“These matters are always complicated,” Vilan added. “There is ego, and there are other considerations. I do not know what Ahmadinejad wanted, but the fact is that he did not go all the way with it.”

The defendants in the Bild case will respond to the charges against them on December 15, more than two years after the original indictment was filed, the Tel Aviv District Court ruled Tuesday.

The hearing was the first since the indictment was amended last month to add senior Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adviser Yonatan Urich as a defendant alongside former Prime Minister’s Office spokesman Eli Feldstein and IDF reservist Ari Rosenfeld.

It was also the first time Urich and Feldstein had met since they were confronted by police during the April 2025 investigation. Rosenfeld was also present in court.

Nearly two years after Feldstein and Rosenfeld were indicted in November 2024, the defendants have yet to formally respond to the charges, and their accounts have not yet been heard in court.

Defense lawyers argued Tuesday that they could not respond to the amended indictment while significant investigative material from the overlapping Qatargate affair had still not been transferred to them.

The prosecution told the court that the Qatargate investigation had not yet been completed, despite previous indications that it had concluded, but said it was “nearing completion.”

The prosecution nevertheless asked for the defendants to respond to the indictment Tuesday. Defense lawyers said that was impossible before they received and examined the outstanding evidence.

Rosenfeld’s attorney, Uri Korb, asked the court to dismiss the indictment, citing alleged investigative failures and the failure to provide the defense with the full case materials.

Feldstein’s attorney, Oded Saboray, argued that Feldstein and Rosenfeld had also been denied the right to a hearing before the amended indictment was filed.

Saboray said the defense contacted the prosecution in June and asked to present its arguments, but the request was rejected within a day.

“They should invite us to a hearing, hear our arguments and decide,” he told the court. “Why are we being discriminated against? Why was Yonatan Urich invited to a hearing and we were not? We were deprived of a right that the legislature found to be fundamental.”

Urich underwent a pre-indictment hearing before he was added to the case. Feldstein and Rosenfeld had already been indicted, but their lawyers argue that the changes to the prosecution’s case entitled them to present arguments before the amended indictment was filed.

The court ultimately scheduled the defendants’ response for December 15.

Classified military documents transferred to German paper

The case centers on allegations that highly classified Military Intelligence material was removed from IDF systems and passed to Feldstein before the German newspaper Bild published its contents.

According to the indictment, Rosenfeld began transferring classified material to Feldstein in June 2024, believing that information produced by the military was not reaching Netanyahu.

The material included a document concerning Hamas’s approach to negotiations over the release of the hostages.

After the military censor barred its publication in Israel, prosecutors allege that Feldstein worked with Urich and others to have its contents published abroad.

Bild published the report on September 6, 2024, days after the IDF recovered the bodies of six hostages murdered by Hamas in a tunnel in Rafah: Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Eden Yerushalmi, Ori Danino, Alexander Lobanov, Carmel Gat, and Almog Sarusi.

Their deaths prompted mass protests and renewed public pressure on the government to reach a hostage deal.

The Bild report purported to describe a Hamas strategy of prolonging negotiations and exerting psychological pressure on the families of the hostages and the Israeli public.

Prosecutors allege that Feldstein and Urich sought to use the document to influence the public debate following the hostages’ deaths, including by directing responsibility for the stalled negotiations toward Hamas and away from criticism of the government.

According to the amended indictment, Urich knew that the material came from a classified military source and had been barred from publication in Israel.

He allegedly connected Feldstein with political strategist Israel Einhorn, who had contacts at Bild, and later worked with Feldstein to amplify the report in the Israeli media.

After the article was published, Urich allegedly wrote to Feldstein that “the boss is happy.” Prosecutors say the two also drafted a statement for Netanyahu referring to the report’s contents.

Urich is charged with providing secret information with intent to harm state security, providing and possessing secret information, and destroying evidence.

Feldstein is charged with providing secret information with intent to harm state security, possessing secret information and obstruction of justice. Rosenfeld faces five counts of providing secret information, as well as charges of obstruction of justice and theft by an authorized person.

All three deny wrongdoing.

Feldstein claims Netanyahu knew of ‘Bild’ leak

The case returned to the center of public attention in December 2025, when Feldstein gave a three-part interview to journalist Omri Assenheim and described what he said had taken place inside the Prime Minister’s Office.

Feldstein claimed that Netanyahu knew about the classified document and the effort to have it published in Bild, and that Urich knew where the information had come from and why it could not be published in Israel.

Netanyahu and his office denied Feldstein’s claims. Urich has also denied wrongdoing.

The interview renewed scrutiny of senior figures in Netanyahu’s office and prompted further investigative steps. Among Feldstein’s allegations was that Netanyahu’s chief of staff, Tzachi Braverman, summoned him to a late-night meeting at the Kirya military headquarters and told him that an emerging security investigation into the leak could be stopped.

Police later questioned Braverman under caution, confronted him with Feldstein, and sought unaired material from the interview. Braverman denied attempting to interfere with the investigation.

The Iranian regime-backed “Explosive Media” Lego AI-generated propaganda channel published a video claiming that the regime was behind the death of US senator Lindsey Graham on Sunday.

The video, which was removed from the propaganda’s X/Twitter page but remains on Telegram, where it is captioned “SUDDEN ILLNESS. Lindsey Graham is Dead! Iran Lego is ready 🙂 Who’s next?” and has been viewed by The Jerusalem Post, shows Graham at home, before being scared of a shadowy, cloaked figure, dying of a heart attack.

The video then shows Graham being taken away in an ambulance, before the medic is seen ticking the name “Lindsey” off a checklist. The name “Laura” appears next on the list.

American right-wing activist and self-described Zionist Laura Loomer wrote on X that she believes this is a death threat aimed at her.

BREAKING:

The IRGC just released another Lego Loomer assassination fantasy video called “Bullseye Loomer.”

They are calling for me to be killed over my support for the war in Iran.

Meanwhile, Trump is bombing all of them tonight and turning every IRGC facility into a parking… pic.twitter.com/hfTLWLPs1F

— Laura Loomer (@LauraLoomer) July 14, 2026

According to Loomer, the propaganda channel also published a subsequent video titled “Bullseye Loomer,” which she stated reinforces the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ death threats towards her. Loomer directly blames the IRGC as responsible for the production of the “Explosive Media” videos.

Meanwhile, the propaganda channel downplayed the effect of Loomer removing death threat videos from X, by writing on Telegram that “They removed this video after 1.9M views and locked our X account. But I don’t think that’s going to bring Lindsey back to life.”

“Explosive Media” on Monday also threatened other pro-Trump and pro-Israel political commentators, including Mark Levin, Miriam Adelson, Randy Fine, and Ben Shapiro, creating Lego figures for each of them.

Propaganda channel operator admits Iran regime is ‘client’

“Mr Explosive,” who runs the propaganda outlet, spoke to the BBC during the height of operations Roaring Lion and Epic Fury, confirming that the “regime is a client.”

A major motif of the channel’s propaganda has been to blame Israel and the US for the strike on a girls’ school in Minab that the regime claims killed 156.

The channel was banned by YouTube in April, a spokesperson for the video hosting site told Agence France-Presse at the time.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu selectively pursues security-leak investigations when disclosures harm him politically, while allowing highly classified information that serves his interests to be released, journalist Ronen Bergman alleged in an interview with 103FM on Monday,

Speaking with Ron Kofman and Prof. Aryeh Eldad, Bergman also addressed a New York Times report that the Mossad had attempted to recruit former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Eldad asked whether publishing details of the alleged intelligence effort served Israel’s security interests, beyond the public’s right to know.

“The report in The New York Times is based on European, Iranian, and American sources,” Bergman said. “These materials are being published as part of the coverage of the issue.”

“I do not think the American sources received censorship approval, but today I read a separate investigation in Haaretz saying that the entire report had been submitted to the censor for approval,” he added. “In other words, it was approved.”

Bergman defends publication of intelligence reporting

“This is a military, intelligence, and political situation that failed,” Bergman said. “The role of the press is to shine a light on the dark corners and ask how we became entangled in this affair.”

Bergman then criticized what he described as the large number of alleged security leaks originating from the Prime Minister’s Office.

“One hand is leaking, and that same hand is ordering the investigation,” he said. “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, or through his mouthpieces, releases and leaks enormous quantities of security information classified at the highest levels.”

Netanyahu lacks blanket declassification authority, Bergman says

Bergman rejected the claim that Netanyahu has the right to disclose sensitive information independently and without consultation.

“Netanyahu has appropriated an authority that he does not have under the law, the authority to declassify any information,” Bergman said. “He has decided that he possesses absolute authority, like the philosopher’s stone that turns lead into diamonds.”

“Every time he sees a classified document, he thinks he can touch it with a magic wand and turn it into an unclassified document,” he added. “That is illegal.”

‘An attempt to intimidate journalists’

Bergman alleged that efforts were being made to frighten journalists and deter them from carrying out their work.

“There is a hand operating here that is trying to intimidate journalists and discourage them from doing their jobs, so that, God forbid, they do not publish what the prime minister does not want published,” he said.

“Channel 12 has a report concerning classified information that was never broadcast,” Bergman continued. “On the other hand, Channel 14 constantly publishes enormous quantities of information. Yaakov Bardugo boasted that he had revealed the date of the strike in Iran.”

“There is no genuine desire here to investigate leaks,” Bergman concluded. “There is a political desire by the prime minister to enlist the security and law-enforcement systems to silence those who uncover information that others do not want exposed.”

Several countries summoned their Iranian ambassadors on Tuesday in the wake of Iran’s recent strikes on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and hostile escalation across the region.

India summoned Iran’s representatives in Delhi after Iran had struck two ships carrying a total of 30 Indian sailors, the External Affairs Ministry announced.

Of those 30, one Indian was killed, and another 10 were wounded in the attacks.

“We strongly condemn these attacks and acts of violence targeting seafarers and disrupting free and safe navigation through international waterways like the Strait of Hormuz,” the ministry stated.

Our statement on attacks on commercial vessels

🔗 https://t.co/ApWdLnC5Tt pic.twitter.com/BZcxl6Awqd

— Randhir Jaiswal (@MEAIndia) July 14, 2026

“We also reiterate our deep concern on account of the resumption of attacks and escalation of hostilities in the West-Asian region and call for immediate cessation of violence and a return to dialogue and diplomacy in the interests of peace, security and stability in the region.”

New Zealand summons Iranian ambassador

New Zealand also summoned its Iranian ambassador, the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry (MFAT) announced on X/Twitter.

“Today MFAT called in the Iranian Ambassador to convey New Zealand’s serious concerns regarding recent escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and across the Gulf region,” the ministry wrote. 

Today MFAT called in the Iranian Ambassador to convey New Zealand’s serious concerns regarding recent escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and across the Gulf region. We urged immediate de-escalation and a return to diplomacy, and reiterated our condemnation of the Islamic…

— New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade (@MFATNZ) July 14, 2026

“We urged immediate de-escalation and a return to diplomacy, and reiterated our condemnation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ destabilizing activities, including beyond the Middle East.”

Despite the ongoing construction of a new border security fence between Israel and Jordan, local residents are fearful that a Jordanian attack could face little in the way of defenses, N12 News reported on Tuesday.

Central Arava Regional Council Head Meir Tzur pointed out the vulnerability presented by the current wire-fence setup.

“There’s nothing behind it,” he explained to N12. “There’s no problem crossing this twisted fence either. Here, for example, it’s completely open. There are no indicative measures on the fence. Any citizen can cross, they don’t even have to jump because it’s torn down.”

The border was also seldom patrolled by IDF forces, Tzus stated. “You can just walk into Jordan.”

“We really want the Israeli army to be stationed on the border line, and not just with remote technology,” he added. “We are afraid of this technology. Every Israeli knows that what starts with a small breach may eventually lead to a failure. A fence alone or technology is not the absolute solution.”

From across the border, a steady stream of illegal entrants and smuggled goods has flowed into Israel over the years, local residents stated, including illegal weapons.

One military source told N12 that the IDF catches around 50% of the smuggled weapons and goods. “If they succeed in smuggling weapons, they can also succeed in smuggling a terrorist.”

IDF building high-tech security fence along Jordan border

In January, The Jerusalem Post learned that the IDF‘s new security fence with Jordan could be completed as early as the start of 2028.

An announcement said that the fence, which will include a variety of cutting-edge sensors and will cost tens of millions of shekels, would begin construction in “a number of months,” but did not set a formal end date.

Defense sources have also made clear that Israel has escalated proactive intelligence collection missions on the border and will not rely solely on the fence, though the fence is expected to be a major boon for securing the Jordanian border.

Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report.

Turkish naval ships made a visit to Syria’s Latakia port on Monday, according to Turkish government media, the first since the beginning of Syria’s civil war.

The visit comes on the heels of Turkey hosting a major NATO summit, which Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa attended.

Turkey is a close ally of the new government in Damascus. This has concerned Israel because Jerusalem sees Turkey as a rising threat in the region. Because of this, the naval visit could have wider ramifications.

Turkey is a major naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean and has further increased its naval role in the last decade. It has used the navy to push claims to what it calls a “Blue Homeland,” essentially a large Turkish sphere of influence stretching far beyond Turkey’s borders, across the Greek islands to the center of the Mediterranean.

The visit of the Turkish vessels is symbolic in other ways. It shows how Ankara will support Syria at sea.

Israel strikes Syrian navy

Israel carried out strikes on Syria’s navy when the Assad regime fell. The goal by Jerusalem was to deny the new government an air force and navy. Now that Syria has support from the US, and also many NATO countries, it is likely Syria will want to revive its navy.

This is also important for Syria because of its offshore economic zone. Syria wants to develop offshore energy blocks in deals with Western and other energy companies. This could mean that Chevron, Qatari companies, and other companies may jump at opportunities. Reuters recently said that Total was exploring an offshore contract.

Turkey’s Daily Sabah noted that “Latakia, where the frigate anchored at, also carries significance for Turkey as a major hub in the Eastern Mediterranean where Turkish interests are abundant. Turkey has been vigilant against Israel-Greek Cypriot cooperation in the region and seeks to defend the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the divided island, especially in terms of maritime borders where Greek Cypriots seek to exploit hydrocarbon resources unilaterally.”

The Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly important. Turkey signed a deal with Libya in 2019 that appeared to bolster Ankara’s claims to a maritime area between Turkey and Libya, potentially conflicting with Greece’s claims. Turkey also used various navigational warnings to harass Greece back in 2020. In recent years, Turkey has ratcheted down this harassment, but it is still clear that Ankara wants to show off its strength in the region.

Israel looking to expand naval capabilities

Israel has bolstered its navy in the last decade as well. The new Sa’ar 6 corvettes began to enter service in 2020, and Israel has increasingly partnered with the Greek and Cypriot militaries in various exercises.

There is increased desire in Jerusalem to expand Israel’s naval capabilities. For instance, Israel HaYom wrote on June 10 that “the Hellenic Navy teaches Israel one hard lesson: how to read Turkish pressure through islands, straits, air-sea seams, and escalation thresholds. Israeli-Greek-Cypriot cooperation already follows that logic. Not all of it is public. It should not be.”

The US and Israel are also cooperating closely. This includes close work with US Central Command. In addition, the Israeli navy sent a delegation recently to the US to mark 250 years of US Independence.

“The delegation held meetings with the Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, senior US Navy officials, and senior officials from navies of various countries, in order to build and advance operational dialogue, deepen professional discussions, and further strengthen the ongoing partnerships between the navies,” the Israel Defense Forces noted. 

Defense Minister Israel Katz submitted a presidential pardon request on behalf of Elor Azaria on Tuesday, 10 years after the infamous Hebron shooting that cast a spotlight on the IDF’s code of ethics and exposed deep divisions in Israeli society.

Azaria was convicted on January 4, 2017, of manslaughter for shooting an incapacitated Palestinian man, Abdel Fattah al-Sharif, one year prior, on March 24, 2016. Al-Sharif and another Palestinian had carried out a stabbing attack against an IDF soldier and were shot by troops, leaving al-Sharif wounded on the ground before Azaria shot him in the head.

Katz’s letter, submitted to President Isaac Herzog, is a formal recommendation. The request itself comes from Azaria, and is specifically to expunge his criminal record; he has been out of prison since 2018.

Herzog said he would need to wait to receive additional recommendations before proceeding with the request.

“After receiving all opinions, the President will weigh the request responsibly and with due seriousness,” the president stated.

In 2017, he was charged with manslaughter and conduct unbecoming, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. However, his sentence was commuted in September 2017 to 14 months by then-IDF chief of staff and current primary opposition candidate, Gadi Eisenkot.  

Then-defense minister and current Yisrael Beytenu head Avigdor Liberman then submitted a pardon recommendation. Then-president Reuven Rivlin declined it in November of 2017, explaining that such a move would harm the resilience of both the IDF and the State of Israel as a whole. 

Rivlin said at the time that he thought “an additional lightening of your sentence would harm the resilience of the IDF and the State of Israel. The IDF’s values… are the core foundation of the strength of the IDF,” and have helped Israel “in the just struggle for our right to a safe, national home, and in building a robust society.”

Katz: Resilience claim ‘ceased to be relevant with the passage of time’

Katz wrote on Tuesday that the resilience claim “ceased to be relevant with the passage of time,” especially given the fact that Azaria already served his sentence, and the request now is only to shorten the time in which his criminal record was to be erased.

A military parole board later trimmed his sentence by a third, and he was officially released on May 10, 2018, after serving nine of the 14-month sentence.

Another request was submitted in 2022 but was never fully actualized. Now, four years later, comes the third pardon request by Azaria. 

Katz noted that in his letter, Azaria highlighted the passage of time and requested that his criminal record on the issue be wiped because it is making it difficult for him to integrate smoothly into society and into the workforce.

The IDF‘s position, Katz wrote, is contrary to his, and is that Azaria’s request should not be honored. The military added that its position was formulated after consultation with three military entities: the military prosecution, the manpower directorate and the chief of staff; it was then transferred to the defense ministry. 

The defense minister made several arguments as to why the request should be accepted. 

He explained that the killing happened over a decade ago, Azaria already served his time, and that what is being requested here is quite simple: To shorten the time period until the criminal record is clean. 

He also spoke to Azaria’s character, writing that he was an outstanding soldier and that he had no criminal record prior to this incident. He noted as well what he described as the complex conditions of the incident itself, where the slain terrorist stabbed and injured two of Azaria’s friends.

“The incident took place when Azaria was a young soldier in highly intense and stressful conditions, in a complex security situation,” wrote Katz.

Azaria’s clean record initially led to lighter sentence

In fact, when the original military court had sentenced him back in 2017, it said that his clean prior record and the stress of the operational situation had indeed led to a lighter sentence.

The Defense Minister added in his letter that the media exposure that followed for Azaria and his family “demanded from them a very high price,” like psychological and emotional issues. 

“His face and the minute details of the incident have become something that is widely known in the public,” Katz wrote, adding that unlike “many” other instances, “where a person could serve their time and return to their anonymity and build their life back,” Azaria cannot do that. 

“It is unreasonable that, a decade later, [Azaria] continues to pay too heavy of a price… one that is preventing him from working and earning a living in a respectable way,” Katz wrote.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Tuesday condemned Britain’s decision to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terror group and security threat, calling the move “unjustified” and “irresponsible.”

The ministry claimed that the IRGC was an official part of Iran’s armed forces and accused Britain of violating international law by targeting a state institution.

Britain on Monday banned support for the IRGC and a linked group under new powers aimed at preventing foreign states from using proxies for activities such as surveillance and sabotage.

Iran, which is at war with the United States and Israel, has previously denied using proxies.

Far Left politicians condemn decision, while Burnham, Pahlavi publicly state praise

Anti-Zionist British MP Zarah Sultana also condemned the decision, writing on X/Twitter “What about the genocidal Israeli Defence Forces?” in reaction to the announcement.

Far Left politician George Galloway, also heavily critical of Israel throughout his career, denounced Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood’s announcement that supporting the IRGC would be punishable by 14 years in prison by stating that it infringes on free speech.

“As far as I’m aware – as a UK legislator across five decades – this is the first time I have been explicitly told that I can go to prison literally for my opinion. For those of you cheering, remember, it will be your opinion next,” Galloway wrote on X.

However, MP Andy Burnham, the presumptive incoming prime minister, praised the decision as “good,” adding that “Supporting a group linked to death threats and attacks here in the UK, doing the dirty work of Iran and Russia, should absolutely be against the law.”

Good.

Supporting a group linked to death threats and attacks here in the UK, doing the dirty work of Iran and Russia, should absolutely be against the law.https://t.co/qjyBqywYU3

— Andy Burnham (@andyburnham) July 13, 2026

Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi also praised the decision, saying that he welcomed the move to “designate the IRGC as a state threat to national security, involved in threats to life and intimidation.”

“This is an important and welcome move by [Prime Minister] Keir Starmer and reflects the growing threat from the regime in Iran to UK citizens and interests. I hope the UK and other Western governments will go one step further and back the Iranian people’s fight for freedom,” Pahlavi added.

“There can be no peace as long as this regime survives,” he wrote.

New UK bill allows state-backed groups to be designated security threats

Britain‘s existing legislation of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides for the proscription of terror groups, did not extend to state-backed groups. The new bill amends the National Security Act 2023, enabling the designation of state-backed groups (which is identical to proscription, although legally different).

Mahmood concluded that there is sufficient evidence to reasonably believe all three organizations are engaged in foreign power threat activity and that designating them is necessary to protect the UK’s safety and national interests.

Mathilda Heller contributed to this report.

Israel and Lebanon will open another round of direct talks in Rome on Tuesday, at the US Embassy and with American mediation, in an effort to move the political understandings reached in Washington to the implementation stage, first and foremost the pilot project in southern Lebanon.

The two-day meeting will focus on implementing the framework agreement signed on June 26. Under the agreement, Israel is expected to withdraw gradually from two defined areas in southern Lebanon and hand them over to Lebanese Army control. The Lebanese Army would then be required to deploy forces there, dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, and prevent the organization from reestablishing a military presence.

If the move succeeds, it could be expanded to other areas and lead to a broader Israeli withdrawal.

Despite the agreement’s reference to two pilot areas, practical preparations are currently focused on the first. An American official said in recent days that an IDF withdrawal from the area could begin within days, but did not provide a date, map, or binding timetable.

Planning for the second area has not yet been completed, and it remains unclear whether it would be activated immediately after the first stage. Israel insists that any further step must depend on the results in the first area. Lebanon, meanwhile, notes that the transfer of both areas is already included in the agreement and says implementation should not become an open-ended process.

The pilot also has a civilian dimension. Under the framework agreement, the transfer of territory is expected to be accompanied by the reconstruction of villages and the gradual, safe return of displaced residents.

The US administration wants to determine whether the Lebanese Army can hold the territory and restore civilian life without allowing Hezbollah to exploit its welfare, reconstruction, and funding mechanisms to reestablish its grip on the area.

Details of IDF withdrawal, Lebanese responsibility remain disputed

As the talks begin, the pilot has not yet been launched. The IDF has not completed its withdrawal from the first pilot area, the Lebanese Army has not assumed full responsibility there, and no agreed public timetable has been set.

The boundaries of the areas, the identity of the Lebanese units that will be deployed there, and the criteria for determining whether Hezbollah has been removed remain disputed.

The choice of territory has itself become a point of contention. Lebanon is demanding that the pilot areas include locations with a real Israeli presence, so that implementation would amount to a withdrawal that can be presented as a diplomatic achievement.

Israel prefers to begin with limited areas where responsibility can be transferred in a controlled manner, and the security risk can be reduced.

In Beirut, the pilot is being presented as the first step toward an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In Israel, it is being treated first and foremost as a test of the Lebanese Army’s capabilities, without any advance commitment to further withdrawals.

In recent days, an American military delegation held talks with the Lebanese Army in Beirut to establish the operational mechanism for activating the first area. The Americans want to synchronize the IDF withdrawal with the Lebanese Army’s entry so that the territory is not left without a force capable of preventing Hezbollah from returning.

Even after the Beirut discussions, no date was given for the start of implementation.

The operational work is expected to be carried out through a US-led military coordination group that will maintain contact with the IDF and the Lebanese Army and oversee the transfer of the territory.

The framework agreement includes a classified security annex intended to define deployment and monitoring arrangements, but its full contents have not been published.

It remains unclear whether the US will have the authority to rule in cases where Lebanon claims it has met its obligations while Israel maintains that Hezbollah operatives or infrastructure remain on the ground.

Israel demanding proof of Lebanese Army’s ability to fight Hezbollah

The main dispute concerns the order of the steps. Lebanon is demanding that the IDF withdraw first, arguing that the Lebanese Army cannot enter an area where Israeli forces remain deployed.

Israel is demanding proof that the Lebanese Army can locate weapons, dismantle tunnels, positions, and depots, and prevent Hezbollah operatives from returning before it withdraws.

The American outline is intended to narrow the gap through a coordinated move. The US would confirm that the Lebanese force is ready to deploy, the IDF would withdraw according to an agreed timetable, and the Lebanese Army would enter the area immediately.

The sides have not yet agreed on the conditions that must be met before US approval is granted, or whether Israel will be bound by Washington’s determination that the area is ready for transfer.

Israel is not satisfied with the deployment of Lebanese soldiers alone. It is demanding effective and sustained control on the ground, including preventing the entry of armed elements not subordinate to the state, collecting weapons, dismantling underground infrastructure, and blocking Hezbollah operatives from returning in civilian guise.

Israel is also seeking US oversight of the units deployed in the area and of how their missions are carried out.

Under the proposal being discussed, Lebanese soldiers deployed in the pilot areas would undergo American training and vetting to ensure they are not linked to Hezbollah.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington was prepared to help strengthen the Lebanese Army’s ability to hold the territory, but he did not publicly confirm all the details of the screening mechanism. In Israel, the composition of the units entering the area is regarded as a central condition for any withdrawal agreement.

Another unresolved question is who will determine whether the pilot has succeeded. The sides have not agreed whether a Lebanese Army declaration that the area has been cleared will be sufficient, whether US Central Command will be authorized to decide, or whether Israel will be able to delay the withdrawal on the grounds that infrastructure or operatives remain.

The IDF’s right to act after the area is transferred, in the event of a violation, has also not been settled.

Even the term “dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure” has not yet been defined in operational terms. It is unclear whether the Lebanese Army will be required only to seize visible weapons and dismantle positions, or whether it will also have to search private homes, expose underground infrastructure, and arrest operatives.

Another sensitive question concerns Hezbollah members living in the area and how they can be allowed to return as civilians while being prevented from renewing military activity.

There is also no agreement on the meaning of the pilot itself. In Israel, it is seen as a limited move that can be halted if it does not meet its goals. Each area would be transferred separately, and only if the Lebanese Army proves that it can prevent Hezbollah’s return would another withdrawal be considered.

In Beirut, the pilot is being presented as the beginning of a gradual process intended to end with a full Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over the entire south.

That difference may allow progress in the first stage, but it is expected to resurface immediately afterward. Israel is not committing in advance to additional withdrawals, while Lebanon is not prepared to accept an Israeli presence without an end date.

The dispute is further sharpened by Israel’s intention to continue holding a security strip near the border even after the pilots are activated, as long as Hezbollah remains armed and continues to pose a threat.

From Israel’s perspective, the pilot areas are part of a broader security concept. In Lebanon, there are concerns that keeping the strip under IDF control will give the Israeli presence a permanent character, even if certain areas are transferred to the Lebanese Army.

Lebanon threatens not to participate in talks until Israel’s withdrawal

Lebanon threatened last week not to participate in the Rome round unless Israel first withdrew from the two pilot areas. It later backed away from that demand after the arrival of the American military delegation in Beirut and a pledge to advance the activation of the first area.

Beirut ultimately decided to attend the talks, but the Lebanese delegation is expected to demand a binding timetable and refuse to settle for another general statement about progress.

Hezbollah’s fierce opposition to the agreement looms over the talks. The organization, which was not involved in the negotiations, rejects the demand that it disarm and has warned against any attempt by the Lebanese government to impose the understandings.

President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam will have to decide whether the state is prepared to deploy its army in the south and act against Hezbollah’s military apparatus.

Hezbollah argues that making an Israeli withdrawal conditional on the dismantling of its weapons gives Israel justification to remain on Lebanese territory. The terrorist organization and its allies have warned that any attempt to disarm it by force could trigger internal conflict.

The government in Beirut presents the agreement as an opportunity to restore state control over weapons and security decision-making. The pilot is therefore also part of the internal struggle over the balance of power between state institutions and Hezbollah.

The difficulties are not limited to operational issues. The framework agreement may require approval by the Lebanese government and possibly parliament, where Hezbollah and its allies have the power to delay implementation.

A technical agreement in Rome will not end the political battle in Beirut over the organization’s disarmament. No timetable has yet been published for the completion of Lebanon’s ratification process.

The broader agreement includes a US commitment to help raise funds for Lebanon’s reconstruction. At the signing ceremony, Washington announced $100 million in humanitarian aid.

The administration views reconstruction and the return of residents as a means of strengthening Lebanese state institutions and reducing southern residents’ dependence on Hezbollah’s civilian systems.

The link between reconstruction and disarmament is also disputed. Lebanon wants work to begin and residents to return immediately after the IDF withdrawal.

Israel wants to ensure that reconstruction funds and the returning population are not used to rebuild Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Civilian and financial oversight mechanisms are therefore expected to play a major role in the arrangement.

Israel will seek in Rome to block any commitment to an automatic withdrawal sequence. Its position is that each area must be examined separately and that only the results of the first stage should determine whether it is possible to proceed to the next.

Lebanon will demand that the pilot serve as the starting point for a process ending with a full Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of sovereignty over the south.

The framework agreement is intended to serve as the basis for a broader process, including an end to the state of war between Israel and Lebanon, mutual recognition of their right to exist in peace, and continued negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement.

It also addresses the return of detainees and bodies and includes a commitment to refrain from hostile steps in legal and diplomatic arenas. At this stage, those broader goals depend on the ability to carry out an orderly transfer of the first area in southern Lebanon.

By the end of the round, it should become clear whether the sides have succeeded in setting a date for activating the first pilot, defining its boundaries, and agreeing on a mechanism to supervise the dismantling of Hezbollah infrastructure.

Another announcement that activation will begin within days, without a map or an agreed sequence of steps, will not constitute meaningful progress. As long as those three issues remain unresolved, the framework agreement will struggle to move from paper to implementation.

Lebanon and Israel resumed talks on Tuesday in the Italian capital, with Beirut hoping for progress towards securing an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon under a US-brokered deal, although expectations for swift progress were low.

US-led diplomacy has emerged since Hezbollah and Israel returned to war on March 2 amid the wider regional conflict, moving forward despite strong objections from the Iran-backed group, which believes only Iranian pressure on Washington can secure an end to the war and Israeli withdrawal.

Iran demanded an end to the war in Lebanon as part of its interim deal with Washington signed last month, but the agreement has been shaken over the last week by renewed US-Iranian hostilities in the Gulf.

Israel’s ​military is occupying what it describes as a “buffer zone” about 10 km (6 miles) into Lebanon along the entire length of the Israeli border. Israeli officials say the zone ‌is ⁠necessary to protect northern Israeli communities from attacks launched by Hezbollah.

A meeting in Washington on June 26 produced an agreement that called for an end to the Lebanon conflict, the disarmament of militant groups – an apparent reference to Hezbollah – as well as the deployment of Lebanese troops to the south and the progressive withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Hezbollah rejects disarmament, IDF remains in southern Lebanon

But deadly Israeli strikes have continued, and Hezbollah has rejected the agreement as well as efforts to disarm it. Israel, meanwhile, has said its troops would remain in southern Lebanon as long as Hezbollah remained armed.

Lebanese and Israeli officials will meet at the US embassy in Rome on Tuesday and Wednesday to set out how to implement the framework deal, Lebanese officials told Reuters. One of the officials said moving the talks to Rome would make it easier for both countries’ delegations to consult their governments for guidance as they negotiated.

Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said on Monday that Italy had offered to host the talks to continue work towards a genuine ceasefire in Lebanon.

“We are also very pleased that Rome can serve as the venue for these meetings. In this way, our capital becomes a capital of peace,” Tajani said ahead of a European Union meeting in Brussels on Monday.

 Pilot zones on the table

In comments published by his office on Monday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said he hoped the Rome meeting would yield “tangible and practical steps on the ground” to implement the agreement and that it would see Israel begin its troop pull-out so that the Lebanese army could deploy to the south.

One of the Lebanese officials said the country’s delegation to Tuesday’s talks would seek the gradual and sequential withdrawal of Israeli troops “one zone after another,” referring to the “pilot zone” project under which Hezbollah would disarm, Israeli forces would withdraw and Lebanese troops would deploy area by area in southern Lebanon.

The June 26 agreement said two zones had been identified as a starting point. A US official said last week that the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) was coordinating with both Lebanon and Israel to launch the pilot zones. A US military delegation was in Lebanon at the weekend to discuss the plan in detail with Lebanon’s army, sources told Reuters.

Israel’s military has forced the local Lebanese population from their homes and carried out controlled explosions of entire villages. It says it is destroying infrastructure, including underground tunnels, used by Hezbollah.

More than 4,000 Lebanese have been killed and more than a million displaced by Israel’s campaign in Lebanon since March, according to Lebanon’s health ministry. The toll does not say how many combatants may be among the dead, and Hezbollah has not disclosed figures on its war dead. Reuters reported on May 3 that several thousand Hezbollah fighters had been killed.

At least 32 Israeli soldiers ​and four Israeli civilians have ​been killed by Hezbollah, most ⁠of them in southern Lebanon since the latest fighting erupted.

Israel Police announced a shooting incident at a Japanika restaurant in Herzliya on Tuesday, in the latest of a series of attacks targeting the chain.

A fire had also broken out at a Japanika branch in Netanya after a stolen IDF grenade was thrown at the restaurant, Israel Police said in a statement earlier on Tuesday morning.

A preliminary investigation by the police suggested that the incident is criminal in nature, the latest in an ongoing string of attacks stemming from a dispute between criminals.

In the span of a few hours, police announced two grenade explosions, a pipe bomb attack, and an attempted arson. Three of the incidents targeted branches of the Japanika restaurant chain, owned by businessman and Beitar Jerusalem owner Barak Abramov.

None of the incidents had any reported casualties.

Dan District investigators are collecting security camera footage, forensic findings, and evidence from all the scenes, and are now checking whether the three attacks on Japanika branches were carried out by the same people. At the same time, the investigation into a grenade explosion at a residential building in Or Yehuda is continuing, and it is still unclear whether it is connected to the other incidents.

Democrats party leader Yair Golan blamed National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir for the string of attacks, saying that he was an “unfit and failed minister.”

אמרנו שזה יקרה.
כשבן גביר הפקיר את המאבק בפשיעה בחברה הערבית, הזהרנו שהאלימות לא תישאר שם – היא תזלוג לכל רחובות ישראל. וזה בדיוק מה שקורה.

בן גביר הוא שר בלתי כשיר וכושל. במשמרת שלו אין משילות, אין הרתעה, אין ביטחון אישי והפשיעה משתוללת ברחובות ישראל.

בן גביר ונתניהו שמינה… pic.twitter.com/JkpISkhoxQ

— Yair Golan – יאיר גולן (@YairGolan1) July 14, 2026

“We said this would happen,” he posted on X/Twitter. “When Ben-Gvir abandoned the fight against crime in Arab society, we warned that the violence wouldn’t stay there – it would spill over into every street in Israel. And that’s exactly what’s happening.”

Fragmentation grenades thrown

Earlier on Monday, four fragmentation grenades were thrown at buildings in separate episodes. 

An explosion was heard in Herzliya after a suspicious object was thrown at a building, according to a statement by the Israel Police.

Police were dispatched to an intersection in central Herzliya after the incident. There were no injuries, but minor property damage has been reported.

The incident is suspected to be criminal in nature.

Much of today’s defense-tech debate focuses on visible platforms: drones, loitering munitions, interceptors, lasers, autonomous vessels, and robotic systems. Each new system attracts headlines, procurement attention, and investor capital. Yet a deeper competition is taking shape in the digital layer that connects these systems into a battlefield network. The next defense-tech race is for the operating system of the battlefield.

A military operating system is the architecture that connects sensors, shooters, satellites, drones, AI models, data, compute, and command-and-control into one adaptive ecosystem. Its value is measured by operational learning: how quickly the force can understand what happened, update the network, and integrate new capabilities.

This matters because the battlefield is filled with sensors and effectors. Some are expensive and exquisite. Others are cheap, disposable, and deployed in large numbers. The harder problem is turning that density into coherent action. 

A drone that sees a target creates value only if its data can be trusted, transmitted, fused with other sources, processed at the edge or in secure infrastructure, and translated into a decision that a commander can use. The platform is the visible element. The operating layer determines whether the network behaves like a collection of assets or like a force.

Ukraine has become one of the clearest examples. According to Reuters, Ukraine is already using AI across drone operations, combat planning, and the analysis of Russian missile-attack data. 

Danylo Tsvok, the head of Ukraine’s Defense AI Center, described the next phase as a “war of operating systems,” in which advantage will go to the system that holds more data, understands it better and can propose operational solutions faster. Ukraine has also opened controlled access to battlefield datasets for allies seeking to train drone AI software, turning annotated combat data into a strategic resource. Battlefield data is now a weapons-development asset.

The United States is moving in the same direction through procurement. In June 2026, the US Army selected Anduril, working with Palantir, to lead the common data layer baseline for its Next Generation Command and Control initiative. 

The architecture centers on an edge-to-cloud data mesh using Anduril’s Lattice and Palantir’s Foundry, with additional tools for data registries, transformation, and federation. This is the practical language of the battlefield operating system: common data, software deployment, edge connectivity, integration, and continuous access to operational information.

The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare gives this trend a useful name. Its work argues that armed forces need to adopt modern software practices across existing and future systems. NATO’s testing of uncrewed and counter-uncrewed systems in Latvia points to the same operational challenge: faster experimentation, validation, and adoption across domains.

For investors, this shift changes the logic of defense technology. A drone, sensor, or interceptor is a product. An operating layer can become a platform. Every new sensor connected to the network increases its value. Every engagement creates data that can improve models, tactics, and interfaces. Every software update can upgrade multiple systems at once. The most strategic defense-tech companies may be those building autonomy stacks, data platforms, simulation environments, secure edge computing, and modular command systems.

Production lines, supply chains, cost-effective mass, and ruggedized systems remain decisive. The emerging advantage will belong to those who connect hardware, software, and operational learning into one repeatable cycle.

For Israel, the question is immediate. Israel has deep operational experience, strong defense engineering, and a fast-growing defense-tech startup ecosystem. The IDF’s establishment of the Alumot unit under the C4I and Cyber Defense Directorate, focused on AI and information-processing capabilities for frontline forces, shows that the direction is already understood. 

Israeli startups are moving in the same direction. Kela, for example, has been described as developing an open and modular software platform designed to integrate commercial technologies such as AI models, sensors, and edge devices into existing military systems. Defense-tech companies working with Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MAFAT) raised more than $1 billion in exits and funding in the past year, according to Israel’s Defense Ministry.

This momentum is significant, and it now needs discipline. Israel’s strength has always included operational improvisation: reservists, engineers, commanders, and technologists solving urgent problems under pressure. That culture is a national asset. It saves lives. It produces capabilities faster than formal processes often allow. The next phase requires converting wartime creativity into durable architecture.

Improvisation is not architecture. A bridge built under fire can solve an immediate operational need, yet the national system still requires common interfaces, data standards, cybersecurity rules, testing environments, and procurement models that reward interoperability. Without that discipline, every major program builds its own stack, and the broader force remains fragmented.

Procurement has to change. Defense acquisition traditionally knows how to buy platforms: a vehicle, a radar, a missile, a communication system, a command post. Software-defined warfare evolves through feedback loops. It requires continuous updates, operational testing, red-teaming, integration with legacy systems, and close contact between users and developers. A procurement system that treats software as a one-time delivery will struggle to support a learning battlefield.

Governance matters as much as speed. As AI moves deeper into command-and-control, military organizations need traceability, validation, auditability, escalation procedures, and clear human responsibility. Human control cannot be reduced to a slogan. Commanders will need systems they can understand, challenge, and supervise under pressure. The operating layer must be built with accountability from the beginning.

Israel should treat the battlefield operating layer as a strategic national capability. That means government-owned interfaces where necessary, open architectures where possible, secured data foundations, edge computers suited for classified and disconnected environments, and simulation environments that allow rapid testing before operational deployment. It also means backing horizontal players alongside vertical platform companies.

The strategic risk is that Israel continues to produce excellent defense platforms while others define the operating layer that connects them. In defense, as in civilian technology, the integration layer shapes who can innovate, who can scale, and who controls the pace of change.

Israel has the talent, the urgency, and the operational experience to lead this field. The decision now is whether to organize those strengths into a common architecture.  

Israel has extended the ban on flights to Dubai until the end of October, as many international airlines continue to suspend operations or reduce service to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) due to the security situation in the Middle East. 

The extension comes amid concerns over escalation between Iran and the US, which continues to affect aviation activity in the Middle East. 

While Israeli airlines still cannot operate direct flights to Dubai, local carriers such as flydubai and Etihad continue to operate most of their flight routes. However, they are also advising passengers to check their flight status before arriving at the airport, as route changes and congestion may cause delays. 

Foreign airlines avoid multiple Middle Eastern countries

Israeli airlines are not the only carriers still waiting to return to normal operations. Many international airlines have extended the suspension of flights to the UAE, including Lufthansa, British Airways and Cathay Pacific. 

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) continues to recommend that airlines avoid flying through the airspace of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon until at least the end of August. Although there is currently no recommendation to avoid flying over the UAE itself, many airlines continue to conduct independent risk assessments and route around certain areas, which extends flight times and sometimes leads to delays in both direct and connecting flights. 

Passengers planning to fly to Dubai or travel through it in the near future are advised to follow airline updates even after completing check-in, to confirm the status of any connecting flights and to arrive at the airport earlier than usual. 

Aviation industry officials stress that schedules may still change at short notice depending on security developments in the region. 

The attack on Sana’a International Airport during the attempted landing of an Iranian Mahan Air flight on Monday came as the Houthis grew increasingly emboldened in their violations of international law, according to statements by Yemen’s Saudi-backed government and international representatives at the United Nations Security Council on Monday.

The flight on Monday, which made international headlines after it prompted strikes on Sana’a, was eventually able to land in the Houthi-controlled Hodeida International Airport. It was notably not the first Iranian aircraft to visit the war-afflicted country in recent weeks. Officials condemned a seemingly connected Iranian flight in early July which is understood to have transported a group of Houthi representatives to Tehran, where they held high-level meetings during the days-long funeral procession of Ali Khamenei.

President Dr. Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council of Yemen, noted last week that an Iranian Revolutionary Guard aircraft had turned off its tracking system over Yemeni airspace, according to reports in Yemen’s state Saba News Agency. While investigations are ongoing into the craft’s cargo, Alimi said that initial information suggests the flight was carrying persons and equipment beneficial to the terrorist group.

According to Alimi, those aboard the vessel included military and security personnel, Iranian experts specializing in drones and missile system development, electronic and communications equipment, and technologies with potential applications in command and control systems, as well as Yemeni personnel who had undergone security training in Iran.

Though the Houthis initially claimed that the visit was humanitarian in nature, Alimi said that the use of a Mahan Air aircraft, owned by the Mol-al-Movahedin Foundation, a widely sanctioned economic entity linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the aircraft’s behavior suggested otherwise.

“The indicators are not limited to the nature of the passengers and cargo. Frequent interruptions in the aircraft’s tracking signals were detected while it was crossing Yemeni airspace, a behavior that contradicts the militias’ claims that it was a humanitarian flight. This necessitates an independent international investigation to uncover the circumstances and objectives,” he said.

UN special envoy calls for de-escalation

Addressing the Monday flight from Mahan Air, UN chief’s Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg asserted at the United Nations Security Council meeting that there needed to be swift de-escalation.

The Houthis fired missiles at Saudi Arabia after accusing the kingdom of bombing an airport under their control on Monday, breaking a four-year truce in the conflict between the kingdom and the Iran-aligned group.

Though Yemen’s Defense Ministry claimed responsibility for the strike on Monday, announcing that its armed forces had targeted the runway at Sana’a Airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing, the Houthis have threatened to escalate the conflict beyond Yemen’s territory. The group issued a threat against airlines flying over Saudi airspace until the “siege” on Sana’a Airport was lifted.

🎥 ورود خلبان محاصره‌شکن به فرودگاه امام

هواپیمای ایرانی که محاصره یمن را در میان بمباران فرودگاه الحدیده شکست، به تهران بازگشت و در فرودگاه امام به زمین نشست و خلبان و تیم پرواز آن وارد سالن فرودگاه شدند. https://t.co/kRlkyD7muN pic.twitter.com/Xb0qbctmRx

— خبرگزاری فارس (@FarsNews_Agency) July 13, 2026

Two US officials told Axios that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman received US President Donald Trump’s support for military action against the Houthis.

Yemen ambassador warns Iranian flights are dangerous precedent

Yemen’s Ambassador Abdullah Ali Fadhel Al-Saad, who requested the UNSC meeting, said the recent Iranian flights constituted “a real test” of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, arguing that the unauthorized flight constituted an “extremely dangerous precedent.”

“We are dealing here with a deliberate attempt to impose a fait accompli,” he warned.

US representative to the UN Tammy Bruce acknowledged that the Iranian flight on July 3 had been purposed with transporting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel, including drone and missile experts in support of Houthi terrorism, Russian representative Ambassador Anna Evstigneeva claimed that the use of the Houthi-controlled airport remained essential for humanitarian operations.

The Russian representative, while acknowledging that the flight should have been coordinated beforehand, disregarded concerns and told the council that the flight was “strictly humanitarian.”

Notably, the Houthis detained an aircraft belonging to the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to one of the country’s ministers during the alleged Iranian humanitarian flight standoff on Monday. 

Bruce noted that the Houthis’ leadership celebrated the flight as a “successful evasion” of international efforts to isolate them.

Yemen expert Inbal Nissim-Louvton, from the Open University and the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, told The Jerusalem Post that the fact that two Iranian flights were able to land in Houthi territory was a major development and that strikes would not be adequate in deterring further escalation and future violations.

Asserting that she wasn’t sure that the violation was something the Saudis could accept, and definitely not a situation that Israel could, Nissim-Louvton noted that the issue extends to the larger civil conflict in Yemen and was part of a wider narrative employed by the Houthis to achieve its own goals.

Houthi media in recent months has aired a number of documentaries and visuals blaming Saudi Arabia for Yemen’s ongoing financial crisis, depicting it as a foreign force depriving Yemen of access to its own natural resources in partnership with the US and Israel, she explained. The media campaign highlights how the Houthis are directing blame for absent civil servant salaries toward Riyadh rather than absorbing responsibility themselves.

The attacks on Saudi Arabia, she continued, are at least partially in response to the Houthis’ own domestic troubles. Nissim-Louvton noted that Saudi Arabia has previously paid off some of the Houthi civil servant debt, out of a desire to keep things quiet, and that was at least part of the reason behind the attack now.

“The Saudis said they were willing to pay the salaries of civil servants, but through a mechanism that would ensure the money went directly to their bank accounts, or that they received it in a way that the Houthis would not be able to get hold of the funds. The Houthis did not agree to that,” she reasoned. “This is still something ongoing, but there were many times when the Saudis eventually did pay in some form and were able to keep the Houthis quiet enough to allow Saudi Arabia to promote its own issues, including projects under MBS’s Vision 2030 and other initiatives. Some of those projects had to be delayed because they were unable to proceed. The Saudis have to remember that if they return to Yemen and renew the civil war, it will probably cost them much more than paying the salaries of those civil servants.”

Outside of domestic troubles, the Houthis have the capacity to escalate the Hormuz crisis by restricting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. A return to civil war now would likely mean involving regional actors, escalating the existing war, she said, adding more weight to Houthi demands at the negotiation table. 

The Horn of Africa is becoming an increasingly important extension of Middle Eastern strategy as governments on opposite shores of the Red Sea deepen their involvement through military agreements, port investments, energy projects, diplomatic recognition, and political alliances.

Egypt’s new maritime cooperation memorandum with Somalia is one part of that transformation. Turkey has built an extensive military, economic, and institutional presence in Somalia while retaining strong ties with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is expanding its defense and maritime relationship with Mogadishu, while the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in ports and logistics, most visibly at Berbera in Somaliland.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has added a diplomatic dimension with potential security implications because of Somaliland’s position on the Gulf of Aden. Sudan, meanwhile, offers the clearest warning of how external competition can deepen instability when it becomes entangled with a domestic war.

This emerging regional order cannot be divided neatly into two blocs. The same governments may cooperate to protect maritime navigation, compete for ports and influence, and take opposing positions on Somalia’s territorial integrity or Sudan’s civil war. African governments are also pursuing their own interests, using external partnerships to secure investment, infrastructure, military assistance, and diplomatic support.

“The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics,” Dr. Aly Tarek Metwally, a political affairs and regional security analyst, told The Media Line. “Positioned at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, the region has become a focal point where maritime security, international trade, geopolitical competition, and regional diplomacy increasingly converge.”

Shiri Fein-Grossman, CEO of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and former head of regional affairs at Israel’s National Security Council, said the region now attracts powers pursuing a broad mix of security, economic and diplomatic interests.

“The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics,” Fein-Grossman told The Media Line. “Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Iran, and Israel all have growing interests in the region, alongside China, the United States, the European Union, and others.”

Those interests range from maritime security and trade to energy, infrastructure, food security, and diplomacy.

A connected Red Sea arena

Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and continue toward the Suez Canal. The route is vital to global commerce but has become increasingly vulnerable to war, piracy, and attacks originating from Yemen.

Middle Eastern involvement in the Horn is not new. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey have maintained relationships there for years. What has changed is the scale of their activity and the degree to which events in the Middle East now shape alignments on the African side of the Red Sea.

“Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East,” Metwally said. “They form part of an interconnected regional security landscape in which stability, economic prosperity and international navigation are mutually dependent.”

That interconnected map includes stronger Egyptian-Somali relations, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Turkey’s presence in both Somalia and Ethiopia, Israel’s growing interest in the Red Sea and expanded Gulf involvement.

Metwally said that competition need not be the region’s only organizing principle. The same developments could support a cooperative security framework based on international law, mutual respect and shared responsibility.

Israel and Somaliland

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a significant recent change to the region’s diplomatic landscape.

On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first, and currently only United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Somalia rejected the decision as an attack on its sovereignty, while Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and the African Union reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Somaliland has governed itself since 1991 and maintains its own institutions, security forces, and political system. Somalia continues to regard the territory as an integral part of the country.

For Israel, geography is central to the emerging relationship. Somaliland’s coastline faces the Gulf of Aden opposite Yemen and lies near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, placing the relationship squarely within Israel’s concerns over Red Sea shipping and the threat posed by the Houthis.

“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations,” Fein-Grossman said. She pointed to Somaliland’s relative stability, functioning institutions, and interest in long-term international partnerships.

“At the same time, its location on the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb, gives it exceptional strategic importance,” she said.

Somaliland’s defense minister said in June that Israel was helping train some police and military personnel, while denying that the sides were negotiating an Israeli base. Somaliland has also promoted potential cooperation in agriculture, water, renewable energy, healthcare, and technology.

Fein-Grossman said the Houthi threat had become more prominent in Israeli strategic calculations after attacks on commercial shipping and direct threats from Yemen, but cautioned against viewing recognition only through a military lens.

She also described an affinity between two societies that have struggled for security, international legitimacy, and national development under difficult conditions.

Egypt views the issue from a different starting point: the defense of Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

“Central to Egypt’s regional policy is its unwavering commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the sovereignty of states,” Metwally said, describing those principles as pillars of both the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

The dispute reflects the central divide over Somaliland. Israel views its stability and institutions as grounds for recognition and cooperation. Somalia, Egypt, and most African Union members see unilateral recognition as a threat to Somali sovereignty and the wider principle of territorial integrity.

Fein-Grossman said Israel should manage those disagreements through sustained dialogue with Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi rather than expect regional actors to adopt a common view.

Berbera and the UAE’s port network

Israel’s relationship with Somaliland is developing alongside a much older Emirati presence centered on Berbera.

Dubai-based DP World, an Emirati multinational logistics company, has committed up to $442 million in a phased plan to develop Berbera Port, an associated economic zone and a transport corridor intended to connect the Somaliland coast with Ethiopia and the wider Horn.

The investment gives the UAE a long-term commercial position near one of the world’s most important shipping routes. It also strengthens Somaliland’s economic relevance despite its limited diplomatic recognition.

For landlocked Ethiopia, Berbera offers a potential alternative to its heavy dependence on Djibouti. For the UAE, the port is part of a logistics network linking the Gulf, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. For Somaliland, it provides revenue, jobs, and a platform for attracting additional investment.

“Berbera has the potential to become one of the Horn of Africa’s most important logistics and commercial gateways, serving not only Somaliland but also landlocked Ethiopia and the wider region,” Fein-Grossman said.

Emirati investment and Israeli recognition do not necessarily represent a coordinated policy. The UAE has not formally recognized Somaliland. Still, its investments have strengthened the territory’s commercial position and increased Berbera’s relevance to Israeli calculations involving Red Sea security and maritime trade.

The arrangement also shows that outside governments do not always work exclusively through internationally recognized central authorities. The UAE has cultivated direct ties with Somaliland and other regional administrations, while Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have placed greater emphasis on Somalia’s federal government.

Egypt and Somalia deepen cooperation

Somalia’s cabinet approved a maritime memorandum with Egypt on July 9 covering transport, ports and the development of Somali maritime infrastructure.

The agreement follows a broader expansion of bilateral relations, including defense cooperation and Egypt’s proposed participation in African Union peace-support efforts in Somalia.

Cairo regards the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb as a strategic continuation of the Suez Canal. Its policy is also shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its opposition to actions that could weaken Somalia’s territorial integrity.

“For Egypt, engagement in the Horn of Africa is not driven by aspirations for regional influence but by an enduring commitment to safeguarding regional stability,” Metwally said, adding that Cairo has consistently viewed the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea as a natural extension of its strategic environment.

He described secure navigation through the Suez Canal and stability at Bab-el-Mandeb as components of both Egyptian national security and the global economy.

The memorandum, he said, goes beyond technical port cooperation. It forms part of a strategic partnership intended to strengthen Somali institutions, maritime security and economic development.

Egypt’s security role is also tied to the African Union’s operations and to cooperation with Somalia’s federal government. Metwally characterized that involvement as part of Egypt’s long-standing participation in collective African peacekeeping rather than a unilateral military deployment.

The relationship is nevertheless viewed partly through the prism of Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland, which triggered a sharp dispute with Mogadishu. Turkey later mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia through the Ankara Declaration. Both governments reaffirmed respect for sovereignty and agreed to pursue arrangements that could provide Ethiopia with access to the sea under Somali sovereign authority.

Metwally said Egypt’s closer relationship with Somalia should not be interpreted solely as an effort to counter Ethiopia. Cairo, he said, continues to advocate negotiations and international law as the proper framework for resolving regional disputes.

Turkey works with both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa

Turkey has built one of the most extensive Middle Eastern presences in the Horn.

Its relationship with Somalia began with humanitarian assistance and expanded into defense, infrastructure, education, healthcare, aviation, trade, and energy. Turkey operates a major military training facility in Mogadishu and signed a defense and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia in 2024 that includes maritime-security assistance.

At the same time, Ankara has preserved substantial political and economic ties with Ethiopia. Its ability to work with both governments enabled it to mediate after the Somaliland agreement caused a rupture between them.

“Turkey is one of the most significant external actors in the Horn of Africa, but its engagement should be understood within the context of a much broader, decades-long Africa strategy,” Fein-Grossman said.

Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Maarif Foundation, Turkish Airlines, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, business associations, and an expanding diplomatic network, Ankara has built relationships extending beyond military or government-to-government contacts.

Its mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia also reflects an ambition not merely to participate in regional affairs, but to shape them.

Saudi Arabia expands its Somali partnership

Saudi Arabia has accelerated its own engagement with Somalia.

The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement in Riyadh on Feb. 9, 2026, followed later that month by a separate agreement covering maritime transport and port development.

Saudi interests are driven by Somalia’s location opposite the Arabian Peninsula, the need to protect Red Sea shipping and concerns about instability spreading from Yemen and the wider Horn.

Riyadh has also supported Somalia’s territorial integrity, placing it closer to Egypt and Turkey than to Israel on the Somaliland dispute.

Fein-Grossman cautioned against portraying Saudi or Egyptian engagement as a response to Israel. Both countries, she said, have operated in the Red Sea and the Horn for decades because of geography, trade, food security and regional politics.

Metwally said Saudi and Emirati investments in logistics, food security, and maritime infrastructure demonstrate the growing interdependence of Gulf and Red Sea security, even when the two states pursue different political relationships.

Sudan shows the dangers

Sudan represents the most destructive example of Middle Eastern interests becoming entangled with a domestic conflict.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are widely regarded as closer to the Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE has repeatedly been accused by United Nations experts and American lawmakers of supporting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Abu Dhabi denies backing the RSF or either side in the war.

Those differences have become part of a wider Saudi-Emirati rivalry extending across Yemen, Somalia and the Red Sea, although both Gulf governments continue to participate in diplomatic efforts seeking an end to Sudan’s war.

“The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region,” Metwally said. “Local conflicts can become considerably more complex when regional rivalries overlap with domestic political crises.”

Preventing external competition from reinforcing internal divisions, he said, is one of the central challenges facing African and Middle Eastern policymakers.

African governments are not passive

Describing the Horn solely as a contest among foreign powers risks reducing Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Sudan to passive arenas.

Somalia is diversifying its economic and security partnerships while defending its territorial claims. Ethiopia is seeking alternatives to its dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade. Somaliland is using Berbera, its political institutions, and its strategic location to seek recognition and investment.

“African governments are not passive participants in this process,” Fein-Grossman said. “They actively shape the strategic environment, diversify their partnerships and choose the relationships that best advance their national interests.”

She also warned that discussions of ports, bases, and strategic rivalry often overlook the people whose futures are most affected.

“The people of Somaliland, like people across Africa, seek peace, opportunity, education, healthcare, investment, and the ability to build a better future for the next generation,” she said.

Metwally similarly argued that international partnerships can support development, security, and stronger institutions only when they preserve local ownership and sovereign decision-making.

Middle Eastern involvement can bring port infrastructure, investment, military training, energy development, and diplomatic mediation. It can also sharpen sovereignty disputes, deepen internal conflicts, and force African governments to navigate rival alignments.

Egypt’s agreement with Somalia, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Turkey’s position between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, Saudi Arabia’s expanding partnership with Somalia, and the UAE’s investment in Berbera are not isolated developments. They are part of a strategic realignment stretching from the Suez Canal and the Arabian Peninsula to Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

Whether that space develops through cooperative security or competing spheres of influence will depend not only on the ambitions of Middle Eastern governments but also on the ability of African states and societies to retain control over the decisions that shape their future.